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This dissertation focuses on the following empirical puzzle: Do the attitudes of
ordinary educated Muslims stand as an obstacle toward the adoption of democracy?
This research question calls for empirical/behavioral methodological tools that bring
into focus contemporary Muslims' attitudes rather than ancient jurists' contributions. In other
words, the dissertation shifts attention from ancient Islamic texts to contemporary Muslims'
mindsets through written and web-based surveys in 32 Muslim societies.
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cases, Muslims behave as rational actors who find that the advantages of having an
autocratic ruler outweigh having a democratically elected one.
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Islamists and liberal secularists. Modernist Islamists find democracy consummating Islamic
teachings that fight dictatorship and ensure pluralism in society. Liberal secularists find
democracy as the core component of modernity that should be adopted on secular grounds.

At the individual level, the dissertation finds that Muslims are too heterogeneous to
be studied in a lump-sum way of thinking. Not all secular Muslims are liberal and not all
Islamists are anti-democracy. Some Muslim countries’ political cultures are compatible with
democracy while others are clear obstacles to democratization. Seemingly unrelated
regression models suggest that socio-economic, demographic and cultural factors have
different types of impact on Muslims' attitudes toward democratic hardware and software
across societies.
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOIGCAL CONSIDERATIONS
Today we [Muslims] are the poorest, the most illiterate, the most backward, the
most unhealthy, the most un-enlightened, the most deprived, and the weakest of
all the human race. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (BBC, Feb. 16,
2002).
Democratization or the march of freedom in the Muslim world is in the interest
of the U.S. … Bahrain, Qatar and - to a certain extent – Jordan [have] several
reformist elements. We want to be supportive of them. Condoleezza Rice, US
national security adviser, (Financial Times, September 23 2002).
We in the Arab and Muslim world know our way. We have our own will and
we hold firm to our rights. Besides, we do not need anybody to give us lessons
in how to run our countries. Ahmad Maher, Egyptian Foreign Minister in
response to Rice’s comments. (Al-Hayat , September 25, 2002).
The previous quotes illustrate the debate over Islam and modernity in general and
democracy in particular. Mostly after the September 11th tragedy, but even earlier, it is not
uncommon in the West to relate Islam as a religion and Muslims as individuals to antagonism to
Western values and norms including democracy. Montesquieu, for one, argues that "The
Christian religion is remote from pure despotism…The Mohammedan religion, which speaks
only with a sword, continues to act on men with the destructive spirit that founded it" (Cohler et
al. 1995).
It is argued as well that Arab and Muslim societies are the most likely to produce
violence in a systematic way and the least respectful of the values of rule of law, individual
dignity and human rights. Besides they are the least in terms of economic achievement (see Said
2002).
These assertions have been advanced to explain the deficit of democracy in the Muslim
world. In 1975, predominantly Muslim countries were responsible for around 25 percent of the
world’s non-democratic regimes (Potter 1997), while in 2003 they have become responsible
for around 55 percent of the world non- democratic regimes. Besides, no one single Muslim
country qualifies as a consolidated democracy as defined by Linz and Stepan (1996). A recent
study shows that predominantly Muslim countries “are markedly more authoritarian than nonMuslim societies, even when one controls for other potentially influential factors" (Fish 2002:
37).
In other words, while the countries of Latin America, Africa, East Central
Europe, and South and East Asia experienced significant gains for democracy
and freedom over the last 20 years, the Islamic world experienced an equally
significant increase in the number of repressive regimes (Karatnycky 2002:
103).
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A working definition of democracy focuses on what democracy does. It is as a system
of government that provides: 1) a system of norms that emphasizes tolerance, trust and sense of
moral and political equality among citizens irrespective of gender, sect, race or religion. This side
of democracy will be labeled democratic software or the software of democracy. 2) It provides
as well the political institutions and procedures that increase people’s access to and influence on
government (ex. free fair and periodic elections, political parties and elected parliaments). This
procedural and institutional aspect of democracy will be labeled democratic hardware or the
hardware of democracy.
The literature on democratization has used several criteria for judging countries on both
of these aspects. On the procedural aspect, Huntington proposed a criterion for democratic
countries based on two consecutive peaceful alterations of power through free fair elections.
Huntington’s criterion anticipates the problematic phenomenon of “one man, one vote, one
time.” Taken with Przeworski’s intriguing criterion: “no country in which a party wins 60 percent
of the vote twice is a democracy” (Przeworski 1992:126), almost no one Muslim country is a
full-fledged democracy. However, some are less democratic than others according to these two
criteria. When it comes to the normative aspect of democracy, violations of human rights based
on gender, belief and thought along with political exclusion of minorities and women from the
political process have been widely studied and reported in Muslim countries with almost no
exception (an-Naim 1990; Ibrahim 2003; Mayer 1999; Moussalli 2001; Price 1999).
However, not all Muslim countries are alike. Some Muslim countries have witnessed
some incomplete elite-guided (reluctant and long) transitions that have been examined by other
scholars such as Senegal (Villaon 1995), Nigeria (Aborisade 2002), Tunisia (Hamdi 1998),
Turkey (Ozbudun 2000), Indonesia (Singh 2000) and (Hefner 2000) , Syria (Wedeen 1999),
Egypt (Kienle 2001) among others. Those transitions defy one of the assumptions that : “any
country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward
democracy” (Carothers 2002) mainly because that the transition did not eventually lead to
democracy, rather to prolong non-democratic regimes.
In the previous fifteen years, for instance, with the possible exception of the troubled
democracies of Senegal, Mali and Turkey, most Muslim countries’ trajectories away from
authoritarianism have been abrupt and irregular. Some countries have been fluctuating around
variant forms of non-democracy (Libya, Chad, Guinea, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Oman and Saudi Arabia to name some). The ruling elites in those countries find
democracy to be luxury that should be postponed to meet other more immediate tasks such as
economic development or achieving national unity. Thus, democratization is not on their agenda
any time soon. Another group can be described as "hybrid regimes,” (see Karl 1995). or "semiauthoritarianism” (see Ottaway et al. 1998; WMD) (e.g. Albania, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar,
Bahrain, Morocco and Egypt.) This group of liberalized autocratic regimes relate themselves to
democracy and acknowledge its importance but for them democratization is too risky to be
pursued. Thus, they find risk-free liberalization through increasing the doses of freedoms (e.g.
controlled freedoms of speech and association) a more compelling strategy than risking their
own positions. A third category can be grouped into the class of "soft authoritarianism," (see
Means 1996) "pseudodemocracy" (see Case 2001) or “semidemocracy” (see Case 1996).
(such as Tunisia, Lebanon and Malaysia). This group is best described as systems with
democratic procedures and severe exclusion of main social and political opposition forces. A
2

fourth group can be labeled "illiberal democracy,” (see Zakaria 1997) or “virtual democracy"
(see Joseph 1998). (such as in Nigeria, Iran, Bangladesh and Sierra Leone). This group of
Muslim countries have some democratic procedures but still suffer from socio-economic, sociopolitical and religious complications that work against full transition toward democracy .The last
group can be characterized as “electoral authoritarianism” (see Fish 2001) or "electoral
democracy," (Freedom House 2001; Schedler 2000) (such as the Sudan, Algeria, Yemen,
Niger and Mauritania) in the sense that they hide their authoritarian nature behind a veil of
democratic rhetoric and procedures yet they do not seem to be convincing either their own
people or the outside world of their democratic façade.
All previous categories refer to political regimes that either did not start or started and
later departed from the process of democratic transition and, not surprisingly, are not
considered free by Freedom House (2002).
The prevailing interpretation of this phenomenon in the West originates in the writings of
the orientalists and neo-orientalists. The main proposition of (neo-) orientalists is that Muslims,
by virtue of being Muslims, hardly have the potential for democratic political culture unless they
give up their understanding of mainstream Islam (Sadowski 1993). In an implicit use of Mill’s
method of agreement, orientalists and neo-orientalists find that Muslim countries have two
common characteristics and several historical, political and economic differences which lead
them to uniquely and uniformly link Islam and lack of democracy in a cause-effect manner. This
logic of inference reminds us of Weber’s attempt to explain the capitalist success by the
proportion of Protestants in West European countries (Weber 1996) following Mill’s famous
method of agreement that has been highly criticized as misleading (King et al. 1994; Skocpol
1979).
Given this characterization of Muslim countries and proposed interpretation of the (neoorientalists), it is reasonable to ponder:
Do the values and attitudes of Muslims obstruct or decelerate the democratization
process in Muslim countries? In other words, following Sherlock Holmes, why do not
Muslims bark for democracy when the evidence suggests that they should? Or do they?
This study seeks to throw new light on this question by examining the cultural values of
educated Muslims in thirty-two societies around the globe, including Muslim minorities in four
countries, utilizing first-hand survey data collected from a probabilistic written survey (followed
by focus-group discussions in eight of these countries) and non-probabilistic (controlled quota)
web-based survey followed by intensive interviews of Muslim scholars, activists and intellectuals
in ten countries of the world.
1. Literature Review
a. Islam and Autocracy: Causation or Correlation?
The relationship between Islam and autocracy has generated considerable controversy
between the (neo-)orientalists and their critics. (Neo-)orientalists tend to think of Islamic creed
as the cause of an anti-democratic culture that accounts for the dearth of democracy in most
Muslim countries. Their critics point to the confusion between causation and correlation that
3

(neo-)orientalists create.
According to (neo-)orientalists, as a religion that “does not differentiate the realm of
Caesar from the realm of God” (Huntington 1984), Islam is fundamentally anti-democratic. It is
argued that (Ben Achour 1999):
Islam is a religion of the two cities. It determines a constitutionality in which
there is no rift between the political and the religious. It unifies norms and
institutions. The law is the embodiment of the faith. The state directs prayers and
protects religion, as well as administrating secular society.
This causal relationship needs an intervening variable which is Muslims’
parochial/passive/violent culture that lacks an appreciation for modern democratic values and
institutions. Pipes illustrates this genuine and uniform anti-democratic nature of Islam as follows:
Islam calls forth intense reactions. It inspires a powerful loyalty among Muslims
which no other faith can rival…nearly all Muslim subjects kept away from
politics and became actively engaged only when they had a chance to apply the
law or battle non-Muslims. This Islamic pattern - customary withdrawal
punctuated bursts of activities - survived into modern period (Pipes 1983: 144).
Fukuyama contemplates that Islam, especially its radical version, works as a
counter-player against modernism and democracy (Fukuyama 2001).
Others (Gellner 1991; Huntington 1984; Karatnycky 2002; Kedourie 1992; Lewis
1993a, 1997, 2002; Miller 1997; Naipaul 1981, 1998; Pipes 1988) argue that for Muslims to
catch up with modern world, they have to give up the mainstream understanding of Islam as a
source of beliefs regarding politics and society and instead adopt a reformed version of Islam
that can be more compatible with modernism. In other words, as Christians now adopt
Christianity version 3.0 which is more secular and modern instead of Christianity version 2.0
that was adopted during the Middle Ages, Muslims have the same task ahead of them. They
need to give up Islam version 1.0 and adopt the new version 2.0 which is more secular and
modern. Under this recommendation is the premise of religions as social organisms that evolve
and mature.
According to this reading, Catholicism is approaching its modernist maturity. Huntington
argues that the third wave of democratization was for the most part a Catholic one. Yet he
thinks that the wave reached its cultural and civilizational ceiling since other civilizations,
particularly the Islamic one, hold values that are not conducive to civil society, respect for
minorities and democracy in general. That said, the civilizational achievements of the ‘JudeoChristian’ West are not easily transferable to the Islamic civilization, which will eventually create
clashes (Huntington 1996a).
Thanks to neo-orientalists, the cultural paradigm has dominated the fields of Middle
Eastern and Islam politics. Thus unlike other regions of the world, Islam and Muslims are taken
for granted as either ademocratic or anti-democratic due to their belief system (Laroui 1997;
Said 1979).
In Latin American, East European and Southeast Asian polities, the nuances of (lack of)
democratic transition are usually examined as a game among actors (incumbent and opposition)
4

or a function of socio-economic pre-requisites rather than a normative attitude adopted by
individuals regarding politics.
To explain why democracy flourished in India and not in Pakistan, it is argued that:
“Ideologically, Hinduism is quite compatible with secularism, democracy and democratic values.
Islam is hostile toward all three´ (Ali 2000).
Lack of democracy in Muslim countries is a phenomenon that cries out for an
explanation that tries to go beyond the simple answer of Islam is the cause of everything goes
wrong in the Muslim world. Even if this is the case, how so? The neo-orientalist reading that
deftly places the vicissitudes of the present in the context of the enduring influence of the past
needs more empirical examination.
Muslim scholars in general find most of these allegations offensive and reflecting of a
prejudice against Islam.
Most orientalists proceed according to a macro-historical approach where they cast
their gaze “across large spans of history, constitutive elements of Islamic faith, and some features
of Middle Eastern languages in order to construct a grand schema” that is usually used to reach
law-like generalizations about the religion and the people (Ansary 1996).
Several scholars, Muslims and non-Muslims, defy the proposed causality between Islam
and autocracy in Muslim countries. Recent writings have adopted three strategies to dispute the
(neo-) orientalist arguments:
1- Showing that Muslims are no exception compared to other non-developed countries
(Abootalebi 2000). That is to say, Muslims’ culture is not unique in its inhospitality to
democracy. But this inhospitality is not because of the religion but other conditions (i.e.
tribalism or illiteracy) that are not conducive to democracy, at least from the perspective
of modernization theory (Fandy 1994).
2- Focusing on the multitude and diversity of Muslims’ cultures (Price 1999). That is to say:
Muslims are not monolithic in their understanding of Islam or democracy (Esposito 1996;
Haddad 1995; Hunter 1988). Rather Muslims would end up adopting their own version
of (adapted) democracy (Kabuli 1994).
3- Studying Islam’s basic tenets and isolating them from the practices of Muslims through
history (al-Ghannouchi 1993; Moussalli 2001) or by the re-interpretation of those
practices (Sachedina 2001). That is to say: Islam is not equal to the beliefs of nominal
Muslims since those beliefs are function of several non-Islamic factors such as colonialism
and nationalism (Gilsenan 1982; Kurzman 1998).
A possible explanation for the competing readings of the relationship between Islam and
democracy is the over/misuse of Qur'anic verses and hadiths/sayings of the prophet by
intellectuals, politicians and ulama/scholars to justify whatever they do or think. Islam itself has
become the battlefield among different sects and trends of thinking in which each claims to be
the true and genuine representation of authentic Islam. This battle is tagged as a cultural or
intellectual civil war among Muslim intellectuals, ulama/scholars and activists by the Egyptian
highly respectable jurist Tareq El-Bishri. This inexorable mélange between Islam and politics has
led Western area specialists to infer that Islamic exceptionalism makes Muslims’ system of
beliefs the least compatible with modernity due to its immunity to the general forces of
secularization, otherwise operative elsewhere (Casanova 2001; Gellner 1992).
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Survey research from different sources has given us somewhat divergent accounts of the
relationship between Muslims' political culture and democracy. Tessler's work (depending upon
different surveys from Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Palestine at different points of time)
emphasizes the diversity among Arabs in their attitudes toward politics and more importantly
that "Islam appears to have less influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested by
students of Arab and Islamic society" (Tessler 2002). Given the limitations of the data "in both
space and time," Tessler calls for further scrutiny of the effect of Islam on Muslims' political
attitudes. This study will examine this effect using fresh data. Inglehart (2003) and Norris and
Inglehart (2002) contend that Huntington's thesis of clash between Islam and the West is partly
right and partly wrong. Huntington, they argue, is right that culture does matter, and indeed
matters a lot, so that religious legacies leave a distinct imprint on contemporary values. Yet he is
mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islamic worlds concerns
democracy. The evidence suggests striking similarities in the political values held in these
societies.
Norris and Inglehart's effort is highly recommended since it takes the scholarship on this
subject into the individual level of empirical analysis. Yet by examining the Muslim sub-cultures,
two caveats should be kept in mind. First, several pieces of anecdotal evidence along with
systematic data from my survey show that Sartori's dilemma of coming up with reliable and
consistent definition of democracy across cultures is almost impossible. As Sartori (1962:12)
put it: “the thing democracy is not described properly by the word democracy”. If this
statement is correct theoretically, it is empirically vivid in the Muslim world too. Many Muslims
are ready to accept the thing democracy but without calling it democracy mainly because of the
non-Islamic (Western) praxis and connotations associated to it.1 Some researchers found that
most of Western concepts do not travel well to the Muslim world. “A plethora of meanings and
incompatible usages have dissuaded many social scientists from using these concepts [e.g.
secularism, liberalism, democracy], as heuristic devices” when they study Muslim countries
(Boroujerdi 1994:56).
Besides, “in many countries, democracy got a bad name because it was associated with
bad regimes that the United States supported, despots like the Shahs in Iran” (Armstrong
2002).
The issue of labels is not peculiar to Muslims; Hochschild finds that political labels such
as liberal, conservative and capitalist society mean different things to different citizens even
inside the same country such as the US (Hochschild 1981).
For some Muslims democracy means excessive freedoms which infringe upon the
sharia/Islamic legislation of Allah (this tendency was found most notable in countries such as
Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE). That is why in some Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia for one,
the word has not been widely used, or has been misused or abused officially or publicly. For
most ordinary Saudis, when the word democracy is used, it refers to an alien system of
government.

1

When asked if "democracy" would lead to homosexuality and replace the will of God with the will of
people, 19% of the Muslim respondents to the web-based survey agreed or strongly agreed. Yet around
38% of the 19% accepted having public elections, parliaments and one person and one vote principle. Many
devout Muslims prefer using the word "Shura" (Arabic word for consultation which is an Islamic imperative
too,) instead of the non- (or even anti-) Islamic word "democracy."
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To others, such as Libyans, the elite's misuse of the word democracy made it equal to a
very conservative pro-status quo system of government that associates democracy with the
current praxis of their rulers. A Libyan professor once corrected me when I asked him about
"democracy" by saying: "I see you mean real democracy not ours." However, this is not the case
in Jordan, Malaysia, Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco among others in which people use the word
democracy to refer to an elected accountable government without necessarily meaning that it is
anti-Islamic. On the other extreme, in Iran, Tunisia and the Sudan, the term Islamic democracy
is often used by progressive/modernist Islamists (e.g. president Mohamed Khatami of Iran
((1998), Rashid al-Ghannouchi of Tunisia (1993) and Hassan al-Torabi of the Sudan (2003) to
refer to democracy as a necessity to establish Islamic rule. Thus it is necessary when we
measure the attitudes of Muslims toward elected accountable government to triangulate the
questions with and without using the term "democracy."2 This is one of the lessons I learned
during the pilot study.
Second, because of the lack of empirical and systematic data from most Muslim
countries some observers overlook the differences among Muslim sub-cultures. For instance,
the conclusion that average Muslims like average non-Muslims have an inclination to support
democratic ideals and performance is limited to the nine Muslim nations that Norris and
Inglehart tackle in their study (which have already experienced semi-free elections at some point
or another in the last 10 years) and does not apply to other Muslim countries that still are more
critical of Western values and ideals (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, the Sudan and others).3
Norris and Inglehart's exploratory work needs to be supported by a survey that is mainly
tailored to understand the Muslim mind. This Muslim-tailored survey does reduce comparability
with other non-Muslim cultures but increases the accuracy and validity of our capacity to gauge
Muslims' attitudes toward democracy.
Third, while examining Muslims’ attitudes toward democracy, it is important to note that
the real challenge in most Muslim countries is not the mere existence of democratic institutions
or procedures (Abukhalil 2001; al-Ashmawi 1992). Most Muslim countries have what a
journalist from Turkey, described to be beautiful constitutions and democratic names with no
democratic spirit or pluralistic praxis. In other words, the challenge of democratic software (that
is to consider women, non-Muslim minorities, communists, Muslims of other sects such as
Ahmadis, Baha'ais and Shiite as morally and politically equal and thus to accept them in the
political process as voters, candidates and elected officials) is more challenging and exigent than
having “beautiful constitutions.” This project attempts to tap both dimensions.
In sum, neo-orientalists paint a portrait of Muslims (one could think of their claims as a
list of hypotheses) as largely indifferent to or negative toward democracy, attracted mainly by
fanatical anti-Western religious discourse, ambivalent or unaware of democracy’s advantages
and unlikely to accept them.

2

World Value Survey and the Pew Project for instance ask the following question: "Having a democratic
political system is a good way of governing this country." I am asking a similar question along with other
questions that describe the democratic process with and without actually using the word democracy itself.
3
In one of the rare surveys done in countries like Kuwait, Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia, Arab responses
were extremely heterogeneous in patterns of life, values, interest in political issues and the nature of these
issues as suggested by Zoby's analysis of the views of 3,800 Arab adults polled by Zogby International
from eight countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel).
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Partly the purpose of this project is to compare this portrait with empirical evidence
from 2001-2002 surveys representative of educated Muslims. In general, the evidence
contradicts the image of democratic deficit described above and suggests that orientalists may
have detected only one group, admittedly the most radical, of Muslims.
The neo-orientalists adopted a definition of culture that circularly will lead to the
causality of Islam and autocracy. The neo-orientalists tend to define culture as “shared values
legitimating social practices” (Wildavsky 1987:6). The main criticism raised to this definition is
the fact that “there is rarely consensus within a culture” (Laitin and Wildavsky 1988: 589).
Conversely, Laitin develops Thomas Metzger’s definition of culture in his examination of
neo-Confucian society as “ ‘points of concern’ that are debated (Laitin and Wildavsky 1988:
589). According to Metzger as quoted in Laitin:
We can understand the Neo-Confucians by understanding what they worried
about… what their shared points of uncertainty and concern …There I suggest
looking at Neo-Confucianism as a widely shared ‘grammar’ defining the
problems of intellectual struggle by positioning discrepancy between the goal of
life and life and the given world. Sharing this grammar, Neo-Confucians differed
in terms of their solutions for these problems.
Laitin continues “[T]o be sure, cultures support some common values. But a general
focus on points of concern rather than shared values provides a richer appreciation of why
political action differs across cultures” (Laitin and Wildavsky 1988:590).
These two views of culture are not mutually exclusive. Rather they point to two
dimensions of (political) culture analysis: unity and diversity. Each culture has elements of unity
that make a group of people share the same culture. Each culture as well has elements of
diversity that take the format of sub-cultures or sub-groups within the same culture. The
elements of unity are manifest in the same aggregate grammar and macro-concerns that can be
best embodied in macro-questions within the culture. However, these common questions do
not mean that all individuals will respond to them in the same way. Rather one expects
individuals to differ in their responses to these questions.
It is reasonable to expect those who belong to the same culture have contesting
“practices, texts and images” (Wedeen 1999) to back up their responses to the questions. With
this contestation, each sub-group will share similar values in responding to the same macroquestions or points of concern. The larger the gap among these sub-groups, the more they will
appeal to other sources of texts, images and practices to prove that their responses are the
closest if not equal to “truth.”
By stipulating culture in this way, it is reasonable to assume that Muslims share one
culture since they respond to common points of concern. The following question can be
proposed as the main point of concern or macro-quest that most Muslims face:
What is the form of government that best corresponds to Allah’s will?
There are three broad schools of thought that compete over the answer to this previous
question. These three schools will be used to analyze the attitudes of ordinary Muslims toward
democracy.
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b. The Relevance of Political Culture
Why should one attend to Muslims’ political culture when discussing democratization?
The examination of Muslims’ political culture is important for any serious discussion
about democracy and democratization for three related reasons.
1- Most elites in Muslim societies have proven to be very far away from adopting elite-guided
democratization following the examples of Juan Carlos and Mikhail Gorbachev (Midlarsky
1998) or elite negotiated transitions such as Greece in 1973, Brazil in 1974, , Portugal in 1974,
and Peru in 1979 and Chile in 1983 (Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski 1992). Being ruled
mostly by non-democratic regimes that have no history of support for real democratization, this
leaves us with two other options for where the breakdown of authoritarian regimes might start:
foreign invasion (George W. Bush's Operation Iraqi Freedom is the most recent example in this
regard) or mass pressure for democracy such as in Romania of 1989 and Georgia of 2003. This
last alternative requires a high level of resentment toward autocracy and an inelastic demand for
democracy.
2- Most neo-institutionalist researchers on democratic transition and consolidation argue that
authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition may not require a specific type of cultural
values. Yet democratic consolidation and sustainability cannot hold up without common
agreement among the great majority of individuals on certain values and norms (Diamond 1993;
Karl 1990; Linz and Stepan 1996) That is why some countries may be more ready for
democratization than others based upon their capacity to assimilate the democratic values.
3- Regarding Islamic countries in particular, most of the literature suggests that lack of
resentment toward authoritarianism and the absence of appreciation for democracy are two
inherent traits of the Islamic political culture (Huntington 1984; Lewis 1993b; Pipes 1983). This
study proposes to test this claim empirically, taking into consideration that Islam is not the only
factor that may be shaping Muslims’ perception of democracy. That is to say, Islam as a religion
is not equal to Muslims’ political culture; yet it is an important component of it. Consequently, a
comparative cross-cultural study of ordinary Muslims’ attitudes toward democracy will help us
go beyond the hasty conclusion of “one religion, one culture, one phenomenon.”
2. Data, Operationalization, Hypotheses and Measures
To garner first-hand data through surveys about serious issues such as democracy in
closed societies is an endeavor that is both risky and rare. Drawing a representative sample of
illiterate and suspicious Muslims made the task more difficult. As Mohamed Majidi, an Iranian
criminologist who administered three cross-cultural surveys in five Muslim countries has said
during the pilot examination of the survey used in this project: “The illiterate people in closed
societies do not have the culture of survey especially if you ask them about issues that, they
believe, will put them in trouble.”
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a. The Sample and its Limitations
The technical aspects of obtaining the first-hand data are fully discussed in appendix III.
Educated Muslims have been approached through two survey techniques followed by focus
group discussions.
It is crucial to explicitly limit the findings of this project to the population of non-poor
educated adult Muslims who form roughly 96% of the respondents to the surveys and represent
around 300 million Muslims (out of 1.2 billion) who have this set of characteristics. It is
important to note that 55% of Muslims of the world are illiterate and over 42% of them are
under the age of 18 (World Development Report 2001).
Only societies with number of respondents equal to 480 and above are included in this
project. This number is an acceptable cut-off to maintain enough observations to run the
regressions and not to lose many observations. Iraq, though it has only 91 respondents, was
included in the society level comparison for its policy implication relevance. Muslims from six
European countries are coded as EU. All other countries are recorded as "other" and are not
used in the regression models.
Consequently, 4 percent of the respondents have been tossed away. Those respondents
indicate that their religions are not Islam; their ages are below 18 or above 50; belong to
societies with the total number of respondents below 480; or do not explicitly state their
nationalities and/or countries of origin.
The two techniques of data collections used in this study are the written and web-based
surveys. The respondents to the written survey were drawn from a cluster probabilistic sample
of college and university students and graduates. After tossing away the ineligible respondents,
around 6,784 responses from 22 societies were kept. These respondents to the written survey
were present in their respective countries or in Egypt or the U.S. The responses were collected
during the period of May to August 2002.
The web-based survey rendered a higher number and more diverse group of
respondents, yet from a non-probabilistic sample.4 Yet whether a non-probabilistic sample is
representative of the target population is an empirical question as Zettenberg (1965) and
Charalambides stated (2000).5
After tossing away the ineligible respondents, the respondents to the web-based survey
number 23,816 responses mainly from 32 countries. These respondents were chosen via 55
thousand emails (collected with a multi-stage and multi-phase sampling technique to represent

4

Non-probabilistic sampling does not ensure the elements are selected in random manner. It is difficult then
to guarantee that certain portions of the population were not excluded from the sample since elements do
not have an equal chance of being selected. Note that it is entirely possible that the elements that were not
selected did not differ from the selected elements, but this could only be determined by examining both sets
of elements. This examination was conducted as shown in appendix III by comparing data from different
surveys.
5
According Zettenberg (1965): "The relationships expressed in theoretical propositions are presumed to be
universally present… both in representative and non-representative samples. To disprove or demonstrate
their existence is hence, possible in any kind of sample –biased or unbiased. … When using a biased
sampling for a verification, we must have assurance that the relationship we want to prove is not introduced
into our data by selective sampling. … Also, when using a biased sample for verification, we should realize
that we have no knowledge of the population to which the result can be safely generalized.”
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Muslims from all sects, countries and different levels of religiosity) to respond to 48 questions
during the period from May until August 2002.
As shown in Appendices 5 and 6, the two surveys capture Muslims’ attitudes from all
over the world and with different democratic experiences. For instance, Turkey, Mali, Senegal
and Bangladesh are countries with an Islamic majority and have experienced a troubled but still
peaceful alteration of power through voting ballots in this past decade. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
Libya are countries that either never experienced elections or at least are only starting gradually
to change this habit. Semi-constitutional monarchies such as Malaysia, Jordan and Morocco are
also represented. Add to the previous list a wide array of countries that have taken some steps
toward democracy but never finished the transition stage such as Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, the
Gambia, Pakistan, and Indonesia among others. Additionally three countries that have just come
out of the Communist fist (i.e. Albania, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) are examined. Muslim
minorities are represented in the sample by four cases. In Lebanon, Shiite, Sunni, Druze,
Isma'ilite, Alawite and Nusayri Muslims compose roughly 70% of the population, yet it is
difficult to think of them as one Muslim population due to the intra creed and political divisions
(World Bank 2001). India (12%), USA (2.5%) and Europe (3.5%) are other three cases
where Muslims are minorities and their attitudes toward an accountable system of government
are examined.
b. Why is this Group of Sampled Muslims Relevant?
Following the experiences of the mass-initiated democratization processes in all the
continents of the world, this slice of the educated adults is crucially important in posing demands
for democratization. Consequently, the educated adult Muslims (above 18 and below 50)
captured in this survey are important. Individuals under 18 and illiterate individuals are assumed
to be the least expected to care about democracy and democratization or to pose real demand
for their political rights and/or to participate in politics if they are given the opportunity (Beckett
and Alli 1998; Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2000; Calhoun 1995; Dolbeare and Hubbell 1996;
Farnen and Meloen 2000; Glassman 1995, 1997; Leighly and Nagler 1992; Milner 2002;
Ogden 1992; Semali 1995). Besides, the number of respondents above 50 is too small to be
included in the analysis.
Some non-empirical assertions suggest that the least educated and poor are the most
radical and thus will not be represented in pooled data. However, no empirical study has shown
that this is the case. Many empirical studies noted "how rare it is to find examples of religious
fanaticism among either the higher or the very lowest social strata of the Egyptian population" (
Quoted in Pipes 2002). Pipes comments: "What is true of Egypt holds equally true elsewhere."
Similar observation was suggested by (Cerutti and Ragionieri 2000; Ciment 1997; Dekmejian
1995; Hunter 1988; Mahmood 1995; Perlmutter 1992; Zeidan 2003). These argumentative
assertions will be the subject of testing in this project.
This data will help in addressing and testing some of the competing readings about
Islam and democracy on two grounds:
1) One needs to revisit the arguments that put Muslims in general in the basket of antidemocracy (neo-orientalists) or those that argue in favor of "striking similarities" between
Muslims and non-Muslims support for democracy (Norris and Inglehart 2002).
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2) One needs to search for a guiding preponderance of evidence, if any, to discern if
there is a causal relationship between Muslims' culture and democracy which eventually
assesses the democratizability of Muslim societies.
Contrary to initial expectations, the one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) suggests
that there are no statistically significant differences between the two sets of respondents
comparing the differences within groups once we control for the effect of age in the web-based
sample (Appendix III). That is to say, one did not find statistically significant attitudinal
differences between college students who have access to the internet and college students who
do not have access to the internet. This result was more solidified by Zogby's study of 3,800
Arab adults from eight countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, the United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) which found that: "[i]n the aggregate, Internet access appears
to make little difference in the personal concerns of Arabs. Even where rankings and ratings do
differ, the differences are slight" (Zogby 2002). Whether or not a study of, say, the professional
lawyers or physicians would turn up similar findings regarding the influence of internet usage on
their attitudes toward democracy is an empirical problem that deserves attentions, but one that
cannot be addressed here.
Though admittedly imperfect, combining the data from the web-based survey and the
written surveys serves three purposes. 1) It provides a larger N with wider representation of a
greater number of Muslim countries and thus more diversity in Muslims' sects, ages, gender and
political ideologies. 2) It strikes a balance between the advantages of a written survey followed
by deeper focus-group discussion and the web-based survey where the researchers distanced
themselves from any influence on the respondents (Smith 2002; Solomon 2001). 3) It controls
for the effect of fear from responding to what can be seen as politically very sensitive questions
given the fact that web-based survey do not meet the same level of censorship that written
surveys may encounter.
To sum up: there is a clear and accounted for bias in the sample toward the educated
Muslims who usually live in urban areas and are above the poverty line. A further limitation of
our study arises from the problem of over-sampling of men compared to women. This oversampling of men can be attributed to the fact that illiteracy rate among women is much higher
than it is among men (Farjani et al. 2002). As one does not use random sample from all
Muslims regardless of their gender, level of education or income, one cannot confidently extend
our inferences from our sample to all Muslims.6
c. Operationalization
This study will contribute to the debate by surveying educated Muslims' attitudes toward
democracy in 32 societies including four countries where Muslims are minorities (USA, Europe,
India and Lebanon) (Appendices 5 and 6 have lists of the societies). To measure the attitudes of
Muslims toward the thing democracy stipulated as a system of accountable government publicly
elected according to the principle of one person, one vote the democracy is operationalized into
two dimensions: democratic software and democratic hardware.

6

A possible solution that is not pursued in this project, to overcome the problem of over-sampling of men is
to run separate regression models for men and women to control for the effect of gender.
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Democratic software is a scale to measure the socio-political sense of tolerance, trust
and equality in the attitudes of Muslims toward (1) their fellow Muslims from other sects (Sunna,
Shiite, and Ahmadi), (2) non-Muslims (Christians, Jews, Hindus…etc.) and (3) women. This
scale has its theoretical justification in the writings that view tolerance, trust and a sense of moral
equality among citizens as a pre-requisite for any stable democracy that deserves its name
(Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1982; Rawls 1993).
In other words, if the majority of Sunni Muslims in a given country think that their fellow
citizens who are Ahmadi or Shiite should be expelled or deprived of their political rights because
of their religious beliefs, the spirit of tolerance and trust is not likely to lead to anything but
tyranny of the majority if the procedural aspects of democracy are satisfied. This form of
intolerant democracy has been labeled illiberal (Zakaria 1997) or electoral democracy
(Schedler 2000). The same can be said about non-Muslim minorities and women who are seen
by some (male) Muslims as politically unequal to them and deserving to be deprived of certain
political rights. For example, Kuwaiti women are disenfranchised from participating in what
otherwise can be labeled fair and free elections (Tetreault 2000).
The attitude toward women has been suggested to be a real obstacle toward
democratization in the Muslim countries based upon the analysis of micro-level survey data
(Norris and Inglehart 2002), macro-level structural data (Fish 2002) and careful examination of
historical evidence (Esposito 1996; Lewis 2002).
Factor analysis (as reproduced in Appendix 8) shows that the responses to the four
questions (among the nine questions that were developed to measure the democratic software)
were found to fall into one dimension and form a reliable and internally consistent measure of
support for socio-political and religious tolerance (Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal
consistency a = .763). As shown in Appendix 8, the four questions examine the attitude of
Muslims toward the political rights of Christians, Jews minorities, Muslim minorities and women.
These questions were meant to measure political tolerance. The democratic software dimension
was standardized and scaled to 100 points, for ease of interpretation, where higher scores
represent the highest level of tolerance, trust and sense of equality.
Democratic hardware is a measurement of the attitudes of Muslims toward the
procedures and institutions of political participation and competition that reflect the popular will
into public office. Some highly homogenous societies may have a fairly reasonable sense of
equality and tolerance toward others yet may not support democratic institutions, thereby
supporting stable (sometimes corrupt) non-democracies due to the lack of peaceful alteration of
power and government accountability (Elkin and Sotan 1999; Hadenius 2001; Lederman et al.
2001; Shapiro and Macedo 2000).
Three questions were found to score the highest factor loadings in gauging the
democratic hardware with a decent level of reliability and internal consistency (Cronbach's
estimate of reliability and internal consistency a = .875). After recoding, the scale was
standardized to 100 points, for ease of interpretation, where higher scores represent the
strongest support for the democratic hardware. Taken together, the hardware and software
measurements would help to produce a cultural map of Muslims’ aggregate relative attitudes
toward democracy as produced in Figure 3.1.
The hardware and software of democracies, unlike the conventional wisdom in the
West, are not identical. Suffice it to say that the history of the U.S. was a struggle to couple the
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elected accountable government with full inclusive liberal political rights for women (until 1920)
and blacks (until 1965). Thus, it is reasonable to expect some Muslim sub-cultures to be in
favor of the hardware of democracy without its software. This type of combination can result in
exclusionary democracy (if there is democracy), a system of elected accountable government
elected only by those who meet certain qualifications enforced by the majority (e.g. Kuwaiti
male-elected parliament).
One of the independent variables gauges the observance of Muslims of their Islamic
rituals or what can be labeled religiosity. Three questions aimed at indicating the same variable
of religiosity. However, the factor analysis (Appendix 8) revealed that only two of them (prayer
and abstaining from drinking alcoholic beverages) fall into the same dimension (Cronbach's
estimate of reliability and internal consistency a = .926).
Muslims differ in their tendency to sacrifice for their political rights. A measurement of
the elasticity of demands for political rights (democracy) has been developed from two
questions (2.14 and 2.20) as shown in appendix 8 and will be discussed in detail in chapter
three (Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal consistency a = .91).
d. Hypotheses and Measures
As indicated earlier, the democratic hardware and software are the two dependent
variables that this project tries to examine. The hardware and software of democracies, unlike
the conventional wisdom in the West, are not identical.
Explaining these two dimensions of democracy will occur at two levels:
aggregate/society level in chapter three and at the individual level in chapter four.
At the aggregate level, it is reasonable to expect some Muslim sub-cultures to be in
favor of the hardware of democracy without its software. This type of combination can result in
some type of exclusionary democracy if there is democratization at all. That is a system of
elected accountable government but only elected by those who meet certain qualifications
enforced by the majority (i.e. Kuwaiti male-elected parliament).
Theoretically, one may expect some sub-cultures to favor the software (tolerance),
more than they are interested in democratic procedures and institutions. If this is the case, the
tolerance may maintain the social fabric of society but no real public demands for accountable
and elected government may be made. This group of sub-cultures usually head toward stable
non-democracy. These sub-cultures, however, are not necessarily anti-democratic; rather they
do not see democracy as a solution to any problem. That is why they do not necessarily support
it or oppose it.
Theoretically as well one may anticipate a third group of sub-cultures that lacks support
for democratic institutions and procedures and meanwhile shows no respect for minorities. If
(neo-)orientalists are right, most Muslims would fall into this category because they uphold
mainstream Islam. In other words, these sub-cultures are the least likely to have mass-initiated
democratization and even if there is a chance for an elite-led democratization, the non-tolerant
culture will remain an obstacle toward democratic consolidation (Diamond 1993; Linz and
Stepan 1996). (Neo-)orientalists would add: this is because of Islam (Pipes 1988) (for more
info. Sadowski 1993).
A fourth group of Muslim sub-cultures is the one that has high level of support to
democratic hardware and software. These are the sub-cultures that are ready to democratize.
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One anticipates that the great most people in this sub-culture think of democratically elected and
accountable government to be good and necessary and thus would see it as anti-Islam.
Chapter three will throw some light on the prevailing values in Muslim societies.
At the individual level, certain hypotheses will be tested to understand the dynamics that
propel some Muslims inside the same society to accept or refuse democracy.
To test these hypotheses and understand these dynamics, multivariate seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR) will be used as shown in Appendix 9. To verify the results,
multivariate logistic regression models will be reiterated. Chapter four will be totally devoted to
testing twelve hypotheses divided into four categories:
1- Demographic characteristics (relative income, education, age and gender).
2- Experience of democracy (previous political participation and residence in a
democracy for year or longer).
3- The effect of Islam (religiosity, support for political Islam and compatibility between
shura and democracy).
4- Perception of different political actors as credible agents of democratization or
autocracy (incumbents, the West and ulama).
A. Demographics
1. Relative Income
Some accounts (Jackman 1973; Lipset 1959) try to explain the dearth of democracy as
a function of economic factors. All (with the possible exception of India) stable democracies
are prosperous. Besides, economic failure is even one of the reasons of the breakdown of
democratic regimes (Linz and Stepan 1978). However, this relationship is subject to some
debate. Dahl's conclusion regarding the pre-World War II polyarchies in Italy, Germany and
Spain suggests that the failure in providing economic needs and to maintain public order spurred
the shift toward dictatorship (Dahl 1971). That is to say, if dictatorships provide necessary
needs to individuals, the individuals would become less supportive of change, even if it leads to
democracy. 7 This hypothesis is crucial especially in some countries that are accused of buying
legitimacy (Luciani 1995) under the slogan of "no taxation, no representation." Sherman
proposes the following as a support for the role of prosperous economy in establishing
consolidated non-democracies: "the correlation between income and democracy holds within all
but one region/culture… The one exception is Islam for which there is no significant correlation.
. . Among Arab nations there is a negative correlation between wealth and freedom" (Sherman
1998).
There is a theoretical puzzle that needs to be addressed regarding measuring and
estimating the relationship between economic status and democratization. Most of the studies
7

"Throughout history, the overwhelmingly most common type of regime in the Islamic world has been
autocracy--which is not to be confused with despotism. The dominant political tradition has long been that
of command and obedience, and far from weakening it, modern times have actually witnessed its
intensification. With traditional restraints on autocracy attenuated, and with new means of surveillance,
repression, and wealth-extraction made available to rulers by modern technologies and methods,
governments have become less dependent than ever on popular goodwill. This is particularly true of those
governments that are enriched by revenues from oil. With no need for taxation, there is no pressure for
representation" (Lewis, 1993b:54-55).
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that have been conducted in this regard approached the puzzle from a macro-level, i.e. to
measure the relationship between macro-economic indicators (i.e. real income per capita,
inflation rate or economic growth rate) and strength of (demands for) democracy (Burkhart and
Lewis-Beck 1994; Gasiorowski 1995).
In this study, the prosperity-democracy puzzle will be approached from a micro-level
route through testing the impact of individuals' relative economic status on his/her attitude
toward elected accountable government in the thirty two cases at hand. The descriptive analysis
of respondents' incomes report skewness toward more affluent than poor which corresponds to
the target population of this article. A 9-point scale variable reflects one's economic status.
2. Education
Education is another factor that can be seen as a highly crucial factor that may shape the
attitudes of Muslims toward elected accountable government. For highly educated people, the
cost associated with acquiring information, comparing and contrasting conditions in different
political systems is low and as a result they should exhibit more support for democracy since it
gives them the rights to be active in deciding the affairs of their societies. On the other hand, the
least educated as suggested by Lipset for instance pose a threat to democracy in the face of any
socio-economic dislocation (1983). Thus, education is hypothesized to instill and reinforce
liberal values such as equality, support for socio-political tolerance, respect for individual liberty
and democratic institutions as suggested by evidence from other cultures (Flangan 1982; Gibson
and Duch 1993). A 5-point scale will be used to measure the comparative level of education.
3- Age
The young are hypothesized to be more enthusiastic about change (Bahry and Silver
1990; Inglehart 1997), but not necessarily about democracy; thus we will pay close attention to
the impact of age on the attitudes toward democracy especially given the fact that several
anecdotal evidence (i.e. terrorist attackers of September 11th 2001 and the ratio of young men
joining Islamist radical groups) indicate the opposite.
It is argued that:
“rapidly increasing birth rates have given rise to a high proportion of young
people in the population and a concentration of them in cities (the under fifteens
in the Arab world are 44 per cent of the population in Algeria, 40 per cent in
Egypt and Morocco, 41 per cent in Jordan, 60 per cent in Gaza, etc.) This
burgeoning generation, born after independence, does not share the nationalist
ideals of its leaders. The failure of nationalism and communism, as well as the
liberal experience which preceded them, all of Western making, leads these
young people to seek a new model taken from their own Islamic cultural legacy”
(Munoz 1999:9).
A 5-point scale captures the age of respondents.
4- Gender
Two competing readings of Muslim women's attitudes toward democratization can be
spotted. In some non-Muslim cultures, women have been traditionally more conservative than
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men about political change; that is why they are hypothesized to be less supportive of
democratic changes (Carnaghan and Bahr 1990). Yet feminists in the Muslim context suggest
the opposite (Afshar 1993; Kandiyoti 1996). Females are coded as 1 in a dummy-coded
variable.
B. The Experience of Democracy
Two indicators are used to gauge the respondents' experience and familiarity with
democracy.
1- Political participation (voting)
Some Muslim countries have public elections or referenda. Though not necessarily free
and fair in all countries, they give Muslims the opportunity to experience an important
mechanism of the democratic process.
A generation ago, with two or three exceptions, virtually no elections were held
in the Muslim world. Now, however, 50 of the 53 predominantly Muslim
nations hold regular elections. In the vast majority of cases the elections, held by
often autocratic and corrupt regimes, are far from free and fair. But they
represent the compliment that vice pays virtue (Taheri 2003c).
One may hypothesize that people who vote in public elections will be more supportive
of democracy. It is reasonable that this hypothesis will hold in relatively democratic countries
where elections really matter but not necessarily in autocratic polities.
A three-point variable is used to measure the voting experience of Muslims whose
countries have public elections (question 1.17). This variable was dropped in the countries that
do not have public elections.
2- The residence of Muslims in a democratic country for a year or longer or being a minority
living in a democracy are presumed to approximate the effect of global diffusion of the
democratic message which lowers the costs of understanding the democratic process. Thus
these types of individuals will be more supportive of democracy (Duch 1995; Mueller 1992;
Starr 1991). To ensure that the individuals have obtained enough knowledge about how
democracy really works, only persons who have had the chance to stay in one or more
democracies for a total of a year have been considered to understand the advantages and
disadvantages of a democratic polity. A dummy coded variable is used to capture this
experience with Muslims who had the chance to live in a democracy for a year or longer coded
as 1.
C. Effect of Islam
Though this dissertation is about Muslims rather than Islam, it is important to know that
Islam, either as equivalent to Christianity or Christendom, is an active factor in shaping Muslims'
attitudes toward the world around them (Ansary 2003). Islam provides most Muslims with a
theoretical framework to judge what is Islamic, non-Islamic (compatible with Islam even it is not
originally developed by Muslims) and Un-Islamic (perceived by Muslims to be against Islam).
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The effect of Islam on Muslims’ attitudes toward democracy may be studied at the
individual level from three perspectives: religiosity, Islam as a political ideology, and the
compatibility between shura/mutual consultation and democracy.
1- Religiosity
Another hypothesis pertains to the relationship between observance of Islamic rituals
(religiosity) and support for democracy. Fukuyama contends that the more a person is
committed to Islam as a creed, the more one is involved in a culture that uniformly rejects
modernity.
According to Fukuyama (2001):
Islam is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people such as
Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel.
This raises the question of how representative such people are of the larger
Muslim community, and whether this rejection is somehow inherent in Islam.
A previous US ambassador to Saudi Arabia concurs.
[M]ore fundamentally, though, all Arab Muslims—and not just young, educated
males—are challenged cosmologically by the modern world. From the start,
Muslims saw Islamic society as a ‘City of God’ upon earth. Islamic society was
built upon the perfect teachings of God's own revealed word, dictated and
unalterable: the Qur'an (Horan 2003).
Thus, it is argued that the more a Muslim clings to Islam’s imperatives, the more he/she
will be puzzled by non-Qur'anic bed'a/man made innovations such as democratic procedures
and values. This relationship will be scrutinized in this project using a continuous standardized
variable that combined two questions as described in the factor analysis appendix (Appendix 8).
2- Support for Political Islam
This hypothesis is important since some commentators made democracy conditional
upon secularism in the Middle East (Binder 1988; Gellner "Islam and Marxism" 1991, 1992;
Sharabi 1988; Tibi 1998). Others argued that some Islamists are more democratic than secular
rulers (Armstrong 2002; Rahman 1982:15). A 5-point scale captured Muslims’ attitudes
toward Islam as deen wa dawla/religion and state which is a slogan endorsed by all Islamists
and opposed by all secularists.
3- Support for the compatibility between shura and democracy.
Muslims do not agree on the relationship between the Islamic concept of shura/mutual
consultation and democracy. Some Islamists perceive shura/mutual consultation as superior to
the inherently un-Islamic concept of democracy. Other Islamists perceive democracy as a
modern implementation of shura/mutual consultation. Some secularists perceive them to be
absolutely two different principles and praxes as it will be demonstrated in the second chapter.
With these three different accounts, one will try to examine the effect of Muslims’ perception of
shura/mutual consultation and democracy as complementary to their support for democratic
hardware and software. A 5-point scale question gauges the attitudes of Muslims toward the
relationship between shura/mutual consultation and democracy.
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D. Political Actors
It is hypothesized that among the variables that affect Muslims’ attitudes toward
democracy are the attitudes toward certain political actors including the legitimacy of the
incumbents, the credibility of the West as an agent of democratization, and trust in
ulama/scholars role as cultural entrepreneurs.
1- Legitimacy of the incumbents
Another important factor that may impact Muslims' attitudes toward democracy is the
support they show to their current rulers. This factor is crucial from two perspectives. First,
legitimacy is usually confused with silence in third world countries, a phenomenon best
described by Wedeen's conceptualization of "acting as-if legitimacy" (1999). Muslims are asked
to evaluate their current rulers and compare them to others who are more democratic (whatever
this means in their minds).8
Second, citizens in stable democracies make clear distinctions between rating their rulers
and the legitimacy of (democratic) institutions (Dahl 1989; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan
1989; Przeworski 1986). In Muslim countries, where the persona of rulers is more influential
than institutions, myopic individuals are more likely to exist (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Kohli
1997). Being 'myopic' means that individuals would accept autocracy as far as it is associated
with a popular ruler or the "benevolent dictator" (Mansour 1992). Support for (undemocratic)
incumbents is hypothesized to be associated with less support for democratic transition. A 3point scale expresses the support of Muslims to their rulers.
2- The West as a credible agent of democratization
Western countries supported democratization throughout the world except in the
Muslim countries where there is the fear that democracy will lead anti-Western Islamists into
power. In Muslim societies, "advocates for liberal values constitute at best a small minority"
(Bacevich 2003:32).
This attitude, along with the support of autocratic pro-Western rulers, created a
negative image of the West in the Muslim world. The Western discourse, led by the Bush
administration, changed dramatically in favor of democratic Islam. Given the negative image of
the US in the Muslim world, it can be hypothesized that the more Muslims distrust the US, the
less they trust its capacity to pressure the incumbents to democratize.
A 5-point scale is used to measure Muslims’ attitude toward the responsibility of the
West for lack of democracy in the Muslim world.
3- Ulama/scholars role as cultural entrepreneurs
It is argued that “Muslims are addicted to religion. Thus any attempt to reform Muslims’
affairs will fail unless it starts from Islam” (Omara 2002b). The problem resides with the fact that
most ulama/scholars are very conservative and traditionalist which may lead Muslims who trust
8

It should be noted that the question about the support for the incumbents was the only attitudinal
question that revealed some discrepancy between the web-based survey and the written survey responses.
Respondents to the web-based survey were comparatively less supportive of their rules than the
respondents to the written-survey. A possible explanation is related to the efficiency of the web-based
survey to capture the attitudes of the respondents regarding sensitive issues (Lipschultz 2000).
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them to adopt undemocratic attitudes. Thus, it is hypothesized that Muslims who trust
ulama/scholars are less supportive of democracy than Muslims who are less influenced by them.
A 5-point scale question measures the level of trust that Muslims have toward the
ulama/scholars.
3. The Structure of the Study
The second chapter will lay out the intellectual map of how intellectuals, activists and
ulama/scholars in Muslim societies relate Islam to democracy. The discussion of the intellectual
map of Muslim public opinion leaders is based upon the assumption that ordinary educated
Muslims do not randomly choose their positions regarding political issues. Rather they resort to
men of ideas to make sense of the world they live in and to respond to the challenges they face.
This chapter will be devoted to the political intellectual debates.
The third chapter focuses on the cultural map of educated Muslims at the aggregate
level. Thus, it responds to the following questions: First, to what extent are ordinary Muslims
mere reflections of the cultural entrepreneurs as discussed in the previous chapter? Second, is it
true that Muslims even if they believe in democracy, they limit it to illiberal version that forbids all
competing un-Islamic ideologies? Third, are Muslims satisfied with their generally nondemocratic governments because they think of them as Islamic governments and that is why
they do not want democracy? Fourth, are Muslims ready to sacrifice for their political rights or
will they wait until they are given to them as gifts from their rulers? Fifth, is it true that Muslims’
minds are chained in the golden past of the early Islamic state?
The fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis of possible causal relationships between
Muslims’ attitudinal positions at the individual level and the most important factors and actors
that are hypothesized to militate both for and against Muslims’ support for democratic software
and hardware. In this chapter, the focus shifts from society-level analysis to individual level
analysis.
The conclusion summarizes the results, reflects on their implications, clarifies their
limitations and leaves some questions open for accumulation and further research.
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CHAPTER II
MUSLIMS’ INTELLECTUAL MAP
This chapter provides a road map for examining the schools of thought that shape the
intellectual agenda in Muslim societies regarding the issue of Islam and democracy.
This chapter will discuss four main themes. The first section will discuss the nature of the
men of ideas who are responsible for shaping Muslims’ intellectual map. These men of ideas can
be broadly categorized into intellectuals and ulama/scholars who function as both public opinion
leaders and cultural entrepreneurs.
The second section will discuss how these men of ideas constitute three
uncompromising schools of thought regarding what they consider Islamic, non-Islamic and unIslamic ideals and praxis. These schools of thoughts are given the labels: traditionalist, modernist
and secularist. The traditionalists in turn are divided into violent and pacifists. The secularists
may be liberals or autocrats.
In a third section, the focus will be on how each school of thought tackles the issue of
democracy given their understandings of Islamic teachings. In a fourth section, one will argue
that these adamant schools of thought that shape the Muslim intellectual map engage in an
intellectual civil war that may have a negative impact on the prospect of democracy in the
Muslim world.
1. Shaping Muslims' Intellectual Map
a. Public Opinion Leaders and Cultural Entrepreneurs
Throughout this chapter, two terms will be used synonymously to refer to the men of
ideas who function as agents of political socialization in Muslim societies. These two terms are
public opinion leaders and cultural entrepreneurs. Each one of these terms reveals one of the
mechanisms by which these men of ideas shape the Muslim mind regarding the challenge of
democracy. These men of ideas through their public debates on the relationship between Islam
and politics shape the cultural repertoire that identifies a limited set of intellectual repertoires
among which ordinary educated Muslims locate themselves. That is to say, these intellectual
debates portray the finite set of visions that ordinary Muslims can hold regarding an issue such
as democracy. These repertoires are “learned, shared and acted out through a relatively
deliberate process of choice” (Tilly 1995:42). Thus, Muslims’ attitudes toward democracy are
part of a learning process and deliberate choices that individuals make among the possible
options available to them by the contemporary public opinion leaders.
This characterization of men of ideas makes this chapter more concerned with what
contemporary ordinary Muslims read and listen to rather than the old philosophic or highly
technical books that were written hundreds of years ago. The goal is not to discuss at any length
all possible schools of thoughts that emerged in the history of Islam (Mohamed Omara
numerated 198 schools and trends in the history of Muslim thought (see Oman 1991)) or their
non-Islamic rivalries mainly because ordinary educated Muslims rarely consult these sources.
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These sources are internalized in the contemporary debates and presented by public opinion
leaders to Muslims as ready-made intellectual meals for consumption.
Public opinion leaders in this project play another related function which is to be cultural
entrepreneurs by traveling through time and/or space to revive the norms of the past or import
norms from others. These norms, “like genes” function as “instructional units [that are] in
competition with other norms… that carry incompatible instructions – and some are reproduced
at much higher rates than their competitors” (Florini 1996:364). Each group of cultural
entrepreneurs competes with others over the legitimacy of the norms (as standards of behavior)
that they present to the public. “Norms are obeyed not because they are enforced, but because
they are seen legitimate” (Florini 1996: 365). Thus one may expect that in a given Muslim
society some norms (e.g. tolerance) dominate other norms which make it more suitable for
democracy than others. A possible explanation for why some Muslim societies may be more
tolerant than others can be the nature of the norms that the cultural entrepreneurs revive from the
past or import from others (e.g. the West).
Muslim intellectuals and scholars usually end up with a set of arguments or schema of
thoughts that portray the past as translated into texts, history and legacy in a fashion that help
them understand the present with all its modern problems, and to project solutions for future
challenges including the challenge of democracy.
By the end of this chapter one will conclude that Muslims’ political attitudes are not
conceived as “a numerous cloud hovering over social life, shifting in its own winds, and
producing social action as rain or snow” (Tilly 1995: 40). Rather Muslims' political attitudes are
part a number of attempts to answer the question of where and how to draw the lines between
what is Islamic, non-Islamic and un-Islamic political values and praxis.
b. Educational Schema: Intellectuals and Ulama
Men of ideas who function as public opinion leaders and cultural entrepreneurs come
from different educational backgrounds and have different ways to spread their words and
hence to influence the public. There are two types of men of ideas in terms of their educational
backgrounds. Intellectuals usually had mainly non-religious education. Most of their influence on
the public comes from publishing books, writing magazine and newspaper articles and
appearances in television and radio shows. Coming from non-religious education background
does not necessarily mean that they are ideologically secularists. Of course some of them are
secularists who think that Muslims caught the Christian disease of ecclesiastic thinking. Most of
these intellectuals publish their books and articles in state-owned or independent institutions as
far as the government tolerates this way of thinking. The real threat that they face comes from
ulama/scholars who would call their contributions apostasy or heresy. Some governments try to
appease the publics by banning their publications but surprisingly these publications became the
best sellers in the uncontrolled market of ideas. There is no real problem for any researchers to
find the secularist writings either in their original languages or translated versions in the Middle
East as in the West.
Some intellectuals have a favorable attitude toward Islam as a source of political
ideology and use their intellectual capacities to draw lessons from the ulama/scholars. Usually
Islamic intellectuals are referred to as Islamic thinkers/mufakereen Islameen to differentiate them
from ulama/scholars who can issue fatwas/religious verdicts. Islamic thinkers are less bounded
22

by the Islamic authenticity or reliance on holy texts. They are freer to learn from non-Muslims
and use their concepts (e.g. democracy). They are not seen by governments as dangerous as
ulama/scholars who can issue fatwas/religious verdicts delegitimizing political regimes and rulers.
They are men of opinions and not intellectual authority. Thus, their intellectual contributions may
be found in books, magazines and newspapers and less in official television and radio stations
that usually think of them as problematic if their ideas are publicly endorsed. Beside lack of trust
on the part of the governments, they are hardly seen by the masses as religious authorities either.
One rarely finds an audio tape in a mosque for any of these Islamic thinkers. They are perceived
by most Muslims as good people with good intentions and testable opinions. If they walk down
in streets, they are barely known by the public because people have not seen them yet they may
recognize their names. One other contributing factor for their intellectual absence in mosques is
that many of these Islamic thinkers or intellectuals may challenge popular ideas without providing
daleel/textual support for their opinions. These Islamic intellectuals do not feel compelled to use
daleel/textual support mainly since they lack the sophisticated Islamic education to allow them to
issue fatwas/religious verdicts.
Fatwas/religious verdicts are issued mainly by ulama/scholars of Islam who are different
from intellectuals in at least one significant aspect. Ulama/scholars got part of or all their
education in Islamic institutions devoted to teach Islamic sciences of Qur'an, sunna/sayings and
praxis of the Prophet Mohamed, fiqh/jurisprudence and turath/legacy of ancient Muslims. These
ulama/scholars are divided into two groups depending upon their dependence on government
institutions. There are ulama/scholars that constitute al-Islam al-rasmi/official Islam and others
who constitute al-Islam al-sha'bi/popular Islam (Bill and Springborg 2000).
This distinction is significant in terms of the sources that one can rely upon to learn about
their political attitudes. Since ulama of al-Islam al-rasmi/scholars of official Islam are considered
moderate by Muslim governments, one can easily read or listen to their attitudes in the official
publications and media outlets. The ulama of al-Islam/al-sha'bi are usually prohibited from giving
public speeches or appearing in public television and radio stations. However, they managed to
make their ways to the public through audio tapes, books and small booklets that are available
in almost all mosques that are out of the grip of governments. With the revolution of the internet,
hundreds of Islamic websites were devoted to the tapes and books of these unofficial scholars
in all the languages on earth. The majority of them are in Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, English and
French.
Some ulama/scholars heeded to preserve and record their contributions more than others.
In general, ulama/scholars who passed away before the revolution of the Internet or did
not care much about audio recording of their fatwas/religious verdicts and sermons are less
influential than others who kept audio and written materials. One way of understanding the
influence of these ulama/scholars is by tracking their contributions in the minds of other
ulama/scholars who learned from them personally or by keeping their outlawed books and
booklets. These books are usually not in print anywhere and when they are in print they appear
with no city of publication or publisher. Most of these publications are waqf/endowment for
Allah’s sake with a phrase that may be translated as follows: “If you want to re-print it, go
ahead. May Allah accept our good deeds.” In most Muslim countries freedom of expression is
limited. Thus, it is a felony to disseminate such ideas. Thanks to some scholars who were
interviewed along with area specialists and personal effort on the part of the researcher, this
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chapter could secure around 60 publications on Islam and politics in general that are officially
banned in many Muslim countries. These publications, nevertheless, are available under the table
or on very high shelves of small mosque in Muslim countries.
One other important aspect of the role of intellectuals and scholars pertains to their level
of political activism. Some intellectuals and ulama/scholars are more politically active than
others. Some intellectuals and rasmi/official ulama/scholars are spokesmen of their governments.
Some others are party ideologues and members in countries that allow political parties. A third
group appears to be more independent.
Many unofficial ulama/scholars are as well leaders of Islamic movements that are usually banned
in Muslim countries. Yet when legally allowed, these ulama/scholars may have more access to
influence the publics.
2. Ideological Schema: Traditionalists, Modernists and Secularists
Ideologically, Muslim intellectuals and scholars adopt three different readings of Islam's
response to modern challenges including democracy. These three ideological readings can be
given the following labels: traditionalist, modernist and secularist.
They shape the Muslim intellectual repertoire through their responses to the common challenge
of democracy that faces Muslims in the 21st century. These three schools of thought disagree
upon which aspects of democracy are Islamic (ordained or accepted by Islamic teachings),
non-Islamic (did not originate in Islam but still acceptable in Islam) and un-Islamic (against Islam
and thus unacceptable).
Traditionalists search for what they perceive as an Islamic government which is
necessarily contradictory with what most contemporary academicians and democracy students
label democracy. Modernists, conversely, search for a modern (democratic) government
compatible with Islam. They usually call it Islamic democracy. This state is different from the
ancient state established by the Prophet and his companions in its format and procedure yet
identical to it in its goals and framework. Secularists do not worry about how compatible their
ideal system is with Islamic labels since Islam, any religion for that matter, can be used to justify
all forms of government, if necessary.
Traditionalists are subject to another division based upon their attitude toward violence into
pacifists and violent. Secularists are divided into autocrats and liberals based on their position on
political plurality.
a. Conceptualization of Labels
There is no claim of novelty in any of the labels used or the idea of classifying Muslim
intellectuals and ulama/scholars. Some caveats, however, should be kept in mind. First, it is
better to think of these labels as depicting schools of thoughts rather than individual thinkers. Of
course, this does not mean that readers cannot easily locate Usama bin Laden and Sayyid Qutb
as violent traditionalists, Mohamed Khatami and Yusuf al-Qaradawi as Islamist democrats, and
Saddam Hussein and Suharto as secular autocrats. Rather, these categories are proposed as
extensions of Weberian ideal types that function as analytical constructs which may or may not
correspond in detail to actual cases but which help us analyze and compare large number of
cases.
24

Second, the following analysis will not be about a pre-determined set of scholars or
intellectuals in particular; rather it is an analysis of intellectual positions regardless of who adopts
them. This observation is important since some of these individuals who actually adopt these
ideas shifted positions and thus may be under different labels given different times. For example,
the Saudi thinker Abdu-Allah al-Qasimi in the early 1950s was considered one of the orthodox
or typical traditionalists; however, in the 1970s he shifted directions to become one of the
typical secularists.
Khaled Mohamed Khaled’s 1950 famous book From Here We Start represented a
core attack on the idea of Islam as a religion and state. Yet his book 1981 The State in Islam
is considered repentance from his support for secularism where he clearly states that he was
very much influenced by the history of theology and clergy in Europe (Kepel 1984). From 1950
to 1980s, Khaled shifted from a secularist position to a modernist Islamist one.
Once again, the labels epitomize schools of thoughts regardless of their adherents rather
than portraying specific individual thinkers, clerics and activists because of what they believe in.
Related to the previous point, it is important to note that some activists, intellectuals and scholars
belong to the same school whereas they spoke different languages, resided in different parts of
the world, lived at different points in time and/or possibly never heard of each other. Yet they
share the same definition of what is Islamic, non-Islamic and un-Islamic and follow similar paths
of reasoning.
Third, the more Muslim intellectuals or scholars move from traditionalism into secularism
the more they set themselves free from the authority of the text and the appeal to traditions. The
traditionalists’ self-ascribed image is that they are the most adherent to the verbatim and literalist
interpretations of Islamic texts such as the Qur'an, Sunna, teachings of the prophet’s
companions and their following ‘ulama / scholars. Conversely, modernists contend that the
interpretations of previous scholars are indicative and suggestive but not obligatory or binding,
leaving more room for inductive learning from other civilizations. Thus they portray themselves
as responsible for introducing the contemporary and modern reading of holy texts. On the
contrary, secularists argue for more rationalist, relativistic and inductionist reading without
assuming any supremacy of the past over the present understanding of socio-political, ethical
and economic matters. Traditionalists and modernists blame secularists for being deductionists
as well yet from Western sources. To Hanafi, the false deduction through time (in case of
traditionalism) and space (in case of secularism) is one of the most important reasons behind the
tension among Muslim intellectuals and scholars (Hanafi 2001).
Illustrating this tension by an example would be helpful. A traditionalist criticized
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first
president, for ignoring the teachings of Islam by quoting Imam al-Shaf'i’s9 advice to Muslims: “If
you see a man walking on the water or flying in the sky, do not be swayed by him until you find
a verdict for what he is doing from the Qur'an and Sunna” (al-'Amro 2002).
Fourth, the labels themselves help understand the core differences among the three
schools. Traditionalists think of themselves as the keepers of the Islamic traditions. The verbatim
obedience, assimilation and deduction from the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of the
Prophet Mohamed as understood and interpreted by al-salaf al-saleh/ the pious predecessors
9

The founder of the Shaf'i school of Islamic jurisprudence (767-820 AD).
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are what distinguish a Muslim from a non-Muslim according to traditionalists. Modernists,
however, claim to combine deduction from holy texts with inductive ijtihad/independent
reasoning. According to al-Qaradawi, a notable name in this school, Muslims currently need
two types of ijtihad/independent reasoning: selective (which is to choose the most fitting and
useful religious verdict if there is a plurality of opinions) and reconstructive (to come up with new
fatwas/religious verdicts that match current and contemporary circumstances as far as they do
not contradict well-established authentic holy text) (al-Qaradawi 1984). Both types of
ijtihad/independent reasoning take into consideration the changing circumstances of modern
world and would create plural interpretations of the same texts. Modernists, as a result, tend to
show a higher level of tolerance toward those who do not adhere to their interpretations of the
texts. For instance, many modernist Islamists (e.g. Fahmy Howaidi, Tareq al-Bishri and Salem
al-‘Awa) expressed their dismay because of a decision by an Egyptian court that deemed Nasr
Hamed Abu Zeid's writings to be blasphemous and his marriage to be dissolved on the grounds
of apostasy. Fahmy Howaidi’s refusal of the decision was best expressed in the following quote:
“Nobody debates anymore! Consequently only two channels are left: judges and guns”
(Howaidi 1994).
Fifth, choosing terms and labels to describe and differentiate among people who think
very differently but while claiming to be the true representatives of a religion that they hold dear
makes the problem of labels more acute. An Iranian cleric, Mohamed Salem Takani,
unequivocally refused using the label "modernist" to describe his way of reasoning yet other
modernists like him find the distinction necessary and vivid (ex. Tareq al-Bishri and Salem alAwa). For some of these scholars and activists, using words such as modernist or liberal is a
great euphemism or even sensationalism depending on which side of the debate one takes. In
contrast, the Turkish Imam Mohamet Soa’at used the label secular sheikh to introduce himself
to me. He clearly refuses the use of Islamic rhetoric to justify or criticize political decisions or
individuals. A Nigerian scholar who studies and lives in Saudi Arabia warns me against using the
word "traditionalist" to describe a given group of Muslims since all Muslims should be, by his
definition of a Muslim, traditionalists or salafis (again from al-salaf al-saleh/ the pious
predecessors) as he said. Counselor al-Said al-'Ashmawi of Egypt preferred using the word
civil instead of secular to describe his writings since the word 'Alamanya/secularism has become
very notorious in the Muslims’ public culture. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi would prefer calling his
school of thought moderate rather than modernist since Islam explicitly calls for moderation not
modernization.10 Though I understand that any consensus on the use of the terms is hardly
viable, I need to take the risk of using the previous labels even if the individuals under each label
may not agree to them. Consensus on the use of terms and labels is impossible as noted by
other researchers and Islam specialists. On his attempt to stipulate what liberal Islam means,
Ansary commented:
The very expression ‘liberal Islam’ would, within Muslim societies, greatly handicap the
acceptance of the very trends and approaches to which the phrase is meant to refer.
‘Liberal Islam’ seems to set up a new strain of ‘Islam’ along side the existing ones –
introducing new divisions or creating new partisan attitudes- and links it to what are
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Al-Qaradawi has a web site that contains almost all his writings and sermons: http://www.qaradawi.net
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perceived- accurately enough, as largely secular attitudes, Western in origin (Ansary
2003).
The selection or stipulation of labels in the Muslim context is not an easy endeavor.
Different Muslims, depending upon the amount of Islamic and Western education they get, use
different labels to describe the same thing or person or use the same label to describe different
things or persons. For instance, mostly Muslim secularists would use the word liberty as it is
used in the West. Yet Rifa’a al-Tahtawi (the Egyptian cleric who visited France in the first half
of the 19th century) made a perceptive observation that liberty in the West is equal to what
Muslims throughout history used to call adl/justice with some modifications. For a while, liberal
secularists in early 20th centuries found themselves the cultural entrepreneurs who implanted a
new norm into a soil that limited the original meaning of liberty independence from colonialism
rather than the antithesis of dictatorship. Based on the focus group discussions with a wide
variety of Muslims in Muslim countries and the U.S., one finds that large sects of Muslims may
make the argument that: “So and so is dictator but… .” That is to say being dictator is bad but
one is a dictator who has other good qualities that may offset the negatives of being dictator
such as being the leader of a national movement of independence, anti-Western policies, or
sensitive to the issue of poverty and so forth. On traveling in space and time, concepts and
labels acquire new meanings and connotations; that is why stipulation is a necessity in a project
that aims at a comparative examination of a wide range of Muslims in different parts of the
globe.
Last but not least, inherent in the idea of ideal types is to search for typical
manifestations of each school of thought rather than semi- and quasi positions. For instance, alMawdudi, the founder of Jama’a Islameyya/Islamic group in Pakistan has inconsistent positions
that make him both traditionalist and modernist in the same time. If one quotes him in his book
Concepts of Islam Regarding Religion and state (Mawdudi 1977) he can be easily classified
as a modernist who respects rights of minorities, democratic procedures such as elections,
voting and representation. Yet upon reading some of his other books that were written during
the same period such as Islam and Modern Civilization (Mawdudi 1977) or Islam Facing
Modern Challenges (Mawdudi 1980), one notices a clear tendency to attack democratic
principles, values and the same mechanism that he praised elsewhere such as elections and
majority rule. Roh Allah Khomeini, as another example, can be used to illustrate a very
traditionalist theological pattern of thinking or a very modernist who argues for democratic
procedures and respect for basic human rights depending on which quotes one will use. For
instance in 1977 he was reported stating that: “The real threat to Islam does not come from the
Shah…The real threat comes from the idea of imposing on Muslim lands the Western system of
democracy, which is a form of prostitution” (Taheri 2003c). However, he was quoted urging
Iranians to participate in the “heavy responsibility” of electing the presidents, members of the
shura council and the experts (Esposito 1996:24) as part of their Islamic obligations. Kuwaiti
Islamists present a quasi-traditionalist and quasi-modernist position too. They participate in
elections and form the majority of the Kuwaiti parliament yet they objected to women’s
enfranchisement (al-Tabetba'i and al-Basseri 2002) based on verbatim interpretations of Islamic
teachings and local tribal considerations. Since this is the case, I prefer to focus on the typical
positions of these cultural entrepreneurs rather than tracking all possible combinations and
permutations of intellectual attitudes.
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b. Drawing the Boundaries among the Ideal Types
The attitudes of different schools of thought toward democracy are a function of their
attitudes of the relationship between Islam and human intellect in general. One can imagine three
Muslims who represent the typical attitudes of the three schools as mentioned earlier giving
uncompromising answers to the following six questions that fully explicate the core differences
among them.
1How would Muslims differentiate between what is Islamic, non-Islamic and unIslamic when it comes to alien ideas and mechanisms?
2What if Islamic Sharia/law (coming from the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of
the Prophet Mohamed) is silent about certain issues? Is it automatically
halal/acceptable or haram/taboo?
3Are there certain areas or zones in Islam that are not subject to human scrutiny and
skeptical investigation?
4Is it possible for contemporary Muslims to violate the ijma'/consensus when they
deem appropriate?
5Is it possible for Muslims to import ideas, mechanisms and inventions from nonMuslims?
Before responding to the first question it is important to note that traditionalists and
modernists are Islamists who share similar assumptions and doctrines regarding the role of Islam
in politics. For both schools of thought Islam is both religion and state. When encountered with
the secular slogan of ‘political Islam,’ Islamists would respond by stating that “Islam cannot but
be political” (cf. al-Khalidi 1984; al-Qaradawi 2001a; al-Ghazali ND; No'amani 2002; al'Aawa 1989; al-'Aawa 2001; Qutb 1970; al-'Oda 2000; Howaidi 1985; Khatami 1998;
Mawdudi 1980).
Secularists, who are not necessarily atheists or disbelievers, perceive Islam as a
relationship between God and His servants. That is why they utterly disagree with Islamists.
(Khalaf Allah 1984; Mernissi 1992; al-Ashmawi 1998; Heggazi 2002a); al-Sa'eed 2001;
Baghdadi 1999). Sociologically, they are highly influenced by non-religious education, that they
often get outside the Muslim world or from translated materials, and act as intellectual
competitors to the semi-closed religious stratum of ulama/ scholars who “for generations had
monopolized learning and intellectual activity” (Sharabi 1970). Not surprisingly, typical
traditionalists think that secularists are not even Muslims any more.
A. Contesting Readings of the Islamic, Non-Islamic and Un-Islamic:
Traditionalist Islamists (whether violent or nonviolent) believe that what is Islamic is
what has been accepted explicitly and overtly condoned by the Qur'an, sunna and
ijma'/consensus of the greatest companions of the prophet and the authentic ulama/scholars,
especially those who lived in the first two centuries after the death of the prophet (early 7th
century). Moreover, they collapse the differences between what is non-Islamic and un-Islamic
to make most if not all non-Islamic ideals and mechanism a priori un-Islamic unless they have
been proven benign by careful scrutiny and passing through the tests of the holy and highly
respectable texts. Modernists, unlike traditionalists, consider all man-made innovations that do
not contradict the Qur'an and Sunna acceptable by Islam even if they do not come from Islamic
28

sources. They usually do not make the novelty of the innovation a sufficient reason to be
rejected on Islamic ground. By adopting this position, they tend to weaken the role of the
ijma'/consensus of ancient scholars. Modernists would say that “the ancient scholars were men
and we [modernists] are men [like them]” (al-Qaradawi 2000a; Ibrahim 1991; Khatami 2001;
al-Ghazali 1997; Howaidi 1999b). Hassan al-Banna', the founder of Muslim Brotherhood
movement in 1928, wore the hat of a modernist in his debate with a group of Saudi traditionalist
clerics in 1942 on the issue of using a microphone in the Ka’ba (the holy shrine of Islam in
Mecca.) Traditionalist clerics refuted to allow him to use the microphone since it was
considered bed'a/man-made innovation. The prophet never used one and the Qur'an has no
clear verdict on it. As narrated by Yusuf al-Qaradawi (al-Qaradawi 2000a), al-Banna' found
one of the clerics wearing a pair of glasses. Al-Banna’ used the analogy between the glasses in
magnifying the written words and the microphone in magnifying the vocal words.
To modernists, forbidden bed'a/man-made innovation is limited to the religious affairs
not worldly affairs. Traditionalists see no big difference between religion and world affairs since
Islam is religion and life/Deen and Dunya. The prophet left Muslims, traditionalists argue, with all
the answers they need to all the questions that they may encounter (al-Qadderi 2000). Some
commentators have records of the debates in the early years of the 1930s and 1940s on the
verdicts of Islam on issues such as using cars, trains, radios and the like. A Malaysian scholar
took a trip from Malaysia to Egypt to report back to his people the attitude of the Egypt-based
famous Sunni school of Islamic fiqh/jurisprudence, al-Azahr, on the use of radios in early 1940s
(Zaman "Interview" 2002).
Secularists in turn would not find the debate over what is Islamic, non-Islamic and unIslamic relevant. They simply collapse the differences among them and neutralize Islam when it
comes to what they perceive to be civilizational requirements such as technology, political
institutions and ideologies. They share the same concerns and questions with the other two
Islamist schools not because of the relevance of the issues they raise but because they cannot
constitute their own vision without proving that the other two visions lead Muslims nowhere. In
other words to build their own arguments they need to convincingly refute the Islamists’
arguments. Secularists, answering the question of what is Islamic, non-Islamic or un-Islamic,
refute the deductionist reading of Islamists with a possible exception of ethics and moralities.
Yet in other worldly affairs, secularists argue that if one can interpret the same verse in two or
more different, sometime contradictory ways, then the verse does not help us much. That is to
say, most of the controversial texts in the Holy Scriptures actually have no one concrete
meaning until the human mind imposes its understanding on them. Furthermore, fighting over the
meanings of verses and sayings does not help solve the socio-political problems that currently
face Muslims. In other words, secularists’ logic goes as follows: if we agree inductively on what
is good for society behind a veil of religious ignorance, we will definitely find good justification
for it in the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed. This cell of secularist
discourse has established itself among the great majority of individuals in the West (Hudson and
Réno 2000). However, because of the lack of empirical examination of Muslims belief system,
we do not know exactly the weight of this vision among Muslims.
Modernists and traditionalists, as a result of their differences in reasoning and sources,
have perennial debates on issues such as celebrating mother’s day and Christmas, congratulating
non-Muslims on their feasts, insurance companies, the charging of interest in banks, the right of
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women to work and participate in politics, the rights and commitments of non-Muslims under
Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation, traveling to non-Muslim countries, studying Western
philosophy, whether growing beards is fardh/obligation, sunna (to be rewarded if you do it and
not being punished for not doing it) or just a matter of looking good (as secularists would
argue), let alone democratic institutions and procedures. For traditionalists differences among
Muslims on these issues are matters of aqeeda/creed that should not be subject to subjectivity
(al-Zawahri ND) yet to modernists these differences are a matter of natural intellectual
disagreements (al-Ghazali 1991).
Secularists find the “fever over hijacking texts” a sign that both schools are wrong
(Zakaria 1986). They clearly draw the analogy between the roles of ulama in the Muslim
context with the Catholic Church in Europe of the middle ages. Traditionalists and modernists
exhaust the Muslim mind with interpretations and counter-interpretations that aim only at
solidifying their positions as super Muslims at the expense of the "ignorant non-knowledgeable
Muslims" who do not memorize old texts with no applicability in the modern era (al-'Azm
1969). Thus in the secularist program of change, the main source of truth and virtue should
come from the human mind as the best and most trustworthy judge between the good and evil,
the true and false, the valuable and useless (Fouda 1993),. Surush’s battle against velayat alfaqih / the rule of the supreme jurist aims at hermeneutic readings of holy texts and putting an
end to the professionalized and personified representation of Islam (Surush et al. 2000).
An Algerian novelist who studied Islamic law was very specific in this regard: “do not
we have books about democracy in Islam, socialism in Islam and private ownership in Islam?”
He has a point to make: Some Muslims twist verses, sayings and interpretations of the Qur'an
and Sunna to justify pre-determined mental positions (al-Azmeh 1992). The novelist argues that
“the speakers in the name of Islam,” meaning Islamists, are just “human beings who support
their own personal arguments by appealing to holy texts.” What is more dangerous, he
contends, is that yet they claim that they are mere mirrors of Allah’s will while Allah did not give
them any right to speak in his name. To a typical secularist, unbounded reason is the redeemer
of Muslims. When secularists make this claim they do not ask Muslims to give up their religion
and follow their human intellect as if it is one or the other. They make the case that it is Islam
that asks Muslims to free themselves from the setup of old texts (Baghdadi 1999).
Typical secularists find contesting meanings, images, and interpretations of holy texts a
convincing sign that the discourse on religion has been very much conflated with religion itself.
Mohamed died and nobody, including his companions, ancient or contemporary ‘ulama, can
speak for Allah. If one verse can mean one thing to a scholar and its opposite to another
scholar, then it means nothing until human beings impose their understanding on it. If this is the
case, the words of the holy text are actually holy but humans’ understandings are not. Muslims
should know that and they should act accordingly. Secularists ponder that the Qur'an and the
teachings of the prophet were more examples of how Muslims should seek public interest given
their circumstance yet the details of these verses and teachings are not binding to Muslims today
(Fouda 1988).
Typical traditionalists gain their credibility by portraying themselves as primarily
deductionists. Typical secularists propagate inductive reasoning as the redeemer of Muslims
from their plights. Modernists, in turn, introduce themselves to the Muslim mind as seeking the
balanced reading of both the imperatives of Islam with modern challenges.
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B. Silence of sharia/Islamic legislation
The issue of democracy calls upon Muslims to discuss topics that are not specifically
addressed in the two main sources of Sharia (the Qur'an and sunna). The silence of
sharia/Islamic legislation is another controversial issue among the three ideological schools of
thoughts. What if Muslims do not find a clear well-established verdict in either the Qur'an or
sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed regarding an issue such as democracy?
To typical traditionalists sharia cannot be totally silent or mute regarding any given issue.
That is to say, there should be a hint regarding what a sincere Muslim should follow regarding
every single issue. Besides, if it seems that there is a legislative vacuity in one topic, this is some
type of test for Muslims and thus they should cling to the original path as described in the holy
texts. Muslims should stay away from accepting bed'a/man-made innovation since it is in hellfire
as the Prophet mentioned (Al-Ahadal 2001). By doing that, traditionalists think of themselves as
the sincerest in their interpretation; since they add nothing of their own mindset to the holy texts.
They are Mutabe’een wa lassna Mubtade’een/followers and not innovators (al-Saqqaf 1993).
Their refusal of silence of sharia on some issues makes them the least likely to compromise their
views even if they do not really have specific texts to clarify where Islam stands regarding
certain issues. Unless it is based upon a familiar reading of authentic holy texts, they usually
deem any addition or different interpretation to holy texts as bed'a/man-made innovation. One
of the often quoted hadith/saying of the Prophet is the following :
I advise you to fear Allah, to listen and obey even if a slave [is in charge]. Since
whoever will live after me will witness so many changes, follow my sunna, and
the sunna of the rightly guided caliphs after me firmly cling to it. Stay away from
heresies, since each heresy is an innovation and each innovation is mischief
(Hadith number in Albany’s encyclopedia 2735).
Modernists consider the silence of sharia/Islamic legislation a deliberate space made by Allah
for the human mind to contemplate and flourish (Iqbal and Vahid 1964). There is no place for
bed'a/man-made innovation in worldly affairs according to modernists. Rather modernists often
quote the following saying of the prophet:
Whatever forbidden in the book is forbidden. Whatever is acceptable in the
book is acceptable. Whatever is left undecided, it is toleration from Allah. You
should accept His toleration. Allah never forgets (al-Qaradawi 2000a).
The silence of Sharia has a different connotation from the secularists’ perspective. It
means that Allah does not answer all the questions but He leaves them to Muslims’ discretion
(Arkoun 1994). “The prophet did not die before telling us that we need to brush our teeth. Yet
he never told us how to choose his successor. Does not this tell you something?” Rifa’at alSa'eed wondered in an interview with him. “Allah teaches us how to ask questions not to follow
pre-given answers. The Qur'an is not a book in politics, economics or social work. It is a moral
reference with no final answers to any social, political or economic problems.”
Secularists make the case that Islamists, like their peers in ancient Europe, manipulate
Muslims’ minds by telling them that Allah has sent down all the answers to all the questions and
they (the Islamists) know them and thus they should be followed and given power ('Abd al31

Karim 1987). Secularists draw the analogy with the ecclesiastic clergy of catholic Christianity
and thus emphasize the indeterminacy and relativity of sharia/Islamic legislation. They argue that
Islamists introduce themselves as super-Muslims. As Zakaria stated it:
The thesis that Islam does not and did not know a religious institution at all is
greatly exaggerated. Sometimes this religious institution used its position and
influence for the defense of the true principles of religion, and that led to intense
clashes with rulers… At other times, they put themselves at the disposal of the
ruler and issued fatwas for him…The conditions of medieval Christianity were
not fundamentally different from the conditions prevailing in Islam… The Middle
Ages are not only a period of time but they are also a state of mind…Many
characteristics of this state of mind are present in contemporary Islamic societies
(Quoted in: Flores 1993:34).
The attitude of each school toward democracy is highly influenced by their position
toward the silence of sharia/Islamic legislation. Democracy is not part of complete and perfect
sharia/Islamic legislation according to traditionalists. It is simply un-Islamic or anti-Islam if you
will. To modernists, conversely, democratic procedures and mechanisms are good innovations
that are highly compatible with Islamic teachings that fight dictatorship and shore up justice.
Modernists would argue that some democratic procedures and mechanisms may be non-Islamic
by origin but definitely can be Islamized. Secularists perceive democracy as absolutely political
matter that should not be judged by holy texts. The silence of sharia/Islamic legislation in this
regard, secularists argue, is an area for the human mind to flourish developing the necessary
political institutions and values compatible with Muslims’ needs.
C. Zones Immune to Skeptical Scrutiny
Are there areas in the Muslim legacy that are not subject to skeptical questioning and
inductive examination? Typical traditionalist Islamists would put sharia-related writings including
the fiqh/jurisprudence and fatwas/religious verdicts of al-salaf al-saleh/ the pious predecessors in
a position beyond skeptical scrutiny for the reasons mentioned earlier. Related to skeptical
examination of Islamic sources is the issue of philosophic thinking in general. Philosophy,
especially if influenced by Western logic of thinking, is blasphemy and an attempt to override
Allah’s wisdom as expressed in the great text with man’s fallible self-serving thinking according
to typical traditionalists (al-Amiri 1983).
To them, humanistic sciences are the sciences of the devil that put the fallible human
mind above Allah's legislation. The so-called Muslim philosophers throughout the Islamic history
created more division and sectarianism in the Muslim umma because of the influence of the
Greek philosophy on them. That is why Allah sent “Godly ulama” to show Muslims “the way of
their God” rather than being led astray by those who “follow the path of the devil by attributing
to Allah what He has not attributed to himself” (al-Buraiq 1994). Another traditionalist
attributed all the failures of the umma to those who betrayed the “trust that Allah has put on their
necks” by associating with Him their “own Gods of Marx, Lenin, capitalists and democracy”
(al-Sawaf 1979). Simply philosophic thinking that is unbounded by Sharia’ is the antithesis of
Islam.
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A typical modernist would be more careful not to confuse sharia/Islamic legislation as
Allah's revelation to prophet Mohamed with the interpretations, arguments and
ijtihad/independent reasoning of the companions, their followers and more recent ulama.
Modernists would even argue that the immunity of the acts and sayings of the prophet is limited
to what he conveyed about and from his God excluding things that he did or said based on his
own human intellect (Iqbal 1930; Omara 1989). Islam is a religion of thinking. Thinking is an
Islamic Obligation is a phrase that al-‘Aqqad chose as a title one of his famous books (al'Aqqad 1962). Modernists would argue that some philosophical thinking is wrong and should
be refuted whether it is coming from Islamic source or non-Islamic sources (al-'Aqqad 1962,
1963; al-Ghazali 1981; Iqbal 1930; Sayyid 1986). Typical modernists accepted dialogues with
intellectuals and philosophers and attempted to ‘enlighten’ them about their religion (Omara
1998). Though they have many reservations on the result of philosophical thinking, modernists
seem more pluralistic and more ready to listen and discuss than traditionalists (al-Sawi 1990;
'Awad 2001; Fasi 1972).
Typical secularists would not agree with either school. There is no one Islam. There as
many Islams as Muslims make of it (Zakaria 1989). Allah sent His messenger with the Qur'an
and sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed not to blindly follow them but to
contemplate and emancipate our minds from the authority of fiction, superstition and irrational
thinking. Habib Bourguiba (Brand 1998), the ex-president of Tunisia, outlawed polygamy based
on the fact that when the Qur'an limited it to four women (with the stringent condition of justice
among them), this was not a static one-time revealed teaching. Rather, Allah teaches Muslims to
extend the line of thinking by limiting the number of women available to men from almost
countless number before Islam to four during the prophet’s time and now it is Muslims’ decision
to follow the same line of thinking and make it one (Salem 1984). The same thing was said
about equating men and women in inheritance. Thus, the texts of the Qur'an are examples of
how Muslims should think rather than actual factual commands ('Abd al-Karim 1987).
That is why the existence of Allah is the only possible non-debatable issue according to
secularists (Abu Zayd 1994). Establishing such rational understanding of sharia/Islamic
legislation requires the liberation of Islam from hide-bound theology as represented by the
schools of traditional fiqh/jurisprudence and their contemporary followers (Chandra 2002; Fasi
1972).
Of course Islamists, modernists and traditionalists, do not agree to this line of thinking
since it equates the holy texts with philosophical texts that are subject to the process of picking
and choosing (al-Sawi 1993; Idris 1999; Qutb 1978).
Secularists attribute the Muslim’s plight of the mind to the lack of critical and
philosophical thinking. Muslims, according to secularists, still live with and in the mentality of
middle ages. Islamic discourse chose to follow Abu Hamed al-Ghazali’s (1058-1111 AD)
methodology of appeal to texts and traditions rather than the critical and skeptical mind of Ibn
Rushd (Averos).They took the path of imitating their ancestors rather than the path of fresh
independent examination of the world affairs. This wrong choice created at least a 400-year gap
between Muslims and the West according to Wahba (Wahba 1998).
Enlarging the area immune to skeptical examination on the part of traditionalists is seen
as an obstacle toward democracy by the other two trends. Modernists and liberal secularists
are skeptical about the compatibility of the inherited fiqh with modern democracy and its
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requirements. However, secularists’ skepticism on political issues is part of a larger and deeper
rejection of most traditional interpretations of the Holy Scriptures.
D. Violation of consensus among ancient ulama and the legacy of the past
To both schools of Islamists “ulama are the heirs of prophets” according to the saying of
prophet Mohamed (al-Okkda 2001; Khatami 2001). Their commitment is huge in terms of
showing Muslims the right path, defending the sharia, achieving the unity of umma and advising
its rulers. However, traditionalists divide regarding how ulama/scholars should perform this task
between violent and non-violent traditionalists. Modernists find no place for violence in their
doctrine unless it is defense of Islamic lands or people. However, it is crucial to note that
modernists have a tendency to think more critically into the inherited legacy of ancient ulama (alGhazali 1981) than the traditionalists who tend to avoid weakening what they perceive to be the
“pure sources of Islam and their interpreters” (al-Khodhair 1998).
To secularists, ulama should be like chemists, physicians or scientists of all sorts. They
should be subject to scientific standards, debates and questioning (Fandy 2003; Mohamed
1989). Otherwise, Islam is in danger since it is being hijacked by those ulama and their Islamist
supporters. Secularists argue that ulama and Islamists claim for themselves the true knowledge
and monopolize speaking in the name of Allah (Surush et al. 2000). Additionally, most
contemporary ulama/scholars, secularists argue, show very weak understanding of the history of
the world and sometimes even with the history of Islam itself which makes them incapable of
rising up to the intellectual debates and complications of the modern world (Arkoun and Maïla
2003).
Traditionalists perceive themselves as having a moral commitment to keep the Islamic
identity of Muslims through reducing or even eliminating ikhtlaf/differences and divisions (al-'Ali
2000). Some traditionalists reckon that their opponents deliberately seek the differences among
ulama to show how relativistic and unauthentic the teachings of Islam are (al-'Alwan 2003;
Gabreen 2003).
Very close to the previous position, modernists are concerned with making Islam a
matter of opinion. That is why they firmly stand against non-ulama who introduce themselves as
thinkers or intellectuals and come up with ungrounded opinions that create confusion and
eliminate the common ground among Muslims (Abo al-Magd 1988; al-'Aawa 2001).
Additionally, modernists reject the tendency among traditionalists to eliminate pluralism by
emphasizing an ahistorical reading of Islam that makes one opinion the right one. This attitude on
the part of traditionalists renders any modern type of ijtihad/independent reasoning bed'a/manmade innovation (al-Bouti 1990; al-Ghannouchi 1993; Omara 1989).
According to secularists, since the consensus on the wrong reading of Islam is an
obstacle toward modernization and democratization, violating the so-called consensus among
ulama is a necessary step toward a better future (interview with al-‘Ashmawi). According to
secularists, Muslims are in backwardness because of these ulamas' control over Muslims' minds.
Secularists think that they have a moral commitment toward their Muslim societies to break up
the vicious control of the retarded understanding of Islam by Islamists. Farag Fouda, in a daring
call to the grand Imam of al-Azhar, the most notable sunni Islamic school in Cairo once wrote:
Oh Shaikh al-Azhar, thank God profusely for the backward of Muslims, for it
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alone preserves your job for you! But don’t imagine for a moment that anybody
will allow you to preside over inquisition courts, to accuse and to oppress, to
threaten and to forbid (Quoted in Flores 1993:32)
Actually no progress or modernization is possible without giving the Muslim human mind
its capacity to disagree with the established Islamic clergy that claims representation of Allah
and His teachings, secularists argue (an-Naim 1990). In other words, Muslim secularists echo
Lewis's argument that Muslims have contracted a Christian illness and now they should consider
the Christian remedy of separation of religion and state (Lewis 1997).
The traditionalists' respect for ancient ulama/scholars is part of their respect for the past
in general. Traditionalist Islamists think that the early years of Islam are perfect and the more we
move from the early seventh century Islam, the less perfect the world becomes and less pious
Muslim are (Othaimeen 2001). They usually quote a saying by prophet Mohamed that:
The best among you (are) the people (who belong to) my century (or
generation). Then those next to them, then those next to them, then those next to
them….Then after them would come a people who would give evidence before
they are asked for it, and would be dishonest and not trustworthy and who
would make vows but would not fulfill them.”(Hadith number in Sahih Muslim
4599 ).
Inspired by this hadith among others and literalist interpretations, traditionalist Islamists
have a tendency to see “classical authors in rather romantic terms: as perfect individuals,
incapable of making a wrong judgment. Classical scholars themselves are also guilty of
perpetuating this. They have venerated taqlid/the following of predecessors to such an extent
that it has now become a sacred principle” (Sardar 2002). Some traditionalists make prayer to
Allah to remain followers and imitators to the early companions of the prophet (Muqaleddeen)
and not innovators/Mubtade’een in both worldly affairs and religious beliefs (al-'Ali 2002; al'Amro 2002).
Modernists note the dangerous aspect of glorifying the past and equating it with rightly
glorified original teachings of Islam (Shariati and Rajaee 1986). A typical modernist would warn
against this tendency: “Because of the sanctity of the Islamic texts (Qur'an and Sunna), salafis
(traditionalists by my terms) sanctified the era during which the texts had been revealed” (Omara
1980: 213). This sanctity of the era increases the closer we get to the age of the prophet.
Secularists tend to attribute the problems of today to the praxis of the past. The three
main causes that led to the current crisis in almost all aspects of the Islamic world are: the
ulama’s monopoly of education and knowledge, males’ monopoly of the public sphere, and the
caliphs' monopoly of public interest (Manna 2001). A famous argument made by almost all
secularists is that the Muslim application of Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation failed except for
around some thirty years during the first century of Islam. Yet after that Islamic history is a “long
series of failures” (Zakaria 1986:174). That is why it is a completely false analogy to promise
Muslims the exceptional ideal thirty years of their history and to completely ignore the lessons of
the other thirteen centuries of dictatorship and corruption in the name of religion (al-Sa'eed
2001; Engineer 1985). Turk al-Hamad, a Saudi political researcher, is critical of the
traditionalist reading that takes the following saying of Imam Malek for granted: “The affairs of
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this umma will not be better without following what its predecessors did.” Al-Hamd deems this
attitude to be wrong because it romanticizes an old golden age. Besides it creates in the Muslim
non-consciousness a myth of the possibility of replicating the past in the future with paying no
attention to the historical differences (Al-Hamad 1993).
Modernists would not confuse Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation (mainly Qur'an and
Sunna) with Islamic fiqh/jurisprudence or fatwas/religious verdicts that were issued in a given
point of time in the past. They would even be more aggressive in their refusal of confusing any of
the previous two with Muslims’ history and literature (such as the behavior or sayings of certain
rulers, poets or others) (Iqbal 1930). Modernists argue that the Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation
has provided Muslims the “noblest principles that any nation may aspire for” yet Muslims may
or may not live up to these principles. Muslims achieved excellent scores ethically and politically
during the first thirty years and relatively lower scores later on but they never were in the
complete failure that they currently face under contemporary secular regimes (al-Rayess 1998;
Howaidi 1999a; Sayyid 1986).
In conclusion, for traditionalists the past is the golden era that Muslims need to replicate;
for secularists it is the past that Muslims need to recover from. For modernists, the past is a
combination of what needs to be learned and should be avoided.
E. Cultural exchange with non-Muslims
Since democratic processes and institutions did not emerge in the Muslim world per se,
this last dimension about cultural exchange can summarize for us from one perspective all
previous points and introduce us to the next section on the attitudes of Muslim intellectuals and
ulama/scholars toward democracy. Cultural exchange and the possibility of civilizational crossfertilization with non-Muslims is an issue that widens the gap between the three schools.
As stated earlier, typical traditionalists gain their credibility in the Muslim mind through
strict deduction from holy texts and their ancient interpretations:
[A]nything not established in Islam should not be followed, as this will lead to
castigation… Islam is complete and perfect, and we derive our total lifestyle from Islam
that Allah has completed for us, we cannot add nor eliminate any teachings from this
completed religion as the Prophet said: ‘nothing of what would bring you closer to
jannah (paradise) and further away from hellfire but I have clarified for you (Jibril
2003).
This quote recapitulates some of the epistemological underpinnings of the typical
traditionalist attitude that were discussed earlier. To traditionalists, Islam is complete regarding
the issues of religion, spirituality and world affairs. Moreover the more Muslims accurately
deduce from the holy texts, the closer they are to the right path of Islam. Besides, the fear of
innovation is clear. If something is not clearly stated in the Qur'an, sunna and ijma'/consensus of
the early companions and ulama, contemporary ulama alone can deduce its verdict through
qiyas/analogical reasoning.
To traditionalists, there is no need for cultural exchange or cross-civilizational
discourses, given their gloomy view of un-Islamic civilizations. Consequently, traditionalists are
inherently anti-modern in many aspects. Importing solutions from non-Muslims defies Allah's
assertion in the Qur'an that He has perfected Muslims' religion (Chapter 5, verse 3). However,
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this verse in itself has been interpreted by traditionalists and modernists differently. Typical
traditionalists believe that Allah through the text of the Qur'an and the life of prophet Mohamed
left Muslims with no need for further investigation regarding the most important issues including
governance which is by itself part of 'aqeeda/creed. When Muslims diverge from their
'aqeeda/creed and follow the paths of wrongdoers, they move into a state of jahilliyya/the state
of ignorance before Islam (Qutb 1989). Thus, according to Enaya (1999), when one says
"Islamic democracy," one belittles Islam by making it in need of corrections and modifications
from others. This attempt in itself goes against the teachings of Islam. According to a
traditionalist Sudanese imam, “Islam has no prefixes or suffixes. Islam is beautiful and complete.
Attaching words such as democracy, socialism or the like to it, takes away from its beauty and
makes it in need of human beings to beatify it. There is not such a thing in Islam.”
Thus, democracy, liberalism, capitalism, socialism, communism, fascism, nationalism and
so forth cannot be justified in Islam either as a means or as a system of values since it is
forbidden for Muslims to imitate the disbelievers (al-Gazza'eri 1984).
Traditionalists often quote two hadiths/sayings of prophet Mohamed in which he clearly warns
Muslims against imitating the non-believers.
In the first one the prophet said:
You will surely follow the ways, steps, or traditions of those who came before
you, span by span and yard by yard (very closely) even if they entered a lizard's
hole you will enter it." The companions asked, "Oh prophet, you mean the Jews
and Christians? So he answered, who else! [Reported by Imam Bukhari]
Another hadith reads "He is not one of us, he who imitates others. Do not imitate either
the Jews or the Christians." [Reported by Imams Termithy & Abu-Dawd]
These two hadiths/sayings among others have been taken by traditionalists to be part of al-wala'
wa al-bara'a creed / alliance to Muslims and disloyalty to non-Muslims meaning Muslims should
be allies of Muslims and vindicate themselves of non-Muslims’ wrongdoings (Al-Howaini; alZawahri 2002).
According to typical traditionalists, imitating non-Muslims (and adopting democracy is
one way of doing that) has been always part of a conspiracy to “destroy Islam and annihilate its
people,” through making Muslims “roll in Western civilization away from Mohamed and his
book,” following the path of Turkey that adopted a “civil constitution instead of its sharia-based
system of government” (al-'Alem 1975:48-49). By enticing ordinary Muslims to legislate for
themselves they challenge Islam’s essence: “No God but Allah” that means no legislator but
Allah (al-Badry 1983: 150; Qutb 1989). As Allah said to his prophet:
judge thou between them by what Allah hath revealed, and follow not their vain
desires, but beware of them lest they beguile thee from any of that (teaching)
which Allah hath sent down to thee. (Chapter 4, verse 49)
That is why “it is not appropriate to use the term ‘democratic Islam’ or ‘democracy in Islam’;
Islam is self-sufficient and does not need the masks of others… No democracy, communism,
socialism or nationalism in Islam. If there is something good in any of these principles, Islam
preceded them and does not have the distortions that they have” (al-Sawaf 1979:38).

37

Thus adopting un-Islamic political or socio-economic systems is not good or right since
it makes individuals compete for worldly benefits; yet Islamic bai’a (allegiance) is based on
belief for the sake of piety. As a result, “Islam ordains upon the al-ra'eeya/subjects not to give
the oath of allegiance except for a pious man” (al-Sharawi 1980:18).
To traditionalists, democracy is un-Islamic by association as well. It comes from the
Judeo-Christian west with all its covetousness, lack of respect for religion and affection for
personal liberties. Muslims are highly encouraged not even to visit the West, let alone import its
systems and values (al-Nadwi 1985). Al-Zawahri perceives a label such as a “Muslim
democrat” to be self-contradictory. “Whoever labels himself as a Muslim democrat or a Muslim
who calls for democracy is like saying he is a Jewish Muslim or a Christian Muslim” (al-Zawahri
NA:22). Al-Zawahri’s position is not limited to the label-democracy but to the thing-democracy
as well. He wrote a piece of advice in response to a fatwa that would allow Muslims to join
parliaments. The title of Al-Zawhari’s piece is very telling: “Advice to the Umma to avoid Ibn
Baaz’s Fatwa of Permissibility to Join Majlis al-Umma/Parliament.”
Modernists and secularists are very critical of traditionalists mainly because they exhibit
noticeable hostility to intellectualism, pluralism and any sectarian divisions within Islam.
Indeterminacy of rational thinking and ijtihad/independent reasoning is not tolerated by
traditionalists ('Arabeyat 1998). Wahabism is considered, from the perspective of their critics,
as the worst example of traditionalism. Whabists refuse to "interpret the divine law from a
historical, contextual perspective and treat the vast majority of Islamic history as a corruption of
the true and authentic Islam” (Abou El Fadl 2001). Rather, typical Wahabists do not consider
themselves as one “school of thought within Islam, but [as] Islam.” (Abou El Fadl 2001)
Typical modernist Islamists, by definition, do not a priori extend their definition of the
"un-Islamic" to non-Islamic sources and civilizations. Rather, a Muslim can learn whatever is
good for him/herself and society regardless of its origins (Fasi 1972). Typical modernists do not
perceive al-wala'’ wa al-bara'a creed/alliance to Muslims and disloyalty to non-Muslims as part
of sharia/Islamic legislation; rather it is part of fiqh/jurisprudence that may not be valid for
Muslims right now. Even if Muslims abide by this creed, it should not be an obstacle toward
learning from other civilizations (al-Qaradawi 2003). Modernists believe that whatever achieves
justice and fairness among humans, even if it is not explicitly mentioned in sharia, is part of it and
vice versa. That is because sharia/Islamic legislation in its origin and purpose is based upon the
interest of people in this life and hereafter. Modernists usually quote a famous saying by a
medieval scholar that goes as follows:
Everything that may divert people from justice to injustice, from mercy to its
opposite, from what is good to what is evil, from wisdom to foolishness is not
part of sharia even if [somebody has] associated it with sharia through [false]
interpretation (al-Jawziyah 1969: part 3, page 1).
Following the same logic, modernists often quote the early praxis of the prophet and his
companions who learned a lot of worldly inventions from the Persians, Romans and Egyptians
as far as they do not contradict clear-cut "do" and "do not do" of the holy texts. This group of
Islamist scholars, intellectuals and activists usually quotes an unauthentic hadith that reads:
“Wisdom is the wandering goal of the believer. Wherever he finds it, he will be the first to follow
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it.” Thus, if Muslims refute Darwinism, Marxism or the contributions of Freud and Kant, this is
not because everything they said was wrong. Some of what they said may be useful and thus
deserves to be studied al-Qaradawi 2000). The following quote best reflects modernists’
position on cultural exchange. “I am Muslim. I may like to eat an Arab grilled fat sheep or a
European simple boiled dish. No problem as far as I mention the name of Allah and eat from
what is in front of me according to Islamic teachings” (al-Ghazali 1985). Mohamed Al-Ghazali
best exemplified the modernist thinking in his refusal of a nominal Islamic constitution prepared
by al-Nabhani since it does not have enough legal guarantees to ensure shura/mutual
consultation, political freedoms and public interests. Al-Ghazali praised the 1923 Egyptian
constitution that was mainly imported from the West as practically more Islamic than most of the
so-called Islamic constitutions (al-Ghazali 1997:156).
Thus a mature Muslim can read un- and non-Islamic philosophies, and pick and choose
what is compatible with his/her ethics and creed (Shariati and Rajaee 1986). Muslims cannot
refute the wisdom that may exist in the books of the “people of falsehood” (al-Qaradawi
2000a:45). Most of what Muslims learn from others was mainly what others previously had
learned from Muslims (al-Ghazali 1997; Rahman 1982). However, this learning cannot violate
or contradict what they perceive to be the fundamentals of Islam. That is why they may accept
Western technologies and institutions but not some creeds such as separation of mosque and
state ('Arabeyat 1998).
This creed contradicts oneness of religion and state in Islam and
assumes conflict between them. A conflict can be between two separate parties but cannot be
between the one (al-Ghannouchi 2003). Some modernists even give the right of
ijtihad/independent reasoning to all Muslims who have the right to choose among the
ijtihad/independent reasoning of ulama (al-Turabi 2003; 'Arabeyat 1998). Unlike secularists,
modernists aim at advocating "modernization without encouraging servility to the West and
discouraging confidence in one’s own cultural resources” (Keddie 1972).
Secularists, unlike both traditionalists and modernists, start from the assumption of
Muslims’ need to follow the paths of the most successful to outdo them. This is exactly what the
West did by learning from ancient Muslims and others. The Islamists’ slogans about the peculiar
and idiosyncratic nature of Muslims are obstacles to rather than catalysts for development and
modernization. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of almost all Muslim territories
under the European colonial powers were not a coincidence or isolated events. Rather, Muslims
stopped developing new ideas in response to new challenges. They clung to the old answers in
face of new questions until they found Napoleon occupying Egypt in 1798. Since then it has
been clear that the gap is getting larger and larger between downward sloping curve of Muslims’
power and flourishing Western democracies (al-'Azm 1969; Fouda 1993). Several attempts
were made to catch up with the Western models but they remained scattered and superficial
mainly because of the supremacy of the theological mentality in the Muslim land and lack of a
worldview that would respect other civilizations and learn from them (Wahba 1998)
Secularists believe that it is very difficult to import Western materialist products and
outcomes without understanding and later adopting the system of beliefs and ideologies behind
them. In a clear criticism of modernists, secularists do not see how possible to “import from the
west what is compatible with our values and leave the rest” (Al-Hamad 1993).
Interaction and learning from other civilizations is a human necessity yet will never
succeed without emancipation from the power of the "holy" interpretations and traditions that
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come as a package with the holy texts (Arkoun 1994). Actually, Muslims imprison themselves
in the old books of the past / turath whether useful or unusual while the world around them
advances in all fields. If learning other languages was discouraged by traditionalists, secularists
deem translating from other civilizations a very important sign of the perseverance of Muslims
and their capacity to make up what they missed. Yet, a secularist argues, all the books that
Arabs translated into Arabic since caliph al-Ma’moun (1000 years ago) is around 10,000
books while Spain translated into Spanish the same number in one year (Bagabeer 2003).
To secularists, Marx, Kant, Locke, Machiavelli, Voltaire, Madison and Rousseau are
more acceptable sources of knowledge and virtue than most of the ancient scholars of Islam
because of the capacity of Western thinkers to set free the human mind from the chains of the
church. They think that a similar reform is needed in the Muslim mind too (Barakah 2002).
Arkoun’s intellectual project collapses the artificial gaps that both Islamists and orientalists
create between Islamic and western civilizations and intellectual heritages. Both civilizations are
built upon religious beliefs and commitments. There will be no salvation for Muslims without
acknowledging their influence on the West and internalizing the influence of the west on them
(Arkoun 1994).
Modernists and traditionalists perceive secularism as an alien solution to a problem that
never existed in the history of Islam since Islam never had a clergy similar to the Catholic
Church. Secularism, modernists argue, is compatible with the Christian creed, yet it is at odds
with Islam (al-Amiri 1983; al-Qaradawi 1980). Mohamed was both a prophet and a politician.
He led the prayer and signed political treaties; conveyed the message of Islam and led armies;
gave sermons and sent ambassadors. Neither Jesus nor Moses had clear political roles to play.
Actually both of them left earth before establishing a coherent society. Mohamed, conversely,
left the responsibility of defending Islam in the hands of the faithful who later on established the
Islamic caliphate. However, when despotic rulers took over power in this Islamic caliphate, this
did not happen because of Islam but despite Islam's teachings. Besides, the ulama/scholars were
the main source of opposition in the Islamic society which is contrary to the situation in ancient
Catholic Europe.
Secularists disagree with the above characterization. They reckon that Muslims’
contemporary intellectual and political dilemma is similar to the Western Middle Ages with all its
implications. There is no much difference between the pope and his priests trying to defend their
status and Islamists' attempts to jump to power. That is why they attack any attempt to liberate
women, build modern education systems, or to create modern civil society. Furthermore, they
refuse to lift their custody over the public mind and call any criticism to their authority some type
of “intellectual invasion” coming from the West (al-'Eraqi 2002). Islamists leave the Muslim
mind with a golden past and refuse to accept the modern inventions and innovations that left
Muslims the least developed among all the civilizations of the world ('Asfoor 2003).
F. Sub-sects:
It is important to note that traditionalists differ regarding the issue of violence. Some of
them infer from the holy texts and their interpretations good reasons to wage violence against
their fellow Muslims; others refrain from pursuing this path. Secularists as well are not identical
when it comes to the issue of pluralism. Some are autocrats; others are liberals.
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1. Traditionalists: Violent and Pacifists
All violent Islamists are traditionalists but not all traditionalists are violent. Some of them
are pacifists. Thus, all modernist Islamists are not violent. However, it is crucial in this study to
limit the definition of violence toward the governments and societies of the Muslim world. That is
to say that Muslims in general regardless of their ideological preferences may support violent
resistance against Israel's occupation of Arab/Muslim lands (al-'Abeykan 2003).
The difference between violent and pacifist traditionalist is lies on which verses they
choose to articulate the concept of jihad. Violent traditionalists disagree with pacifist
traditionalists (e.g. Sufis) and modernists on the applicability of the so-called the verse of the
sword.
To understand the textual logic behind the use of violence on the parts of violent
traditionalists such as those found in al-Jama’a al-Islameya, al-Jihad, al-Qae'da, al-Salfeya alJihadeya in Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, Malaysia, Morocco, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the U.S.
among others, we need to refer to the fact that there are three types of verses in the holy Qur'an
and hadiths/sayings of prophet Mohamed that pertain to the issue of violence: First there are
verses that ask Muslims to treat non-Muslims justly and kindly, such as:
Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive
you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loveth those
who are just. (Chapter 60, verse 8).
Second, there are verses that ask Muslims to lean toward peace if others do the same
such as: “But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace”
(Chapter 6, verse 61).
A third type of verses demands Muslims fight the infidels such as the verse that is
labeled the ‘verse of the sword.’ The verse reads11:
But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans
wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them
in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and
practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving,
Most Merciful. (Chapter 9, verse 5).
Violent traditionalists believe that this verse among others propels sincere believers to
wage violent jihad against all infidels, by virtue of them being infidels, including their rulers who
replaced the sharia of Allah with Western laws and falsify Hakemeyat Allah/ the sovereignty of
Allah (Mawdudi Concepts of Islam Regarding Religion and State 1977; Qutb 1989 ).
Pacifist traditionalists along with modernist Islamists think of this verse as an exception to
general principles mentioned elsewhere in the Qur'an that equate jihad with defense and require
justice and kindness as a path for co-existence (Chapter 49/13) (Ibn Baaz 1992). Besides,
11

There is disagreement about which verse is actually the verse of the sword. Yet most likely it is the quoted
verse or the following one that is usually quoted with it from the same chapter of Surat al-Tawba: “Fight
those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by
Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from among the People of the Book, until
they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.” (Chapter 9, verse 29)
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pacifist traditionalists use very tough criteria to permit the use of violence against their rulers such
as prohibition of prayers, denying the authenticity of a verse or hadith and/or publicly renouncing
Allah’s verdicts and replacing them with others, believing that the latter are better or more just
than the former (Othaimeen 1998).
Modernists in particular refuse the radical concept of jihad adopted by violent
traditionalists. If this conceptualization of jihad advanced by violent traditionalists is true and
authentic, then the Islamic state is a colonial state that aims at khiraj/properties of the nations
Muslims occupy (al-Ghazali 1985). A modernist describes the violent traditionalist argument as
“ignorance, stupidity, even madness” (al-Rikabi 2003). Another eminent Pakistani modernist
referred to the success of Islamists in general in guiding a considerable percentage of new
generations of young men and women into love and respect for their origins but this success was
coupled with a magnificent failure in creating civilizational and intellectual depth and modern
understanding of Islam’s peaceful and tolerant message (Rahman 1982).
Violent traditionalists consider the verse(s) of the sword, that were revealed to be
chronologically last, and therefore abrogating and amending former verses (al-Zawahri 2002;
Azzam 1984; Qutb 1989). They make the analogy between two verses: “O ye who believe!
Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you” (Chapter 2, verse 183)
that assigns fasting on each capable Muslim with another verse in the same chapter that reads
“Fighting is prescribed upon you, and ye dislike it.” (Chapter 2, verse 216). How come that
Muslims comply with the prescription of fasting unquestionably yet question and philosophize
the prescription of fighting?, a violent traditionalist argues (Halima 2001).
Non-violent traditionalists would be reluctant to accept the idea of abrogation without
another clear text that says so (al-Buraiq 1993). Thus, they prioritize the verses that ask
Muslims to seek peace at the expense of the verses that solicit Muslims to wage wars.
Modernist Islamists, in contrast, would go into a complex process of deduction and induction
that would take into consideration three aspects: 1- the linguistic meaning of the texts; 2- the
historical setting (reasons for revealing these verses); 3- the consequences of taking one verse
(and not the other) as the principal rule; while the other is a mere exception or boundary. By
following this way of thinking, modernist Islamists end up rejecting the idea of abrogation and
instead think of the verses as different directions that were given on different occasions (alGhazali 1985). Thus in this particular case of using violence, modernist Islamists would not think
that the mentioned verses of chapter nine (sura al-Tawba) have actually abrogated 120 other
verses that were revealed earlier to emphasize, peaceful co-existence of Muslims with nonMuslims let alone many verses and hadiths that prohibit Muslims from killing each others (Abo
al-Magd 1988; al-Ghannouchi 1993; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Anwar 1995; Howaidi 1999b).
According to modernists, the rules of jihad are not applicable to the governments that do not
apply Islamic Sharia since “the rulers are not infidels even if they did not apply Sharia.” (al-Din
2001: 85; al-Qaradawi 2001a)
Pacifist traditionalists’ main field of jihad is in da'wa/inviting Muslims and non-Muslims
to a better understanding of Islam; thus they devote themselves to respond to questions, teach
the Qur'an, explain its verses, issue fatwas and revive old ijtihad/independent reasoning to
remind Muslims of the basics of their religion (Ma'moon 2003). They are the least politicized
compared to all other Islamists and can be considered the religious “preservers” or “caretakers”
of status quo (Lipset and Basu 1976). Violent traditionalists think of the pacifists in the same
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way Marx thought of religion in bourgeois society (al-Zawahri NA; Qutb 1978). Modernists
think of pacifist traditionalists in general as incompetent lawyers who claim to defend the just
cause of Islam (al-Ghazali 1981). Secularists believe that this type of non-violent traditionalists
represents the moderate and technical Islam and leave the affairs of politics, economics,
engineering and so forth to the best who can handle them (al-Ashmawi 1987).
2. Secularist: Liberals and Autocrats
Some secularists are more pluralistic than others. Autocratic secularists may be
benevolent or malevolent. In the history of Muslim world, almost all the rulers were autocrats
(who possess personal political domination) but not necessarily unjust dictators. This distinction
should be understood within Roy’s notice that in the Muslim world the opposite of tyranny is not
liberty but justice (Roy 1994). A just benevolent autocrat was the catchword of an ideal system
of governance. Thus, judged by the history of the Muslim world, autocratic governance should
not be necessarily equated with malicious dictatorship. Liberal secularists are the closest to the
Western concept of liberal democracy. They think that all citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims
alike, should enjoy all basic human and political rights including Islamists as far as they abide by
the democratic principles (Abul Khair 2003).
Autocratic secularists in return oppose and fear Islamists (traditionalists and modernists)
more than they respect democratic principles and procedures. Put differently, they know that if
they allow real democracy in Muslim countries, the public will get mobilized by the other two
groups which means the end of their reign and probably the end of democracy once allowed.
Their best bet then is to make sure that guided risk-free liberalization, if any, is at its minimalist
level. To justify their autocratic tendencies autocratic secularists poison the well of Islamists by
equating all Islamists to one version of long-bearded fascist fanatics who want to establish
totalitarian theocracies once in power. If there are differences among Islamists, secular autocrats
would argue, then it is a difference in degree rather than in kind. This was the argument made by
the Tunisian president Zein Abdin Ben Ali to decapitate the Islamic opposition (Renaissance or
Nahda party) after winning the elections of 1993 with 99.91 percent of the vote (King 2003).
"If you open the door for genuine democracy, you have the chance that fundamentalists sill
come to power. What will the Americans do with them?” the head of the Foreign Relations
Committee in Egypt’s parliament contended (Faki 2003). The result is a patriarchal system
(Abu Odeh 2003; Sharabi 1988).
Secular autocratic discourse is associated with most intellectuals who earn their living
through glorifying and defending the rulers in most Muslim countries. Most of these regimes have
learned how to play the game of autocratic tactical liberalization through the measures of “statemonitored political openness to promote reforms that appear pluralistic but function to preserve
autocracy” (Ottaway et al. 2002). These regimes are highly skillful at controlling “elections,
manipulating divide-and-rule tactics, state interference in civil society organizations, and the
obstruction of meaningful political party systems, these regimes have created deeply entrenched
systems that are surprisingly effective at resisting democratic change” (Ottaway et al. 2002).
Most autocrats face a dilemma of credibility as they use democratic rhetoric yet
systematically exclude or marginalize their most important rivals, the Islamists whose discourse
resonates with an important segment of the public. Autocratic activists argue that if free and fair
elections are held, they will bring to power political parties and movements that will abrogate
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democracy itself and rather create a more despotic theocracy. Thus the status quo, though not
fully democratic, is better than theological dictatorship that would come hand in hand with the
naïve trust in Islamists’ respect for democracy (Fouda 1993). To skirt this dilemma many
governments, such as those in Algeria, Kuwait, Indonesia, Niger, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt,
Lebanon, Yemen, Malaysia, and Morocco allow Islamists to sneak into politics but not to the
extent to pose a viable alternative source of legitimacy (Esposito 1996; Etienne 1987). An
immediate democratization process may make democracy a more remote likelihood because it
would “too quickly tip the balance in favor of the groups that are best organized and enjoy
grassroots support, Islamist organizations in most cases” (Ottaway et al. 2002). Democracy
requires time and it is not necessarily the most immediate task of the moment. A Jordanian
former prime minister argues:
Democracy is an evolving being, gets born and grows up. It is never created all
at once. Whoever asks for something pre-maturely, one will be punished by not
getting it. The baby that is born bigger than its natural size either will die; the
mother will die or both will die (al-Rawabda 2001).
According to autocratic secularists, Muslims are not ready for democracy: illiteracy,
tribalism, apathy, emotionalism, and nostalgia are not conducive to democracy. It is argued that
most of these problems are not necessarily the outcomes of wrong policies adopted by the
autocratic rulers themselves (Mahathir and Hashim 2000). They were inherited from the
distorting experience of colonialism that led to (1) urbanization without industrialization, (2)
verbal education without productive training, (3) secularization without scientification (decline of
religion without the rise of science), and (4) capitalist greed without capitalist discipline (Mazrui
1990:35).
Unlike others, the autocratic discourse is unique in its defense of the status quo. To the
question, "is the ruler autocratic because of the people or the people not democratic because of
the ruler?," autocratic discourse would definitely refer to the masses who are not ready for
liberty (Zartman 1982) as the cause of leisurely democratization. Some examples may support
the autocratic argument: the Lebanese democratic experience ended up with a severe civil war
(Fisk 2002). The democratic political opening in Egypt in the eighties opened up the can of
massive violent fundamentalism (Mubarak 1992). The rebellion against Siyad Berri in Somalia
ended up with chaotic state breakdown (Schofield 1996). Free elections in Algeria led the
country into civil war with tens of thousands of deaths and causalities (Martnez 2000). Hafez alAssad's autocratic policies managed to break the vicious cycle of coups d’etat by systematic
removal of his opponents for “the interest of Syrians and all the Arab umma” (Assad and Talas
1990). Each democratic experience in Nigeria, Pakistan, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire and the Sudan
among others failed to be sustained and was shattered due to military intervention. Interestingly
enough, autocratic discourses are similar and propagate the argument that each autocrat
maintains the highest possible levels of freedoms given the potentials of instability (Berberoglu
1999; Musharraf 1999; Soekarno 1959). Autocratic discourse is clear as well in the importance
of other tasks such as defending national integrity and security (Hussein 1988).
In democratic countries, the majority or at least the plurality forms the government; in
Muslim countries the schism is severe and the majority is apathetic and irrational; that is why the
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autocrat has to create and shape the majority around his persona. Muslim autocratic rulers
attempt to accomplish this task of holding their countries together through mobilizing symbols,
pictures, slogans and the annihilation of possible opponents (Diamond et al. 2003).
Liberal secularists disagree. Liberal secularists argue that no limits on anybody’s right to
be part of the political competition should be allowed. That is why their main target of criticism
is not Islamists in opposition; rather their main battle is with autocratic rulers; Islamists or
secularists.
For decades after independence, most populist autocrats had suspended
democracy until national liberation; until Palestine had been liberated; until we
have economic development; until we have true social justice, and so on. As it
turns out now, after fifty years of depriving ourselves of democracy, we find
ourselves with none of these things! And we are no closer to democracy… We
must not continue to allow ourselves to be manipulated by these false
messiahs… Now we know better than to fall for the despots' delaying tactics
(Ibrahim 2003).
Liberal secularists perceive the ruling non-democratic regimes as more dangerous and
immediate challenge than Islamists (Abdelrazeq 2001). From their perspective, the appeal to
Islamists comes from the fact that they do not have current failures in most societies (Hariq
2001). The more they reach power and fail to convert their demagogic slogans into practical
solutions, the more Muslims will refrain from electing them.
Liberal secularists argue that failures of Islamists in the Sudan, Iran, and Indonesia among other
places will prove that politics is not about slogans and symbols but about running trains, building
bridges, delivering public services, fighting diseases and eliminating illiteracy (Ibrahim 1984).
With those kinds of problems, how many times Islamists pray a day will not be the main factor
in determining their re-election.
Liberals do not buy the autocrats’ argument that
fundamentalists would annihilate the available, though limited, freedoms once in power.
Autocrats do not show enough tolerance toward opposition parties even if they are
secularist or Islamic with a genuine democratic and liberal agenda such as al-Wasat party (the
middle way) in Egypt. This party “advocates political pluralism and human rights…has a woman
and a Christian on its central committee, setting it apart from other Islamic groups” (Rouleau
2001). Yet the Egyptian government does not (or does not want to) see the difference between
al-Wasat party and other Islamists. Whether out of conviction or opportunism, Islamists learned
how to shape their political discourse and propaganda to reveal the autocratic tendencies of the
rulers by repudiating “all forms of violence, whatever their sources” (al-Nahda 2001) asking for
a real opportunity for them to prove their adherence to democratic principles. Autocrats know
that this is a risky and irreversible path (Ibrahim 2002).
Liberal secularists have the weakest voice in the Muslim world and they seem to be the
least in number too (Salamah 1994). They do not have the baksheesh (tips and free services)
that autocratic rulers have (Korany 1994). They do not have the legacy of the past and claims
of Islamic assala /authenticity that Islamists have. No wonder that their program of
democratization failed so far. “How can you have democratic institutions if you have few
democrats?” (Gerges 2001)
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To sum up the discussion of the typology of the intellectual map, Table 2.1 has been
developed. As the table shows, the three schools face common challenges and concerns. They
respond to them differently, including the challenge of democracy itself that has not been
addressed fully yet and will be discussed in the pages to come. The table as well shows that
there are five major types of intellectuals and scholars: Islamist violent traditionalists, Islamist
pacifist traditionalists, Modernist Islamist, liberal secularist and autocratic secularists. These
schools of intellectuals and ulama/scholars contest scarce resources. Each school presents itself
as the genuine representative of Islam and speaker of its name.
Table 2.1
Three Main Schools of Intellectuals and Scholars
Traditionalist
Islamists
1) For something Be consensually
to be Islamic, it
accepted by sharia
should
and ulama.
2) Silence of
Impossible
Sharia is
3) Zones
sharia and fiqh
immune to
skepticism are
4) Violation of
destroying the unity
consensus
and uniqueness of the
among ulama is
umma
5) Cultural
imitation and
exchange with
innovation
non-Muslims is
6) Sects:
Violent
Pacifist
7) Democracy is Anti/un-Islamic

Modernist
Islamists
Not contradict the
sharia

Secularist
Muslims
in the interest of society
regardless of holy texts

opportunity for
Ijtihad
Sharia

a sign of the
indeterminacy of sharia.
No immune zones

dangerous but
possible.

Necessary to eliminate
traditional consensus

a search for wisdom

better than blind imitation
of ancestors

Islamist Democrats
Islamic/Islamizable

Liberals
Necessary

Autocrats
Impractical

Traditionalist Islamists limit what is acceptable by Islam to what has been anciently
accepted by sharia/Islamic legislation and consensually condoned by al-salaf al-saleh/the pious
predecessors. To them sharia/Islamic legislation can never be silent even if they need to resort to
qiyas/analogical reasoning. Preserving the identity of this umma/nation requires traditionalists to
keep both sharia/Islamic legislation and traditional fiqh/jurisprudence immune to skeptical minds
who want to corrupt the ideal legacy of the past. That is why they would argue against any
bed'a/man-made innovation or violation of the consensus among ulama/scholars. The greatest
threat to this pure Islamic tradition of respecting the legacy of al-salaf al-saleh/the pious
predecessors is coming from the external sources of values, norms and ideas most notably the
West. However, traditionalists differ in their strategies to bring their ideals into power. Some are
violent; others are pacifists. Whether violent or pacifist, they think ill of democracy as an alien
un/anti-Islamic system of government that replaces the will of Allah with the will of the masses.
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Modernists on the other hand respond to the previous questions differently. They accept
new ideas, mechanisms and values as far as they do not contradict authentic and wellestablished sharia/Islamic legislation. They would accept that Allah left Muslims deliberately
with some legislative vacuum that should be filled by the human mind performing
ijtihad/independent reasoning within the boundaries of Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation.
Well-established and clear-cut verses of the Qur'an and hadiths/sayings of the prophet
are the only zones that are immune to skeptical scrutiny. Yet the interpretations of these verses
and hadiths are subject to ijtihad/independent reasoning. The scholars of the past and al-salaf alsaleh/the pious predecessors performed ijtihad/independent reasoning to respond the new
challenges that they faced. Now it is time for modern and contemporary Muslims to have their
share in this ijtihad/independent reasoning. Modernists think that most of their modern
ijtihad/independent reasoning rarely violates consensually agreed upon fatwas/religious verdicts
of the past. Even if this violation happens, there should be a direct and clear reference to
authentic sources of Islam to justify the violation of the previous ijma'/consensus. Modernists
find nothing in the Islamic authentic sources that hinders them from communicating and learning
from non-Muslims as far as they do not infringe upon authentic Islamic principles. To
modernists, most aspects of democracy are compatible with Islam.
Secularists do not think that holy texts tell Muslims much about how to run their
societies. Holy texts are excellent sources of aqeeda/creed and ethics but not politics and
economics. Numerous and sometimes contradictory interpretations and inferences made based
upon the very same verses or sayings of the prophet indicate that most of these texts have no
one meaning until the human mind imposes its understanding on them. The silence of
sharia/Islamic legislation regarding many issues is another sign that Allah wants the human
intellect to function and flourish.
To them all texts and issues are subject to human scrutiny with no immune zones. By
doing so, Muslims will replace their obsolete impractical perception of the world with more
contemporary science-based ideologies. Cultural exchange with other civilizations is a must in
this regard. Some secularists are liberals; others are autocrats. Liberals tend to think of
democracy as good and possible. Autocrats think that democracy is not possible in their
respective countries without giving Islamists their golden opportunity to establish theological
states.
3. Four Readings of Democracy
No one single group can claim absolute triumph in this intellectual contest in the Muslim
world since it is still escalating on different fronts and over different issues. The attitudes of the
previous schools regarding democracy and its Islamic alternatives will follow. Yet it should be
noted that violent Islamists do not differ from the rest of traditionalists except regarding the issue
of the use of violence against rulers and their supporters. That is why in tables 2 and 3 all
traditionalists will be treated as one group.
a. Shura and/versus Democracy
The most famous concept that comes to the Muslim mind when asked about Islamic
governance is shura/mutual consultation or governance based upon decision by consultation and
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deliberation. When traditionalists are asked if not the un-Islamic democracy, then what? The
traditionalists’ answer is shura . Shura/mutual consultation is an Islamic principle that requires
Muslims to consult each other on important matters as it is ordained in the Qur'anic chapter of
al-Shura.
Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who (conduct)
their affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what We bestow on
them for Sustenance. (Chapter 42, verse 32)
When it comes to the application of shura, traditionalists travel in history to al-salaf alsaleh/the pious predecessors of Islam to infer from their writings how shura was and should be
applied. The first lesson that they learn from them is that all issues that are already determined
by Qur'an, sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed and ijma'/consensus are not
subject of consultation. To traditionalists, shura is the antithesis of democracy. For the past fifty
years, traditionalists used every possible argument, whether logical or fallacious, to prove the
contradiction between shura and democracy. Ali Belhaj, the second person in the Islamic Front
of Algeria said: “I disbelieve in dictatorship as much as I disbelieve in democracy. Democracy is
shirk (polytheism)” (al-Gorshy 1997).
Ayman al-Zawahri clearly adopts a similar position when he considers democracy to be
“a new religion to allow God-like men to legislate for themselves… versus the religion of Allah
that gave the right of legislation to Allah and Allah alone” (al-Zawahri NA: 19). Thus,
democracy is inherently un-Islamic since it gives individuals the rights to legislate regarding
everything including issues that Allah has already stated in His own words. “When Allah
decides, there is no place for consultation” (al-Sharawi 1980:18; Mawdudi 1977). Even the
issues that are not addressed in Holy Scriptures should not be subject to the debates by
commoners. This deliberation should be limited to Ahl-alhal wa-a'lakd/men of decision making
because they are pious and knowledgeable to make ijtihad/independent reasoning and draw
verdicts by qiyas/analogical reasoning (Taskheeri 1999). Even if the ruler consults, he is not
forced to act according to the decision of the majority. According to typical traditionalists, the
ruler is responsible before Allah more than he is responsible before people, following the
Qur'anic verse that says:
and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs (of
moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah. For
Allah loves those who put their trust (in Him) (Chapter 3, verse 3).
Traditionalists argue that on this verse Allah addresses prophet Mohamed to consult
and listen to his companions and then to make up his mind and trust God only. The most recent
application of unbinding shura is the Taliban’s system of government that had several shura
councils, none of which could enforce their decisions on mulla Omar (Haqqani 1997).
Traditionalists state that the prophet and his early companions consulted just to garner opinions
and information to take enlightened decisions with no commitments toward their followers to
abide by the decision of the majority since the commitment is before Allah and to serve his
religion alone (Mushtaheri 1993).
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King Fahd of Saudi Arabia wore the hat of a traditionalist when he commented on the
compatibility of democracy with Islam:
The democratic system prevalent in the world is not appropriate in this
region…The election system has no place in the Islamic creed, which calls for a
government of advice and consultation and for the shepherd’s openness to his
flock, and holds the ruler fully responsibly before his people (Fahd 1992).
Table 2.2
Break Down of Democratic Values and Institutions – Shura
Is shura

Islamist
Traditionalist Modernists
1- Mandatory?
Imperative by
Imperative by
Islam
Islam and
practical
reasons
2- Binding?
No
Yes
3- Institutionalizable? May be
Yes
4- Open to the
No.
Yes
commons?
5- Selection of
Ahl-Alhal waElections with
consultants?
Al'akd
given
restrictions

Secularist
Liberals
Autocrats
Imperative for Negligible
practical
reasons
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No.

Elections

Appointment

An Iranian conservative faqih/scholar argues that Islam cannot allow the unqualified to govern
and rule either with the approval of the masses, as in Democracies, or against their wills as in
aristocracies. This is simply un-Islamic. Islam’s way is to keep Allah as the only legislator and to
allow people to apply Allah’s laws meaning sharia. Thus the ruler abides by Allah’s imperatives;
that is why there is no place for dictatorship in Islam. Rulers are good Muslims as far as they
obey Allah more than they obey their own whims or even the people (Shirazi 2001).
Modernists disagree. They think that typical traditionalists draw a false analogy between
Muslims' golden era and contemporary circumstances (al-Bouti 1990). Modernists believe that
shura is not only obligatory but the result of the shura is binding (al-Gorshy 1997). They even
extend the frame of candidate consultants to include all Muslims regardless of gender or
knowledge, based on the fact that ulama/scholars, though knowledgeable about religion, are
limited in their understanding non-religious worldly affairs (Abo al-Magd 1988; al-Ghazali ND).
Modernists use the term Ahl-alhal wa -a'lakd/men of decision making (al-Gorshy 1997) too
but these people are publicly elected representatives of the whole umma, including non-Muslims
(al-Ghannouchi 1988; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Bishri 1996; Howaidi 1985). Unlike traditionalists
who have many reservations on bed'a/man-made innovations, modernists believe that Western
democratic institutions are the best mechanisms for implementing shura/mutual consultation in
Muslim societies (Nehnah 1999).
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Liberal secularists perceive shura/mutual consultation as a characteristic of good
governance that existed before Islam in Arabia and was ordained by Islam later on; yet Muslim
rulers since the Umayyad caliphs manipulated it (Heggi 2002). A Western democratic regime of
government with separation of powers and checks and balances would be the ideal shura-based
system of government (Surush et al. 2000). Autocratic secularists do not trust the masses and
reduce shura to the deliberation among their aids since shura is not obligatory or binding. If there
are people to be consulted, they are mostly appointed or at best elected among a predetermined set of loyal politicians (Halliday 2000; Hariq 2001). Autocrats in this sense are very
elitist who distrust the masses.
As a way of summing up the core differences among the four different schools of
intellectuals and ulama/scholars, Table 2.2 was developed.
b. Democratic Institutions and Processes
A closer look at the inclusiveness of the political participation is another aspect of strife
among the four mentioned schools of thought. Typical traditionalists would disfranchise nonMuslims, Muslims from other sects and women from any self-initiated or voluntary participation
in running the affairs of society. Since a non-Muslim or a woman cannot lead Muslims in prayer,
they are not allowed to have the right to decide for the whole umma. The often quoted
statement is Ibn al-Qayyim’ statement that “a woman for her husband is like a slave for his
master” as quoted by traditionalists (al-Oda 1994; Ibn Baaz 1981). Women are intellectually
and physically suited to be the queens of their homes with no political rights whatsoever
(Abdelkarim 2002). What is said about women is said about non-Muslims too (al-Hawali
1994). Non-Muslims are safe in Muslim land but they do not have the same political rights of
Muslims (Gabreen 1989). Equality before government means allowing the infidels and
innovators to have sultan / authority over the believers (al-Oda 1997). The most ideal way for
selecting the ruler is through Ahl-aAlhal Wa-a'Al’akd/men of decision making then the
bay'a/oath of allegiance among the rest of the umma. Ahl-aAlhal Wa-a'Al’akd/men of decision
making are the most pious and knowledgeable of who best fits into this major position (alKhalidi 1984).
A quote from the Qur'an was used to refute majority rule while it is clear that it is not
about the majority of Muslims but the majority of non-Muslims: “Wert thou to follow the
common run of those on earth, they will lead thee away from the Way of Allah. They follow
nothing but conjecture: they do nothing but lie” (Chapter 4, verse 116). This verse was used to
characterize majority rule as un-Islamic (Saleh 1992). Another account considered the idea of
majority rule and competing parties toward power as forbidden bed’a and imitation to the
“lovers of this world” since the prophet clearly stated that whoever asks for power should not
be given it (Soweyyan 1999). To traditionalists bed’a revolves around “everything whose
essence was available during the prophet’s era yet the prophet did not do” (alsalafyoon.com;
Soweyyan 1999). Since the prophet could have used majority rule and counted the votes of his
companions yet he did not, then it is un-Islamic bed'a/man-made innovation (Soweyyan 1999).
Asking two of the traditionalists (Sheikh al-Galali of Saudi Arabia and Tomawi of the
Sudan) about any possibility of tajdid/rejuvenation in Islam, they did not consider adopting the
mechanisms of voting, majority rule, and competition over votes Islamic praxis. Al-Galai was
clear that the struggle between tajdid/rejuvenation and taqlid/the following of predecessors
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dates back to the Abbasid period (extending from the 8th to the 13th century) when scholars
without prior agreement or arranged coordination decided to close the gates of
ijtihad/independent reasoning and tajdid/rejuvenation. They had three main reasons for that
position. First there was a tendency among new comers to Islam to flavor their understanding of
Islam with their own inherent cultures and traditions which made the pure and authentic
teachings of Islam debatable. These scholars, in other words, wanted to stop the flows of wrong
interpretations and un-Islamic ijtihad/independent reasoning from creating another nominal
heretic Islam that would sway people from the true teachings of the 7th century Islam. A second
reason for freezing up ijtihad/independent reasoning was to stop the misuse of religion by caliphs
who showed greater tendencies toward usurping power and using religious arguments to
legitimize their actions. A third reason is the wrong but still convincing assumption that the world
would hardly need new types of fiqh/jurisprudence since all new problems could be easily
solved by imitation or by analogical reasoning. Typical traditionalists argue that the three reasons
are still valid today (Sardar 2002). There are Muslims, who call themselves 'Assraneen/
modernists or 'Aqqlanyeen/rationalists (al-Khodhair 1998) who have not studied Islam well and
try to flavor it with their own fallible understanding. Additionally autocratic rulers intimidate or
bribe scholars to issue fatwas that would serve their personal interests.
Modernists disagree. Nobody can close a door that the prophet left open. The
traditionalists’ assumption was reasonable given the circumstances of the Abbasid era;
modernists argue that this in itself was some type of ijtihad/independent reasoning suitable for its
time. The abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) was magnificently more advanced than the abode of
war (dar al-harb) during the first ten centuries of Islam. Everything un-Islamic was bad and
everything bad was simply un-Islamic. There was no real challenge politically, economically,
socially, scientifically or culturally to the Muslim way of life. The only possible challenge was
military in nature and this one needed only larger armies and more weapons. And it worked; the
Mongols were defeated physically and spiritually and crusaders’ vibrant attempts to invade the
East failed too throughout the middle ages. To sum up, in the 13th century Muslim world, every
non-Islamic thing was equal to un-Islamic and vice versa. In other words, every new idea,
discovery or invention, if any, coming from outside the Islamic world was not worth discussing
either because it was heretical (e.g. the Greek philosophy) or evil (e.g. the crusades). Starting
from the 18th century, Muslims would be struck that some non-Islamic inventions are not
necessarily un-Islamic (i.e. are not against Islam). Some 18th and 19th century reformists such
as al-Tahtawi of Egypt, al-Tunisi of Tunisia, al-Kawakebi of Syria, al-Afghani of Iran, and
Mohamed Abdu of Islam, in the name of Islam, called upon Muslims to learn about these nonIslamic discoveries and inventions from Europe (Afghani et al. 1957; Husry 1966; Omara 1980;
Tahtawi and Luqa 1988; Tunisi and Shannufi 1991)). These scholars are the God fathers of the
modernist intellectual discourse in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. They would argue that if
there is anything not Islamic by origin but necessary to establish Islamic goals, such as justice, it
can be imported and Islamized.
Modernists criticize the idea of freezing up or narrowing down the gates of
ijtihad/independent reasoning that limit contemporary Muslims from making ijtihad/independent
reasoning in favor of reviving the already agreed upon ijtihad/independent reasoning of the 13th
century. That is to say, most of post-13th century ijtihad/independent reasoning aimed mainly at
keeping the 13th century fiqh/jurisprudence alive which led to the death of certain topics in fiqh
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and most notably the political ones as Ibn al-Qayyim in the 14th century referred to (al-Jawziyah
1969; al-Qaradawi 2001a).
Prior to the 19th century, there was no place in Islamic writings for revolutionary ideas
such as voting, elected bodies, institutionalization of the very Islamic concepts such as
conditional bay'a/ oath of allegiance, accountability or peaceful alteration of power. Though they
did not lack the theoretical/philosophical or textual/religious support for these ideas, experts on
Islam, Muslims and non-Muslims, barely find any traces of these ideas in medieval Islam (Abd
al-Raziq 1925; Kurzman 1999; Lerner 1958; Lewis 2001).
The ready explanation was the
closed door of ijtihad/independent reasoning. Yet the problem seems to be as political as it is
religious. Traditionalists prioritize the value of unity around one ruler, even if despotic, over other
values including limiting the power of this ruler himself. Voting, factions and majority rule on
worldly issues would have institutionalized differences and created fitnah/internal divisions while
Muslims are asked to be united: “Be not like those who are divided amongst themselves and fall
into disputations after receiving Clear Signs: for them is a dreadful Penalty.” (Chapter 3, verse
105) The traditionalist understanding of shura is very close to Mansbridge’s concept of unitary
democracy (Mansbridge 1980) except that shura, to traditionalists, is not inclusive. It was a
deliberation among brothers in religion that should end up with ijma'/consensus. That is why
shura should be only among a small number of knowledgeable and pious people. Yet even with
rightly guided caliphs and the greatest companions of the prophet, this consensus broke up
within thirty years of the death of the prophet. Modernists attempt to go beyond what ought to
be by reading the world as is. To them, the fitnahs/internal divisions are already there and
Muslims are already divided over religious and non-religious issues alike. Thus, it is better to
institutionalize these differences in the format of political associations and parties where the
representatives of each madhab/sub-tradition can negotiate and compromise. According to
modernists, these associations are not only acceptable but necessary to face the God-like rulers
(al-Ghazali 1997; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Howaidi 1999b).
Modernists of the 19th century and onward go back to this closed door of
ijtihad/independent reasoning and open it widely for the discussion of ideas such as voting,
political parties, elected representatives, rights of non-Muslims and women, though not without
resistance (Abo al-Magd 1992; al-'Aawa 1989; al-Din 2001; al-Ghannouchi 1993; al-Ghazali
1997; al-Qaradawi 2001a).
To typical modernists, political participation is open to every citizen regardless of
religion or gender. Even the concept of ahl al-Dhima/people of the covenant that was used to
refer to non-Muslims who are under the protection of Muslims is not applicable in the modern
era since they are politically full citizens who join the army and defend their countries (Bishri
1982). However, devout Muslims, both men and women, in particular are required to be more
participatory since it is part of their religion to enjoin the good and forbid evil and not to conceal
the testimony if they can express it in voting (al-'Aawa 1989; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Khatami
2001).
Some traditionalists pointed out that referenda are the closest form in modern history to
the early praxis of Islam regarding the way of selecting a ruler. The most knowledgeable among
Muslims Ahl-aAlhal Wa-a'Al’akd/men of decision making would nominate one person to be the
caliph and the rest of the umma would swear (conditional) allegiance to him (Abu Talib 1986).
Modernists are open to import the idea of multi-candidate elections to put an end to the 99.9%
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referenda that have been very popular in the Muslim world since independence (al-'Aawa 2001;
al-Gabri 1987; al-Ghannouchi 1988; al-Ghazali 1997; al-Qaradawi 2000a). Al-Qaradawi was
reported praising Israel for having free fair elections comparing to the famous %99.9 that
Muslim rulers get. Al-Ghazali praised Indira Gandhi for being honest to the extent that she failed
in the elections that her party ran. These two events are hardly heard of in Muslim societies. It is
interesting to know that when sheikh al-Othaimeen (a well-known traditionalist scholar) was
told that sheikh al-Qaradawi (a well-known modernist) had extolled the free elections of Israel,
he said that al-Qaradawi should repent to Allah for praising the polytheists.12
Given the long history of Muslim rulers' capacity to manipulate Ahl-alhal wa-a'lakd/men
of decision making, modernists decided to resort to public voting. Modernists do not perceive
public voting as an un-Islamic Western idea; rather it is the culmination of the effort of millions of
people through thousands of years to limit and check the rulers. There is nothing un-Islamic
about that (al-Qaradawi 2001a; Omara 1998) and even if the idea and practice non-Islamic, it
can be Islamized since it is a necessary mechanism against acts of dictatorship that are highly
condemned by Islam. Majority rule is an Islamic principle according to modernists. Some of the
sayings of the prophet support voting and majority rule. So they are not bed'a/man-made
innovation. For instance, prophet Mohamed told his great companions Abu Bakr and Omar: “if
you agree upon something, I will never disagree with you.” “The devil is remoter from the two
and he is closer to the one” and “the umma cannot agree upon wrongdoing” (al-Qaradawi,
2001a: 32). Even when the second caliph, Omar ibn al-Khatab, left six of the companions of
the prophet to decide the next ruler, he told them to count among themselves and to follow the
group that had the greatest number out of the six. So voting and majority rule along with political
parties are all Islamic or Islamizable according to modernists.
However, modernists face a moral and religious dilemma when they are asked about the
possibility of allowing communist, socialist and liberal parties in Muslim countries. They usually
give very indecisive responses to this dilemma because these parties in general are un-Islamic.
Unlike traditionalists, typical modernists cannot act as if these imported ideologies have no
followers or supporters. Given their reading of the Muslim political systems modernists argue for
general and respected principles of government that are applicable to everybody. Modernists in
general do not want their commitment to democracy to be questionable by secularists. To them,
Muslims should be given the right to choose among all these parties whether they have Islamic
labels or not. Typical modernists perceive the existence of these parties and associations as
negative signs since it means that Muslim societies search for imported solutions. Yet if Islamists
fail as rulers, there is nothing in Islam that gives them the right to usurp power (Howaidi 1999b;
Ibrahim 1991; Khatami 1998; Omara 1980).
Secularists in general do not trust Islamists in this regard. Modernists share with
traditionalists their refusal of associations that clearly and offensively challenge the immune zone
of Islamic teachings such as the existence of God or the prophethood of Mohamed or any of the
other prophets. Thus, atheist associations are absolutely unacceptable. Issues of this sort draw
the fine and thin line between their acceptance of democracy as a technical mechanism for
limiting the despotic tendencies of Muslim dictators and liberalism as a framework for competing
co-existent relativistic readings of truth. This discrepancy between liberalism and democracy in
12

The two audios are available with the researcher.
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the mind of modernists instills a heavy dose of suspicion among secularists who see modernists
as equivalent to traditionalists with modern rhetoric (Harb 2003; Hariq 2001; Heggazi 2002b).
Typical secularists do not waste their time digging into the texts to support what they
perceive to be right and necessary. Liberals do not differentiate among citizens based on
religion. They even argue for not using a cell for religion in personal identification cards ni
Muslim countries. To typical liberals, there should be no a priori conditions on formation of
parties or associations (El-Naggar 1993; Ibrahim et al. 1997). Public elections of rulers in multicandidate campaigns are a must for them (Abu al-Su'ud 1995).
Autocrats do not have one concrete vision regarding the inclusion of non- Muslims and
women into the political process. For instance, Qaddafi of Libya appeared to be more open to
women's equal rights than Kuwaiti Islamists. The Kuwaiti Islamists have no objection to the idea
of elected and representative parliament yet they disqualify women. Qaddafi, who endorses
women's rights in public office, stands against public elections and equates representation to
travesty and deception. Theoretically direct public participation, though a sham, is guaranteed in
Libya (World Center for Researches and Studies of "The Green Book". 1988). To limit the
possibility of multiple sources of legitimacy, most typical autocrats rely on referenda instead of
elections. However, this should not make us think that elections in themselves would indicate
higher levels of tolerance toward competitors. Muslim autocrats do not accept bargaining and
clearly refuse pressures from any group or sect of society. They simply see them as signs of
weakness and danger (Hassan 1999; Sadat 1978; Sallam 1996). Thus, there should be no
institution, public square or sport stadiums without their personal photos and statues and run by
their own appointees. An official who does not perceive himself as an extension of the autocrat
is perceived by the autocrats as a seed of Huntington’s penetration crisis (Huntington 1968).
That is why all major positions are appointed rather than filled by elections. According to
Edward Said, “We live in a region with no one democratic country.” This phenomenon is not
easy to explain but “part of the problem is that most of Arab rulers did not live in the West or
know what democracy means.” Thus, no wonder that Arabs and Muslims live in the “only
region in the world that still suffers of dictatorships in universities, civil societies, press…etc.
There is democratization in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa, except for us who are
still ruled by military rulers starting from 1948 war” (Sa'id 2000).
Political parties, if allowed, should be loyal to the regime and respect the green and red
lights imposed by the autocrat either through coalition with the ruling party (ex. Syria) or posing
no threat to the dominance of the autocrat (George 2003; Jafri 2002; Marsh et al. 1999; Ujo
2000).
c. Civil and Political Rights
Traditionalist Islamists have a clear argument against personal freedoms and basic rights
that are not explicitly mentioned in hotly texts. For them rights are not fundamental or basic; they
are given from Allah and thus limited by Allah’s imperatives as stated in the Qur'an and
practices by the prophet. To traditionalists, these un-Islamic rights and freedoms are themselves
the core of illegitimacy of democracy. To typical traditionalists, democracy in its essence is the
replacement of the will of Allah with the will of fallible people who legislate for themselves rights
and freedoms Allah has not legislated for them (Tash 1980). No wonder that democracy is
associated with the materialistic system of capitalism and atheism that entitle them un-Islamic
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freedoms (ex. same sex marriage, gambling, cursing the prophets and distorting their messages)
(Cahtelier et al. 1980). Allah has forbidden injustice and democracy is the highest form of
injustice (Soweyyan 1999). Democracy is unjust since it allows humans to be their own Gods
by legislating for themselves what is halal/acceptable and what is haram/taboo (Saleh 1992). In
an extreme form of traditionalism, a person who praises democracy because it guarantees
human freedoms and rights is considered fasiq / sinner since praising the disbelievers’
wrongdoings is a sin in itself (Al-Ahadal 2001:24) .
Muslims are given the right to express their points of view as far as they do not create
fitnahs/internal divisions. If there is a possibility of fitnahs/internal divisions, the freedoms of
expression and association ought to be restricted. Public opposition is absolutely forbidden;
however, an individual can raise one’s mazelm/injustices to judges or scholars who can defend
one’s rights without creating fitnahs/internal divisions. Rulers can be advised by Ahl-aAlhal Waa'Al’akd/men of decision making but not challenged for the same reason. Traditionalists’ reading
of these basic freedoms seems inconsistent when it comes to the issue of the capacity of the
commons to question their ruler as an authentic well-established Islamic right and the fear of
fitnahs/internal divisions. Typical traditionalists believe that the leader of Muslims is not
accountable before the ignorant commons as far as he (never ‘she’) “obeys Allah’s book and
His prophet’s straight path” and should not govern according to their own perception of the best
interest (Abdelkhaleq 1997; al-Maged 2002). Personal freedoms of democracies are
excessively un-Islamic and immoral. Democracy allows adultery, drinking wine and drugs,
homosexuality, atheism and the like. Thus “Islam created for Muslims rights to enjoy within
Sharia but not unbounded freedoms” (al-Badry 1983: 155). Al-Zawahri among others often
quotes the following verse to argue against democracy-based legislations: “What! have they
partners (in godhead), who have established for them some religion without the permission of
Allah?” (Chapter 42, verse 21) (al-Zawahri NA).
Violent and pacifist traditionalists differ on the issue of public opposition to rulers.
Violent traditionalists acknowledge the imperative of obedience to the ruler. But they focus on
limiting this obedience to those they perceive to be pious rulers (al-Albani et al. 1997). Prophet
Mohamed was reported to say:
It is obligatory upon a Muslim that he should listen (to the ruler appointed over
him) and obey him whether he likes it or not, except that he is ordered to do a
sinful thing. If he is ordered to do a sinful act, a Muslim should neither listen
to him nor should he obey his orders. (Hadith number in Sahih Muslim: 3423)
Violent traditionalists put more emphasis on the italicized part of the previous hadith.
While Pacifist traditionalists focus more on the former portion. The fear of fitnah/internal
divisions is a clear concern among pacifist traditionalists (al-Albani et al. 1997). They usually
quote other hadiths to refute the public opposition to rulers since it habituates people to dissent
and disobedience (al-Buraiq 1993):
The Messenger of Allah said: If one sees something which he dislikes from his
Amiri (leader) he should be patient, for if he separates from the main body of
the Muslims even for the length of a hand-span and then died, he would die the
death of one belonging to the days of Jahilliyya (disbelief). (Hadith number in
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Sahih Muslim: 3438)
Other traditionalists (al-Tareqi 1993; Galil 2003) quote another hadith that states:
That time will witness the rise of people who will adopt ways other than mine
and seek guidance other than mine…They will be a people having the same
complexion as ours and speaking our language…You should stick to the main
body of the Muslims and their leader… [Otherwise] separate yourself from all
these factions, even if you have to eat the roots of trees (in a jungle) until death
comes to you and you are in this state. (Hadith number in Sahih Muslim: 3434)
These two hadiths reflect the fear of fitnahs/internal divisions and loss of Muslims’
identity by imitating un-Islamic systems of governments with all their fallibilities (Ibn Baaz 1992).
Bringing these hadiths up by traditionalists represents another sign of their attempt to portray
themselves as mere deductionists who refuse the idea of pragmatic reading of the Holy
Scriptures. Additionally, traditionalists have their own reading of freedom of religion. The Qur'an
explicitly states that “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (Chapter 2, verse 256). To
traditionalists, nobody can be forced into Islam; yet once a person voluntarily has become a
Muslim, he/she should be forced to practice Islam (al-Sharawi 1980:24). They are forced to
become perfect. For instance, all women should wear hijab and once the call of prayer is raised,
all stores, restaurants and businesses should be closed down and whoever does not pray should
be forced to pray. A typical example in this regard is the men of amr belma’roof and al-nahai
‘an al-monkar/enjoining the good and forbidding the evil in Saudi Arabia.
Typical modernist Islamists have a different reading regarding basic human and political
rights. There is more space for freedom of expression to scholars and non-scholars alike as long
as they do not infringe upon the immune zone of sharia/Islamic legislation. Modernists base their
support for freedoms of expression and association on a different reading of the famous
argument made by traditionalists that Islam is a complete religion and rarely needs human mind
to reason beyond the deductive active application of its teachings. No doubt that Islam is a
complete religion as the Qur'an states. Yet when it comes to worldly affairs the Qur'an asks
Muslims to go and ask the knowledgeable. “If you do not know, ask the knowledgeable
[among you]” (Chapter 16, verse 43). Thus, according to typical modernists, Islam is complete
since it provides Muslims with all the answers they need regarding their spiritual affairs and lets
them search inductively for the appropriate answers regarding their worldly affairs within the
boundaries of what is halal/ acceptable (Iqbal 1930). However, the real tension between
traditionalists and modernists goes deeper to two other questions that stem from the previous
verse: First where to locate political freedoms and politics in general? Are they worldly affairs or
religious affairs? Second, who are the knowledgeable whom we can consult on worldly affairs if
there is agreement on politics as worldly affairs?
Typical traditionalists consider politics as part of religious faith since Allah and his
prophet explicitly discussed them due to their great relevance to the creed itself (al-Ansari
1988). A famous quote by al-Zawahri states that:
The issues of governance against Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation, democracy,
and loyalty to non-Muslims are not matters of minutiae that are subject to
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scholars’ jurisprudential differences; rather they are germane to the principles of
iman/faith and the core of Islamic aqeeda/creed which is al-Tawheed.”
Al-Zawahari used this argument to wage a war of criticism against the somewhat
modernist Muslim Brethren (mainly in Egypt) since they:
support the rulers of Egypt, the constitution, democracy, beside their refusal of
jihad against the disbelieving government, their acquiescence of secularist
parties, their participation in elections and their acceptance of un-Islamic laws
and legislations in Egypt and the Muslim world (al-Zawahri NA).
Modernists ponder that the principle of Islamic state governed by sharia/Islamic
legislation is beyond questioning, but the structural and institutional aspects of this state are
subject to human scrutiny. A typical Iraqi modernist (Sheikh Ahmad al-Qubaissi) was under
severe criticism from traditionalists in an open discussion of the issues of governance and creed
in Islam on al-Jazeera network. Al-Qubaissi, building a counter argument against traditionalist
vision, contends that Islam has two types of sources: constant and variable. “The constant
aspects form the aqeeda/creed and rituals. The variables are man-innovated mechanisms to
apply the aqeeda/creed.” When it comes to politics, al-Qubassi contends that “Islam does not
have a specific form of government.” This means that any government that applies sharia is
Islamic even if it is republican, monarchic, caliphatic or something else. Part of sharia/Islamic
legislation is to guarantee people their freedoms and rights (al-Qubassi 2002).
Traditionalist callers accused him of admiring the West that “does not have creed” to
follow. Al-Qubassi does not agree that the West does not have a creed (meaning an ethical and
moral framework). He thinks that the West clings to its creed of freedom, justice, and
independent thinking in a way that he wishes Muslims would imitate. According to him, “if you
contrast the founders of the U.S. and the founders of the early Islamic state [the companions of
the prophet], you will find a lot of resemblance in their emphasis on freedom, power,
commitment, and adherence to moral principles.” He thinks that the only way for Muslims to
cope with modernity is by opening the gates of Ijtihad/independent reasoning (independent
reasoning) in all aspects of human life and guaranteeing Muslims all possible freedoms and rights
within Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation. In a clear challenge of traditionalism, al-Qubassi states
that:
Omar [one of the greatest and most charismatic of the companions of the
prophet] will not come back. Had he come back, he would have failed…
Muslims need a modern Muslim ruler who understands this modern world with
its values and concepts. Muslims wasted their time waiting for the rightly guided
Caliph and he will never come back (al-Qubassi 2002).
The second question regards who the knowledgeable are. Modernists have a less elitist
vision compared to traditionalists. Hassan al-Turbi thinks that ijma'/consensus is not only the
Ijma' of scholars but Ijma' of the umma/nation… thus a referendum can constitute an Ijma' (alTurabi 2003). Thus, the public have their rights to gather, air their voices and publicly challenge
and question authorities (Howaidi 1999b) within sharia, democratic laws and regulations.
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Modernists’ attitudes regarding basic freedoms are self-serving since they mostly have been
subjects to prosecutions and jails. Besides, they maintain that a system that guarantees basic
human and political freedoms will eventually lead them to power, since they know that they have
the majority in the street (Omara 2002a).
Freedom of religion goes beyond refraining from forcing non-Muslims into Islam to
abstaining from forcing Muslims to practice Islam. The role of Muslims is to remind and advise
each other unless there is a crime that should be penalized according to Islam’s penal code
(hodod) (Abo al-Magd 1992; Howaidi 2003a; Khatami 2001; al-Ghannouchi 1993).
Liberal secularists are like their counterparts in the West when it comes to basic
freedoms. A truly democratic state does not limit the freedoms of its citizens beyond democratic
rules and laws. That is why they think that conservative understandings of Islam or religion in
general can be an obstacle toward one’s right to freely and equally express his/her point view,
to publicly convene and openly oppose the policies of their governments (El-Naggar 1993;
Surush et al. 2000).
Autocratic secularists are close to liberal secularists regarding freedom of religion but
differ with them regarding the other two freedoms. However, some commentators single out
Arab countries as the most autocratic compared to the rest of Muslim countries. Countries such
as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Senegal, and Nigeria, though far from democratic, are very
much less autocratic comparing to almost all Arab countries (al-Mahdi 2002). A quick
comparison of the percentages of votes that each Arab ruler claims to gain comparing to other
non-Arab Muslim rulers may be a good indicator of how Arab rulers perceive their followers
and how successful they are in oppressing and intimidating their opponents. Suffice it to
remember the 100% that Saddam Hussein gained in the 2003 elections. Autocratic rulers warn
Muslim intellectuals from admiring a Western model of democracy. Mahathir Mohamed was
quoted saying “We are weak nations and need strong governments” (Taheri 2003b). AlQadhaffi of Libya was blunter when he likened the masses as “sheep with no opinion”
controlled and directed by the rulers (Qaddafi 2002). Liberals disagree and argue that freedoms
of expression and association and public opposition contradict the interests of the autocratic
rulers on all fronts. Thus autocrats blame the lack of these freedoms on the masses that need to
be educated before being allowed to practice these freedoms. Autocratic rulers, as an Arab
liberal noted, speak about and on democracy but add practical qualifications and conditions that
make ordinary people and opposition figures know that they are just meaningless words.
“Democracy … is just a tool in the machine of political propaganda” (Shuryan 2003) to
legitimize their grip on power.
Out of self-survival and/or fear of increasing and overwhelming political and socioeconomic demands that cannot be met at reasonable costs, autocrats restrict the freedom of
expression and association to certain levels and issues. Some autocratic regimes are more
liberalized than others. Liberalized autocrats allow nominal opposition parties, some level of
freedom of expression and association and some level of loyal public opposition and
demonstrations. The use of the word "loyal" is purposeful in this regard. Some opposition
groups and parties are considered loyal since they hardly generate a competitive or alternative
source of legitimacy to the one established by the autocrat. They may be critical of a given
policy or official but accept the autocratic ruler as the only master in town. This kind of
opposition is highly tolerated by autocrats to give the democratic façade necessary for global
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prestige. Disloyal opposition is met with violence or exile. Some autocratic regimes hold even if
they lose their legitimacy “because there is no coherent organized source of competitive
legitimacy” (Przeworski 1986). All Arab countries, with no known exceptions, and most
Muslim countries have disloyal opposition figures and movements in jail or in exile due to the
repressive policies of autocratic regimes (Marzouki 2002; Shames 2002). Most Muslim
autocratic regimes try to leave no room for real opposition even if it nominally exists. The
famous 99.9% vote in favor of the incumbent does not mean that the ruler has won the
respective elections but all coming elections too. Autocratic ideologues blame the opposition for
being fragmented and more concerned about reaching power rather than searching for credible
and applicable solutions to the problems. “[Autocratic] rulers risked their lives to reach power.
They have the power and plans to rule; that is why they rule” (Nour al-Din 2002).
Table 2.3
Break Down of Democratic Values and Institutions - Civil and Political Rights
Islamist
Traditionalist
Modernists

Secularist
Liberals
Autocrats

1) Freedom of
expression and
association
2) Public
Opposition:

Highly restricted.

Limited

Extended

(Highly )
restricted.

Fitnah = dissent

Legitimate as far as it
is “loyal.”

Acceptable

Highly
Restricted

3) Religious
Freedom: No
compulsion in
religion:

No force into
Islam but force
Muslims to
practice

No force into Islam
or to practice Islam
except for Islamic
penal codes.

No forced
religion

No forced
religion

Freedoms and rights are not to be given; they are to be earned through struggle and
effort. Discussions of democratic values and ideals are like foreign movies and songs: they
represent alien cultures and values and rarely resonate in the Muslim mind. Autocrats are not
only creators of this situation but also the first beneficiaries of it. “In Europe, one does not need
to organize a conference on civil society because it is there and understood. The same can be
said about tolerance. These concepts emerged and evolved in the same soil” (al-Gabri 2000).
Yet in the Muslim culture in general one needs to import these concepts, legitimize them by
proving that they are not in contradiction with basic and fundamental values of the culture. This
process occurs in a political environment that impedes it through governmental intervention and
security concerns which makes independent intellectuals potential threats to the whole regime.
Sa'ad El-Din Ibrahim, an important defendant of civil society in Egypt, narrated that he
mentioned the concept of civil society in the presence of President Mubarak who exclaimed
what Ibrahim had against military personnel. According to al-Gabri, this exclamation on the part
of the president indicates how alien such concepts are to political elites in the Muslim world (alGabri 2000).
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Autocrats argue that this is not the right time for opposition. It is the time of war against the
enemy whether it is Israel or else.
The great majority of our countries have no freedom, democracy, human rights,
accountability, checks, transparency or rule of law thanks to Israel … [that]
efficiently provided us with a good excuse for all our failures and wrongdoings
(al-Khazen 2003b).
With slogans such as “no voice should rise over the voice of the battles” all liberals and
modernists were deprived of their basic political rights in almost all Muslim countries and most
specifically in the Arab world.
Table 2.3 functions as a summary of the different attitudes of the four main intellectual
schools.
4. Muslims' Intellectual Civil War
The more one reads and interviews Muslim intellectuals and scholars, the more one
finds severe tensions and vigorous attempts to annihilate, politically and even ethically, the other
partners in the debates. The tension is so intense that the eminent Egyptian counselor Tareq elBishri called it intellectual civil war. I asked my interviewees to verify this description.
Surprisingly, out of 83 scholars, intellectuals and scholars whom I had interviewed, I found 68
interviewees (around 81.93%) agree that there is a great deal of support for this depiction.
The content and logic of the debate among the main schools of thought in the Muslim
world does not leave much space for compromises and alternative possibilities. If you will, each
group of intellectuals and ulama/scholars handle the debate with an ‘either/or’ dominant strategy.
Muslims’ history reveals many intellectual and actual civil wars (Gittler 2000). The attempts of
some groups to purify Islam through the stringent application of its imperatives with
extraordinary fascination with its penal codes and harsh rejection of their intellectual opponents
were always common causes behind most of these tense debates and wars. However, in the
modern era another factor exacerbated the tension: it is the dual systems of education. Educated
traditionalist Islamists travel in time to advocate pre-modern Islamic society over modern unIslamic society. Educated secularists travel in space to embrace religion-neutral modern society
over pre-modern one. Educated modernist Islamists try to emphasize the possible compatibility
between the holy texts and modern developments and achievements of the West and others.
Researchers attribute the cultural civil war to the accumulation of the dual educational system:
Westernized civil and traditional religious (Omara 1989). A Yemeni diplomat calls upon Muslim
governments to stop this duality (No'man 2003).
Gellner and Rodinson’s readings are very pessimistic about the future of a
compromising and liberal Islam (Gellner 1981; Rodinson and Khoury 2003). The eminent
French orientalist Maxime Rodinson acknowledges the tension among different intellectual
factions in the Muslim world, yet he finds it closer to a blame game rather than to the critical
thinking that has been a characteristic of the Western thought. As a result, most Muslims still live
intellectually in the middle ages. Rodinson sees that the most distinct difference between
Muslims and the West is not religious but rather socio-economic. He believes that the relative
autonomy of the bourgeois class reduced the potential power of the aristocracy and oligarchy in
modern Europe. This was not the case in the Muslim world at least since the sixteenth century
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where the oligarchic nature of the Ottoman rulers created a military system controlling the
Muslim world from its grassroots to its top from the 16th century until the 19th century. Once
again, this development was absolutely the opposite of what happened in Europe and the U.S.
where the economic and political power moved downward towards the bourgeois class that
established a technology-based society, voting system and accountable governments. Other
countries attempted to catch up, such as Japan and some other Asian countries but no one
single Muslim country managed to replicate the Western experience so far. He even predicts
that Muslims will need several centuries to have the renaissance that the Europeans had starting
from the 16th century in Holland, 17th century in Britain and 18th century in France and the U.S.
(Rodinson and Khoury 2003).
A careful reading of the tense debates among the mentioned schools of thoughts reveals
the following five characteristics that they share at different degrees. 1- They are
uncompromising debates. 2- Each trend claims full monopoly of truth. 3- They tend to nonpragmatic and rhetorical discourses more than collaboration. 4- They aim at the non-existence
of other groups rather than co-existence with them. 5- Defaming strategies are usually used with
frequent tendencies to strawman each other.
An Arab intellectual once wrote that Muslims’ culture
… does not appreciate criticism; they do not even know it… It is a plot, and
treason against authenticity… [Muslims] consider their worst enemies those
who try to correct their ideas and beliefs and protect them from the thieves of
reason and deceivers of beliefs… (al-Qasimi 1967).
Al-Qasimi’s harsh criticism of Muslim culture, and the Arab one in the heart of it,
confirmed his point. In response to al-Qasimi’s criticism of the traditionalist and autocratic
readings of Islam and culture, very unforgiving poems written by Sheikh Rashed Ibn Khaneen,
Shikh Saleh al-‘Iraqi, Shaikh Saleh Bin Sahman, and harsh critiques by Shaikh Ibn Baaz of AlQasimi publicly apostatize him especially after his book These are the Chains .13
Zaki Naguib Mahmoud’s criticism of Arabic culture extends to reflect the deeper
phenomenon of equating disagreement with dissidence to the extent that makes each opinion
holder think of himself as "Truth" holder which from his point of view creates an environment of
hostility in the intellectual life (Mahmoud 1971).
It is not uncommon in Muslim culture to spot traditionalists who attribute the
characteristics of mobtadea'/innovator or zendeeq/heretic to anybody who advances a new
interpretation that does not correspond to the famous readings of any verse or saying of the
prophet without making enough distinction between Modernist Islamists and secularists.
a. Secularists Wage Their War
Autocratic secularists, mainly from positions of political power, have their part in this
intellectual civil war. In a way to limit the public support for modernist Islamists, the regimes put
them in the same basket with traditionalists (violent and non-violent) and pursue the same
strategy: annihilate them ethically if not physically. This strategy sees all Islamists as criminals
13

Read some of these poems along with other uncompromising criticism at:
http://www.shahr2000.com/reads/gasemy_9.htm
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and/or terrorists who use Islam as a cover for their worldly illegitimate aspirations, as noted by
Howaidi (Howaidi 2003a). Limiting the modernists’ capacity to advance an image of peaceful
modern Islam is a tactic that different autocratic rulers have adopted through different
mechanisms. A very telling decision was taken by the Moroccan government on the May 18,
2003 when they prevented moderate Islamists and women wearing hijab to participate in the
huge demonstrations denouncing the terrorist attacks that occurred there a week earlier. The
Moroccan government simply did not want to give the opportunity to modernist Islamists to
prove that they are moderates even though they were among the first to refute and condemn the
attacks (al-Hayat, May 19th, 2003).
Modernists contend that violent traditionalists and autocratic secularists with no prior
collaboration conspire against modernist Islamists’ model of Islam. Violent traditionalists sinfully
wage violent jihad against innocent people on their war against ‘infidel’ governments. Autocratic
secularist governments, even long before September 11th, seize the opportunity to strawman
modernists’ arguments by diminishing the core differences between modernists and
traditionalists.
"It is a waste of time and effort to try to distinguish Islamist terror groups one from another
according to their alleged differences along a series of traditional religious, ethnic, or political
divides" (Boroumand and Boroumand 2002). Thus secularists advance the argument that all
Islamists are alike except in their clothes, their appearance and their outspokenness (al-Sa'eed
2003).
In Egypt, it was reported that the violent al-Jihad movement seized the opportunity of a
large police campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood who had declared and committed itself
to non-violence to offer high level of coordination between al-Jihad and the Muslim
Brotherhood since the government put both of them in the same cell. However, the Muslim
Brotherhood refused the offer which expanded the gulf between the two factions of the
Islamists. Yet the Egyptian authorities considered the mere correspondence between the two
groups sufficient evidence to wage preemptive attacks on both, as one of the modernists
reported (Howaidi 2003a).
That said, one can easily infer that the very three-cell classification of intellectuals and
scholars as presented in this chapter comes from a modernist or a liberal secularist position.
That is to say, a traditionalist or an autocratic secularist classification would have only two cells:
one for true Muslims and the other for else.
Modernists and liberal secularists argue that autocratic secularists in power have developed
clever skills to defuse public anger. For instance, during the operation Iraqi Freedom, hundreds
of thousands of Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia demonstrated to express their anger
against their failed regimes and their inability to stop the attacks on their brethren in Iraq.
Interestingly, the autocratic regimes managed to march thousands of their supporters denouncing
the attacks and declaring their solidarity with the Iraqi people at the same time they banned
liberal secularists and Modernist Islamists from the right to protest against the war. Imposing a
monopoly over agents of socialization (e.g. public education, public TV and radio stations and
mosques) is a famous tactic by autocrats to guarantee self-survival. One intellectual attributes
the intellectual civil war among intellectuals to the role of Muslim authoritarian states that leaves
no (or very little) room for critical thinking and offering alternative visions. “The state
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monopolizes history; thus all defeats go without accountability…All intellectuals’ contributions
remain nonsense without documents and claims without proofs” (al-Imam 2003).
Some secularists, including those not in power, denounce the mere existence of Islamists
regardless of their level of extremism or moderation. According to Taheri there is no such a
thing as Islamic democracy. It is an oxymoron. He agrees with what a student leader in Tehran
told him "Democracy cannot be modified by prefixes and suffixes" (Taheri 2003a). He goes
further to dismiss the capacity of Islamists to even introduce any viable contribution to Muslims’
lives.
Today, the Islamists cannot field a single serious thinker or creative artist. There
are no Islamist novelists, poets, filmmakers, architects, and, more obviously, no
Islamist composers, painters and sculptors. All the Islamists produce are suicide
bombers and street thugs. They are fast losing the support they once had in
sections of society that produce culture and sustain the economy. Political
books with Islamist themes no longer sell in any significant numbers (Taheri
2003a).
Taheri is definitely exaggerating yet his message is clear. The non-existence of Islamists
is the ultimate goal compared to the coexistence with them. Wahba agrees with Taheri. To
Wahba, the main obstacle to democracy is fundamentalists who claim that they have the full
truth; they do not believe in relativism which is the core of democracy as a struggle among
different attitudes and opinions. That is why they tend to call their opponents infidels,
disbelievers, sinners and the like (Dr. Murad Wahba, Al-Jazeera Interview, 17 December,
2000).
Secularists argue that the medieval fiqh/jurisprudence and its contemporary supporters
are, after all, merely human, and to suppose that their understanding of Islam represents the
word of God is, therefore, misleading. Contemporary Muslims do not have to be constrained by
the formulations of the traditional ulama/scholars. “From an Islamic point of view, no body of
persons or institution has a monopoly on valid and relevant understandings of Islam.” On the
contrary, he insists, "Islamic discourse is radically democratic” (an-Naim 1990).
Modernist Islamists along with liberal secularists agree that the autocratic Muslim
regimes have lost their credibility. As one commentator characterized the situation: “Those
secular regimes are ready to fight against Iraq, their own people but not against Israel. They are
traitors.” (Dr. Nader Al-Tamimi (Palestinian), Al-Jazeera Interview, 17 December, 2000).
Muslim autocratic secularists imported the words "democracy" and "elections" from the
west but they localized them. Muslim regimes reduced democracy to fake elections. There is no
democracy without elections; yet Muslims have pseudo elections without democracy (Taheri
2003c). With the popular Islamists who are ready to hijack democracy and shut off the
windows of freedom, most liberals feel that they do not have a chance to defend their cause. In
the Arab and most of the Muslim world, “liberals are widely viewed as political dissidents,
advocating the wrong ideas and values in a region that is illiberal, if not antiliberal.” They are
considered, even worse, as “vestiges of colonial domination”(Saghie 2003).
The secularists in the Muslim world would use certain defaming mechanisms against
Islamists. For instance they use the word "Islamawi" – best translated as Islamicized- to refer to
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the Islamists. The use of "Islamicized" is a sensationalism of ‘Islamist’ and political Islam in
general was meant to convince the public that Islamists manipulate Islam for their worldly
purposes (al-Sa'eed 2001). A Saudi secular intellectual, Turki al-Hamd, describes the current
situation in the Arab-Muslim intellectual arena as a battlefield for “raising slogans and exchanging
accusations and nothing but that” (Al-Hamad 2003). Another Syrian intellectual summarizes the
intellectual war in the following words: “Ruling dictators and coward intellectuals betraying their
noble mission so as to please the dictators.” He quotes his fellow Syrian thinker, al-Kawakebi,
who wrote over 100 years ago that “a nation that does not feel the anguish of dictatorship will
never strive for liberty” (al-Lazaqqani 2001).
Secularists think that their program, compared to the Islamist one, is the only way
toward a more powerful and modern world (al-'Arfaj 2003). They reckon that they have
achieved some progress.
No Muslim society today is governed solely with reference to religious law…and newly
emerging leadership classes are almost everywhere displacing or marginalizing the
clerisy of theological-legal experts who used to control meaning and organization in
these societies (Ansary 1996).
b. Islamists Wage Their War
The intellectual war between modernist Islamists and traditionalist Islamists is as tense as
the one between Islamists and secularists. Traditionalists play the game of strawman too. They
present themselves as the true al-salaf al-saleh/the pious predecessors who have pure
understanding of Islam with no un-Islamic influences. Thus, typical traditionalists do not think of
secularists and modernists as good Muslims but rather as Mubtade’een/innovators who present
themselves as “enlightened” Muslims. Since they claim to be enlightened, they get this
enlightenment from un-Islamic sources (Sultan 1993) which makes them innovators at best.
Some traditionalists would even consider modernists and secularists polytheists since they
worship their minds, whims and masters. Among them, there are those who “worship the
Americans, … Europeans, … Russians, …the new world system, …the rulers…, philosophies,
…, nationalism, …their thinkers and ideologues. Thus there is no difference among them in
disbelief and apostasy” (Luqmani 1998).
Another traditionalist labeled modernists and secularists as “students in the colonial
schools (of thought)… thus Muslims, young and old, governments and commons have to resist
this new polytheism and new idolatry” (al-Khodhair 2000).
Traditionalists accuse modernists and secularists of being like monkeys and parrots in
the way they repeat Western ideas such as religion being the opium of the people; the evolution
of the human mind from theological reasoning into philosophical, then scientific reasoning
(Ghorab 1981); the applicability and compatibility of positivist ideological undercurrents with
Islam (Qutb 1970); the separation between church and state and emphasis on Islam as a
spiritual religion rather than both (al-Sharawi 1980).
Traditionalists use some technical terms to label modernists in particular since they are
Muraja'at who tend to postpone Allah’s punishment when it comes to monotheism. They are
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pacifists14 when it comes to Jihad, though some traditionalists are pacifists too. They are
Mu'tazila and rationalists when it comes to the sources of Islam since they put reason before
text. They are relativists when it comes to fiqh since they search for the most modern and thus
least authentic verdicts, especially regarding women, songs, arts, liberties, photographing,
clothes and so forth. They do not acknowledge the role of al-salaf al-saleh/the pious
predecessors. They are the most suspicious of consensus because modernists habituate people
to different opinions and contradictory verdicts. They are neutral against innovators, heretics and
deviant minorities (al-Khodhair 1998).
To traditionalists, modernists and secularists alike are harbingers of moral degeneracy
who are transfixed by the admiration of the west. Among Islamists, the debates over violence,
women and non-Muslims create a lot of tension. Traditionalists view non-Muslims (especially in
the Muslim world) as temporary and non-authentic, let alone enemies (al-Oda 1997).
Traditionalists make supplication to Allah to annihilate non-Muslims regardless of details.
Modernists reject what they call the ‘innovated supplication’ that Allah would destroy all nonMuslims or all Christians or Jews. Modernists perceive this type of supplication as un-Islamic
and based upon a distorted understanding of Islam (al-Rikabi 2003).
Modernists find themselves actually fighting two wars: one against people who claim to
be more deductionist (authentic) than they are and another against people to claim to be more
inductionist (rational) than they are (Rahman 1982). Modernist Islamists agree with
traditionalists on two accounts. First, no Islamic solution that deserves its name can be attained
without clear and direct reference to and inference from the Qur'an and the Sunna of Prophet
Mohammed. Islamists, both modernists and traditionalists think that secularists betray Islam and
Muslims when they dilute the differences between Islam and Christianity. Secularism is a
solution to a problem that Muslims did not and do not have. Muslims achieved their civilizational
achievements under the rule of Islam because of Islam’s compatibility with science, not despite it
(Qutb 1978).
Yet modernists keep in mind that Prophet Mohammed's personification of the teaching
of the Qur'an was limited by the fact that he was an Arab living in the 7th century and dealing
with much simpler problems than those one faces fourteen centuries later. Second, they
emphasize, along with traditionalists, that what keeps the idiosyncratic character of a Muslim
person, and thus his/her belief in the oneness of God, is his/her commitment to the teachings of
Islam with no objection or arrogance. Yet, this submission to Allah is not equal to refusing to
develop modern political, economic and social systems that would not contradict the teachings
of Islam. Traditionalists, from the perspective of modernists, are antiques or dinosaurs who live
in the past and cannot carry the responsibility of Islamic tajdid/rejuvenation. Modernists argue
that traditionalists negate the possibility of a contemporary scholar to reach the level of
knowledge of Malik, Ahamd, Abu Hanifa, or the other great scholars of the past. They are
worried that religion-claimers would distort Islam. Modernists share with them the same
concern with one difference, modernists consider only secularists to be religion-claimers.
Shutting down the gates of ijtihad/independent reasoning is not a viable solution given the huge
amount of qualitative and quantitative differences between the contemporary world comparing
to it ten centuries ago. Modernists accuse traditionalists of being less competent to represent
14

Traditionalists criticize modernists since a typical modernist would think that there is no place for violent
Jihad since the freedom of religion is guaranteed in the 21st century.

65

Islam. They are prisoners of haram-phobia meaning excessive fear of taboos. Thus, they tend to
render most of modern inventions haram/taboos.
By moving away from this tradition, traditionalist Islamists reckon, modernist Islamists
have no place to go except for imitating, or at least giving credit to, the West.
Modernist Islamists argue that what they have in mind is fully, at least implicitly, autonomous
from any Western influence. But learning from others is an absolutely Islamic tradition practiced
by the prophet Mohammed and some of the early founding fathers of the Islamic state.
Modernist Islamists do not think that any resemblance or difference between an Islamic
democratic form of government and Western democracy is even a criterion for judging the
success or failure of their theory (Safi 1996).
The other battle that modernists fight is the one against secularists. Modernists follow
two paths: they first try to prove that they are different from the traditionalists. Second, they
show that they can present a modern understanding of Islam that would diminish the need for
Westernization. In other words, they try to Islamize what they deem appropriate and necessary
from other civilizations. Modernist Islamists agree with secular intellectuals that the misuse of
religion can lead to a theocracy which is absolutely against Islam. Besides they agree with the
secular trend that any political division based upon creed may lead to turmoil and even civil wars
which are, again, absolutely against Islam. However, they absolutely reject the false dilemma of
either theocracy or secularism. From their perspective there is a third, viable option: Islamic
democracy.
While doing that, they show the danger of those who are psychologically defeated due to their
admiration of the Western civilization.
The intellectual environment in the Muslim world is the antithesis of Mill’s argument that:
Not the violent conflict between parts of truth, but the quiet suppression of half
of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced to
listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into
prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being
exaggerated into falsehood (Mill and Shields 1996:1062).
What makes this type of intellectual civil war a real obstacle to democratization in the
Muslim world is the fact that it is transferred into the political arena from different angles.
In cases of sharp ideological and societal division, it is not likely to have
peaceful alteration of power. Democracy presumes some level of democratic
culture that respects pluralism of sources of truth as an acceptable value in
society. There is no democracy in a culture that negates the other (Hilal 2002).
When political parties and competing elites catch the same disease, peaceful alteration
of power becomes highly unlikely. These intellectual civil wars occur as well inside the political
parties which create the phenomena of 1) personalization of the political parties (the person of
the leader is more appealing to its members and supporters than the ideology or interests of the
party); and 2) a lack of democracy inside the political parties themselves which leads to
divisions inside the parties. Most disagreement inside political parties is solved through dissent
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and splintering (Abdelmiggeed 2003). That is to say negation of the other is not only an
intellectual but a political phenomenon in most Muslim countries as well (al-Gamal 2001).
5. Concluding Remarks
The previous analysis shows that Muslims are more heterogeneous than some academic
and media circles in the West portray them. Muslim intellectuals and scholars advance different
and even contradictory readings of Islam and reality. Consequently, it is reasonable to judge that
most orientalists and neo-orientalists fall into the trap of hasty generalization when they assume
all Muslims are traditionalists.
The debate among Muslims on issues such as modernization and democracy dates back
at least to the early 20th century when Muslims discovered the huge gap between how their holy
texts describe them being the best nation came out in humanity and the reality that defies this
assertion. In the heart of this gap is how Muslims would respond to the challenge of good
governance. In response to this common challenge, this project demonstrated three broad ideal
typical schools of thought: traditionalists, modernists and secularists. Traditionalists search for an
Islamic government that is not similar or even close to any other un-Islamic government. It is
closer to the moral state that was established by the prophet and his great companions in the 7th
century. This system of government is the antithesis of what has been known as representative
democracy. Modernists search for a government system that is compatible with Islam rather
than being idiosyncratically Islamic. To them most aspects of democracy are compatible with
their reading of Islam or at least Islamizable. Secularists do not worry about how Islamic or
moral the government system they prefer. Religious texts can be read in different and
contradictory ways. They do not help much and better be ignored when they come to face
political challenges.
Muslim intellectuals and scholars are engaged in an uncompromising debate that has
been characterized as analogous to an intellectual civil war. In the following chapter, the focus
will shift to ordinary educated Muslims and to what extent they reflect the same tension.
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CHAPTER III
MUSLIMS’ CULTURAL MAP OF DEMOCRACY
Students of Islam and the Middle East had mixed success in pinning down the causal
relationship between Islam as an explanatory variable and lack of democracy as the variable of
concern. Any serious examination of this relationship cannot ignore the intervening variables of
Muslims themselves. How Muslims understand Islam and how they understand democracy is far
from monolithic. This chapter explores this question of causality, if Islam does have antidemocratic effects on Muslims, what are the causal mechanisms? Five hypothetical mechanisms
will be explored. First, to what extent are ordinary Muslims mere reflections of the cultural
entrepreneurs as discussed in the previous chapter? Second, is it true that Muslims even if they
believe in democracy, they limit it to illiberal version that forbids all competing un-Islamic
ideologies? Third, are Muslims satisfied with their generally non-democratic governments
because they think of them as Islamic governments and that is why they do not want
democracy? Fourth, are Muslims ready to sacrifice for their political rights or will they wait until
they are given to them as gifts from their rulers? Fifth, is it true that Muslims’ minds are chained
in the golden past of the early Islamic state?
Some accounts propose generalizations on the assumption that Muslims are all
influenced by the same creed and thus have similar culture. Their assumption is a testable
hypothesis for this chapter. One way of testing this hypothesis is by drawing an aggregate
cultural map that demonstrates variation among Muslims on their perception of democracy. The
cultural map will depict Muslim societies' comparative positions through two 100-point scales of
democratic hardware and software. Upon developing these two scales, the focus will shift in the
following five sections to the validity of the five hypothetical mechanisms to explain the various
positions of each Muslim society on the democratic hardware and software scales.
1. Democratic Hardware and Software
Unlike the previous chapter that was devoted to depict the intellectual debates among
Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars, this chapter is limited to capturing an aggregate
representation of educated Muslims toward democracy stipulated as a system of periodic and
publicly elected accountable government under conditions of equality and freedom of choice
according to the one-person, one vote principle regardless of religion, gender or belief.
a. Muslim Societies' Cultural Map
Most literature on democratization suggests that the image of democracy has never been
more favorable as shown by public opinion polls. Inglehart, along with others (Lingemann 1999;
Norris 1999), concludes that "democracy has become virtually the only model with global
appeal" (Inglehart 2000).
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Figure 3.1
Cultural Map of Muslims Societies toward
Democratic Hardware and Software (Web and Written Survey Data)
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Data collected in the course of this research help qualify this proposition in the Muslim
world. Though Muslims belong to the same religion, they are heterogeneous enough (in their
interpretation of Islam among other factors) to make a grand theory of Islam and democracy
overly simplistic. This result is depicted in Figure 3.1, a map of the attitudes of mostly urban,
educated and non-poor Muslims in thirty three societies of the world.
On the horizontal axis, attitudes of Muslims toward democratic institutions and
procedures (democratic hardware) are depicted in a 100 point scale. On the vertical axis, a 100
point scale of socio-political tolerance (democratic software) is presented. The pooled sample
indicates a significant diversity of opinions.
From Muslims of Turkey, Morocco and Egypt on the up right corner to those in Saudi
Arabia, Yemen and Libya, the idea that Muslims have one unique vision regarding democracy is
not supported. The first observation regarding the map is that if one judges by the crude number
of sampled societies that have 50 points or more in terms of support for democratic hardware
and software (countries above the horizontal line and to the right of the vertical dotted line), one
can infer that most Muslim societies do not prefer autocracy over democracy. This finding, in
general, is consistent with Norris and Inglehart's findings (Norris and Inglehart 2002).
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b. Reliability of the Data
Before drawing any conclusions from the previous data, one needs to ask about the
reliability of the data. In other words, is the previous map a mere artifact of the survey's biases
or is it a reliable snapshot of the Muslims’ political culture?
To answer this question, I decided first to account for the effect of the internet by redrawing the map of the cultures based only on the written surveys that mainly and randomly
capture the attitudes of students in fourteen countries (Egyptians, Libyans, Nigerian students in
Egypt, Malaysians, Syrians, Pakistanis, Algerians, Bangladeshis, Yemenis, Saudis in the U.S.,
American Muslims, Sudanese, Iranians, and Turkish) and students of other eight Muslim
countries who reside in the previous countries. This cultural map that is based only on written
survey is presented in Figure 3.2.
When the t-test is used to compare the means of the support for hardware and software
in both the written and web-based surveys, the tests show no statistical difference between the
means in any of the cases at confidence level .01 (Table 3.1). Although this test supports the
claim that the alleged bias in the Internet did not produce observable biases that would propel
us to treat the web-based survey and the written surveys as two different surveys, they do not
give us enough indication on the reliability of the cultural map itself. Fortunately, during the same
period some other survey data became available.
Though different in structure and questions, these other surveys can give us a good
frame of comparison. Among a group of Muslims who were surveyed by the Pew Center’s
Global Attitudes Project, it was clear that the results on certain issues such as women’s social
rights (including work outside the home and their rights to decide on wearing veils) indicate
almost identical results with this survey in Bangladesh, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Senegal,
Nigeria, Mali, Indonesia, and Jordan. Unfortunately, the attitudes toward women were the only
set of questions parallel to this project’s measurement of democratic software. Regarding the
hardware, with the exception of the cases of Mali and Turkey that are reported in this survey as
two of the most supportive of democratic procedures and mechanisms, the Pew survey suggests
almost identical results.
Table 3.1
T Test Results for the Comparison between the Web-based and Written Surveys

Mean
Written
Survey
Web
survey

62.77
62.77

Hardware
Std.
T
Probability
Dev.
10.18
0
1
11.42

Mean
55.77
55.38

Software
Std.
T
Probability
Dev.
6.52
1.14
0.27
6.90

2-tailed probability is shown.
Note: A T-ratio below 1.96 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference
between the means at confidence level of .95.
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Though the scale used in this project does not address the question of the “most reliable
kind of leadership” – democratic governments or strong leaders – the scale adopted in this
project leads to very close results in the cases of Senegalese and Bangladeshis who highly
support “democratic government;” Indonesians and Lebanese who moderately support
“democratic government” and Pakistanis and Nigerians who clearly score the lowest in terms of
their support for “democratic government” in favor of “strong leaders.” There is a legitimate
concern to be raised about the mutual exclusivity between “democratic government” and “strong
leadership” options as used by the Pew surveys. Yet the real discrepancy between the findings
of this survey and the Pew project rests with Mali and Turkey that both are reported to be
among the most democratic cultures in this survey while, according to the Pew project, they
moderately support democracy.
The preponderance of evidence suggests that this survey seems to capture the culture of
these two countries better. With Mali as the only Muslim country that is considered to be “Free”
according to the Freedom House (Karatnycky 2002) for the past 10 years with presidential
elections and one of the relatively most peaceful processes of alteration of power in African in
2002, it seems that the wording of the question or other unknown factors made only 50 percent
of Malians prefer “democratic government” over a “strong leader” in the Pew project.
Around 57 percent of Muslims in Turkey as well are reported in the Pew project to be in
support of “democratic government” (Pew 2003a). Once again, based upon this survey (around
77 points of support for democratic hardware) and based upon the voting turnout which was
around 77 percent in the 2002 parliamentary elections, one may suggest that the Turkish
respondents did not necessarily prefer a strong politician leading a non-democratic government.
However, there can be another explanation, since these two countries already have
democratic elections, while economic problems still exist, then a good number of the
respondents took for granted that a strong leader would not violate the democratic nature of the
government. Except for these two cases, the rest of the cases seem to be highly in congruence
with this project’s survey.
Another survey that used the question about strong leadership versus democratic
government among other questions to measure the attitudes toward democratic institutions and
practices confirmed the results of this survey. The World Value Survey (WVS) shows that all
the countries that appear in top right corner of the cultural map (Figure 3.1) actually support
democracy. “In Albania, Egypt, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey, 92
to 99 percent of the public endorse democratic institutions- a higher portion than in the United
states (89 percent)” (Inglehart and Norris 2003). The country with Muslim majority that Norris
and Inglehart found least supportive of democracy in their surveyed countries, Pakistan, is found
among the relatively least democratizable cultures in this survey as well (Figures 3.1 & 3.2).
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Figure 3.2
Cultural Map of Muslim Societies toward
Democratic Hardware and Software (Written Survey Data only)
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In a different article that used the same pooled data (WVS 1995-2001), the two
authors suggest similar results in terms almost all the cases except for Iran (Norris and Inglehart
2002). In their results, Iranians seem to be more supportive of ‘democratic ideals’ (equivalent to
the democratic software of this study) than this project’s survey suggest. It is very difficult to tell
the exact reason for this difference but one possible factor is the period of time covered in their
survey (95-2001) and this survey (2001-2002) or the wording of the questions. However,
Iranians’ "approval of democratic performance" (equivalent to the democratic hardware of this
study) is almost identical.
Unfortunately the few other surveys that were conducted in the Muslim world were
done without actually addressing democratic issues per se to any great extent. Yet their
concerns with issues such as Muslims’ perception of the West (Gallup 2002); Arabs’ evaluation
of their personal, socio-economic lives and again perception of the West (Zogby 2002); the
impact of September 11th terrorist attacks on Muslims attitudes toward religion, and the west
(Moaddel 2003); and societal issues (Hassan 2002) impede one’s ability to compare results
especially with somewhat remotely different wording of questions. However, as one will see in
the pages to follow, these surveys generally confirm the results of this survey regarding certain
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issues such as the impact of Islamic teachings on Muslims’ political attitudes and the negative
attitude toward the West in general.
c. Categorization of Muslim Societies' Cultures
Most Muslim societies fall into one of four broad categories:
1- Societies that score high on software and low on hardware.
2- Societies that score low on both scales.
3- Societies that scores moderately on both scales.
4- Societies that score high on both scales.
Each one of these categories will be discussed in more details.
A. High Software and Low Hardware Category
The first category of Muslim societies' cultures is best exemplified by UAE, Oman and
Libya. In terms of socio-political tolerance Libya, Oman and UAE score 51, 54, and 59
points respectively but with relatively low support for democratic institutions around 41- 43
points. Based on the focus group discussions with Libyans, the real discriminatory attitudes of
Libyans is not toward their fellow Libyans but toward non-Libyans such as the half million
Africans (around 10% of the population) who live and work there. A similar observation can be
made about the relatively low political status of women in the minds of Libyan men. However,
educated Libyan females are reported to be less parochial. Thus they enjoy higher level of selfesteem and sense of political efficacy now comparing to a decade ago (Obeidi 2001). Around
64 percent of Libyan educated women think that women should be equally enfranchised and
they have the capacity to resume top executive positions. This result is almost identical to
another survey conducted in Libya in which 63 percent of Libyan women thought that they can
hold positions that may involve authority over men (Obeidi 2001). However, tribal traditions as
a source of low status of women in the mind of men, even if educated, are a factor that cannot
be missed in explaining the Libyan political culture (Bianci 2003). This relatively low image of
Libyan women in the mind of Libyan men is best depicted with only 48 percent of Libyan men
believing that women should participate in politics. Another survey showed that only 29 percent
of men would accept women holding jobs involving authority over men (Obeidi 2001).
Educated Emirati women are even more self-confident with around 73 percent of them
defending their rights as political actors including 25 percent accepting that women should hold
top executive positions. Unlike Libyan men, the majority of UAE educated men (around 60)
accept that women should participate in politics as legislative representatives, although only 7
percent give them the right to hold top executive positions.
Women in Oman are both self-perceived and perceived by men in general to be in a
relatively higher status comparing to their peers in Libya and UAE. In the pooled sample,
around 33 percent of Omanis (men and women) would agree to give women top legislative and
executive positions; however, this percentage goes down to 26 percent in the case of Libya and
10 percent in the case of UAE.
Though the Muslims’ cultures are not necessarily a good determinants or predictors of
Muslim regimes’ official policies, it is worth noting that Sultan Qabus of Oman, for the first time
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in all Arab gulf states, granted women the right to vote and participate in the election in 1994
and appointed the first female minister in the history of the region in March 2003.15
Having a culture that is comparatively pro-women’s rights begs the question why Oman
is located in a lower position comparing to UAE in terms of democratic software. This
comparatively lower status can be attributed mainly to the negative impact of overlapping
cleavages between religious sects and tribal affiliations that some researchers have found
(Beasant 2002). However, the increase in government-administered sector is positively
correlated with the level of trust and sense of equality comparing to the late sixties under the
Dhofar Rebellion that ended in 1975s (Economist 1998).
The three countries’ poor support for democratic institutions deserves some scrutiny
too. The three countries together can be illustrated as an exemplars of semi-rentier state where
"no taxation, no representation" seems to work fine (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Kechichian and
Grunebaum 2001). Libyans, for one, despite their relatively moderate level of socio-political
tolerance, enjoy a very low level of support for democratic institutions. This discrepancy can be
understood by the bizarre system of government that al-Qaddhaffi of Libya has established
(Tahir and Qaddafi 1996; Zartman 1982). It is a system that claims full participation by all
Libyans but with no political competition or clear contending platforms or political parties.
Actually, according to an anonymous Libyan intellectual: "most [of the Libyan] people do not
even know on what basis they are asked their opinions and what difference it makes to air
them." No transparency, no opposition, and no partisanship but still it is a government by the
people according to the Green Book that constitutes al-Qaddaffi's theory of politics.
In the survey conducted in the course of this research, When Libyans were asked about
how satisfied they are with the performance of the system, only 20 percent showed a notable
level of satisfaction. The rest were either unsatisfied or not sure. Muslims of UAE and Oman are
stronger advocates of their incumbents in both the written survey (in the case of UAE) and the
web-based surveys albeit at the expense of their support for democratic institutions. Around 80
percent of Emiratis show satisfaction of their political system while around 52 percent of Omanis
have the same attitudes. These two scores are among the highest in the whole sample. Among
all the ten participants in the focus group discussions in UAE, there was no one single supporter
of copying Western democratic institutions to the country. According to Sa’eed, one of the
interviewees in UAE who lived in Britain for two years, "democracy is a good system of
government that we do not need in UAE." Analogously, it is a solution to problem or a medicine
to a disease that they do not suffer. Even with noticeable resentment among almost half of the
26 Libyan focus group participants, the solution from their perspective was not so radical as to
have a totally new system of government but for the officials to be “fair and conscious as Allah
orders them to be." To sum up, the three countries represent comparatively high level of sociopolitical and religious tolerance (democratic software) with relatively low level of support for the
procedures and institutions of political participation and competition (democratic hardware).
The classification of the rest of the 30 cases into three categories reveals less
discrepancies and more symmetry between support for democratic hardware and software.

15
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B. Low Hardware and Low Software Category
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Tajikistan, the Sudan (and possibly Pakistan and Nigeria) form
what can be labeled the relatively least democratizable cultures, given the attitudes of their
citizens toward democratic institutions of participation and competition and socio-political
tolerance and trust. These countries occupy the lower left corner of Figure 3.1 which makes
them belong to the same category albeit for different reasons. Saudis’ feeble support of
democratic institutions can be understood by the legacy of the kingdom that never experienced
publicly elected government of any sort since its modern inception in 1930s (or even possibly
since the early years of Islam 1400 years ago). Besides, Saudi officials rarely if ever use, abuse
or misuse the word democracy or any of its connotations in any of their public speeches or to
allow it to sneak into public schools curricula. Additionally, opposition in Saudi Arabia has
always been seen to be equal to dissent; having political parties leads to fitnah/internal divisions
(Fandy 1999). Around 74% of the Saudi respondents to the survey strongly disagreed to the
compatibility of democratic institutions and procedures such as political parties, parliament and
elections with Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation as they understand it. Even though Saudi Arabia
has a fully appointed powerless Shura Council, Saudis do not even think that it is of any use
because of its powerlessness. Ordinary Saudis, according to a Saudi engineer, call this council
"manshaffa" meaning towel. That is when the royal family wants to make unpopular decisions, it
sends them to the Council just to give them a flavor of legitimacy. In other words if the council is
fully appointed by the King, then he is its constituency. Though I failed to have well-organized
focus groups discussions in Saudi Arabia, anecdotes and casual talks with Saudis who never
visited the West along with others who lived in the West for some time showed that the
traditional institutions of the family along with the tribe play the political roles of interest
articulation and representation that interest groups and lobbies perform in the West. Political
parties, as collective actors competing for power and forming either the government or
opposition, do not have counterparts in the public mind of the Saudi culture.
A Saudi journalist said:
It is highly destabilizing to allow political parties in the Kingdom. Tribal and
familial cleavages will spontaneously convert into party competition and political
campaigns with a lot of agony and prejudice. In a country that is named after one family,
other unsatisfied families are not going to be controllable.
As for socio-political tolerance and sense of equality, women's position and the negative
image that Shiites have in the minds of Sunnis and vice versa do not facilitate treating all Saudis
regardless of belief, gender and religion as morally and politically equals. Around 40 percent of
the Saudi respondents consider that women should not be franchised and 34 percent prefer to
limit their participation to voting in case Saudi Arabia adopts some type of elections. A Saudi
businesswoman blames ordinary Saudis for not being open-minded not because the government
prevents them from interacting (learning) from non-Saudis but because “this is the nature of the
Saudi people who are not ready for learning or interacting with others. Saudis are peculiar
people [in this regard]” (al-'Alyan 2003).
Women in Saudi Arabia are not considered full citizens in the legal, social and financial
senses because of their “inferiority to men rationally and psychologically. That is why a woman
is always in need of man’s custody” (al-Fassi 2003). This can be attributed to legal restrictions
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on the one hand and to the social and cultural traditions on the other hand (al-Fassi 2003). The
pooled data shows that around 35 percent of educated Saudi women would not think of
themselves as political actors at any level and 33 percent limit this participation to voting without
being able to represent themselves in elected councils or resuming executive positions.
Considering that the data depicts only the attitudes of educated Muslims, this past result raises
questions about the quality of education. The answer comes from a Saudi intellectual and
political scientist who states that most of the Islamic values that students get in Saudi Arabia
come from salafi/traditionalist teachers who do not train their students on critical thinking, rather
on memorizing and blindly believing in unquestioned sayings that would not serve pluralism,
tolerance or relative thinking (Al-Hamad "Beyond Brain-Washing (Arabic)" 2003). What is
worse is that they are educated to believe that the authentic and (only) true Islam is the
salafi/traditionalist Islam of Saudi Arabia. This notion makes other Muslim (let alone nonMuslim) societies pervert and thus should be avoided rather than studied and examined. With
around 50 percent of Saudis are under 18 right now and thus still get affected by schools as
agents of socialization, the forces of reform in Saudi Arabia should speed up the process of
reviewing this educational material.
Given the peculiarity of Saudi Arabia where the country that has no non-Muslim
citizens, it is meaningless to expect tolerant positions toward non-Muslims. However, the
attitude toward the remaining non-Muslims in Arabia (not necessarily in the boundaries of Saudi
Arabia) and Shiite is clear from the Islamic rhetoric adopted by some sheikhs who fully reject
Shiites since they are people of bed'a/ man made innovation who curse the first great caliphs of
Islam and attack the mother of the believers ‘Aisha, as a Saudi scholar put it. In a sermon given
by Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Hozzeffi under the title, “Wipe out the Jews, Christians and Shiite
from Arabia” (al-Hozzeffi 1998), one finds complete support for this type of intolerance.
Though Yemenis, Sudanese and Tajiks show remarkable religious tolerance toward
non-Muslims (especially Christians and Jews) in terms of their rights to build their houses of
worship (over 75% agree or strongly agree), this tolerance fades away when it comes to the
issue of political rights. Only 4 to 7 percent of the Yemenis, 2 to 12 percent of Sudanese, and 7
to 11 percent of Tajiks agree to give non-Muslims or Muslims from other sects the right to fully
participate in elections, assuming top legislative and executive responsibilities.
The misuse of democratic techniques and procedures to create phony images of
legitimate rule has caused a lot of harm to the perception of democracy in the minds of the
Muslims of Yemen, the Sudan and Tajikistan. Four Sudanese students in two different group
discussions differentiated between a ‘democracy’, referring to their own country’s system of
government, and real democracies. The pooled data show that Yemen's excessive tribalism,
despite the claims that it is weakening (al-Iryani 1998; Othman 1998), and highly conservative
attitudes toward women and Muslims from other sects are responsible for the weak support for
democratic software. Sudanese and Tajikistani civil wars may help explain the relatively low
level of socio-political tolerance. The Sudanese long civil war (from 1955 until present) has
severely shackled the trust and tolerance among northern and southern Sudanese alike
especially with lines of overlapping cleavages that separate Arab, predominantly Muslim political
elites in the north from the rest of the population in the south. Tajikistan’s civil war was shorter
(1992-1995) but with over 100,000 causalities that revealed and exacerbated the gap of trust
among many local groups and factions such as Kulob, Khujand, and Hisar who fought on one
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side and later formed the government and their opponent Tajiks from Qarategin and
Badakhshan. “Growing localism and the lack of a national consolidation have brought the
[Tajik] society and the state to the verge of collapse” (Abdoullaev 1998).
However, the puzzle remains in the feeble level of support to democratic institutions.
Unfortunately, the confusion between real and phony meanings of public elections in most of
these countries account for the lack of respect for democratic procedures and institutions. Only
10 percent of the Sudanese and 12 percent of the Tajiks think that the elections and referenda,
respectively, are free and fair. Sudanese interviewees were very critical of the phenomenon of
putting all major opposition Figures in jail or in exile and to have free elections afterwards; a
phenomenon that is very common in most Muslim countries. The civil war along with the four
abrupt military coups, and the tension among the political and intellectual elites drove down the
hope of real democratization in the Sudan. The Sudanese people chose to punish the
government by boycotting both legislative and presidential elections which ended up with the
empty ballot boxes in most of the counties; yet still the “elected” president Omar al-Bashir
claimed landslide victory in the 2000 elections which encouraged the ruling party to propose to
change the constitution to allow the president to be re-elected for unlimited number of times to
guarantee the stability of the country.16
Pakistanis and Nigerians have a problematic position in the cultural map of Muslims
attitudes toward democracy. Given their support for democratic institutions and procedures
(democratic hardware), they do not belong to the same category as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and
UAE. Yet given their relatively weak level of tolerance, it is easily to put them with the previous
cases. For further explication, as Figure 3.1 shows, they have a relatively moderate support for
democratic institutions and procedures (around 55 points) which is relatively higher than all
previous cultures and as good as Indonesia and the Gambia. Conversely, the two cultures do
not show equivalent level of socio-political tolerance. By examining the individual responses of
the two cultures, it is clear that there is a lack of trust among Nigerian and Pakistani Muslims
and non-Muslims of their respective countries. Furthermore, Pakistani Sunni, Shiite and Ahmadi
do not hide their negative attitude toward each other with 73 percent of them refusing intersectarian marriages among themselves. Yet, as expected with most minorities, the Shiite and
Ahmadi minorities tend to have more tolerant attitudes toward Sunni majority. The data suggests
that the tension among different Pakistani ethnic groups such as the Punjabi, the Sindhi, and the
Pashtun among others seems to be of secondary importance or has no significance unless
concurrent with religious cleavages among different sects of Muslims and non-Muslims (Sunni
77%, Shiite and Ahmadi 20%, Christian, Hindu and others 3%). This result actually confirms
other readings of the unstable social fabric of Pakistan (Chaudhri et al. 1989). Similarly in
Nigeria, the overlapping religious and ethnic cleavages can explain the lack of socio-political
tolerance (Suberu 1996). Though around 75% of Nigerians agree or strongly agree to the right
of Christians and Jews to build their own houses of worship (a right that was actually given to
the people of the book by Islam), 34 percent of the respondents believe that Christians and
Jews should be disfranchised and 32 percent think that their participation should be limited to
voting and nothing more. Commenting on this finding a Nigerian student studying Islamic fiqh in
Al-Azhar, Egypt said:
16
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[Nigerian] Christians impede Muslims from living according to Islam. Muslims
of Nigeria are going to fight for Sharia no matter what it costs even if they have
to have their own Islamic state in northern Nigeria.
This finding suggests that Nigeria’s public culture among Muslims (50% of the
population) poses a problem not only to the country’s prospectus of a sustainable democracy
but more fundamentally to the unity of the country in general. Though the survey did not capture
the specifics of the possible ethnic hostilities in Nigeria, a quick look at Nigeria’s electoral
disputes that were coupled with ethnic violence and military coup from 1960s thus far reveals
the problems of nation building that the country has to face (Aborisade 2002).
Women are not seen in Pakistan as necessarily politically incompetent or unequal to
men comparing to the previous cases. In Pakistan, almost 68% of the respondents have no
problem that women would participate in politics as ministers (33%) and members of parliament
(35%) let alone voting. However, according to the Pew survey, only 52 percent of Pakistanis
think that women should decide for themselves on the issue of veiling (Pew 2003a). This result
does not contradict with the previous finding about women’s participation in politics since
hijab/head scarf for both traditionalist and modernist Islamists is considered part of sharia rather
than a personal preference. Actually to have this large percentage of Pakistanis to give women
the right to decide on this issue is quite surprising. In sum, the deficit in Pakistan’s democratic
software can be attributed mainly to non-gender religious issues.
Unlike Pakistan, gender gap is a real problem in Nigeria with around 17% of the
respondents refuse that they would participate in politics in general and 57 percent limit their
participation to voting with only 2 percent of them trust women to be on top executive positions
such as ministers. Once again Pew’s survey confirms this attitude toward women from a
different perspective by showing that 53 percent of Nigerians (the highest among the surveyed
Muslim countries in their sample) clearly disagree to allow women to decide on veiling (Pew
2003a).
Regarding the attitudes toward democratic hardware, the negative experiences of
military interventions and high levels of corruption and manipulation of elections in both countries
have its impact on the attitudes of ordinary Muslims toward the visibility of elections and
democratic procedures (Aborisade 2002; Jafri 2002; Jawed 1999; Ujo 2000). Only 20
percent of the pooled respondents from Nigeria and Pakistan showed some satisfaction with the
performance of political parties and elected officials. A 57-year Pakistani respondent
commented on the web-based version of the survey by saying:
The survey overlooked the role of the military… I never voted for a government
without being overthrown by a coup… There is no need for elections if the
officers see themselves better politicians.
A Nigerian respondent described elections as “an arena for bribery and corruption” that
makes it absolutely undemocratic and un-Islamic. Another Nigerian and four Pakistani
respondents made similar comments. This criticism of democratic institutions is very common in
both countries. Moreover around 70 percent of the respondents in both countries chose “not
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sure” if democratic institutions such as parliaments, elections and parliaments are against Islamic
sharia or not.
A notable observation is related to the public acceptance of the label “democracy.” For
instance, 60 percent of the Saudis, 50 percent of the Yemenis, and 53% of the Omanis disagree
or strongly disagree to liken "democracy" to the Islamic system of shura which they prefer more.
Yet this ratio goes down very sharply in the countries such as Libya (40 percent), Tajikistan (25
percent), Pakistan (27 percent) and Nigeria (30 percent) where the word democracy is
commonly and publicly used by the Westernized intellectual entrepreneurs or even by
politicians.
The Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen and Nigeria in particular are examples of countries that
have periodic elections that themselves are causing more problems than to both the democratic
hardware and software. These fraud and risk-free elections make individuals increasingly less
trustful in their values which deeply harm the democratic hardware in the minds of the public.
Besides in deeply divided societies, the easiest way for political competitors to win votes is by
appealing to ethnic, tribal, religious constituencies which is very destructive of the social fabric of
society and thus worsens the public attitudes toward democratic software.
Based on this reading of the political cultures of these countries, one can partially explain
why these countries have not seen mass-initiated or mass-supported democratic transitions. In
three of the seven cases where elections are common, the turnout in most of the elections was
around 35 to 41 percent according to the usually exaggerated official sources (World Bank
2001). This reading of these cultures indicate that unless major cultural shifts occur, any elite-led
democratic transitions, if it happens at all, will need to address the issue of non-tolerance toward
women (as in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria and Libya), other sects of Muslims (Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Pakistan and UAE), non-Muslims (Pakistan, Nigeria and Yemen). Holding other noncultural factors constant, one may anticipate that even if the ruling elite decides to administer a
genuine democratic transition or occupying forces try to tilt these countries onto democracy,
most likely they will find themselves forced to adopt one of two strategies:
1To adopt, at least for the short-run, some form of exclusionary
democracy (i.e. by excluding given sects of society) analogous to most Western
democracies that disfranchised women or other minorities for quite some time until there
is a higher level of support for the proceduralist aspects of democracy among those who
are already franchised.
2To adopt the quota system by allocating certain number of seats to
women and other minorities. It is highly possible that these seats can be less than the
actual ratio of women and other minorities for the total population to appease the
illiberal majority in the short run.
These two strategies may help countries shirk the possibility of unsuccessful transitions
that may lead to domestic tension (i.e. civil war) if it is not already there.
These two strategies assume that well crafted democratic hardware can coexist with
poor democratic software. The support for this assumption comes from some established
democracies that have managed to survive even with relatively low level of democratic software.
Israel is a case in hand. According to a survey conducted by Israel Democracy Institute, 57
percent of the Jewish citizens of Israel support forcing the Arab citizens of Israel (their de jure
fellow citizens) to deport Israel while 53 percent of them objected to giving Arabs full citizenship
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rights. Additionally 77 percent believed that Arabs should not take part in any “vital decisions”
(al-Hayat, May 18, 2003). Taking these indicators together, one would put Israelis’ support for
democratic software, as operationalized in this project, not far from the Sudan and Tajikistan.
Building upon the experience of Israel, a good policy recommendation to democracy
builders in the previous Muslim countries is to proceed with cautious and gradual democratic
hardware reforms without upsetting the fragile social fabric of society due to low levels of
tolerance, sense of equality and trust.
C. Moderate Software and Moderate Hardware Category
The prospects for democratization increase the more one moves right-ward in Figure
3.1 since the support for democratic hardware increases. The circle in the middle of Figure 3.1
refers to cultures that are less resistant to socio-political differences and more accommodating
or democratic institutions and procedures. These cultures include 11 groups of Muslims
(including the 91 Iraqi respondents) and most notably two minorities: Lebanese Muslims and
Muslims of European countries. Turkmenistan is in a problematic position mainly because of the
low level of support for democratic institutions and procedures. Except for Iraq, all Muslims of
these countries were exposed to the initial steps of democratic transition (such as the Gambia,
Indonesia and, Bangladesh) or at least some liberalization process (such as Kuwait, Qatar,
Bahrain, and Turkmenistan) in the past twenty years. Unlike cultures of the first group that are
relatively less supportive of democracy either on institutional/procedural or socio-political
tolerance/trust bases, Muslims of the middle circle of cultures seem to be more ready to enter
the democratic era as far as it is not fiction or part of a self-survival mechanism on the regimes'
part. According to a Syrian intellectual, "Syrians are ready to die for Hafez al-Assad and Bashar
al-Assad on one condition: give them the right to choose that for themselves… through free
elections."
Most of these cases, with the exception of Muslims in the European Union countries,
are products of the third wave and they are embodiments of Huntington’s saying that: “A
general tendency seems to exist for third-wave democracies to become other than fully
democratic” (Huntington 1996b). All these cultures currently have some sort of public elections.
Some of them are new to elections such as Qatar and Bahrain while others have never
witnessed competitive multi-party elections such as Syria and Iraq. A third group has had
bloody experiences with elections, including Lebanon and Algeria. Kuwait stands alone as the
country that fully disfranchises women which makes it the opposite of Indonesia and Bangladesh
with their female heads of governments.
The Gambia is constitutionally a presidential republic yet despite democratic institutions
there is no fair chance for the opposition to check and balance the government. Turkmenistan is
a country under dictatorial rule with the lowest support for democratic hardware in this group of
countries (53 points). With the exception of Muslims of Turkmenistan and of Europe,
approximately 40 to 46 percent of the Muslims of other countries in this group characterize their
current political system as exactly in the middle between fully free and a full dictatorship which
reflects their tendency to see the pros and the cons of the status quo and to compare it with
what real democracy looks like. An Algerian professor of sociology, commented on this finding
that “most of the people in these countries, with the exception of Iraq, Syria and Turkmenistan,
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can opine and talk freely yet they are not politically effective. They are like one-eyed men. They
cannot say that they cannot see but they cannot say they see well like normal people either.”
Despite the fact that the mode of the responses was toward the middle point of partially
free and partially dictatorial, only 10 percent of the respondents in countries like Iraq, Syria or
Algeria perceived their countries as free or partly free. This ratio increases dramatically to be
around 40 percent in the case of Muslims in EU countries and Lebanon. Yet around high 20
and 30 percent of the respondents of the rest of the countries think that their countries are free
or partially free.
Surprisingly, the data suggests that Qatar has the highest level of support for democratic
software in this group of cultures (around 62 points). Actually Qatar, along with Bahrain, is
often quoted as a good example of modernizing and liberal elite that is ahead of its own people.
The semi-city-state of Qatar has made the best use of its coherent social fabric and small
population by putting the issues of women on the locus of the attention since the assumption of
Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani the government in 1995. The number of Qatari women joining
university is higher than Qatari men with full political rights (al-Sharq al-Awssat, April 20th,
2003). Around 49 percent of Qatari respondents, the highest ratio in all Gulf States, think that
Qatari women can be voted in to the parliament and assume ministerial positions. This finding on
its own merit is a possible answer to a question raised in the New Yorker in 2002. Under the
title of Democracy by Decree the reporter asked: “Can one man propel a country in the
future?” (Weaver 2000) The answer seems to be yes. Though, there is no data available about
the Qataris’ attitudes toward democratic aspects before 1995, Qatar’s political culture puts it in
the highest rank comparing to all other gulf states in terms of its support for democratic software
and second to Kuwait in terms of support for democratic hardware.
In terms of democratic software, it scores even higher than Jordan, Tunisia, Iran,
Senegal, and Mali that definitely preceded it in their liberal/democratic transitions. Kuwait on the
other hand lacks this support for women’s enfranchisement with around 45 percent refusing to
support women's right to participate in politics at all. Lebanon, Indonesia and Syria’s relatively
clear deficit in software is hardly attributed to the public’s attitude toward women. Only 5
percent in Indonesia, 7 percent in Lebanon and 13 percent in Syria think that women should not
be entitled to vote in public elections. In a clear support for the respect for women, the Pew
project showed that 86 percent of Muslims in Indonesia, and 90 percent of Muslims in Lebanon
endorse women’s right to decide on wearing hijab; an attitude that can generally speaking
described as modernist or liberal. However, in the three countries there is high level of
intolerance and lack of trust toward non-Muslims and toward different sects of Islam (especially
Lebanon). Around 17 percent of the Indonesian respondents do not agree that Christian and
Jews would participate in politics at all and only 3 percent give them right to fully participate as
ministers. Indonesians however, are more tolerant toward their own fellow Muslims from other
sects; only 5 percent of the respondents think that Muslims from other sects should be deprived
from their political rights. The effect of the Lebanese civil war on Muslims’ low level of tolerance
toward Lebanese non-Muslims is clear but still high comparing to other countries that
experienced similar tragedies such as Tajikistan, Nigeria and Pakistan. Fairly less tolerant than
Indonesians, 33 percent of the Muslims of Lebanon who responded to the survey consider it
right to disfranchise all non-Muslims and only 5 percent favor the right of non-Muslims to
assume top executive offices such as ministers. The shadows of the civil war are still around in
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Lebanon even during basketball games where one hears slogans of racial and religious bigotry.
In a recent basketball game, the fans of al-Riady (the "Sportive"), mostly Muslims, shouted
“Syria .. Syria” in reference to their support of the Syrian army that empowers Lebanese
Muslims. In response, the fans of al-Hikma (the "Wisdom"), mainly Christians, shouted “USA”
and “Hakim.. Hakim” in reference to the Christian leader of the so-called Lebanese forces who
was famous for killing his Muslim opponents during the civil war (al-Sharq al-Awssat, June 8,
2003).
Conversely, the Lebanese Muslims seem to be relatively but not highly more tolerant
toward inter-Islam sectarianism with around 27 percent supporting the disenfranchisement of
Muslims from other sects while still only 6 percent would give them full political rights. Syria is
somewhat similar to Lebanon regarding the attitudes toward Muslims from other sects while
dramatically less tolerant towards non-Muslims, especially the Jews, with around 70 percent
supporting their total disenfranchisement. The long war against Israel is the first factor to come
to mind to explain this finding. However, the level of intolerance noticeably decreases to 16
percent of the respondents in favor of disfranchising Christians. Only 10 percent of Syrian
Muslims think that their other fellow Muslims from other sects should be disenfranchised.
Not taking other factors into account, mass-led democratic transition is a possibility in
these countries that occupy the middle circle of Figure 3.1; yet it is not highly likely given the
moderate level of support for democratic hardware. This does not mean that there are no
political demands for economic or social reasons. But these demands are most likely to fall short
of demands for real democratic transition.
However, elite-led democratic transition (or one forced from abroad) would not meet
much resistance at the mass level, provided that appropriate institutional design strategies are
followed since the level of tolerance is not that high either (Hadenius 2001).
The case of Iraq is significant in this regard. The 91 Iraqis who responded to this survey
showed a relatively acceptable level of tolerance and trust toward each other (53 points) which
is actually higher than Indonesia, Syria, Algeria, Lebanon and Kuwait. There is nothing in the
current data that shows Iraqis to be exceptionally anti-democratic. However, as mentioned
earlier, the countries in the middle circle do not have the level of tolerance that would make a
quick resort to elections a smart move. An Iraqi liberal commentator supported the coalition
forces’ reluctance to hold elections in Iraq right now. “Iraqis have to move toward democracy
cautiously and gradually… Though, the odds of a democratic Iraq are high, democracy needs
training” (al-Qashtini 2003).
The circle in the middle contains as well the average of all Muslims including the ones
that were coded as others since the number of the respondents from their respective countries
did not meet the criterion of 480 respondents for each country. The average Muslims,
regardless of their respective countries, are relatively but not highly tolerant toward women,
non-Muslims and Muslims of other sects with a score of 54 points. In other words average
Muslims are not as necessarily and inherently intolerant as the stereotype suggests. Besides, an
average Muslim scores around 60 points of support for democratic institutions and procedures
as far as they are real and genuine.
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D. High Hardware and High Software Category:
The symmetry between support for democratic hardware and software continues with
the group of cases in the upper right corner of the graph labeled the relatively most
democratizable cultures. These countries are relatively the most democratizable given their high
level of tolerance and trust and support for democratic institutions and procedures.
That is why when it comes to explaining why some of these countries have not already
achieved stable democratic governments, the data suggest that one should search for noncultural explanations. For instance, Moroccans have the highest level of support for democratic
institutions and a relatively high level of tolerance, yet it is not a constitutional monarchy
following the Westminster model. The monarch still plays a crucial rule that makes the political
parties effectively administrative parties (Gillespie and Youngs 2002). This finding actually can
be explained by the fact that the independence was achieved mainly by the efforts of the alIstiqlal (Independence) Party founded in 1944 and through a lot of negotiations and coalitions
inside an elected parliament. Besides the successive Constitutions of Morocco, in a rare
exception in all Muslim countries, starting from 1962 the constitution emphasized a
representative government, elected parliament and multi-party system under a strong monarchy.
One can argue that the lack of a stable democratic system in Morocco cannot be attributed to
the individuals' attitudes, as the pooled data suggest, but to the role played by the king (Bourqia
and Miller 1999; Layachi 1998).
Turkey on the other hand has the highest level of socio-political tolerance in terms of
culture and very high support for democratic institutions. But military interventions to protect and
safeguard the secular system along with a somewhat illiberal constitution pose a great obstacle
toward full democratization. Based upon both the survey data and the focus group discussions,
Turkey has a publicly tolerant culture that does not reflect on the practices of its government,
especially in its military arm. One should recall that the public already voted in a woman with
hijab into the parliament. It was the secular government, induced and supported by the military
that disqualified her, not the Turkish people (Saktanber 2002). Even the Kurdish issue does not
seem to be the battle of Turkish individuals but of the military inducing successive governments
since 1924 (Ibrahim and Gèurbey 2000). According to a Turkish student of engineering, "there
is no guarantee that the military would not strip the president himself of his constitutional rights.
They can change the constitution or even tear it up in an hour." This reading of Turkish culture is
compatible with the findings that democracy was not constantly seen as a top priority by Turkish
official politicians (Heper and Sayari 2002). The last elections reflected the disappointments that
the Turkish voters had toward all parties that have been in power since the military gave up
power in early 1983 (Kedourie 1996).
Muslims in the U.S. seem to be more supportive of democracy than any other Muslim
minority compared to India, Europe and definitely Lebanon. For instance, 57 percent of
American Muslims believe that women should be given all political rights without reservations.
This ratio goes down to 51 percent in case of EU Muslims and 41 percent in case of Indian
Muslims.
With the exception of Iran, almost all other societies in this group have (semi-) secularist
constitutions and governmental platforms. This finding supports the arguments made by some
secularists that secularism once introduced to Muslim societies will increase the level of
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tolerance and peaceful co-existence among religions and sects (Baghdadi 1999). Another
support for this claim is the position of Iran in Figure 3.1 in terms of its democratic software.
Only Jordan scores below Iran in this group of countries. Iranian scores around 55 points in the
scale of democratic software not because Iranians are intolerant rather because “they do not go
in terms of their tolerance to the level of infringing upon the roots of their religion” as an
anonymous Iranian reformist lawyer commented. This analysis finds support in the pooled data.
In the four questions regarding the political rights of Christians, Jews and other non-Muslims,
women and Muslims from other sects the mode was to allow all of them to vote and to become
members of the parliament. Yet the second most supported option was to give them full political
rights including becoming top executives which suggests that Iranians in general are tolerant but
cautious.
Table 3.2
Attitudes toward Jews and Christians in the Whole Sample (T-Test)

Christians
Jews

Mean
2.799
2.639

Std. Err
.007
.008

Std. Dev.
1.052
1.111

T
39.316

N= 20457 and 2-tailed test.
Note: A T-ratio above 1.96 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference
between the means at confidence level of .95.
Table 3.3
Difference in Tolerance toward Jews and Christians in Morocco (T-Test)

Christians
Jews

Mean
3.351
3.344

Std. Err
.029
.029

Std. Dev.
.685
.696

T
1.265

N= 558 and 2-tailed test.
Note: A T-ratio below 1.96 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference
between the means at confidence level of .95.
The relative deficit in Jordan’s democratic software is attributed mainly to the clear
polar skewness regarding the political rights of women where between 33 percent of the
respondents refuse to give women any political rights and 42 percent who want to give women
full political rights. Another factor that seems to be responsible for the relative deficit of
democratic software in Jordan is the attitude toward Muslims from different sects and tribes
with 55 percent of the respondents refusing to give others any political rights. As one of the
respondents commented, this may be because of the fear of the effect of tribalism and
sectarianism on the unity of the country rather than because of prejudice or bigotry.
There are some lessons and observations that can be discussed in summary points as
follows:
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1- The pooled data suggest that the tolerance toward Jews is much less than the tolerance
toward Christians in all Muslim countries except for the case of Morocco where the Jews have
always been part of the social fabric as Table 3.2 and 3.3 shows. In Table 3.2, given the large
value of t (39.3) one rejects the hypothesis that Muslims treat Christians and Jews alike and
accept the alternative hypothesis that Muslims are more tolerant toward Christians than toward
the Jews.
2- There is almost consensus among all the interviewees, secularists and Islamists alike,
that this discrepancy in tolerance between Jews and Christians can be attributed to the Qur'an
clear criticisms of the Jews and Muslims’ sympathy and solidarity with their brothers in
Palestine. However, the above result is applicable to all Muslim societies except for Morocco
where there is no statistical difference between the way Muslims of Morocco perceives
Christians and Jews as demonstrated in Table 3.3 .
3- Intra-Islam factions are associated with less tolerance toward non-Muslims in
countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (where Sunni are the majority), along with Bahrain and Iran
(where Shiite is the majority). That is to say there is a statistically significant difference between
the levels of tolerance toward non-Muslims versus Muslim minorities with relatively higher level
of tolerance toward non-Muslims. Muslims, in countries like Indonesia, the Gambia, Egypt,
Nigeria, India, Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar and Bangladesh, are generally tolerant. Yet this
tolerance is higher toward Muslims from other sects than toward non-Muslims mainly because
these countries do not actually have significant Muslim minorities from other sects. Pakistani and
Sudanese Muslims are alike in their lower level of tolerance toward Muslim and non-Muslim
minorities alike. Muslims from countries like Morocco, Senegal, Mali, Lebanon, UAE and
Oman do not have statistically significant difference in tolerance between Muslims of other sects
and non-Muslim minorities in their respective countries.
However, as Table 3.4 shows, in general Muslims have a tendency to show tolerance
toward their fellow Muslims from other sects more than tolerance toward non-Muslims. This
difference in tolerance can be attributed to which can be attributed to the fact that most Muslims
do not live in countries that have intra-Islam sectarian divisions. That is why intra-Islam sectarian
division can be a real obstacle toward democratization in the countries that have these divisions
(e.g. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). However, as a general comment on how these intra- and
inter-religion divisions may impede the democratic transition, Pew’s 2003 survey showed that
nearly four-in-ten of the American citizens “would not vote for a well-qualified Muslim for
president” (Pew 2003b). A noticeable number of Americans would not vote for a qualified
evangelical (15 percent), a Jew (10 percent), a Catholic (8 percent) or an atheist (52 percent)
(Pew 2003b). Thus the cultural influences of inter- and intra-religion divisions are not a
peculiarly Muslim phenomenon but it can be more acute and troubling in some countries more
than others.
4- Rigid attitudes toward women's political efficacy in general are a male rather than a
female phenomenon as Table 3.5 suggests. That is to say, with the exception of Turkey and
Tajikistan, all sampled data refer to the clear tendency among women to support their own
political rights more than men do. In Turkey and Tajikistan, there were no statistically significant
differences between Turkey’s men and women support for women’s rights and likewise
Tajikistan’s men and women relatively lower lack of support toward women’s political rights.

85

Even in countries with little support for women’s political rights on average, women are more
tolerant than men.
Table 3.4
Difference in Tolerance toward Muslim and Non-Muslim Minorities (T-Test)

Non-Muslims
Muslim Minorities

Mean
2.652
2.727

Std. Err
.010
.009

Std. Dev.
1.065
1.052

T
-8.6966

N= 11168 and 2-tailed test.
Note: A T-ratio above 1.96 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference
between the means at confidence level of .95.
Table 3.5
Difference in Tolerance toward Women (T-Test)

Male
Female

N
15476
7738

Mean
2.696
3.176

Std. Err
.008
.010

Std. Dev.
1.050
.909

T
-34.131

N= 15835 and 2-tailed test.
Note: A T-ratio above 1.96 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between
the means at confidence level of .95.
2. The Influence of Cultural Entrepreneurs on the Masses
Building on the last chapter's discussion of how Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars
(cultural or intellectual entrepreneurs) introduce different and uncompromising readings of
Islam’s compatibility with democracy, this section will examine how these tense debates
influence the public culture. In other words, does one expect the public mind to reflect the same
division and tension? Besides, how can one relate the division among the four types of
intellectuals and ulama/scholars to the cultural map of different cultures as portrayed in Figure
3.1? The response to these two questions requires us first to classify the respondents to the
survey into Islamist traditionalists, Islamist modernists, liberal secularists and autocratic
secularists.
Table 3.6 identifies four criteria to distinguish among the respondents who fall into the
four groups. Question 2.8 is a very straightforward and reliable criterion for one’s position as a
secularist or Islamist since it directly asks respondents to (strongly) agree or strongly disagree to
the famous statement of Muslim brotherhood that Islam is deen wa dawla / religion and state.
Those who chose “Not sure” are excluded from the classification. However, since the attitude
toward democracy specifically is much more delicate, the three other questions (2.4, 2.7, and
2.28) were used to differentiate between modernists (who argue for the compatibility of Islam
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and democracy) and traditionalists (who argue the opposite) among Islamists and between
liberals (who advocate democracy) and autocrats (who advocate autocracy) among secularists.
Table 3.6
Classification of Respondents’ Attitudes toward Democracy

1. Traditionalist
Islamists
2. Autocratic
Secularists
3. Modernist
Islamists
4. Liberal
Secularists

Islam as a source
of political
doctrine
(Q. 2.8)
(Strongly)
Agree
(Strongly)
Disagree
(Strongly)
Agree
(Strongly)
Disagree

Is Islam and
elected polity
compatible?
(Q. 2.7)
(Strongly)
Disagree
Not Applicable

Associating
democracy with
negatives?
(Q. 2.4)
(Strongly) Agree

(Strongly)
Agree
Not Applicable

(Strongly)
Disagree
(Strongly)
Disagree

(Strongly) Agree

Definition of
Democracy
(open-ended)
(Q. 2.28)
(Very)
Negative
(Very)
Negative
(Very) Positive
(Very) Positive

Traditionalist Islamists have been identified in the survey as those who consistently
refuse the values and institutions of democracy since they are un-Islamic. The best
exemplification of this mentality is Ali Belhaj (a leader of Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front that
almost won the 1988 elections) who said: “when we are in power, there will be no more
elections because God will be ruling.” Hadi Hawang of Partai Islam Sel-Malaysia (PAS)
echoed the same mentality by saying: “I am not interested in democracy. Islam is not
democracy, Islam is Islam” (Quoted in: Pipes 1995)
Traditionalists have been identified from their takes on 1) Islam as state and religion
(slogan raised by Islamic groups throughout the Muslim world); 2) their negative definition of
democracy (an open-ended question) and 3) their belief that Islam and publicly elected and
accountable government are incompatible. Modernist Islamists, unlike traditionalists, have been
identified as those who consistently accept both the values and institutions of democracy since
they are Islamic or Islamizable (condoned by Islam) in both their definition of democracy and
their response to the same mentioned questions. Modernist Islamists in general argue that
democracy is a priority over sharia not priority of supremacy but priority of order. Analogously,
the street is prior to the mosque since you need to pass by the street before you go to the
mosque.
Autocrats are those who consistently (strongly) disagree to the linkage between Islam,
as a religion, and the state, as a political institution, and oppose democracy, as not suitable or
not the top priority of Muslim countries, thus should be dropped or postponed.
These attitudes were captured in the responses to questions 2.4 and 2.28. Liberals are
the sub-group of secularists who consistently accept democratic norms and institutions in their
responses to these two questions. It is noteworthy that if any respondent does not show
consistency in answering questions such as agreeing to question 2.7 and at the same time
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agreeing to question 2.4, he/she is dropped from the classification. Keeping that in mind, the
data suggest that the Muslim public culture reflects the same division among intellectuals and
ulama/scholars in 86 percent of the cases. It is important to note that around 4.5 percent of the
respondents did not respond to two or more of the questions mentioned in Table 3.6. However,
it is very difficult to assess why the remaining 9.5 percent of the respondents who actually
responded to almost all the questions did not fall into any of the four categories. They may have
misunderstood a question or more, they may be simply inconsistent or adopt an outlying position
that could not be met by the four positions advanced by Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars.
Based on tabulations of the 21,143 respondents who consistently fall into one of the four
categories, Table 3.7 that shows the relative percentage of each one of these groups by country.
Table 3.7 can be very informative in a variety of ways. First, it suggests that educated
Muslims are predominately Islamists (either traditionalists or modernists). This finding in itself
confirms Islamists’ argument that they control streets and mosques while secularists control
palaces and media. Only in Tajikistan (55 percent), Turkmenistan (58 percent), Mali (57
percent), Tunisia (58 percent), Albania (62 percent) and Turkey (68 percent)are secularists in
the majority.
An Islamist modernist commented on the results of the 2003 elections in the Egyptian
syndicate of journalism where the opposition (mainly pan-Arabists and Islamists) won two third
of the seats that: “When true and genuine democracy prevails, it will definitely lead to the
unequivocally opposite direction to the current trends in Arab politics” (Howaidi 2003b). Let it
be clear that since the great majority of Muslim countries are not governed by liberal or
modernist elites, according to the working definitions articulated in this project, this data, though
not qualified for generalization about all Muslims, confirms this past statement.
Third, there is a common factor that characterizes all the countries with a
secularist majority: Muslims were forced through governmental policies to be secular (through
secular system of education, mass media and the governmental control over Islamic institutions)
either by communist regimes (Ex. Albania, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), or Muslim rulers who
decided to westernize their countries through non-democratic means (Ex. Turkey, Mali and
Tunisia).
Apparently, other rulers in other Muslim countries were not that successful. With the
exception of Tajikistan, in five of the previous six cases, and totally unlike the elites, the majority
of public attitudes are more liberal than their autocratic rulers.
Fourth, since the modernist Islamists and the liberal secularists are the only two groups
of the repertoire of the cultural positions available to Muslims that seek co-existence with each
other, albeit with a very high level of self-restraint, they deserve more attention. It is almost
impossible to imagine a scenario by which a peaceful alteration of power could ever happen in a
country governed by traditionalists or autocrats. Yet one can imagine, assuming that each group
of cultural entrepreneurs will act according to their declared discourse, that the only two groups
that may accept, even reluctantly, democracy to be the only game in town are the liberals and
modernists. Added up together they have formed the seventh column entitled 3+4.
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Table 3.7
The Percentages of the Four Cultural Categories in 32 Muslim Countries
1
2
3
Trad. Auto. Mod.
Turkey
1
5
31
Senegal
9
0
68
Morocco
9
0
72
Albania
5
6
33
Egypt
3
7
63
Tunisia
6
8
37
Iran
2
12
79
USA
10
8
33
MALI
2
15
50
Gambia
3
15
54
Turkmenistan
11
9
31
Malaysia
14
6
62
EU
15
5
47
India
10
16
50
Kuwait
17
11
41
Bangladesh
20
8
48
Jordan
20
9
48
Qatar
23
8
45
Bahrain
23
10
58
Syria
26
7
40
UAE
30
3
60
Lebanon
20
14
31
Algeria
25
10
33
Indonesia
28
7
40
Oman
31
5
46
Libya
27
9
59
Yemen
35
1
46
Sudan
26
12
55
Pakistan
24
15
42
Nigeria
31
14
38
Tajikistan
11
36
35
Saudi Arab
46
2
48
Average
18.34 8.41 47.69
Source: web and written survey 2002

4
Lib.
63
23
19
57
27
50
7
50
33
29
49
18
33
23
32
24
23
24
10
27
7
35
33
25
18
5
17
7
19
17
19
4
25.72

1+3
Islamists
32
77
80
38
66
42
81
53
43
56
42
76
62
61
58
68
68
68
81
66
90
51
58
68
77
86
81
80
66
69
45
95
65.13

3+4
Democrats
94
91
91
90
89
87
86
83
83
82
81
80
80
73
73
72
71
69
67
67
67
67
66
65
64
64
63
62
61
55
54
52
73.38

Democratizability
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Most
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Possibly
Least
Least
Least
Least
Least
Least
Least
Least
Possibly

To avoid the arbitrary classification of societies, one can suggest a continuum where
societies with the highest percentage of democrats (column 3+4) are the most democratizable
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and societies with the least percentage of democrats are the least democratizable. In this
column, Muslims of Turkey, Senegal, Morocco, Albania, Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, USA, Mali, the
Gambia, Turkmenistan, Malaysia, and the European Union countries are the most
democratizable cultures. If we compare this list of countries thus far, with the exception of
Muslims of Turkmenistan and EU, this result confirms the cultural map of democratic hardware
and software as presented in Figure 3.1. This confirmation is crucial since three of the four
questions (2.8, 2.7 and 2.28) were not used in building the scales of democratic hardware and
software as portrayed in Figure 3.1. Thus, two different types of questions lead to a similar
result which increases the reliability of the data. Actually, one should not be concerned about
shift in the status of the Muslims of the EU since they were among the highest supporters of
democratic hardware and were more tolerant than Iran, Tunisia, and Jordan that were in the
category of the most democratizable cultures in Figure 3.1. The actual surprise is the shift in the
Turkemani Muslims’ position toward the ‘most democratizable’ category. Though, there is no
enough data to explain the shift, one can argue that the legacy of the state-imposed secularism
and distorted understanding of democracy under the Soviet Union may explain part of the
discrepancy. No other discrepancies between positions of countries in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.6
except for the downward shift of Jordan from the most democratizable category to the possible
democratizable and UAE into the opposite direction. Once again, the shift is fallacious since
Jordan was actually the lowest score of democratic software country in the category of most
democratizable cultures. Thus, moving backward in Table 3.1 should not be a surprise. UAE as
well shift upward to become possible democratizable, though it has one of the least supportive
cultures of hardware but this does not mean that they are anti-democratic. It is just that they do
not need it, but in case they need it, they may adopt it.
Second, Table 3.6 suggests that average Muslims’ political culture is not necessarily
democratic but definitely democratizable. As shown, 73 percent of Muslims overall (irrespective
of country) are either modernist Islamists or liberal secularists.
Based upon Table 3.6, one can ask if the intellectual civil war that was based upon lack
of trust and defaming one’s opponents has its impact on a cultural civil war among ordinary
educated Muslims. The following section will try to answer this question.
3. Illiberal Democracy Debate
How liberal are Muslims? A balanced and moderate level of democratic checks and
boundaries benefit both democratic procedures and liberal values. Unlimited democracy harms
liberal principles by favouring “discriminatory measures benefiting the various groups supporting
the majority [besides,] it is also doubtful whether in the long run democracy can preserve itself if
it abandons liberal principles” (Hayek 1978:143).
The available data can help examine educated Muslims' attitudes toward some aspects
of liberal democracy. Muslims are claimed to be illiberal even if they are democratic. This
discrepancy suggests that they may accept the means and mechanisms of participation and
democracy such as elections, parties, and parliament with the minimal level of democratic values
associated with it such as equality and tolerance for loyal "others." Yet they do not go the further
step toward the protection of others’ liberties of religion, belief, speech, assembly, and property
even if they are perceived to be radically different (Zakaria 1997). Democracy, in terms of
procedural hardware, is proposed to be more acceptable by Muslims than liberal, non-Islamic
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values (Kramer 1999) which increases the possibility of accepting democracy only among those
who think alike. Other studies found Muslims less tolerant toward homosexuals and atheists
(Norris and Inglehart 2002; Pew 2003b). According to a Sudanese Sheikh who talks very
comfortably about Islamic democracy: “a Muslim tolerant of homosexuality is not a Muslim
since he tolerates what he is asked not to tolerate. It is kabeera/grand sin that takes one to
hellfire.”
In this section, the less ideologically liberal Muslims are, the more they reflect the
intellectual civil war depicted in the previous chapter. Thus, a measurement of political and
ideological liberalism serves two purposes: First, it helps examine if democracy functions as a
disposable "ladder" that is abused by some groups and will be burned once they are in power.
Judging the intentions of others is rather impossible but the data in this survey functions as a tool
of affirmation if this tendency exists. Second, liberalism is a system of values that merits
examination in itself especially when it comes to adopting liberal attitudes toward who are
ideologically different: secularists versus Islamists and vice versa.
In other words, Muslims’ software (socio-religious and political liberal attitudes at the
individual level) was important but not enough to judge the democratizability of different cultures
since these cultures divide as well on the ideological Islamist-secularist axis. The pages to come
will introduce another measurement of Muslims’ (il)liberal attitudes toward the rights of their
ideologically political opponents to establish legal political parties and thus to compete for
power. No democracy can emerge and flourish if elections are not coupled with mutual respect
for both the liberal and democratic rules on the parts of the majorities and minorities toward
each others’ right to exist and function.
It should be clear that the measurement of ideological liberalism used here is based on a
normative scale that assumes full acceptance of others' ideologies and acknowledges their rights
to exist. It is a normative scale since it is practically impossible to find such a level of mutual
acceptance in any modern polity.
Even Germany – widely held to be a consolidated liberal democracy – outlaws parties
of the extreme left and right (Communists and Nazis). Their reasons are based in their own
history, together with the logic that both extremes are committed to using democratic means to
end democracy. Most Germans support the laws. The U.S. has hate speech laws, and
campuses have the right and the judicial procedures in place to expel students who engage in
hate speech. Yet this does not make either Germany or USA illiberal societies.
Despite these examples, this project adopts the normative scale that assumes full
acceptance of others' ideologies. This choice is due to the fact that it is the only possible
unbiased tool that enables us to compare Muslims' positions without making judgments about
individual intentions. For instance, secularists accuse Islamists of being opportunistic who want
to use democracy and dispense with it once they are in power. Though, one can make some
good guesses about whether this is true or not in each Muslim society individually, these guesses
are not empirically verifiable in most cases.
In the current survey, the respondents have been asked to respond to two questions
that captured their tendency to allow "Islamist" parties and "non-Islamist" parties such as
communists, socialists and liberal in general to compete for power. Neither of the questions
differentiates between genuinely democratic parties and opportunistic ones. Thus, the questions
assume that if an Islamist refuses all the "non-Islamist" parties regardless of their commitment to
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democracy, then it is a clear indication that he/she adopts an illiberal position toward nonIslamic (alien) parties and ideologies. Likewise, if a secularist refuses all Islamist parties,
regardless of their attitudes toward violence and democracy while there is no single Muslim
society without some modernist Islamists who believe in the compatibility of Islam and
democracy, then he/she adopts an illiberal attitude.
The four Tables 3.8-1, 3.8-2, 3.9-1 and 3.9-2 demonstrate Muslims’ attitudes toward
the legal establishment of liberal, communist, and socialist parties in their respective countries
and their attitudes toward allowing Islamist movements to form legal political parties.
The last columns in Tables 3.8-1 and 3.9-1 explicitly demonstrate the polarization in
attitudes among Muslims regarding forming parties. Around 37 percent of Muslims, holding their
countries of origin constant, (strongly) disagree with giving liberal, socialist and/or communist
political parties the right to exist as captured by question 2.27. Table 3.8-2, which is another
way of demonstrating Table 3.8-1, shows that half of those who (strongly) disagree that these
parties ought to exist (36.59%) are the traditionalists (18.39%) for religious reasons. However,
autocrats as well are responsible for around 20 percent of refusing this type of parties
(6.9/36.6). This is consistent with their tendencies to set the idea of having multi-party system on
a low level in their list of priorities. The attitude of modernist Islamists who, given their other
answers, represent the most liberal and pluralistic face of Islamists is very intriguing. Around 20
percent of them refuse to legalize such "alien" parties (Table 3.8-1) which puts them in a very
close position to traditionalists. Though democratic in general, one modernist of each five in the
pooled data does not seem to be liberal enough to accept parties that are based upon nonIslamic ideologies.
Table 3.8-1
Tolerance toward Non-Islamist Political Parties %
Tradition.

Autocrat Modern. Liberals
(Strongly) Disagree
69.72
20.36
5.55
Not sure
0
17.40
23.60
7.54
(Strongly) Agree
0
12.88
56.04
86.9
Total
100
100
100
100
Pearson chi2 (12)= 12000 Pr = 0.000

Total
36.59
15.07
48.35
100

Table 3.8-2
Tolerance toward Non-Islamist Political Parties % (Different angle)
Tradition. Autocrat.
(Strongly) Disagree
18.39
6.89
Not sure
0
1.72
(Strongly) Agree
0
1.27
18.4
9.9
Pearson chi2 (12)= 12000 Pr = 0.000
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Modern.
10.06
11.67
27.69
49.42

Liberals
1.24
1.68
19.37
22.29

Total
36.59
15.07
48.35
100

Yet when one considers the 23 percent of modernists who are skeptical (not sure), a
preponderance of evidence supports the claim that some modernists are more democratic and
less liberal. That is to say, they accept democratic mechanisms and institutions as means of
participation and competition but only among those who accept the Islamic frame of reference.
This finding was supported by many of the focus-group discussions with many pro-democracy
interviewees who very reluctantly accept even to discuss why a communist party may exist in a
Muslim country given what they know about Marx’s often quoted opinion about religion. Does
this mean that the secularists who put traditionalists and modernists in the same basket are right?
There is a possibility here for this reading at least in the case of 20 percent of the illiberal
democratic modernists. Some modernists, when given the opportunity to actually govern such as
in the Sudan under the current "Islamic" regime, were not much different from despotic
autocratic secularists. Thus, it is safe to infer that not all modernist (democratic) Islamists are
liberal. The proportion of illiberal modernists Islamists, according to this data, is around 20
percent of all modernists.
However, some liberal secularists as well have reservations on allowing some nonIslamic parties to exist particularly the communist and socialist ones. As shown in Tables 3.8-1
and 3.9-1, 5.5 and 18.8 percent of the nominal liberals seem to be conditional liberals; that is to
say they have reservations and concerns about Islamist and non-Islamist parties’ commitment to
the democratic rules and liberal values. An Algerian professor called himself a “conditional
liberal.” He added: “I am liberal before I am a democrat.
Table 3.9-1
Tolerance toward Islamist Political Parties %
Tradition. Autocrat
(Strongly) Disagree
98.9
96.67
Not sure
.91
1.51
(Strongly) Agree
.20
1.82
Total
100
100
Pearson chi2(12)= 19000 Pr=0.00

Modern.
0.42
10.07
89.5
100

Liberals
18.81
26.04
55.15
100

Total
30.51
11.76
57.73
100

Table 3.9-2
Tolerance toward Islamist Political Parties % (Different angle)
Tradition. Autocrat Modern. Liberals
(Strongly) Disagree
16.7
8.87
0.21
4.73
Not sure
0.15
0.14
4.91
6.56
(Strongly) Agree
0.03
0.17
43.65
13.88
Total
16.89
9.17
48.76
25.17
Pearson chi2(12)= 19000 Pr=0.00
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Total
30.51
11.76
57.73
100

Democracy may eat itself by giving illiberals the right to deprive me from all my rights.”
Thus, he is liberal on one condition; liberalism does not wither away at any point of time no
matter what the system of government is. Yet he sees no future for liberalism if Islamists take
over. “They think that they are the soldiers of Allah and speak in His name.” The Algerian
professor's attitude is not an exception. Dr. Hazem Hosni of Cairo University, though liberal in
general, prefers the current regime in Egypt, even if it may not be fully democratic to “a
totalitarian theology under Islamists.”
The percentage of liberals who show no tolerance toward Islamist political parties is
around 18.8 percent (Table 3.9-1). Thus almost one fifth of the nominal liberals seem to be
conditional liberals to say the least, contradictory or opportunistic liberals to echo the Islamists’
criticisms of secularist positions. A Syrian independent Modernist Islamist whom I interviewed
in UAE waged a harsh criticism on liberal secularists since they talk the talk of liberalism but
walk the walk of autocrats. “They like elections only if it gets them to power.” Howaidi of Egypt
made a similar observation when some nominal liberals criticized the illiberal elections that may
bring Nasserists and Islamists into power (Howaidi 2003c). This analysis gives an indication for
how the lack of trust and opportunistic tendencies exists in roughly 20 percent of modernists
who do not actually adhere to the principles of co-existence and tolerance with non-Islamic
ideologies and 18 percent of liberals follow the same path.
Sa'id al-‘ashmawi of Egypt, a prominent and leading secularist figure in the Arab world,
is sure that the great majority of Muslims, if given the opportunity to elect their representatives,
will fall into the trap of the demagogic Islamists. I have to concur that 40 percent, but still not the
majority, of the interviewees in the focus-group discussions in Egypt, UAE, and Algeria affirm
al-‘Ashmawi’s fears. Some adopt Islamic rhetoric and discourse in a suicide way of thinking. A
Syrian student studying in al-Azhar University, for one, clearly states that: “Islamists are the only
hope for us now. We tried everything and failed. Let us try Islam.” When I raised the possibility
of Islamists being worse than current rulers, a scary nightmare that many secularists have, I
received the following response from a student of medicine in Algeria: “Allah is going to punish
Islamists if they misuse Islam but we did what is right; we chose the best whom we know to
defend Allah’s cause. If they betray Allah, it is their responsibility.” This way of thinking has
been characterized as suicide-thinking in the sense that one chooses the best for him/herself, to
clear his/her consciousness, without thinking of the ramifications of his/her choice on others. A
Moroccan-American citizen justified his support for Islamists by saying: “They deceived us by
Allah and we accepted the deception.” When I asked why, he said: “We are deceived
anyway!”
It seems that some of those who prefer the Islamic agenda choose it according to
culturally embedded rational calculations that render deception under Islamic umbrella better
than deception under alien slogans. These modernist Islamists and nominal liberal secularists
who are certainly pro-democratic procedures and tolerant toward women, non-Muslims and
Muslims from other sects do not show enough liberal stamina to push themselves to accept the
right of each others’ parties to legally exist. Once again they represent 20 percent of modernists
Islamists and 18 percent of the nominal liberals according to the pooled data and pose a real
threat toward viable democratic transitions in the Muslim world in general.
However, looking at the other side of the coin, approximately 56 percent of modernist
Islamists accept and tolerate the existence of non-Islamic parties (Table 3.8-1) at the same time
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55 percent of liberals accept the existence of Islamist political parties (Table 3.9-1). This last
finding may reveal that the classification of the previous four ideal types needs more articulation
since only 55 percent of the liberals seem to be fully liberal and 18 percent seem to be
conditionally liberal. Likewise, only 56 percent of modernist Islamists are genuine Islamist
democrats who adhere to the walk and talk of democracy.
Since 47.7 and 25.7 percent of Muslims are modernist Islamists and liberal secularists
(Table 3.7), then around 41 percent of Muslims captured by this survey pass the three tests of
liberal democracy: 1- democratic software (minimum level of tolerance and trust needed for
democracy to function); 2- democratic hardware (support for the democratic processes and
mechanisms) and 3- liberal values (acceptance of the "other" ideologies).
Intra-cultural comparison is useful in this regard. In Table 3.10, a measurement of
liberalism/illiberalism was developed based upon the comparative percentages of those who
support or do not support the existence of parties that are based on the "other" ideologies
whether it is Islamist for secularists or un/non-Islamic for Islamists. Since liberalism is an attitude
toward whom and what one disagrees with, the first two columns represent the percentages of
Muslims who (strongly) refuse to allow Islamist or secularist (liberal, communist, or socialist)
parties to legally exist in their respective countries.
To classify relatively liberal, semi-liberal and relatively illiberal cultures at the aggregate
level, a tentative criterion was developed to reflect the relative acceptance of the parties that
adopt ideologies Muslims happen to refuse. Thus, if only 15 percent (maximum of 30) or less of
Muslims in a given country refuse to legalize both types of parties adopting the "other"
ideologies, this country has a relatively or comparatively liberal culture among its Muslims. If 16
to 24 percent (maximum of 48) Muslims in a given country refuse to legalize both types of
parties adopting the "other" ideologies, this country has a relatively or comparatively semi-liberal
culture among its Muslims. If 25 percent (maximum of 50) or more of the respondents refuse to
legalize both types of parties, it is considered to have a relatively illiberal culture among its
Muslims. Thus, a country like Albania is among the relatively liberal cultures because only 9
(less than 15) percent of its Muslims object to have non-Islamic parties. Yet a country like
Nigeria is relatively illiberal since 34 percent of its Muslims refuse to allow Islamic parties while
49 percent have the same attitude toward secularist ideologies. With this type of polarization,
there is a clear indication of lack of ideological liberal environment and, thus, a tense ideological
and cultural civil war among Muslims of Nigeria.
If this measurement of political and ideological (il)liberal cultural environment is reliable,
one can classify the 32 cases into the demonstrated categories with Albania, Turkey, Iran,
Egypt, Morocco, Senegal and the Gambia among the comparatively most ideologically liberal
cultural environments in the Muslim world. Yet the Sudan, Syria, Alger1ia, Tajikistan, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Qatar, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Oman, UAE, Libya, Indonesia,
and Lebanon are among the least politically and ideologically liberal cultural environments in the
Muslim world.
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Table 3.10
Attitudes toward Political Parties Based on Islamic or Non-Islamic Ideologies (%)

ALB
TUR
IRN
EGY
MOR
SEN
GAM
MALY
USA
IND
JOR
KUW
TUN
TRK
MALI
EU
LEB
INS
LIB
UAE
OMA
YEM
PAK
SAU
NIG
QAT
BAN
BAH
TAJ
ALG
SYR
SUD
average

* (Strongly)
** (Strongly)
Relatively
Skewness in
Disagree to
Disagree to Non- liberal & Illiberal Support for
Islamist Parties Islamist Parties
Culture
ideologies
18
9
Liberal
-9
14
15
Liberal
1
9
23
Liberal
14
11
22
Liberal
12
7
22
Liberal
15
7
20
Liberal
13
15
23
Liberal
8
21
28
Semi Liberal
7
24
24
Semi Liberal
0
22
31
Semi Liberal
9
25
37
Semi Liberal
13
20
30
Semi Liberal
10
18
16
Semi Liberal
-2
23
19
Semi Liberal
-4
18
27
Semi Liberal
9
18
29
Semi Liberal
11
34
38
Illiberal
4
39
37
Illiberal
-2
38
43
Illiberal
5
42
41
Illiberal
-2
43
42
Illiberal
-1
43
46
Illiberal
3
30
41
Illiberal
11
44
55
Illiberal
11
34
49
Illiberal
15
27
39
Illiberal
12
27
35
Illiberal
8
28
37
Illiberal
10
47
28
Illiberal
-19
29
33
Illiberal
4
25
36
Illiberal
11
25
45
Illiberal
19
26
32
Semi-liberal
6
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Cultural
Tendency
Pro-secularist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Equal
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-secularist
Pro-secularist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-secularist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-secularist
Pro-secularist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-secularist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist
Pro-Islamist

* Pearson chi2(124) = 3200 Pr = 0.000, ** Pearson chi2(124) = 1700 Pr = 0.000.
By looking at the last row in Table 3.10, 26 and 32 percent of average Muslims would
object to having Islamist or non-Islamist parties respectively. Taken together, these people who
object to legalize either types of parties represent 58 of Muslims. This other way of calculation
confirms the previous finding that around 41 percent of Muslims are genuine liberals whether
modernists or Islamists. With the exception of Muslims of the U.S. who on average treat both
types of political parties similarly, all Muslim cultures have a tendency to favor Islamist or
secularist parties. In a scale from +19 to -19 the skewness in support for ideologies among
Muslim cultures captured in the survey is measured.
The more a culture supports Islamist parties the closer it gets to +19 it scores and vice
versa. Cultures that scored relatively around 0, such as Muslims of the U.S., Turkey, Tunisia,
Oman, and Indonesia are more equally balanced in their acceptance (ex. Turkey) or refusal (ex.
Indonesia) of both types of parties.
Some cultures, however, are clear in their acceptance and preference for Islamic
ideologies to be officially transformed into Islamist political parties such as in the Sudan,
Morocco and Iran. Other cultures showed evident tendencies toward secularist parties most
notably in Tajikistan and Albania with a clear lower degree. Out of 32 cultures, only seven
cultures seem to be supportive of secularist parties than Islamist parties.
With the exception of Malaysia and Yemen, the Table 3.11 clearly predicts that if these
countries run free and fair elections with relatively massive participation on the part of educated
Muslims, the political map and power structure will radically shift in favor of new powers.
Out of the 24 cultures that support having Islamist parties only seven countries
occasionally and officially allow such types of parties or associations (Jordan, Morocco,
Turkey, the Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Iran) which reflect the gap between what the elite
allows for ordinary Muslims to choose from and what ordinary Muslims want for themselves.
Among these seven countries, Islamists are somehow represented in the political arena either as
government (Turkey, Iran and the Sudan) or opposition (Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and
Indonesia).
The preponderance of evidence suggests that Islamists have more presence in the street
than secularists. Islamists can meet Muslims in mosques that abundantly exist in almost all major
streets in virtually all Muslim cities and towns.
Most Muslim autocratic governments have closed the political system to such an extent that the
secular forces (liberal, Marxist, nationalist and socialist) “have been totally marginalized, and the
only ideology that people can gravitate around has been that of political Islam. The Islamists
have provided the only viable alternative to these governments” (Weaver 1999).
One last conclusion may be inferred from the previous analysis regarding the
secular/Islamist tension. Though some researchers (Fish 2002; Lewis 2002; Norris and
Inglehart 2002) focused on the unequal position of women in Muslim societies as one of the
core reasons for lack of democracy, this study proposes another, and possibly more important,
factor that may account for the lack of democracy which is mistrust and suspicion that sharply
divides Muslims into “minority of secularists who have no trust in Islamists and the majority of
Islamists who have no respect for secularists” as noted a professor of University of Tehran.
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4. Change Vs. Status Quo
The foregoing analysis provides some idea about the general tendency among Muslims
regarding democracy and liberalism without actually asking the fundamental question: are
Muslims satisfied with the status quo? If Muslims are content with their mostly non-democratic
political systems, then one cannot be more Catholic than the pope.
The survey directly asked the respondents to choose between the incumbents and
democratic rulers. As shown in Table 3.11, only UAE can be considered to have a proincumbents’ political culture. Ninety-three percent of the respondents think that the status quo is
better than a democratically elected ruler. Oman comes second with 65 percent of the
population prefer the un-elected incumbents over publicly elected one.
The other cultures clearly are not supportive of the status quo at least in comparison
with the first two cases. The Muslims least supportive of incumbents are the Kuwaitis,
Egyptians, Syrians, Moroccans, Sudanese, Malians, and Gambians.
Around 31 percent of Saudis are in favor of democratically elected rulers. This result is
consistent with the fact that citizens of Saudi Arabia scored around 43 points on the scale of
support for democratic hardware.
Yet as a university professor from Riyadh commented: “Most Saudis want change but
not necessarily democracy. If democracy leads to change, they may reluctantly accept both.”
Malaysians and Yemenis seem to be dubious about what democracy can bring better than the
status quo with around 48 and 43 percent of the respondents not sure about democracy or
incumbents.
“All democratic developments in the Arab and Muslim world since 1967 have benefited
Islamists mainly.” Dr. Nevin Mousa’d of Cairo University observed. She predicts that the more
Muslim countries open up politically, the more Islamists will benefit from the growing levels of
dissatisfaction among the masses. One cannot agree more.
The focus-group discussions tried to shed more light on those who are pro-incumbent
(around 14 percent on average) even if they are not democratically elected. One interesting
finding is that most of these pro-incumbents adopt the logic of “dictators but…” That is to say
there is always a tendency among pro-incumbent Muslims to justify the autocratic practices of
the rulers on grounds like fighting foreign enemies or keeping the national unity (Sudanese
interviewees), achieving domestic stability (Egyptian interviewees), re-distributive (socialist)
policies (Libyan and Emariti interviewees), achieving independence (Algerian interviewees), or
the application of sharia/Islamic legislation (Saudi and Iranian interviewees).
These groups of Muslims who adopt the strategy “dictator but…” would not accept
being ruled by “sinner but…” That is to say, when the interviewees who supported the
incumbents were asked if they support a sinner ruler (I consistently used the name of President
Bill Clinton as an example), they clearly refused to support a “sinner but…” logic of thinking.
Modernists in general refused the false dilemma of either “sinner but” versus “dictator but.” They
prefer a third scenario of a devout Muslim who acts according to shura and respects the public
will. No heed was given to the issue of personal piety by secularists. A democratic liberal ruler
is preferred to the “sheikh of Islam if the sheikh of Islam is not publicly elected and keeps his
understanding of Islam to himself,” An American of Lebanese origin commented.

98

Table 3.11
Pro-democratic or Pro-incumbents (%)
Society
Pro-Incumbents
Not Sure
Pro-Democratic Rulers
Total
UAE
93
3
4
100
OMA
65
37
18
120
TUR
37
6
57
100
ALB
35
7
58
100
IND
34
11
55
100
QAT
34
18
48
100
SEN
34
14
52
100
MALI
32
11
57
100
JOR
16
28
56
100
LIB
15
30
55
100
PAK
15
35
50
100
TAJ
14
31
55
100
ALG
13
35
52
100
INS
13
38
49
100
LEB
13
18
69
100
SAU
12
51
31
100
BAH
12
29
59
100
BAN
12
27
61
100
MALY
12
48
40
100
IRN
11
36
53
100
NIG
11
36
53
100
TUN
11
34
55
100
TRK
10
21
69
100
YEM
10
43
47
100
GAM
6
24
70
100
MOR
6
31
63
100
SUD
6
26
68
100
SYR
6
23
71
100
EGY
5
20
75
100
KUW
4
8
88
100
Average
20
25
55
100
Source: web and written survey 2002
These pro-incumbents, according to the survey, are 14 percent of Muslims in general
and 10 percent of the focus group participants.
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5. The Elasticity of Demand for Democracy
From Table 3.11, one infers that around 55 percent of Muslims in general support
democracy over incumbents who are generally undemocratically elected. However, are Muslims
ready to pay the price of democracy? That is to say, assuming that the only way for Muslims to
achieve democracy is through mass-led series of demonstrations, strikes and public demands
following the East European path toward democracy, are they ready to do that?
The term of elasticity of demand for democracy is useful in this regard. In microeconomics, the term elasticity of demand is used to reflect the sensitivity of quantity demanded
to price changes. In other words, to what extent is a person ready to sacrifice his money (in this
case his/her freedom or even life) to gain the demanded commodity (in this case political rights)?
The demand for drugs by addicts is inelastic; that is no matter how expensive the drug is, the
addicted person has no other choice but to pay what is needed. However, demand for flowers
or perfume is very elastic. A very small increase in their prices may lead to a very sharp decline
in the demanded commodity.
How do Muslims perceive their political rights: necessary drugs or luxurious flowers?
The data pooled in the survey help shed some light on this issue by resorting to the
answers of two questions in the survey (2.14 and 2.20). The first question reads: “To achieve
their political rights (ex. freedom of expression and freedom of association), Muslims should…”
Four options are offered ranging from violent opposition to rulers to patience and prayer to
Allah.
The second question reads: “There are individuals who are killed or sent to jail because
they publicly ask for their political rights. Do you agree or disagree with what they do?” The
respondents are given five choices starting with strongly agree through strongly disagree.
Confirmatory factor analysis was run to verify that the two questions measure the same
dimension. Varimax rotation followed by Cronbach's test of reliability and internal consistency
showed that the responses expressed a high level of internal consistency (a = 0.91). The
responses to the two questions have been standardized and re-scaled as reflected in Table
3.12. A culture with high points is more ready to sacrifice for democracy, thus the demand for
democracy is less elastic. That is to say, no matter how much one has to sacrifice for one’s
political rights, he/she is ready to pay the price.
Some cultures seem to be more ready to sacrifice for democracy than others. Iran,
Turkey, Mali, Senegal, and Malaysia are the highest in this regard. Arabs as a distinct group of
Muslims seem to be the least ready to sacrifice for democracy. Countries like Morocco and
Egypt – each having strong public support for democratic hardware and software as well as
relatively liberal cultures – rank 16 and 24, respectively, in a list of 32 countries.
These two countries have cultures that are compatible with democracy but they are not
likely to sacrifice for it. Thus, if they are given democratic freedoms and procedures as a gift
from their rulers, they will accept them but the chances of mass-led democratization are
relatively low comparing to the cases of Iran and Turkey.
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Table 3.12
Muslims’ Relative Elasticity of Demand for Political Rights

Elasticity
Obs
Mean Std. Dev.
SAU
743
-2.27
1.53
UAE
545
-2.20
1.95
YEM
396
-1.89
1.55
LIB
512
-1.58
2.06
OMA
458
-1.52
1.95
QAT
464
-1.01
1.46
TUN
495
-0.86
1.74
TAJ
449
-0.81
1.62
MOR
575
-0.69
1.70
TRK
478
-0.68
1.64
JOR
634
-0.65
1.69
PAK
1473
-0.60
1.77
SYR
577
-0.55
1.48
KUW
438
-0.52
1.90
BAH
395
-0.51
1.80
SUD
532
-0.49
1.44
EGY
1277
-0.43
1.47
LEB
430
-0.30
1.96
NIG
543
-0.25
1.97
ALG
515
-0.06
2.42
EU
708
0.57
1.73
INS
1208
0.61
1.66
BAN
825
0.82
1.72
USA
984
0.85
1.46
ALB
447
0.95
1.41
IND
1357
0.98
1.48
GAM
478
0.99
1.41
MALY
1072
1.14
1.31
SEN
517
1.19
1.25
MALI
510
1.21
1.20
TUR
948
1.26
1.10
IRN
1031
1.31
1.16
Source: web and written survey 2002

Min
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62
-3.62

Max
1.92
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
1.52
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
1.52
1.52
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64
2.64

Scale from 28 to
100
28.06
29.53
35.83
41.89
43.20
53.46
56.32
57.48
59.81
59.99
60.56
61.65
62.61
63.22
63.43
63.82
65.03
67.69
68.64
72.43
85.13
85.87
90.07
90.63
92.74
93.33
93.48
96.43
97.60
97.89
99.01
100.00

In Iran, even if Khomeini’s ideology is read to be controversial, one thing seems to be
clear-cut: Khomeini instilled in the Iranian public mind the notion of equating political rights to
religious obligations. If in Islam issues and things can be classified into obligatory/wajib,
recommended/mostahab, acceptable/mandob, hated/makrouh and forbidden/haram, Muslims’
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political rights are largely conceived part of the obligatory/wajib aspects such as prayer and
fasting in the Iranian public culture. According to an Iranian journalist, “If I die for my right to
freely publish what I believe in, I’ll die as shaheed/martyr.” The Iranian students’ demonstrations
shouting “death to dictatorship” and denouncing the banning of reformists’ newspapers such as
Salam are mainly Iranian phenomenon.
Most demonstrations in the Muslim world are not for democracy or democratic rights;
rather they are anti-American or anti-Israeli, or for solving economic problems. What is worse
is that the demonstrations do not pay off. A Sudanese female student noticed that most of her
colleagues demonstrate for non-political issues while “the whole problem is political… We are
given the right to demonstrate but not to effect, to waste our time and energy shouting but not to
really change anything. I gave up the habit of demonstrations.”
Another survey conducted by al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies found that around
75 percent of Egyptians pointed to democracy as their favorite political system but when asked
about their priorities only 7 percent set political reform as their first priority comparing to
economic and social problems, achieving Arab or Muslim unity and the liberation of Palestine.
The director of the Center commented that the Egyptian public mind distinguishes between
democracy and solving the socio-economic problems of the country and other relevant goals
(Sa'eed 2003). Alarmed by this possibility, I asked all the interviewees who participated in the
focus groups in the countries I visited the following hypothetical question: “would they accept a
contract with a ruler like Saddam Hussein to be their life-time ruler on the condition that he
would actually liberate Palestine?”
Surprisingly, the great majority of the educated Muslims (around 73%) whom I asked
this question responded affirmatively. Assuming that I gave them a loaded question, I followed
up with the following comment: “Lifetime Saddam Hussein means no political freedoms for all
your lifetimes.” This fact did not change many of their attitudes.
It is important to note that only in Turkey, Iran and Muslims of the U.S., the majority of
the interviewees did not accept the proposed contract. Counselor al-Bishri of Egypt had a
telling comment on the attitudes of the 73 percent of Muslims: “In the Muslim mind, issues of
personal freedoms come second to the issues of Umma’s freedom.” He stated that the Egyptian
liberation movements tried to achieve the two goals at a time: “Independence and the
Constitution.” Most Muslim countries, including Egypt, achieved national independence of
military occupation but without achieving personal and political freedoms. There are three
explanations that seem to complement each other for the attitudes of Muslims: First, The Muslim
mind prioritizes (other) Islamic imperatives over personal freedoms.17 Second, the occupation of
Palestine is perceived to be the number one issue in the mind of all Arabs and most Muslims. It
is as if the Muslim body has a bleeding nose, and finds it very difficult to focus on any thing else.
A twenty year old lady from UAE commented on the hypothetical Palestine/Saddam deal by
stating that: “At least with a free Palestine, we can say that we achieved something meaningful
for our religion.”

17

A Syria whom was interviewed in the U.S. commented: “Dignity not life is the most valuable thing I have.
Israel humiliates not only the Palestinians or Arabs, but all Muslims.” When I challenged his logic by
stating that he hates Israel more than he loves life, he concurred but assured me that life without dignity is
not worth living.

102

Third, Saddam Hussein is not seen as being as bad as Israel. Statistically Saddam
Hussein killed more Muslims than all Israeli wars with Arabs did. But who knows that? With the
exception of the Kuwaiti and Saudi media after 1991, most government-owned Arab mass
media refrain from disseminating the dirty laundry of other Arab governments, lest their own
laundry should be published too. But this is not the case regarding Israel’s usage of Western
(mainly American) weapons to kill their brothers and sisters in Palestine. As a Pakistani engineer
reckoned, “Saddam Hussein is not the enemy of Muslims. He is the enemy of Kuwait. Israel is
the enemy of Muslims.” When I demonstrated to him, among others, that Saddam Hussein
killed more Muslims than Israel did, he accused him of being a tool in the hands of Israel the
U.S. Though the rest of the Pakistani interviewees disagreed with him, they perceived Saddam
to be a less threat to them than Israel.
The 70 Muslim interviewees (27 percent) who refused to accept the Saddam/Palestine
deal have interesting arguments to make: “Israel wins because it is a democracy, we will not
defeat Israel with Saddam in power,” an Egyptian student of business commented. Sixty-six
other interviewees voiced similar thoughts. With the exception of three respondents who were
not that enthusiastic about the whole issue of liberation of Palestine because it is a Palestinian
issue, the great majority of the 70 interviewees valued democracy as an necessary means for a
better life and a free state of Palestine.
Arabs in general (around 89 percent) accepted the Saddam/Palestine deal while nonArab Muslims showed lower support for it (around 61 percent). One inference that can be
made with some level of certainty is that most Muslims perceive the issue of national
independence from non-Muslim powers to be more worth sacrifice and resistance than resisting
their own corrupt autocratic rulers.
6. Muslims and the Myth of the Golden Age
The respondents were given thirteen political systems and asked to choose the one that
comes close to their “best / ideal / favorite” one. They were given as well the option of “none of
the above.” In the following question in the survey, they were asked in an open-ended format to
state why they chose the political system they chose. After a daunting process of coding, the
results are presented in the Table 3.13.
Table 3.13 reveals a number of intriguing trends among Muslims. The percentage of
those who chose “none of the above” (40.6 percent) is beyond one’s expectation given the fact
that the range of the proposed thirteen political systems cover almost all types of political
systems that one can anticipate in modern world from unconstitutional monarchies (Saudi
Arabia) to constitutional monarch (e.g. Britain;); from most totalitarian (e.g. Iraq) to most
democratic (e.g. USA and France); from most secular (e.g. India and Turkey) to least secular
(e.g. Afghanistan under Taliban, and Iran); beside all other system in between such as Jordan,
Egypt and the Sudan. A quick look at column (4) in the previous Table demonstrates that
around 48 percent of traditionalist Islamists chose none of the mentioned system to represent
their best or ideal political system.
Though to a lower degree but still a clear trend, 14 percent of modernist Islamists find
no single political system that actually reflects their ideal system of government. Secularists seem
to be more down to the earth in this regard. Only 2 percent of the autocrats and 1 percent of
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the liberals dream of a system that is not in the list. Traditionalist Islamists are known to perceive
democracy to be antithetical to Islamic government; thus, it is self-explanatory to find them
distribute the rest of their preferences among the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan under
Taliban. These three political systems ascribe themselves to be defending and abiding by Islamic
Sharia.
It is noteworthy that Iran, though self-described as an Islamic country was not widely
chosen by traditionalists. The twenty seven sunni traditionalist interviewees deliberately avoided
Iran as their ideal system because Iran is Shiite. Shiite, according to the vast majority of
traditionalists, are not Muslims at all. Their political system is not a possibility mainly for reasons
of creed. “Whoever does not adopt the prophet and his companions’ system of life and
government cannot be right” said an Emeriti graduate student. As a confirmation to the
classification of Muslims into traditionalists and others, it is clear that the percentages of
traditionalists who chose the U.S., France, India, and UK to be their best/ideal system of
government is 1 percent as shown in the last row.
Table 3.13
Respondents’ Ideal Political Systems
(1)

Freq.
43
102
173
311
395
398
401
503
546
955
2,989
3,372
4,072
9,883
24,365

%
Total
0.18
0.42
0.71
1.28
1.62
1.63
1.65
2.06
2.24
3.92
12.27
13.84
16.71
40.56
100

(2)
%
select
selfcountry
0
12
11
8
3
15
14
34
23
31
27
37
-

Iraq
Turkey
Jordan
Pakistan
Egypt
Sudan
S. Arabia
UK
India
France
Afghan
Iran
USA
None
Total
%
Support
Democracy
24.93
Source: web and written survey 2002

(3)
%
Modern
-ists

(4)
%
Traditionalists

(5)
%
Autocrats

(6)
%
Liberals

0
18
5
1
2
5
1
10
6
7
3
17
11
14
100

0
1
2
4
1
12
14
1
0
0
14
3
0
48
100

11
5
21
18
19
9
1
1
2
1
2
6
2
2
100

0
22
10
4
6
3
0
14
12
10
0
6
12
1
100

34

1

6

48
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When most of the intellectuals and activists whom I interviewed learned that four out of
every ten educated Muslims prefer none of the thirteen mentioned political systems, they
advanced different interpretations such as lack of information about these systems, vagueness of
the question, ignorance, nostalgia to the previous golden ages of Islam, among others. However,
this last one of nostalgia seemed to be the most appealing, given the fact that the trend of
refusing all current political systems is almost limited to Islamists whether modernists or
traditionalists (48 and 14 percent) comparing to autocratic and liberal secularists (2 and 1
percent). This issue will be visited shortly.
Back to Table 3.14, it is interesting to note that out of the 14 percent of the
traditionalists who chose Saudi Arabia to be their best/ideal political systems, only 2 (out of the
14) percent were Saudis. That is to say, that the great majority of the traditionalists who choose
Saudi Arabia to be their best/ideal system of government, are either not well-informed, uninformed or mis-informed about Saudi Arabia. A Saudi traditionalist Sheikh who was critical,
but not publicly, of the Saudi regime, attributes this lack of support among Saudis for their own
political system as opposed to the support of other traditionalists for the Saudi system to the
effect of the façade. I interpreted his analysis to be “it looks Islamic; it talks Islamic; it says it is
Islamic; so it must be Islamic.”
However, the Saudi citizens themselves, since they know better, they do not tend to
support their own political system to be their best/ideal political system. Only 14 percent of the
Saudis perceive their political system to be the best/ideal one (column 2). Comparatively
speaking, the Saudi political system is more legitimate than the Iraqi, Egyptian and Pakistani with
0 percent of the Iraqis (most of them were not in Iraq during the survey), 3 percent of the
Egyptians, and 8 percent of the Pakistanis who think of their political systems to be their
best/ideal political systems. Surprisingly, Jordanians, Sudanese and Turkish are not much better
in the way they perceive their political systems. One can infer that there is a legitimacy dilemma
in these countries with these numbers in mind. However, based upon the focus group
discussions, it was clear that most of the respondents confuse the political system with the
current government. In other words, it was clear among interviewees that they deemed the
government’s performance inexorably intertwined with the structure of the political system.
"Once they hate the government they hardly accept the rules and institutions of the system" as a
Sudanese Professor argues.
Iranians seem to be the most satisfied Muslims who live in a Muslim country with their
political systems; 27 percent think it to be the closest to their best/ideal system of government.
However, with a deeper look at the responses of the Iranians, it becomes clear that over 90
percent of the Iranians who prefer their own systems are actually traditionalists. A 21 year
female traditionalist student from Iran, thinks that:
Allah has made Iran the refuge of all true Muslims… It will never remain as such
unless all true Muslims vote, write, teach, preach and die to keep it so… The
West and its collaborators from other neighboring countries do not want Iran to
remain as is, since it symbolizes their moral vacuum. They want us [Iranians] to be
like them. But insh’aa Allah, this will never happen.
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This voice and the like are highly satisfied with the current Iranian regime and think of
themselves as guardians of Allah’s message against Allah’s enemy. When I explored who
Allah’s enemies specifically are, I found that they are a very vast and inconsistent circle of
conspirators from West to East with one common goal in the mind of the traditionalists: to
devour Islam. This circle includes their fellow Iranians “who prefer the Western style of life,
food, songs, dress, and social relationships over Allah’s way of life,” an Iranian student said.
Muslims who live as minorities in democracies, even with troubles such as in India, seem
to be more satisfied with their own political systems. This satisfaction reaches its peak in the
U.S. (37 percent) and goes to its lower end in the case of India (23 percent). Keeping in mind
that this data was collected immediately before the new measures taken by the U.S. government
toward Muslims after September 11th, one suspects that this percentage would be sharply lower
were the survey to be conducted now.
However, these results as is show that Muslims in general are not satisfied with their
own respective political systems and search for a better one.
Both modernists and liberals prefer the Turkish model (18 and 22 percent respectively).
Dr. Essam Al-'Eryan of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood praised the Turkish system and
proposed it to be a viable system that can allow all voices to be heard on equal footing. Of
course he lamented the role of the military as negative in this regard. But he clearly preferred it
to the Iranian model that for him is another example of an authoritarian regime but with an
Islamic dress. Based upon this finding, the Turkish model can be a good model that most
Muslim democrats (Islamists and secularists) may agree upon.
However, the support for democratic regimes is another feature that is common among
modernists and liberals with 34 and 48 percent support respectively. These two figures are
shown in the last row of Table 3.12 and have been calculated by adding up the percentage of
the supporters of the four stable democracies in the model (italic). The support for Taliban was
relatively high only among 14 percent of the traditionalists. This percentage is relatively low
mainly because it is still not as good as the golden age of Islam especially with the civil war of
brothers in Afghanistan a UAE female teacher pointed out. The autocratic secularists favored
mostly Jordan possibly because it is more stable with rare social unrest compared to other
autocratic regimes. One should remember that in Jordan Islamists are allowed to participate in
election and have their own political associations. They have their own complaints regarding
being deprived of participating in government no matter how many seats they win and of the
support the king gives to his own preferred political associations. Egypt is a good example of a
stable relatively liberalized country where the masses are left to mind their own personal
business as if they resigned from the public sphere, according to Dr. Bahgat Qurani of the
American University in Cairo. The support for Iraqi model appears only among autocrats. One
will find out in the next Table that the support for Iraq under Saddam Hussein has no
democratic or Islamic reasons. The same can be said about autocrats those who supported the
democratic systems of the West. This support has nothing to do with democracy; rather it is a
matter of personal (not political) freedoms, economic advancement and technology. Liberals, as
depicted in the last column of Table 3.13, clearly prefer the Western models of democracy (48
percent) and the Turkish model comes second (22 percent) as a clear support for their own
liberal positions. Their support for Jordanian political system (10 percent) is based largely on its
capacity to peacefully absorb Islamists into the political system.
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However, it seems that Muslims are not as uninformed as some of the intellectuals and
activists whom I interviewed suggest. Rather, they have their own synthesis of Islam and
democracy. For instance, most of those who choose stable democracies to be their best/ideal
political systems were not captives of the fallacious "either Islamic or democratic" way of
thinking. Conversely, they advanced arguments based upon Islamic and democratic references
at the same time as it is clear from column (4) in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14
Explanation of Selected Best/Ideal Political System
(1)

(2)
Democratic
Reasons

Freq.
Percent
Iraq
43
0.18
Turkey
102
0.42
32
Jordan
173
0.71
3
Pakistan
311
1.28
10
Egypt
395
1.62
9
Sudan
398
1.63
5
S. Arabia
401
1.65
1
UK
503
2.06
55
India
546
2.24
47
Fr ance
955
3.92
51
Afghan
2,989
12.27
0
Iran
3,372
13.84
5
USA
4,072
16.71
52
None
9,883
40.56
2
Total
24,365 100
20.9
Source: web and written survey 2002

(3)
Islamic
Reasons

(4)
Combination

11
5
8
15
72
82
11
12
7
68
11
13
74
29.9

21
31
22
21
11
3
23
20
28
0
78
25
18
23.2

(5)
Other
Reasons
100
36
61
60
55
12
14
11
21
14
32
6
10
6
26.0

Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

The respondents were asked to spell out why they made their choices. A summary of
the responses is presented in Table 3.14. In the table, the respondents who choose each system
are classified into one of four reasons: purely democratic reasons, purely Islamic reasons, a mix
of democratic/Islamic reasons and other reasons (such as liberating occupied territories,
affection with a place, economic advancement…etc.) Around 74 percent of Muslims who did
not find any of the thirteen political systems appealing were propelled by Islamic reasons.
According an UAE citizen who chose none of the mentioned systems, “None of these systems
come close to the Islamic state established by the prophet. They are not designed to make
Allah’s word above all other words” This reasoning is very common among most traditionalists
(around 93 percent) and some (around 6 percent) of modernists.
This reasoning as well supports the secularists’ argument about Muslims’ nostalgia that
makes them live in the golden past with all its glory and splendor. Thus, they are less practical in
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terms of their capacity to develop socio-political systems that are more compatible with modern
life.
According to a secularist intellectual: “it should be known that the dead are controlling
the contemporary Arab and Muslim societies…To date, we have not solved the problem
between ‘Ali and Moa’weya or al-Hussein and Yazeed and even failed to swallow them”18
(Saleh 2003b). The data definitely support this claim in at least 40 percent of how Muslims
perceive the world they live in.
What seems to be more interesting is the tendency of many modernists to argue that the
British, Indian, French and American political systems are Islamic systems of government in the
way they are structured. “Had Muslims been able to independently develop their own systems
of government, they would have come up with a French system of government with the
president as the caliph and the ministers as his aides while the parliament is ahl al-hal wa
al’aqqd” a Tunisian respondent said. “The colonial era distorted the natural development of the
Islamic caliphate. The Ottoman Empire started political reforms in the 19th century but the West
did not want us to outdo them,” a Malaysian respondent said. “Islam is justice. Whatever
achieves justice is Islamic. Thus democracy is as Islamic as prayer and fasting” and Iranian
respondent said. “The U.S. system is like the Islamic caliphate system. The differences are just
in names,” a Malian respondent said. “The British system is the best one to fit modern Islamic
state” a Nigerian respondent said.
7. Concluding Remarks
The conclusion of this chapter has two purposes: First, to discuss how the country-level
variation in democratic hardware and software can be observed by the appeal to the five
mechanisms that were discussed in the body of the literature. Second, to shed some light on the
prospect of democratization in these countries based upon the society-level data.
a. Explaining the Society-Level Variation
In the introduction to this chapter, five hypothetical mechanisms were proposed to
account for the effect of Islam on Muslims' perception of democratic hardware and software. In
Table 3.15, one finds that the five proposed mechanisms significantly correlate with societies'
democratic software and hardware.
The correlation coefficients clearly show that a Muslim society would score highest on
the democratic hardware and software scales and thus have a relatively democratizable society
if:
1. The distribution of attitudes indicates that autocrats and traditionalists are in the minority and
modernist Islamists and liberal secularists are in the majority.
2. Muslims are ideologically liberal in the sense that they accept the existence of political
parties even if they endorse opposing ideologies.
3. Muslims have negative attitudes toward the undemocratically elected incumbents.
4. Muslims are ready to sacrifice for their political rights.
18

Ali, his son al-Hussein, Moa’weya and his son Yazeed are the leaders of the Islamic wars that occurred in
the first century of Islam and ended up with division of Muslims into Sunni and Shiite.
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5. Muslims do not adopt fantastic ideas about what government can or should be and thus,
accept a democratic system of government.
This society-level analysis sheds some light on why and how Muslim societies in
general perceive the democratic alternative. Yet this analysis does not help us understand why
some pro-democracy individuals may exist in anti-democratic societies or vice versa. To
examine this, chapter four will deal with individual-level data.
Table 3.15
Testing the Effect of the Five Hypothetical Mechanisms

% of Islamist and Secularist Democrats
% of Muslims Accept "other" Ideologies
% of Muslims Support of Status Quo/Incumbents
% of Muslims Ready to Sacrifice for Political Rights
% of Muslims Choosing Democracies as Ideal System
Number of cases = 32
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***<.001 – two tailed tests.
Source: web and written survey 2002

Software
0.71***
0.82***
-0.69***
0.27**
0.74***

Hardware
0.79***
0.81***
-0.81***
0.31**
0.83***

b. Prospectus of Democratization
In an attempt to explain the emergence and evolution of norms in the international
system, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) identify three-stage life-cycle of norms: (1) norm
emergence, (2) norm acceptance, and (3) internalization. This three-stage cycle may help us
differentiate among four theoretical types of Muslim sub-cultures. First , there are some subcultures that are in the stage of rejection of democratic norms and institutions either because it is
deemed harmful or haram/taboo. Second, there are some sub-cultures where democracy has
emerged in the discourse of some intellectual entrepreneurs (intellectuals and ulama/scholars) but
has not been widely accepted among the masses. A third group of Muslims’ sub-cultures
showed higher level of support for democracy but democracy is not seen as the first priority in
the public mind. Thus they will accept if it is given to them as a gift from the ruler. But they are
not ready to fight for it. Acceptance of democracy can be attributed to the effort the modernist
Islamist and liberal secularist intellectuals, ulama/scholars and activists. A fourth group of
Muslim sub-cultures reached a higher level of democratic internalization in the sense that
democracy is not a luxury for the mass majority of the public. Rather it is the solution to their
problems and thus they are ready to pay its price in the format of public demands associated
with risk.
Based upon the previous four categories, Muslim cultures can be divided according to
the previously discussed issues into four types of sub-cultures: 1- sub-cultures that reject
democracy in terms of its software, hardware and hence democratizablity mainly for lack of
liberal attitudes toward others including "other" ideologies; 2- sub-cultures where the democratic
notions of government emerged but have not gained roots into the culture yet mainly because of
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the lack of support for its norms; 3- sub-cultures where democracy is accepted in general with
relatively high level of tolerance toward "other" ideologies yet without being the top priority in
the sense that individuals accept it as a gift rather than to sacrifice for it; 4- sub-cultures where
democracy has been internalized and individuals perceive it as necessary for solving other socioeconomic problems. Thus, they tend to accept "other" ideologies as part of the rules of the
democratic game.
Table 3.16
Typology of Muslim Cultures

Cultures

Rejection
Emergence
1
2
Stead
3
Steady Shaky
y
Shaky
UAE
S.
None Sudan
Oman Arb.
Pakist.
Libya
Yemen
Niger.
Indon.
Tajik.

Software
M/H
L
H
Hardware L/M
L
M
Democrat- L
L
L/M
izability
Liberal
L
L
L/M
Status quo H
L
H
ELAST.
H
H
H/M
Ideal sys.
D*
Not D D
Source: web and written survey 2002

L/M
M
L/M

Acceptance
4
5
Steady
Shaky
Qatar
Gambia
Bahrain
Leban.
Moroc.
Turkem.
Tunisia
Kuwait
Jordan
Syria
Algeria
Egypt
Bangld.
H
M/H
M/H
M/H
M/H
M/H

Internalization
6
7
Steady
Shaky
Turkey Iran
Mali
Malaysia
Seneg.
India
Alban.
USA
EU
H
M/H
H
H
H
H

L/M
L/M
H/M
D

M/H
M/H
M
D

H
H
L
D

M/H
L/M
M/L
D

M/H
L/M
L
D

These cultures as well differ in their perception of the status quo and their tendency to
sacrifice for their political rights. Some cultures seem to be more comfortable in what they
believe in. They are almost in a case of cultural/political equilibrium. For example some cultures
perceive themselves as non-democratic and do not want democracy. Thus they are classified as
steady rejectionists of democracy. However, other cultures seem to be in turmoil; there is no
support for the status quo or incumbents but at the same time clear desires for change. This
change may not necessarily be democratic but it is desirable. These cultures are classified as
shaky since they bear the values of their own change.
In Table 3.16, there is a typology of the thirty two cultures examined in this survey.
Under category 1, there are five cultures that can be seen as in general in a case of rejection of
democratic government as understood in the West. These countries are UAE, Oman, Libya,
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, there is a subtle difference between them.
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The first three cultures are in a steady rejection of democracy while the other two are in
a shaky rejection of democracy. This difference can be inferred from the internal consistency
among the seven indicators. For instance, the prevailing culture in UAE does not indicate that it
will witness mass-initiated demands for democracy in the near future, ceteris paribus. It is a
country with a relatively high level of socio-political acceptance of minorities but with very little
support for what they do not have which is democratic hardware. Besides, there is a relatively
high support for the status quo and incumbents with a high elastic demand for democracy. All
the indicators refer to the fact that there is a steady rejection for the democratic system of
government as understood outside of UAE. However, the cultures of Saudi Arabia and Yemen
are in a shaky rejection of democracy due to the low/mild level of support of the incumbents
and status quo yet with the majority preferring non-democratic systems over the democratic
ones mainly for religious reasons.
No culture met the criterion of steady emergent democratic culture yet five Muslim
cultures are suggested to be in the category of emerging democracy albeit in shaky position.
These countries are the Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia and Tajikistan. These countries
have low or mild level of support for democratic software as one of the reasons that make them
in a shaky position. Thus, once the autocratic government weakens its grip, ethno-religious
tensions is highly to erupt. However, they have a relatively mild support for democratic
hardware (between 52-57 points in a 100 scale as shown in Figure 3.1). Given the fragile
democratic software, the possibility of successful democratization is relatively low or mild at
best especially with all of them full into the category of ideologically illiberal cultures (Liberal 10)
which indicates that there is a highly possibility of rejecting parties that adopt ideologies "other"
ideologies whether Islamist or secularist.
However, being in a shaky position has another indication for the future. There is a clear
lack of support for the status quo and clear desire for a change. But there is no guarantee that
this change will be democratic or non-democratic change such as replacement of an autocrat
with another one. It was clear however, that the majorities in most of these countries are prodemocratic political systems (including Turkey) when they were asked about their ideal/best
system of government. Ceteris paribus, Indonesia is the country that comes closest to successful
transition toward accepting democracy in this category. The data shows that Indonesians’
elasticity of demand for democracy is 85 points in a 0 to 100 scale which means that relatively
speaking Indonesians are ready to sacrifice for their political rights more than all other countries
in this category.
Thirteen cultures accept democratic norms and procedures yet do not perceive it to be
their first priority thus the elasticity for demand of democracy is low/mild generally speaking. Six
of these cultures seem to be relatively steady in the sense that though the support of the status
quo is low yet the elasticity of demand for democracy is mild as an indication of how luxurious it
is perceived. All other indications seem to be pro-democratic with relatively high levels of
democratic software, hardware, democratizability, acceptance of "other" ideologies and choice
of democratic systems (including Turkey) to be their best/ideal systems of government. Ceteris
paribus, these countries are most likely to remain as it unless a decision on the part of the elite
takes the move toward democracy. The cost of suppression on the part of the rulers is not that
high and the propensity to demand political rights on the part of the masses is not high either
which make the status quo, thought not anybody’s perfect alternative, an equilibrium. These
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cultures represent a good example of what Professor Ahamd Yusuf of Cairo professor labeled
“the happy slaves.” Even with some liberal gestures or steps toward political openness, back
and forth, they were mainly due to the desire on the part of the elite to diffuse public anger or
assimilate world norms without solid increase in public demand for democracy.
However, some other cultures do not reveal the same level of equilibrium or steady
position due to the relatively mild elastic demand for political rights and low/mild support for
status quo (category 5). These cultures, though accepting of democracy, are comparatively less
tolerant toward minorities and women comparing to the cultures that are steadier and more
accepting of democracy (category 4). But for this relative deficit in democratic software, these
cultures would have been more inclined toward moving to the democratic internalization
category given the relatively low support for the status quo and tendency to sacrifice for their
political rights.
There are nine other cultures that show great support and appreciation for democracy
including seven steady cultures and two shaky ones. All cultures that appear in category six have
one common factor: all of them witnessed some sort of peaceful alteration of power in the past
ten years. This observation may suggest that there is a dialectic relationship between democracy
and culture. In other words, once democracies are in place they tend to create the culture
conducive to them. This observation sounds true given the fact that these countries have very
high level of support for democratic software, hardware, liberal attitudes toward "other"
ideologies, relative support for the status quo and election mechanisms, beside their low elastic
demand of democracy. Steady internalization of democracy is the antithesis of the steady reject
of it. Another common factor among the cultures that internalized democracy is that none of
them is actually an Arab country.
Muslims of Iran and Malaysia share almost all the characteristics of steady democratic
internalization except for lower level of democratic software, less liberal position toward "other"
ideologies and lower level of support toward the status quo.
Comparing the means and percentages among cultures could be misleading if other
endogenous factors are influencing the attitudes of the individuals regardless of their respective
countries. The multivariate regression models will be necessary to compare the individual
attitudes of Muslims from each country after including controls for demographics, and strength
of religiosity as introduced in chapter four.
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CHAPTER IV
MUSLIMS' ATTITUDE TOWARD DEMOCRACY:
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS
In this chapter, the focus shifts from society-level analysis to individual level analysis. I
am considering the possible factors and actors that militate both for and against Muslims’
support for democratic software and hardware.
Without replicating the discussed theoretical foundations for the hypotheses discussed in
the first chapter, the following equation summarizes the examined variables:
Support for democratic hardware and software is hypothesized to be a function of
demographic characteristics, familiarity with democracy, the effect of Islam, and trust in
numerous political actors as credible agents of democratization or autocracy.
I use several variables to measure the effect of each group of factors. Relative income,
education, age and gender are used to gauge the possible impact of the demographic
characteristics. The familiarity with democracy can be derived from previous political
participation and residence in a democracy for year or longer. The effect of Islam on the
attitudes toward democracy can take three dimensions: religiosity, support for political Islam
and compatibility between shura and democracy. The extent to which Muslims trust political
incumbents, the West and the ulama as credible agents of democratization or autocracy is
hypothesized to influence Muslims' attitudes toward democracy.
Regarding the model specification, it is highly anticipated that different variables will
affect attitudes in different ways in different countries. To minimize the probability of omitted
variable bias, I include a large number of variables in the models. Since the models have ample
observations per country, including all the projected variables does not present any problem
related to degrees-of-freedom. But there is an efficiency cost. Including a number of irrelevant
variables in each country model does reduce efficiency, but the benefit is that one can directly
compare model performance across countries. In other words, to avoid biases and increase
comparability, I decided to sacrifice the efficiency of the standard errors in final models.
To improve the efficiency of the model, I choose a statistical modeling technique
(Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression or SUR) that estimates the parameters of the system,
accounting for heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across
equations. The estimates of the cross-equation covariance matrix are based upon parameter
estimates of the unweighted system. To release some of the assumptions of the SUR system of
equations, the whole models were replicated using multiple logistic regressions. There was
hardly any discrepancy between the two modeling techniques. In other words, the substantive
results are virtually identical. Appendix 10 has the SUR technical tables.
The final SUR model is reported in this chapter and used as the basis of testing the
hypotheses. SUR produces linear regression models whose coefficients are easy to interpret
and draw lessons from.
However, to test the efficiency problem, separate models were run to control for the
effect of these variables separately and then simultaneously in the 32 cases. There are no serious
discrepancies among the case-by-case models with the control for variables and the final
aggregate models with all the variables.
The length and depth of the discussion of the variables differ depends upon the empirical
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and theoretical significance of these variables. For instance, the debate over subjection of
women in Muslim countries has always been on the research agenda of researchers.
Consequently, it deserves more investigation than for instance the effect of relative income.
Besides, some variables are captured in this survey for the first time and thus will be discussed in
more detail due to their uniqueness. Trust in the incumbents, the West and ulama are examples
of such data.
Table 4.1 summarizes the SUR and multiple logistic regression estimates. Horizontally,
the table lists the variables hypothesized to influence Muslims' attitudes toward democratic
software and hardware. The effect of each variable is reported in two columns: one for the
impact on democratic software (Sof) and the other for the impact on democratic hardware
(Hdw). The impact may be positive (increasing one's support for democratic software or
hardware) and thus given the sign (+) or negative (decreasing the support for democratic
software and hardware) and thus given the sign (-). The cells are either empty (indicating the
lack of statistical significance) or have stars (indicating the existence of statistical significance).
These stars reflect the SUR models' tests of significance. Three stars (***) in the body of the
Table mean that the respective variable has a statistical significance at 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05,
and (*) at 0.1. The point estimates and standard errors are reported in Appendix 10.
This table can be read horizontally to demonstrate the hypothesized variables that the
literature suggests their capacity to explain why certain Muslims are pro- or anti-democracy in
each society. For instance, democratic software is mostly supported in Albania by female
Muslims who are relatively rich, well educated, tend to vote in public elections, resided in a
democracy long enough to experience democracy, believe in the compatibility between shura
and Islam, trust incumbents, believe that the West is sincere about supporting democratization in
the Muslim world and tend not to trust the ulama as genuine agents of democratization.
The table can be read vertically as well to show the (in)consistency of certain variables
across cases. For instance, the variables of relative income have contradictory impact on
Muslims' attitudes toward democratic hardware across Muslim societies. Relatively affluent
Bahrainis tend to be less supportive of democratic hardware than relatively disadvantaged
Bahrainis. Conversely, Muslim Indians become more supportive of democratic hardware the
higher their incomes are.
A quick vertical look at the table suggests that some variables have more explanatory
power than others. For instance, the effects of gender, residency in a democracy, and the
perceived compatibility of shura and democracy explain positive attitudes of educated Muslims
toward democracy. Trust in the West as a genuine "democratizer" does not seem to be of great
impact on how Muslims perceive democracy.
1. Demographics
Demographic characteristics such as income, education, gender and age are among the
most standard yet still debatable possible variables that affect one’s attitude toward many
issues, including democracy. Some scholarship attributes Muslims’ antagonism against the West
to some demographic aspects such as poverty, poor health conditions, growing number of youth
as a percentage of population, failure of development and lack of education (Abootalebi 2000;
Sachs 2001; Stern 1999, 2003).
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Table 4.1
Explaining Attitudes toward Democracy: Factors and Actors
1R. Income
Sof
+ -

Pos/Neg
Albania
Algeria
Bahrain
Bang.
Egypt

*

Europe
Gambia

***
*

India
Indon.
Iran
Jordan

Hdw
+
-

*

*
*

*
**

***

**

Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Mali
Morocco
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar

Hdw Sof Hdw
+ - + - + -

*
***
***
***
***

**
**
***
***
***

**

**

***
***
***
*** ***

***
***
*
***

*

**
***

**
*

**

**
*

***

Taj
Tunisia
*

*

***
***
***

***

***
***

***
***

***

Sof Hdw
+ - + -

**
***
***
***
***

***
*
***
**

*

***

*
*
**
*

***

**
**

**

*

*

**
* ***
**
*
*
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***

***

***
***
***

***
**
***

***
***

**

***

**

*
***
**

**

*
***
*

***
**
***
***

*
***
**
***
***

***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***

**
*

***

*** **
**
***

*

***
***
***
***
***

***

*** ***
***
***
**
*
**

***
***
***
***
***

**

***
*** **
*** **

**
*
**
***

Sof Hdw
+ - + -

***
***
***
***
***

***

***
**
*

Sof Hdw
+ - + -

***
**
**
***
***
***
***

***

**
*

***
***
***

**
**

***
***

6- Reside in
Dem.

**
***
***
***

***
***
*** ***

5Vote

***
***
** ***
***

**

**
*
***
***
***

4Female

*** *
**
*

***
*

**
*
**

***
*
**
*
***
***

Senegal
Sudan
Syria

UAE
USA
Yemen

Sof
+ -

*

* *

S. Arabia

Turkey
Turkm.

3Age

2- Education

**
*

***

**

***

***
***
***

***
***
***

*
***

***
***

***
***

***

***
*

**

Table 4.1 — Continued
7Relig.

8-Shura /
Dem.

9Pol. Islam

10.
Incumbents

11.
West

12.
Ulama

Sof Hdw
Sof Hdw Sof
Hdw Sof Hdw Sof Hdw Sof
Hdw
+ - + - + -+ -+ +
-+ - + - + - +
-+ - + Albania
*
**
*** *
* *
*
Algeria
*** *
**
*
*
Bahrain
***
** **
*** *
*
***
Bang.
***
*** **
*** ***
***
***
**
Egypt
***
*** *** *
*** **
*
Europe
** ***
*** **
*** ***
** ***
Gambia
*
*** ***
***
**
***
India
***
*** *** **
***
*
Indon.
*** ***
**
***
**
******
Iran
***
*** *
*** ***
*
***
Jordan
***
*
***
*** *
***
*
Kuwait
***
*
***
** ***
**
***
Lebanon
**
***
***
*** *
*
**
Libya
**
***
*
*
Malaysia
***
*
**
*
**
**
Mali
**
** **
***
*** *
*
Morocco
*
*** ***
*** **
**
Nigeria
***
***
**
*** **
***
**
Oman
*** **
*** ***
***
**
***
Pakistan
***
*** ***
**
*** ***
***
***
Qatar
***
***
** ***
*** *
***
**
S. Arabia
***
*** ** **
***
***
***
Senegal
*
*
**
*** **
***
***
Sudan
*
** ***
**
*
**
**
Syria
*** ***
*** **
*
Taj
*
**
**
Tunisia
*
*** *
** *
**
Turkey
***
** ** *
** *
Turkm.
*
**
***
UAE
***
**
**
*
***
*
**
USA
** **
*** *** * *** **
Yemen
***
*** ** **
**
** **
***
**

In the Western experience, it is said that more educated and better off individuals who
generally belong to the middle class will adhere to values conducive to democracy (Bermeo
1997; Kaufman 1997). However, an in-depth examination of jailed Egyptian radical Islamists in
1980 revealed that the typical member is "young (early twenties), of rural or small-town
background, from the middle or lower middle class, with high achievement and motivation,
upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, and from a normally cohesive family”.
116

In other words, they are “significantly above the average in their generation" while among the
most extremist (Ibrahim 1980).
With this type of conflicting normative and empirical accounts, the pooled data may help
determine if demographic characteristics influence Muslims differently across societies or there is
a uniform pattern in all societies.
To do that, the most important demographic characteristics suggested by the literature
(i.e. relative income, education, age and gender) were examined.

a. Effect of Relative Income
A 9-point scale variable was developed to gauge the relative income of the
respondents. This variable is hypothesized, as indicated in the theoretical chapter, to reflect the
effect of socio-economic status on individual attitudes toward democracy. Dahl's conclusion
regarding the pre-World War II polyarchies in Italy, Germany and Spain suggest that the failure
to provide economic needs and to maintain public order spurred the shift toward dictatorship
(Dahl 1971). That is to say, if dictatorships provide necessary needs to individuals, they would
become less supportive of change, even if it leads to democracy. The following quote illustrates
this relationship in the Muslim context:
"[W] ith new means of surveillance, repression, and wealth-extraction made
available to rulers by modern technologies and methods, governments have
become less dependent than ever on popular goodwill…With no need for
taxation, there is no pressure for representation." (Lewis 1993b:54-55)
This hypothesis is crucial especially in some countries that are accused of buying
legitimacy (Luciani 1995) under the slogan of "no taxation, no representation." Sherman
proposes the following quote as a support for the role of prosperous economy in establishing
consolidated non-democracies: "the correlation between income and democracy holds within all
but one region/culture. . . The one exception is Islam for which there is no significant correlation.
. . Among Arab nations there is a negative correlation between wealth and freedom" (Sherman
1998). Another account refuses any link between wealth and Muslims’ attitudes toward
modernity in general (Pipes 2002).
The available data helps us test this relationship afresh at the democratic software and
hardware dimensions.
A. Democratic Software
As Table 4.1 demonstrates, relatively high income produces more support for
democratic software in Albania, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Jordan and Turkey. In
other words, relatively richer people tend to be more tolerant toward women and minorities. By
controlling for the effect of education, one finds that relative income lost its significance in the
cases of Indonesia and Jordan, which indicates that relative income has its significance mainly
due to its effect on education that functions as an intervening variable in these two cases.
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However, relatively high income has the opposite effect in two other countries: Kuwait
and Nigeria. Differently put, the relatively affluent Muslims who responded to the survey tend to
be less supportive of democratic software in the cases of Kuwait, and Nigeria. Controlling for
the effect of relative income did not change the significance of other coefficients, which suggests
that the negative effect of relative income on democratic software in Kuwait and Nigeria is not
due to the interaction with other variables.
Finding out the mechanisms of causality between relative income and negative support
for democratic software needs more scrutiny with more empirical data.
However, there is no statistically significant relationship between relative affluence and
democratic software in the other 23 cases even after controlling for the effect of other variables.
In other words, Muslims' relative economic status does not help explaining the political attitudes
of Muslims toward minorities and women.
B. Democratic Hardware
The impact of relative income is more significant in explaining Muslims attitudes toward
democratic hardware than their attitudes toward democratic software. Relatively high income
produces more support for democratic hardware in Europe, the Gambia, India, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Morocco, Turkey and USA. These countries share very few common economic,
cultural or political characteristics. From the most capitalist and affluent countries of the world
(e.g. USA and Europe) to a number of the poorest economies in the world (the Gambia and
India), there could be different mechanisms that make relatively affluent Muslims in these
countries support democratic procedures and mechanisms. As Dr. Bahgat Kourani of Montreal
University pointed out in an interview with him in Cairo, the rich may be appreciative of the
connection between democracy and their economic status and the poor in these countries are
hopeful to reach the same pattern.
However, relatively high income produces less support for democratic hardware in the
case of Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. This result suggests that, with the
exception of Kuwait, all Arab (semi-) rentier states produce relatively undemocratic affluent
individuals. A plausible explanation is that most of these relatively rich people are worried about
losing their status if democratic changes are introduced into their societies.
Why are the Kuwaitis' relatively rich individuals more supportive of democratic
hardware and less supportive of democratic software? The structure of the Kuwaiti respondents
to this survey indicates that around 58 percent of them are Islamists and the 71 percent of them
are men who believe that "Kuwaiti women are not suitable for outdoors challenges" as a
respondent put it. Whether this attitude is related to Islam, tribal tradition or both is not as
important as the fact that it exists. At the democratic hardware dimension, the history of
representative politics in Kuwait since the adoption of the 1962 constitution indicates that some
democratic elements existed in the past without necessarily leading to abrupt shifts that may
jeopardize the privileged status of the most affluent citizens in Kuwait (Byman and Green 1999).
In the rest of Muslim societies, being relatively rich or poor did not bring much
explanation of Muslims' attitudes toward democratic hardware.
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b. Effect of Education
Education has always been proposed to be a very important factor in shaping
individuals' political attitudes. It is suggested that for highly educated people, the cost associated
with acquiring information about how democracy in other countries is low and as a result they
exhibit more support for democracy since empowers them. On the other hand, the least
educated pose a threat to democracy in the face of any socio-economic dislocation (Lipset
1983). Thus, education is hypothesized to instill and reinforce liberal and democratic values such
as equality, support for socio-political tolerance, respect for individual liberty and democratic
institutions as suggested by theory and evidence from other cultures (Gibson and Duch 1993)
and (Flangan 1982). In the Muslim context, it is argued that education was one of the most
important reasons behind the weakness of civil society and democratic praxis (Diamond et al.
2003).
I use a 5-point scale to measure the level of education. As indicated in Table 4.1, this
study finds that education does not have any effect on either democratic hardware or software
in two countries: the Gambia and Oman. This result suggests that more education in these
countries does not necessarily mean more or less support of democracy. However, education
has a significant effect on democratic software and/or hardware in the rest of Muslim societies.
A. Democratic Software
Education has a negative effect on democratic software in the cases of Saudi Arabia
and UAE. This result is very alarming since it suggests two types of findings: First, more
education does not necessarily mean more tolerance in all societies. Assessing the impact of
education requires understanding the contents of the curriculums that lead to less tolerance
toward women and minorities. Second, this result as well casts some doubts on the role of
school and colleges as agents of democratic socialization in these two countries. "The
domination of higher education by the ulama has led to a general rise in complaints by Saudi
students about the curriculum's lack of relevance to their everyday practical needs" (Yamani
2000).
Some interviewed Saudi intellectuals were clear in their criticism of rote learning in Saudi
schools with barely any avenues for developing critical mentality. Some Saudi ulama/scholars
refused this link between education and intolerance (al-Buraiq 1994; Ibn Baaz 2002).
A Shiite Saudi was quoted saying: "The religious curriculum in Saudi Arabia teaches you
that people are basically two sides: Salafis, who are the winners, the chosen ones, who will go
to heaven, and the rest. The rest are [Shiite] Muslims and Christians and Jews and others" (alAhmed 2002).19
The negative effect of education on democratic software in the case of UAE stands as a
real surprise in a country where 72 percent of registered students in higher education are
females. However, a plausible explanation for this negative impact is the role of age. By

19

The Saudi government has started a program of "revising school curriculums, condemning Islamic
extremism and easing restrictions on the press" and working hard on "promoting a tolerant and pluralist
vision of Islam" in the Saudi education system that may result into a different type of graduates Kristof,
Nicholas D. 2002a. "Can This Marriage Be Saved?" New York Times, November 1, 2002.. This revision has
been adopted as part of the war on terrorism and anticipated political reforms.
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controlling for the effect of age, one finds that education loses its negative significance, which
means that education has its effect through age.
Besides, though the UAE women occupy more school and college seats than men (the
ratio in high schools in 2002 was 2.7 to 1), most education experts find that Emeriti society in
general still does not encourage women to work outside the fields of education and some
governmental positions (AbdelGalil 2003).
What is interesting is that Pakistani educational system has not appeared in this survey
to be anti-democratic despite the 8,000 religious schools, or madrassas, that are considered by
many to be incubators for Islamic militants (Iqbal 2003). A good possible explanation for the
lack of effect of these types of madrassas that teach only traditional curriculum of Quran, Arabic
and Urdu studies on the attitudes toward democracy is that most of these schools function as
parallel education system that is not under the supervision or control of central government.
Thus, unlike Saudi education, most educated Pakistanis do not send their children to these
madrassas. Besides, it is extremely difficult for students who go to these madrassas to join
college later on.
B. Democratic Hardware
Unlike the cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE, more education leads to more support to
democratic hardware and/or democratic software in all other countries holding other variables
constant. This finding implies that more education in these countries drive both tolerance toward
women and minorities and support toward democratic mechanisms up.
An intriguing result is that education does not have a negative effect on democratic
hardware in any of the cases studied in this project and has a positive effect on democratic
hardware in 25 cases. This relationship between education and support for democratic
hardware suggests that Muslims with advanced education support democratic institutions and
mechanisms more than Muslims without advanced education. This finding in itself is important
since it supports some of the claims made by some scholars that Muslims’ lack of support of
democracy is not a peculiar function of Islam’s influence on Muslims’ political culture but rather
a common problem that Muslim societies share with other developing countries (Abootalebi
2000). Besides, it supports the argument that mass literacy, economic modernization,
urbanization, and the flow of information associated with the communications revolution, lead to
the rise of the middle class that is usually supportive of democratic procedures and mechanisms
(Sivan 1997). Based on a similar analysis, a prominent researcher projected that mass
education, along with independent mass media, would have the same impact on Muslims like the
impact of printing press on sixteenth-century Europe (Eickelman 1999).
The policy recommendation associated with these findings is that if Muslim governments
intend to advance genuine democratic reforms they need to review their curriculums to make
sure that they do not advance anti-democratic norms. For instance, Saudi education is in need
of revision to accommodate Muslims from all sects and women as politically equal. The rest of
Muslim countries need not only to fight illiteracy but also to expand in post-high school
education that increasingly creates positive impacts for democracy.
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c. Effect of Age
As indicated earlier, it was found that the young are more enthusiastic about change
(Inglehart 1997) and (Bahry and Silver 1990), but not necessarily about democracy. However,
age is an important variable among Muslims. Some reports suggest that there is a tendency
among young Muslims, who form the majority of Muslims nowadays in most Muslim countries,
to resort to religion and religious thinking in the last two decades. This tendency has become a
concern for the West since those religious young men resent Western values (al-'affifi 2002).
In this study, one finds that the 5-point scale of age does not have any effect on either
democratic hardware or software in 14 cases, but does in the rest.
A. Democratic Software
Other things being equal, age has a positive effect on enhancing democratic software in
India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Tunisia and UAE. This result by
itself sounds very alarming. Older people are more tolerant toward non-Muslims, Muslims from
other sects and women than younger people in these cases. If this trend holds in the future, this
means that these societies may end up having relatively less tolerant cultures. Some scholars
note the relative erosion of tolerance in India with the election of the Hindu party of Bharatiya
Janata comparing to the older generation that used to support the secular Conference Party
(Jayal 2001). In Lebanon, older people are more tolerant of minorities and women than younger
people despite the fact that most of old people still remember the 15-year civil war. However,
Dr. Samir Salmani, a Lebanese sociologist, pointed out that older people do not want to repeat
the cultural environment of the civil war in contrast with the younger generation which has been
socialized into a sense of defeat.
Only among Muslims of the US have do older people support democratic software less
than younger people. However, around 73 percent of the respondents from the US are under
the age of 30 which is a good indication that they assimilate the relatively tolerant democratic
culture of the US. In the rest of the cases, the age of respondents does not have any impact on
their level of tolerance toward minorities and women.
There is the possibility that age has its effect on democratic software through other
intervening variables such as education and relative income. Controlling for the effect of these
other variables did not change the significance or direction of age’s influence on democratic
software in any of the cases.
B. Democratic Hardware
Older Muslims in the Gambia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Mali, Nigeria and Tunisia tend to be
more supportive of democratic hardware than younger Muslims in these countries.
However, older Muslims in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan and UAE are less
supportive of democratic hardware than the younger generations. Some researchers find it
easier to explain why older people are inimical to democratic procedures than younger people
by referring to the historical experience of older people whose dissatisfaction is higher and their
knowledge of their backwardness is noticeable. Elderly Muslim men and women have no local
history of democracy on which to draw. As democracy has blossomed in Western states over
the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal
and clan leaders.
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The great majority of Muslims are born and have lived in autocracies. Even the
attempts of nationalist governments to launch ambitious programs of mass education failed to
serve the purpose of political development mainly because of the logic of mass-mobilization and
indoctrination rather than focusing in basic freedoms and civil rights (Eickelman 1992). New
generations have access to electronic communications and the media that educate younger
about democratic standards.
d. Effect of Gender
The issue of women’s political status has been debated for centuries. The data available
for this project may be helpful in shedding some fresh light on this issue. For instance, Islam was
described in a 1920 article as “a religion that ignores the personal existence of an entire
sex…[thus it] can hardly hope to survive outside the dark places of the earth” (Kinross 1920).
Others refer to the impact of an “interpretation of Islam that relegates women to second-class
status” (Karatnycky 2002) on democratization in the Muslim world as extremely negative.
Although this interpretation definitely exists and its impact is confirmed (Fish 2002), it is not
clear if women have been socialized or forced to believe in this interpretation. Put differently, do
Muslim women perceive their political roles in the same way Muslim men do? This data
categorically suggests that educated Muslim women in all countries are more supportive of
democratic software and hardware than Muslim men. This result should be understood only
within the context of the pooled data that captures educated women. United Nations figures put
illiteracy rates for Muslim women at up to 55 percent (World Bank World development report
2001).
Some scholars, relying on ethnographic research and deep knowledge of specific
societies (Ahmed 1992; Ahmed 2001; Barakah and Nasif 2001; Bayes and Tohidi 2001;
Engineer 2001; Rosen 2002; Shahidian 2002), have emphasized the relatively high degree of
subordination of women in Muslim societies. The data of this study show at least that there is an
overall awareness among educated Muslim women of their plight. The focus group discussions
add some depth and propose an important recommendation.
While talking to most men in the focus-group discussions, I found a general trend in
which the most modernist and liberal male ideologues talked as if they were traditionalists when
the discussion pertained to the status of woman. Almost 78 percent of the men interviewed in
the focus-group discussions advanced various arguments about women’s home-based duties
such as taking care of the kids and bringing up good families. I did not find enough support for a
famous claim made by some researchers that women are responsible for their own plight by
socializing their daughters on the principle that their role in life is secondary to men’s missions
(Farjani 2002b; Hijab 1988; Mernissi 2003). Rather it was clear that men have this gender-bias
toward their missions in life even if they do not use Islamic argumentation. This claim may be
applicable to illiterate women but definitely not to educated women as captured in this project.
In all groups, women have portrayed themselves as being treated unfairly socioeconomically by men but not by Islam. Interviewed Muslim women clearly accused society of
depriving them of the rights stated to them according to sharia/Islamic legislation. On making the
distinction between Islam as a creed and cultures, interviewed women consensually agreed that
male-centered cultural norms do not give women a fair share even by Islamic standards. A
Saudi university graduate young lady with a degree in marketing, stated that: “Allah’s rules are
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respected and will be respected in Saudi Arabia. We [women] do not want to dress
inappropriately in streets or intermingle impolitely with men in offices… Women should keep
wearing the abayas/ black cloaks because Allah dictates chastity on us; not because men
decided so.” Fatema Nour of Iran refused the Western criticism of Islam’s treatment of women.
“I can wear bikini, listen to music, and sing… but not in front of men… Some [Muslim] men do
not understand Islam or abide by its rules. They harm Islam’s image and there are always
people who are ready to blame everything goes wrong on our religion.”
Once the issue of women taking office and participating in politics has been introduced,
many women (roughly 20 percent of the interviewees) begin to quote fatwas/religious verdicts
that forbid women from having superiority over men on political matters. It is noteworthy that
the classification of men into traditionalists, modernists and secularists does hold when men
expressed their attitudes toward women's public roles, since most of them appear to be of
traditionalist tendencies. However, most Muslim educated women interviewed in all countries
are modernists (60 percent) or liberal (15 percent). They argue for more active role for women
in politics. Liberal women quote Islamic and Western examples. Modernist women barely make
any references to the West.
Modernist and liberal women quote the examples of many Muslims women who
govern(ed) important Muslim countries and were not less efficient than men.
No single Muslim woman in the focus group discussions or on the open-ended
questions criticized Islam as a creed. Actually quite the contrary, even among the most secular
of them, there is a clear rejection to any attempt to track Muslim women’s plights to the
sharia/Islamic legislation but to the man-centered schools of fiqh/jurisprudence that degrade
women. They are asking for an Islamic version of equal but separate rights and facilities.
Another intriguing observation is that most interviewed women, even secular ones, are
critical of the Western model of man-woman relationship. As a Turkish female sociologist
comments: “American movies scare Muslim conservatives. They are worried that if they give
women their rights, Muslim societies will be like Western societies.” As a supporter of the
Islamist governing party in Turkey, she thinks that her mission is to educate the masses that a
Muslim woman can be free in an Islamic way and not necessarily to follow the paths of Western
women or veiled women of Afghanistan. Most interviewed women think that Islamic principles
give them the negative freedoms that any woman may aspire to: freedom from sexual
harassment, freedom from pornography, freedom from selling their bodies to market
commodities. The real challenge they face pertains to the positive freedoms that Islam has given
to them but Muslim men deprived them from. Atop of these freedoms is their freedom to have
equal opportunity with men in workplace and public offices. As the feminist Iqbal Barka of
Egypt put it: “The opportunity to fix what men messed up.”
Is there a way to empower Muslim women against man-dominated culture?
One of the major advantages of focus group discussions with educated women is their
capacity to nail down their perception of a solution. “Empowering women through quota system
in political positions” was suggested by an Algeria female lawyer and human rights secular
activist, and was unanimously supported by all the modernist and liberal female interviewees of
the focus group discussions in almost all eight countries. Her logic assumes that Muslim rulers
have to deal with women in the same vein that mothers deal with their children. Otherwise, the
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subordination of women to men will continue even if many Muslim women are increasingly
educated.
A Sudanese female student of medicine concurred. She thinks that most women are not
aware of their potentials and do not know how to defend their political rights. It is the
responsibility of governments in Muslim societies to allocate resources and positions to women.
From her perspective, if governments decide to do that, they will succeed.
A contrast between Morocco’s and Iran’s experiences is indicative in this regard.
Though Iranian women are active in almost all socio-economic and political arenas, they are still
lagging behind when they compete with men. Women occupy only 4 percent of the Iranian
parliament seats. Applying the quota system in Morocco raised the number of women in
Morocco parliament from two to 35 and five of them won seats that were open to both sexes
(11 percent of the seats as mentioned earlier).
Some recent developments show us that though culture matters but it is not that
insurmountable if the political elite decides to empower women.
The Qatari experience strikingly speaks for progressive stands taken by the elite toward
women. In a clear contrast to the highly conservative traditions of the Arabian peninsula, a
Qatari woman has become a minister of education and another woman was appointed as the
Dean of the School of Sharia where tens of male ulama/scholars work.
The Qatari Constitution does not only mention the equality between sexes (article 34)
but emphasizes the responsibility of the government to empower women (article 19). From an
Islamic point of view, if a woman can run the affairs of a school of sheikhs and ulama, while the
male gatekeepers of Islamic traditions have no objection to that, then she is entitled to do so
many other things.
Practically speaking, the Qatari government has been working hard the past two years
to bridge the gap between women and men in education, employment opportunity, and political
positions (al-Ansari 2003). There is not much difference between the culture of Qatar and the
culture of Saudi Arabia where women are not allowed to drive cars and until December 2001
did not have personal identification cards because their faces should not be exposed to
strangers. All the appointed Shura Council of Saudi Arabia are males and the only allowed
elections of Trade Chambers are limited to men. However, there is a clear difference between
the political elites in the two countries. A Saudi citizen showed me a free booklet (with no
author or publisher) where the following quote by the famous Islamic scholar Abu Hamid alGhazali (12th century) appeared: “Women should stay at home, do not see men and men should
not see them. If a woman had to go outdoors, she must be in extremely awful clothes…. etc.).
Yet the Saudi government decided to allow women to participate in the national
dialogue on reforms in the country, through video-conferencing from separate rooms, but with a
growing respect for their role in society.
A famous example that has been used to underscore the role of culture and tribalism in
degrading women’s political status in Muslim countries is the Kuwaiti example where the
Supreme Court and the (50-male member) Parliament refused to give Kuwaiti women the right
to participate in politics. Both decisions invalidate a decree issued by the prince in 1999 to
enfranchise women. However, one of my Kuwaiti interviewees argued that the prince was not
fully serious about enfranchising women. “Had he been fully supportive of it, he would have got
it.” Is it a matter of a peculiar Kuwaiti culture? The answer does not seem to be yes. If it is a
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matter of culture, how can we explain that educated Kuwaiti women have top positions as
bureaucrats, academicians, journalists, and diplomats, but they are not allowed to vote in public
elections? Besides, it is very difficult to come up with significant cultural differences among the
Gulf States.
Additional evidence to support the supremacy of the political actors’ agenda over the
cultural/religious factors is the role of women as justices. Though there are over 1000 Arab
justices, Egypt appointed its first female justice only in 2003. Approximately 50 percent of
Morocco’s justices and 67 percent of Sudanese justices are women (Ibrahim 2002). Female
justices have been in Morocco since 1959, the Sudan since 1962, Tunisia 1975, Yemen since
1990, Lebanon since 1966, and Jordan since 1995.
Iqbal Baraka thinks that Muslim men fear women’s progressive and reformist ideas.
“They do not want to give women the chance to know their potentials.” According to Baraka,
men, mainly Islamists, use religion and cultural traditions to subdue women throughout the
Muslim world (See also Mernissi 1991). There is some evidence in this data that clearly
supports the fact that women are more supportive of democratic hardware and software than
men.
According to Togan al-Faisal, the first woman to be elected into the Jordanian
parliament in 1993, opposition to women’ public role is not based on religion or culture but on
“political agenda.” Her evidence is twofold. First, King Hussein of Jordan appointed two
women in the Jordanian parliament after she was elected in 1993 contrary to the conservative
and tribal culture that emphasized honoring women by staying at home for decades. Second,
though members of the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan were very critical of women’s
participation in politics based on religious and cultural reasoning during the 1989 elections, they
retreated after her being elected in 1993 elections. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood,
contrary to their previous discourse, appointed a woman in their Shura Council for the first time
in the whole Arab region and later nominated a woman to get elected (al-Faisal 2003). Had it
been an actual religious and cultural mandate, the late King and the Islamic groups should not
have shifted directions that quickly.
If Sweden has the highest percentage of women’s representation in Parliaments (54
percent) and US women occupy 41 percent, Senegal and Morocco (19 and 11 percent
respectively) are the highest among Muslim countries mainly because of the political support
women get from the governing elites.
What seemed interesting is that the attempts to empower women were always coupled
with progressive interpretations of certain verses of the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of
the Prophet Mohamed beside underscoring certain incidents and paying little heed to others.
2. Experiencing Democracy
a. Previous Political Participation
Following a proceduralist reading of voting in meaningful elections as the main form of
political participation (Dahl 1989; Downs 1956; Sartori 1962; Schumpeter 1976), this project
measures political participation in the countries that have public elections through voting. It may
be suggested that people who vote are definitely pro-democracy. Actually Bollen refused to use
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voting as a vindication of democracy because it has been widely common in non-democratic
countries. He actually cited data from 1970s to show that countries like North Korea, Romania
and Bulgaria among others had very high levels of voter turnout (Bollen 1980). Thus it is not
clear if voting would necessarily lead to more support for democracy or not. In the countries
studied in this project, only Turkey has compulsory voting.
The variable of voting has not been used in the cases of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman,
Qatar, Bahrain and Libya.
A. Democratic Software
Intuitively one may anticipate that individuals who participate in politics through voting
are usually more open-minded regarding tolerating the right of minorities and women to run for
office and participate in the democratic process. However, this result is true only among
Muslims of Albania, Bangladesh, Europe, India, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Turkey and USA.
These countries have two important characteristic in common. First, they all have a relatively
long tradition of elections with clear opportunities given to minorities and women. Besides, these
countries occupy the top right corner of Figure 3.1 that shows that they have the most
compatible aggregate attitudes toward democratic software and hardware.
Second, this finding suggests as well that people who tend to vote are more liberal and
modernist than being traditionalists. The traditionalist position contradicts the democratic spirit
that focuses on voting for the best candidate regardless of faith. Typical traditionalists refuse
Muslims’ participation in elections since it is bed'a/ man made innovation. However, some nontypical traditionalists accept participating in elections only under extreme conditions. For
instance, women should not vote or participate and male Muslims should vote only for Muslims
even if a non-Muslim candidate seems to be better than a Muslim candidate quoting some verse
of the Qur'an such as (221, ch. 2). (Islamweb.net/fatwas, Fatwa # 5141).
This result may be of a good support to Dr. William Ritchie’s dialectical relationship
between democratic mechanisms and democratic political culture. He states that “democracy
tends to create the type of culture conducive to its sustainability.” In other words, people who
value democratic institutions and participate in their dynamics end up supporting the civic spirit
that favors individuals’ rights to participate in politics on equal footing. Besides, people who are
tolerant and trustful of minorities and women think positively of the capacity of democratic
mechanisms such as voting in fulfilling the task of giving a fair outlet for minorities and women in
expressing their interests.
B. Democratic Hardware
As expected, the more people are voting in public elections, the more supportive they
are of democratic hardware in Albania, Bangladesh, India, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, USA,
Turkey, Senegal, Iran, and Europe. However, what is more interesting is why this relationship is
limited only to Muslims of eleven societies. In other words, how can some individuals'
participation in elections have no affect on their support for democratic hardware?
The answer comes from many observers who noted that meaningless or fake elections
are increasing in Muslim world. "Most of these elections barely change anything" as Dr. Bahgat
Qurani in Cairo commented.
Out of the 53 countries with Muslim majorities, around 50 of them officially hold some
sort of elections and referenda. They are close to Sartori’s description of some elections as
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“nothing more than the people’s periodic renunciation of their sovereignty” (Sartori 1962:24).
Most Muslim countries that hold elections can be best described as electoral authoritarian
regimes that “neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked oppression” (Schedler
2002:36) which explicitly implies that elections on their own rights are necessary but not
sufficient for a polity to become a democracy.
If one uses Przeworski’s criterion that “no country in which a party wins 60 percent of
the vote twice is a democracy” (Przeworski 1992: 126), one will conclude that elections
virtually and irregularly matter only in seven Muslim countries: Albania, Iran, Senegal,
Bangladesh, Mali, Turkey and Indonesia.
In the rest of Muslim countries, some elections are “shams that nobody can take
seriously; others are occasions of struggle that nobody can ignore” (Schedler 2002: 38). This
study shows that participation in elections is a good predictor of democratic hardware only in
countries where elections actually matter. In Iran, even if elections produce a relatively weak
president and parliament while the actual authority remains in the hands of the Supreme Leader,
the regression results show a significantly positive relationship between voting and support for
democratic hardware. Actually most Iranians still hope that voting will eventually advance
reforms through electing liberals and moderates into the presidency and parliament (Jahanbegloo
2003).
In Bangladesh, elections are largely an opportunity for exchanging seats between
Shaikha Hesseina (the daughter of Muguid al-Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh) and Khaldha
Dheya (the widow of the Dheya'a al-Rahman, the President of Bangladesh in the 1970s). One
Bangladeshi respondent described the Bangladeshi elections as “ceremonial" in their impact but
Bangladeshi people “still think that elections tell whoever in power that we can change you.”
Voting by Muslims of Pakistan did not have an impact on their support for democratic
hardware though elections were periodic occasions for changing the seats of the Prime Minister
between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. “Most Pakistanis welcomed [Musharraf's] coup in
hopes that the military would institute long-awaited-structural reforms” to the 11-year of
misgovernance under what most Pakistan experts considered democratic rule until 1999 (Shah
2002: 72).
There is no democracy without elections but in most Muslim countries there are
elections without democracy, elections that breed dictatorship. An Iranian journalist clearly
refuses to describe his country’s polity as a democracy though he participated in all the elections
took place in the Islamic Republic. As a journalist himself, he measures democracy by freedom
of expression and press. He referred me to the international reports on freedom of press. By
checking the Reporters Without Borders’ first worldwide press freedom index, one finds that
Muslim countries that have elections are very poorly placed. Indonesia is number 57, Turkey is
number 99, Bangladesh is number 118, Pakistan is number 119, and Iran is 122, which clearly
indicates that elections have not been translated into substantive respect for freedoms and
rights.20 Most of the moderate interviewees expressed their concern that liberal Iranians may
end up giving up voting because it does not matter.
Another angle was introduced by a lawyer from Algeria. She champions democratic
reforms but not from a feminist point of view. From her perspective, the real challenge that faces
20
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Muslim countries is not the right of women to vote and participate; rather, it is the efficacy and
relevance of the elected councils even if fully dominated by men. In patrimonial and hierarchical
societies the structure of power makes all relevant decisions come from top to bottom even with
decorative public elections. Thus, these so-called representative institutions are not effective
anyway and consequently voting does not increase or decrease the trust in these institutions
because they are exactly the same thing. When I asked: why do people vote then? She quoted
many examples of people who vote for money, to take a vacation from work on the day of
elections or because of appealing to ethnic and religious commitments but “not because of any
trust in the politicians” they elect. If one searches for good illustrations of Zakaria’s illiberal
democracies (1997), these electoral authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world can serve best.
A note of caution should be made regarding some Muslim societies where real and
effective elections are not allowed (e.g. Libya, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and until recently Qatar,
Bahrain, and Oman). Ruling families and elites provide some access to their citizens by “holding
regular, but informal, meetings where citizens can air complaints, petition for redress of
grievances, or otherwise try to influence decision-making” (Byman and Green 1999). In most
cases, this informal access to elites becomes more effective in defending their interests than
regular voting process, as one of my interlocutors indicated. Based on the focus group
discussions, it was noted that individuals who have informal access to government officials are
less supportive of democratic procedures such as elections, voting, and the whole idea of
representation. However, it opens up the gates of nepotism and weakens the role of institutions
and creates an accountability-free culture.
b. Residence in a Democracy
This variable is measured by a dummy variable coded one for Muslims who have lived
for a year or more in a democratic country (North America, Europe, Japan, or India). This
variable was dropped from the models of democratic countries such as USA, Europe or India
because all Muslims who have the nationality of these countries have already lived there for a
year or more.
There are two controversial debates regarding the impact of living in the West. Some
studies suggest that living in the West by itself does not have any effect on Muslims’ attitudes
toward modernity. Overall, the perpetrators of the September the 11th attacks lived in the West
enough to experience democracy but did not get influenced by it (Pipes 2002). One can quote
as well the example of Sayyid Qutb who became more radical after visiting the US (al-Khaledi
1987). Other Muslim intellectuals who ilved in the West as students or visitors were highly
impressed by socio-economic and political modernization and assimilated the Western
experience in building their intellectual programs. Some researchers refer to the triumph of the
US in the Cold War as another factor that ensured “the growing impact of the U.S. democracy
and of American popular culture in the Islamic lands… This kind of relationship is further
encouraged by westward migration” (Lewis 1993b).
The pooled data helps to test the effect of residing in a democracy for a year or longer
on their attitude toward democracy.
As Table 4.1 demonstrates, holding other variables constant, in almost all cases, all
Muslims who lived in a democratic country for a year or more are more supportive of both
democratic hardware and software than Muslims who never had enjoyed this experience. This
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result indicates that travel and living in a democracy is one of the most, if not the most, influential
agents of democratic socialization.
Some focus group discussions conducted in the US and others conducted with Muslims
who lived in a democracy for a year helped to understand the impact of living in a democracy
on Muslims coming from non-democratic countries. Most Muslims who were interviewed were
impressed by the peaceful rotation of power. A Palestinian student (three years in the US),
commented that democracy means that “people can choose their ruler and not to wait until he
dies.”, a Pakistani student, (four years in Canada and Britain) liked the freedom of religion in
Canada: “I pray without fearing being arrested for letting my beard grow.” A Saudi student (in
the US for 5 years) suggested that the “rulers of Muslim countries should come and stay in the
US for two years to learn how to govern.” A Lebanese administrator (3 years in the US) thinks
that the democratic system is an Islamic system. “If there were a modern Caliphate, it would be
like the US.” He had in mind two aspects, federalism and democracy, but with one caveat. He
does not approve using the word democracy: “it will contaminate the Muslim mind.” Instead he
wants to call it shura system.
An Egyptian engineer worked in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Germany and USA (4
years in the US and Germany). He thinks that the US has the fairest and most just system.
“There is no discrimination in the US. If I am more qualified than a US-born American, I’ll get
the job and be the boss of other Americans. This cannot happen in Iraq or Saudi Arabia…
American [democratic] system is more Islamic than all Arab nominally Muslim countries.”
An Emarati student (18 months in the US) who has a lot of reservations on what he calls
“excessive freedoms” but still very much impressed by elections, Congress, and most of all the
Supreme Court idea. His class on American Political System was a lot of fun. It described to
him what Muslims need to do in their countries. Another Sudanese student (14 months in the
US) positively commented on the capacity of the American society to accommodate different
religions, ethnic groups and languages.
Though Muslims who live(d) in the US are not fond of the US foreign policy, as will be
discussed later, most of them maintain that democracy works great for Americans and can work
for Muslims with necessary modifications to accommodate Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation such
as making sure that certain basic Islamic teachings cannot be violated.
There is a small number of the interviewees who are critical of the democratic ideal
itself. Their main criticisms focus on the defects in the mechanism such as the effect of money on
the campaigning and electoral process, the perceived control of Jewish lobby over the US
political agenda and “the freedom of wrongdoing” as a Nigerian female puts it.
In sum, there is a clear positive impact of living in a democracy for a year or more on
Muslims’ support for both democratic hardware and software. Definitely, Muslims’ experience
in the US cannot speak for Muslims in Europe or India. But the comments of these Muslims
reveal that democratic principles are contagious and that Muslims are quick learners. Once they
are exposed to real democracy, most likely they will assimilate it.
3. The Effect of Islam
How much influence does Islam have on individual Muslims’ attitudes?
In this section, the main task is to understand how Muslims’ attitudes toward
democracy gets affected by their adherence to Islam in terms of observing Islamic rituals
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(religiosity,) understanding of the relationship between shura/mutual consultation and democracy
and their perception of Islam as a source of political ideology or as deena wa dawla/religion and
state.
It has been argued that Islam itself has no impact on the political attitudes of Muslims.
“The roots of Islamic radicalism must be looked for outside the religion, in the real world of
cultural despair, economic decline, political oppression and spiritual turmoil in which most
Muslims find themselves today” (Amirahmadi 2002).
An eminent scholar of Islam started his book by stating that: “My own experience of
Islam began with a surprised and uncomfortable recognition that things are not what they seem”
(Gilsenan 1982:9). Later on he explains: “So we should be especially wary of assuming that it is
Islam is the most important area on which to focus” (Gilsenan 1982:20).
Conversely, Islam’s impact on Muslims’ attitudes and behavior has been a core aspect
of the neo-orientalists’ analysis of the undemocratic tendencies among Muslims. “Such familiar
pairs of words as lay and ecclesiastical, sacred and profane, spiritual and temporal, and the like
have no equivalent in classical Arabic or in other Islamic languages” (Lewis 1999:28).
Islam remains a religion of the Dark Ages. The 7th-century Koran is still taught
as the immutable word of God, any teaching of which is literally true. In other
words, mainstream Islam is essentially akin to the most extreme form of Biblical
fundamentalism. (Johnson 2001).
It was reported as well that the late Nobel laureate and poet Octavio Paz once argued
“Islam today is the most obstinate form of monotheism in a world that otherwise accepts plural
truths” (Gardels 2003).
Muslims, on average, are claimed to be more influenced by their religion than other
monotheists. For instance 17 percent of the books issued in the Arab world are religious while
this percentage is 5 percent in other parts of the world (Farjani et al. 2002).
Empirically, the Gallup survey of nine Muslim countries maintains that “religion
dominates daily life in the Islamic world” (Gallup 2002).
Politicians, such as the German foreign minister, have doubted the capacity of religious
and orthodox Muslims to have an "an Islamic path toward modernity and to a society that is
established on human rights, individual freedom and equality among men and women" (Fisher
2002).
Fearing that using the three variables of Muslims’ commitment to Islamic rituals
(religiosity), Islam as a political ideology, and compatibility between shura/mutual consultation
and democracy may lead to multicollinearity, the test has been run and found that, though there
is a theoretical relationship between them, empirically there is no multicollinearity. The model has
been run after controlling for the effect of each one of the three variables. Only in the cases of
Yemen and Malaysia, one finds that dropping out the variable religiosity led the variable of
support to Islam as a political ideology to lose its significance.
a. Religiosity
Religiosity in this project is measured as the combined factor of two indicators: drinking
alcoholic beverages and observing daily prayers (alpha= .926 as discussed in appendix 8.)
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A. Democratic Software
The more Muslims observe Islamic rituals, the less they are supportive of democratic
software in the cases of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Jordan,
Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, UAE and Yemen. This
is a very intriguing result especially since it is applicable to a sizable number of countries.
Besides, these countries have very rare aggregate characteristics in common in terms of history,
economic status and political experiences. Religiosity here definitely means that people who
observe Islamic rituals are less tolerant toward minorities and women in general. Does this result
mean that sins make people more tolerant? This finding makes sense if committed Muslims are
predominantly traditionalists. However, traditionalists in all these countries combined are around
16 percent of the respondents while religious people (who observe 80 percent of the rituals) are
approximately 27 percent of the respondents. The resort to focus group discussions was a must
to understand why a committed Muslim would be less tolerant toward women and minorities
than a less committed Muslim. There was a consensus among the interviewees that committed
Muslims tend to attend sermons and listen to Islamic audiotapes that make them objects of a
certain type of Islamic rhetoric. This answer makes committed Muslims’ attitudes a function of
the discourses disseminated by ulama/scholars who give sermons and communicate through
audiotapes which is an issue that will be discussed soon.
Why didn't this type of effect appear in other countries such as Egypt and Iran,
especially since they are known for having extremely vocal and efficient official and unofficial
ulama/scholars? I took this question to Dr. Salim al-Awa of Egypt who has very solid ties with
ulama/scholars and Islamic thinkers throughout the Muslim world. He did not show any
astonishment regarding these results based upon his knowledge of most of the countries that are
studied here. For instance, he thinks that the Saudi and gulf states’ religious discourse has not
been pluralist. This discourse is changing right now but it will take time for these changes to have
an effect on peoples’ minds. Regarding Egypt and Iran, he argues that the majority of committed
Muslims in these two countries specifically are not absolutists because of the nature of the
pluralist religious discourses of the salafi (traditionalists and conservatives) and progressive
ulama/scholars. They are part of the mainstream moderate reading of Islam that “lives and lets
others live.”
Dr. al-Awa’s analysis rationalizes why committed Muslims in Egypt, Iran, and Mali are
more supportive of democratic software than people who pay less head to Islamic rituals. In the
rest of cases there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables.
B. Democratic Hardware
The more Muslims observe Islamic rituals in Europe, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Senegal, the Sudan, Turkey, the more they are supportive of democratic
hardware.
The more Muslims are religious, the less supportive of democratic hardware they
become in cases of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen and Algeria. In the rest of the cases, there is no
statistically significant relationship between religiosity and support for democratic mechanisms
and procedures.
This result suggests that Pipes make the second group of Muslims speak for all Muslims
when he stated that Muslims refuse freedom since it sanctions "disposable marriages, sexual
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license and abortion on demand as much as it does self-government and the rule of law - and
they decline the package" (Pipes 2003). In other words, this data suggests that Pipes' analysis is
generally valid in the cases of religious Muslims in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen and Algeria but
not all Muslims.
b. Perception of Islam as Religion and State
This is a discussion of the effect of Islam not as a religion but as a political ideology.
Thus the more people (strongly) agree to the slogan of Islam as a religion and state, the more
one is Islamist.
The less one believes in it, the more secularist one is. Some commentators have made
democracy contingent upon secularism in the Middle East (Binder 1988; Gellner "Islam and
Marxism" 1991, 1992; Sharabi 1988; Tibi 1998). Most researchers in the West and secularists
in the Muslim world think that Islamists-in-power are a huge drawback for the cause of
democratization in the Muslim world. Two reasons are usually advanced. First, for neoorientalists, Islamists are the clearest embodiment of the genuinely anti-democratic Islam. Islam
is inherently anti-democratic, and Islamists are the most anti-democratic.
Second, Islamists who reached power did not prove to be as democratic as they had
claimed while in opposition as in the case of mullahs in Iran and Hassan al-Turabi in the Sudan.
Besides, the Islamists of Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria admittedly sent a clear message of
anti-democratic rule.
Some commentators preached a gloomy future for democracy in the Muslim world
because of widespread political Islam especially among young men and women.
Muslim secularists make it clear that the resort to political Islam, which is unequivocally
anti-democratic in their minds, has reasons on the ground. First, the failure of all secular
programs of political and economic development and military defeats in major wars since
independence in 1950s and 1960s. In the words of an Egyptian secular intellectual as
interviewed by New York Times in Cairo:
It's easy for the average Egyptian to say, we tried modernity but it didn't take us
anywhere and we didn't become Europe," said Tarek Heggy, a wealthy Cairo
businessman and political analyst. "It's easy for him to say, we tried panArabism and it didn't work. And, if he's a simple-minded person, he might say
they didn't work because God wasn't with us. (Sachs 2001).
Others concur; Muslims are less influenced by “scriptural principles than by immediate
political, social and economic needs" (Abrahamian 1993).
Second, some secularists argue that ulama/scholars, sheikhs and imams of mosques
have poisoned the well of secularism in the Muslim world by “quoting certain verses that lead
Muslims to believe that secularism is equal to disbelief and infidelity” as an Iranian female
housewife explained. Her comment called for Holyoke’s motive behind coining the term of
secularism in 1854 in his famous book Principles of Secularism . Holyoake noted that he
needed an ethical term to convey the value of the non-religious arena without equating it with
terms such as “infidel, skeptic and atheist” (Holyoake 1860). Holyoake’s success in the West is
as magnificent as his failure in the Muslim world where the term has been rejected by the masses
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as a loanword or neologism and its connotation has become popularly antithetical to Islam itself
rather than to political Islam.
If these assertions are true then one expects Muslims who believe in Islam as a source
of political ideology to be less tolerant and trustful of women and minorities and less supportive
of democratic procedures and mechanisms.
All other reasons that were discussed in the focus group discussions or mentioned by
area and religion researchers did not add much to the two previous reasons but confirmed one
result: secularists should stay away from using the term ‘almaneya/secularism as a label for what
they believe in. Except in Tunisia and Turkey, the word has become an assault on Islam and
Muslims’ beliefs even if they are against Islamists’ attempts to take over government.
A. Democratic Software
The SUR models as discussed in Table 4.1 indicates that the association between
political Islam and lack of tolerance and support toward women and minorities have some
validity in some countries but not others.
The more one is supportive of the Islamist ideology in Egypt, India, Tunisia, and Turkey,
the more they are supportive of democratic software. There is no surprise in these four countries
since one already knows that they have a group of the most tolerant cultures in the 32 Muslim
societies discussed in this project. However, the result itself raises an important point regarding
how tolerant the adherents to political Islam are in these four countries. The seeming paradox is
solved by Tariq al-Bishri of Egypt: “What does secularism do? It creates pluralism and
coexistence among different religions. This is Islam. It has a long history of justice, pluralism,
coexistence and perseverance of rights of non-Muslims.” As an Islamist thinker himself, he finds
the result appealing and assuring that the majority of Islamists at least in Egypt are still
“prescriptively good Muslims with tolerant attitudes.” A recent survey in Iraq showed that 90
percent of Iraqis want democracy instead of any other type of government but still two thirds of
them believe that Islam should play a major role in governance and “(61%) agreed that the
government should be made up mainly of religious leaders” (ORI 2003).
Although Western commentators have found it difficult to apprehend the contradictory
trends among the Iraqi public, this project sees no contradiction here because Islam is inherently
tolerant and suitable to democracy in their minds. “The Middle East was deprived of an
important prerequisite for secularization, i.e. a religious hallucination” (Boroujerdi 1994). The
religious hallucination throughout the Middle Ages of Europe and during the religious wars
helped to refine the role of organized religion away from the public sphere.
Another interesting observation in this regard is that Islamists in officially secular
countries (e.g. Tunisia and Turkey) seem to be more tolerant than secularists or than Islamists in
non-secularist societies. This result is very counterintuitive. There is a possible explanation here.
The process of official secularization does not necessarily mean cultural secularization. Turkey’s
officials have tried to force secularization for decades and the country ended up with a
democratically elected Islamist party. Iran’s Pahlavi family imposed secularization on almost all
state’s institutions and ended up with an Islamic revolution. Algerian Islamists were almost in
power in 1988 despite 150 years of French colonialism and 26 years of secular regimes.
Islamists are the main opposition group in almost all officially secular states from Indonesia to
Mauritania.
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In Turkey, Ataturk closed all madrassas [religious schools], forced the Sufis
underground and forced men and women to wear Western dress. In Iran, Shah
Reza Pahlavi gave orders to shoot at hundreds of demonstrators protesting
compulsory Western dress. In that environment, you can see how secularization
is experienced as an assault (Armstrong 2002).
What is going on?
Ernest Gellner argues that: “no secularization has taken place in the world of
Islam”(Gellner "Islam and Marxism: Some Comparisons" 1991:2).
I would not go as far as Gellner. Arguably political Islam has been concealed under the
pressure of secularization but most Muslims are not persuaded that Islam and politics are like
Christianity and politics. As Hamed Ramadan of the Sudan put it: “when you read the Qur'an
you find many verses discuss governance issues such as hodod/ penal codes, shura/mutual
consultation, and responsibility of Muslims to apply Allah’s hokm/rule. What shall we do with
them? Ignore them or re-write the Qur'an to please the secularists?” No secularist government
in the Muslim world, despite indoctrination and intimidation, seemingly could convince most
Muslims of how to deal with these verses from a secular perspective. A prominent Muslim
intellect echoes the Muslim mind by stating that: “Secularism is necessarily atheistic” (Rahman
1982:15).
“Many Muslims recognize the conundrum: when a government tries to impose a new
version of religious correctness, it is a political act, and no one has yet figured out how to
remove religion from politics without paying a price” (Sachs 2001b). The price has always been
some form of repressing basic political and civil rights and eventually autocracy.
However, official secularization has had one positive effect for the cause of democracy:
it taught modernist Islamists that they are feared because of not showing enough tolerance
toward their religious and ideological opponents and not enough commitment toward the
democratic ideals. Consequently, it has become a tradition in all Muslim countries that modernist
Islamists denounce any acts of terrorism in their home countries, congratulate non-Muslims on
their religious feasts, nominate a woman or more for public office, publicly declare their respect
for democracy and commitment to abide by it if in power, and adopt the most liberal
interpretation of debatable verses and hadiths/sayings of the prophet. Whether modernists will
be committed democrats or not when in power is an issue beyond the results but they are
definitely changing their discourse to debunk the secular attacks on them.
However, the good news about Islamists’ tolerance did not expand beyond the
mentioned four cases. Islamists of Algeria, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, the Sudan, UAE and Yemen are less tolerant toward women and minorities than
secularists of the same societies which confirms the fears of secular intellectuals and neoorientalists. With the exception of UAE, all these countries have been through violent tension in
the past 30 years where Islam has been either a cause or justification for the tension. This
tension seems to be of a negative effect on the level of tolerance and support for minorities’
political rights.
B. Democratic Hardware
Unlike the diverse impact of support for political Islam on democratic software, this
project finds no statistically significant differences between Islamist and non-Islamist individuals’
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attitudes toward democratic hardware in any of the cases. This result confirms the logic of
differentiating between democratic software, that seems to be more problematic, and
democratic hardware.
C. Compatibility of Shura and Democracy
As stated in chapter three, most Muslims tend to think of an ideal Islamic political
system as one based on shura/mutual consultation to the extent that some thinkers propagated
the concept of shuracracy to refer to the Islamic political system (Nehnah 1999).
Thus the project explicitly asked the respondents to relate shura/mutual consultation to a
publicly elected government (hereafter democracy). The logic behind this question can be best
understood by the following quote:
[T]he existence of democracies depends, other things being equal, on the
popularization of the idea of democracy, in the sense that a clear understanding
of what democracy is about is a major condition (although not the only one) for
behaving democratically. For wrong ideas about democracy make a democracy
go wrong (Sartori 1962:5).
Arguably, the more Muslims perceive democracy as a modern application of Islamic
shura/mutual consultation, the more they are supportive of it in terms of its software and
hardware. Whether this is true or not is left to the empirical examination based on the pooled
data.
In one of the most consistent results in this model, one finds that people who believe in
the compatibility of shura and democracy are more supportive of democratic hardware and
software. This effect is present in almost all cases. However, by looking at Table 4.1, one
notices that this effect on democratic hardware is stronger (according to the number of stars)
and more frequent comparing to the effect on democratic software. Muslims in countries such as
Indonesia, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and UAE become more
supportive of democratic hardware, the more they believe in the compatibility of shura and
publicly elected and accountable institutions. However, in these same countries their belief in the
compatibility of shura and democracy does not have any impact on democratic software. A
possible explanation stems from the fact that the process of Islamic shura/mutual consultation
was usually limited to pious Muslims rather than to non-Muslims or ordinary men. Though the
prophet Mohamed himself was known to consult everybody including women and nonMuslims, many Muslim ulama/scholars, fearing the plots and conspiracies of hypocrites and
non-Muslims, limited the candidates for shura/mutual consultation to the most pious among the
umma/nation. Muslims of the these societies who support democratic institutions and
mechanisms as modern applications of shura/mutual consultation do not extend these
applications to mean trust and tolerance toward non-Muslims and women.
However, there is no one single case of negative impact of Muslims believing in
compatibility of shura and democracy on Muslims’ support for democratic software and
hardware.
This result lends some confirmation for claims of the prevalence of Islamic impact over
the Muslim collective mind. Besides, it gives credit to the modernist Islamist reading of the
compatibility between Islam and democracy.
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Focus group discussions were an indispensable source of explanation to most of
these results. To learn how Muslims relate shura/mutual consultation to democracy, I
sought their opinions on why this system of shura/mutual consultation did not hold
throughout the Muslim history and was applied only on the discretion of the leader.
Most respondents concurred that the system of shura/mutual consultation assumes a
certain level of iman/piety on the part of the ruler and the ruled. However, there was
almost complete consensus on blaming the rulers and their corrupt henchmen including
some ulama al-sultan /scholars of authority to corrupt the inherently noble principle.
For instance, most interviewed Muslims do not think of the rightly guided
caliphs as rulers in the literary sense of the word. They are just governors who do not
make up rules. They just govern according to these Allah-given rules and at best if there
are different interpretations of Allah’s rules, then they can choose, upon consultation, the
one that best fits. Thus, under Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation, there is no place for
arbitrary authority without infringing upon key Islamic principles. That said, the system
of shura/mutual consultation collapsed when the caliphs became rulers.
This answer took the discussions to the issue of democracy and its capacity to
drop the assumption of iman/piety on the part of the rulers and the ruled. The
interviewees were asked: “can democracy be introduced as a replacement of
shura/mutual consultation?”21:
1- Shura/mutual consultation is superior to democracy but democracy is still good (36
percent of the interviewees agreed).
2- Shura/mutual consultation is equal to democracy. Democracy and shuracracy are
synonyms. Democracy is just a modern representation of shura/mutual consultation (33
percent of the interviewees agreed).
3- Democracy is evil or even apostasy. Shura is not only superior to democracy but it is its
antithesis (12 percent of the interviewees agreed).
4- Democracy is inherently superior to shura/mutual consultation (11 percent of the
interviewees agreed).
The first two groups of the interviewees that clearly form the majority think that
democracy is genuinely compatible with Islamic principle of shura/mutual consultation but not
necessarily from an Islamist point of view. In other words some secularists believe that Islam’s
principle of shura/mutual consultation, which was actually practiced by Arabs before Islam,
means that Islam in inherently pluralistic. Modernists argue that some aspects of democracy are
Islamizable as means to the common end of fighting dictatorship.
The first group (36 percent of the interviewees) believes that shura/mutual consultation
is superior to democracy from two different aspects. First shura is a religious, social and
economic principle. Democracy, from their point of view is a political system only. One of the
interviewees in Libya states that “Muslims are required to consult on everything they are doing.
Even a man is required to consult his wife on their daughter’s future husband.” The obligation of
a husband to consult his wife is truly an Islamic principle but most of the interviewees have not
21
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noticed the lack of legal and political mechanisms and guarantees to apply the principle of
shura/mutual consultation in any of the mentioned arenas.
Second, some of the interviewees referred to the different roots of the two systems.
In a democracy, man is the master of the world. What his mind guides him/her to be
true, then it is true without making references or abiding by any moral or ethical codes. In other
words, man’s fallible mind is sovereign in democracies. Thus, the people are the source of the
law and the law in turn is to ensure the will of the majority even if they defy all ethical and divine
principles. A Syrian physician who was interviewed in Saudi Arabia quoted the incidents of
colonialism, slavery, racism throughout Europe and North Africa as examples of how the rule of
the majority may lead to unethical results. Shura/mutual consultation, conversely, is limited to the
arenas where Allah “has not revealed His just commands… Only in these areas, Muslims can
consult and make decisions on one condition which is not to violate Allah’s rules.”
Despite their belief that shura/mutual consultation is superior to democracy, the first
group favors democratic institutions and mechanisms as acceptable tools to implement the great
principle of shura/mutual consultation. An Algerian female graduate student used the example of
the car in comparison to the horses that early Muslims used for transportation.
The second group of Muslims (33 percent of the interviewees) who believed in the absolute
compatibility of shura/mutual consultation and democracy emphasized the similar essence of
both shura/mutual consultation and democracy. Limiting rulers’ arbitrary rule and the consequent
rule of law are common purposes of both shura and democracy. Thus, both of them are on
equal moral footing.
To this group of interviewees, “had the prophet lived in the 20th century, he would have
prescribed a democratic system of government … with excluding the taboos” as an Algerian
Islamist put it. An Iranian student and activist pointed out: “During the prophet’s time,
sharia/Islamic legislation functioned as a complete code of ethics that stipulates for every
contingency. Muslims deliberate and eventually the prophet judges. There is no prophet any
more.” This logic leads some Iranians to think highly of democracy without assuming superiority
of Western values over their Muslim counterparts. The best exemplification of this attitude is
Sheikh Mahfoud Nahna’s concept of shuracracy as a “a Catholic marriage between shura and
democracy” (Kutty 1998).
The third group of interviewees (12 percent) finds it impossible to compromise God’s
supremacy (represented in sharia/Islamic legislation) by transferring decision-making to human
actors (through democracy). Without repeating what was said about traditionalist Islamists in the
second chapter, the interviewees who think that shura is superior to democracy postulate that
the outcome of shura is not binding by any quantitative measurement (majority rule for instance).
The only criterion is to meet Allah’s pleasure. None of the interviewees could come up with an
empirically verifiable way to judge if one’s opinion meet’s Allah’s pleasure without assuming that
(some) humans have perfect access to God’s will and intentions. If this were the case, why
would they need consultation from the outset? An Algerian interviewee in a somewhat loud
voice accused me of “repeating by rote the Westerners’ logic of thinking.”22
Since no one has such access to Allah’s will, then nobody should claim that he/she
knows better than others. The fourth group finds that democracy, with its separation of powers
22
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and institutionalized checks and balances, superior to shura/mutual consultation that is inherently
an Arab practice that existed before Islam and fitted well the tribal nature of pre-Islamic Arabia.
This position does not mean that Islam is incompatible with democracy. They echo the
traditional secularist position that Islam as a religion has been used to justify different political
and economic systems based on one’s choice of holy texts and their interpretations.
Three observations can sum up the effect of Islam on Muslims’ perception of
democracy at the individual level. First, it is important to note that all the interviewees, even
secularists, perceive Islam in absolute terms. In other words, Islam, in the mind of most
Muslims, is equivalent to Truth, Good and Beauty. If democracy is good then it is Islamic. If it is
bad, it is not Islamic. This assertion is related to almost every other issue. To most of my
interlocutors, a good Muslim cannot do such a horrible thing such as the September 11th
attacks. If the attacks were committed by Muslims, then they are not good Muslims. The Gallup
survey supported this finding by showing that sixty-one percent of the 1000 Muslims polled said
they did not believe Muslim groups carried out the September 11 terrorist attacks and around
21 percent said that they were not sure (Gallup 2002).
Second, Islam is a very important vehicle for Muslims to differentiate between what is
acceptable and not acceptable around them. According to Muqatder Khan, “Islam is common
sense. But to convince Muslims of certain conclusions, one has to color his argument with an
Islamic discourse.” In other words, any position with an Islamic logic and rhetoric acquires more
legitimacy and appeal among most Muslims. I found this logic very common among the
overwhelming majority of the interviewees and in the positive association in the Muslim mind
between shura/mutual consultation and democracy.
Third, this impact of Islam on Muslims’ perceptions of democracy is not a spontaneous
phenomenon. Rather, it is the outcome of the effort of ulama/scholars, sheikhs and imams who
function as cultural entrepreneurs and agents of political socialization. The overwhelming
majority of Muslims who read the Qur'an hardly relates it to everyday affairs. They usually need
the ulama/scholars to interpret the verses for them. If a Muslim is introduced to democracy as
antithetical to Islam’s principle of shura/mutual consultation, the chances that he/she refuses
democracy is very high and vice versa (Maddy-Weitzman 1997).
The following section will focus on the political actors who are perceived as responsible
for the perpetuation of autocracy and credible agents of democratization. Three actors in
particular will be discussed: the incumbent rulers, the West and ulama/scholars.
4. Who is to Blame?
Who, in the mind of Muslims, are the actors responsible for political dictatorship in the
Muslim world? Can they function as credible agents of democratization? The two questions are
highly related.
a. The Legitimacy of the Incumbents
One of the questions asked the respondents to convey their opinion about which is
better for Muslim countries, current rulers or publicly elected rulers. As stated in Table 3.11, it
was clear that almost all Muslim polities face a legitimacy crisis. However, to what extent does
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this lack of public support to the incumbents influence Muslims’ support for democratic
hardware and software?
A. Democratic Software
Except for the cases of India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Tajikistan where there is no
statistically significant effect for rulers’ legitimacy and democratic software, there is a statistically
positive effect of Muslims’ preference of a publicly elected rulers on democratic software. This
result indicates that Muslims perceive most of their rulers as not as tolerant as the respondents
would prefer.23
B. Democratic Hardware
There is no relationship between the incumbents’ legitimacy and the preference for
democratic hardware in the cases of India, Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan.
Differently put, in these five countries there was no impact of individuals’ support for the
incumbents versus publicly elected politicians on their support for democratic hardware.
Except for the previous cases in addition to United Arab Emirates and Oman, it is clear
that Muslim people tend to be more supportive of democratic hardware, the more they support
having publicly elected rulers instead of the incumbents, holding other variables constant. In
other words, Muslims who do not support the incumbents, and perceive them as illegitimate,
tend to be the most supportive of democratic hardware in almost of all cases except in UAE
and Oman (beside the five mentioned cases where there is no significant relationship). In these
two countries, Muslims who are supportive of the incumbents tend to be less supportive of the
democratic hardware. These two countries are clear outliers in the support of their citizens to
their incumbents and thus deserve more scrutiny. A Syrian intellectual who lived in both
countries for years referred to the phenomenon of economic satisfaction.
Among most UAE citizens, there is a clear support for the current regime headed by
Sheikh Zayid al-Nahyan who founded UAE. Besides, UAE has the highest GNP per capita
(around $22,800) in all the 32 cases of predominantly Muslim countries.
Though the 2.8 million-population is highly heterogeneous with around 72% of them
non-citizens, there is not much difference in terms of political rights between citizens and noncitizens. Despite the lack of official data, around 90% of UAE citizens are Sunni Muslims while
around 7% of them are Shiite (World Bank 2001). Though some illicit tension exists among
Sunni and Shiite Emiratis, the high level of income and political stability with relative social
freedoms comparing to neighboring countries clearly offset this tension. Based upon the
interviews with Emirati citizens, it was clear that democracy is not on the agenda of the publics
and the political status quo is highly desired. As one of the interviewees in UAE indicates:
“Westerners… do not understand our system. We do not need to vote to check the
government and solve problems. Voting is going to upset the social balance in society.”
In Oman’s case, Sultan Qabus Bin Said’s personality and his modernization efforts have
rendered him a clear support among Omani citizens. Some political reforms including the elected
shura council with limited powers and the enfranchisement of women led the country one step
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on the path of tactical liberalization. The relatively mild skewness in distribution of income with
$8,200 GDP per capita offsets the possibly disturbing effect of religious plurality among
different sects of Islam (Barnett 2003).
The focus group discussions revealed three trends among Muslims’ attitudes toward
their rulers.
First, several cases have been made regarding how Muslims are passive and parochial
subjects because Islam habituates them to obedience and indoctrinates Muslims in fear.
Muhammad ruled in accordance with the will of Allah as revealed to him and
translated into his own will. Nothing could have been more irrelevant to his rule
than the consent of the governed. There was no room for "we the people" or for
legislation by elected representatives of the people because the whole body of
laws as laid down in the Sharia was valid and binding for all times. That is the
reason why parliaments in Muslim countries even today are rubber-stamp
bodies. Neither citizens' right to criticize nor to dissent from their rulers are
recognized. Islam admonishes Muslims to obey Allah, his prophet and those in
power, as it admonishes women to obey men, because "men are a degree
above them (Ali 2000).
Moreover, Mirza Agha Kermani was once reported saying: "The rise of the Western
powers as masters of the world, and the decline of Muslim nations into abject servitude, are due
to one fact only. In Europe, governments fear the people. In Islam people fear the government"
(Taheri 2003c).
Most Sunni jurists argued that “a ruler is not removable from power unless he commits a
clear, visible, and major infraction against God (i.e., a major sin)” (Abou El Fadl 2003). This
major sin can be as grave as preventing Muslims from prayer as one of the hadiths/sayings of
the Prophet states. This argument has been used or misused to refer to Muslims as passive not
because of fear but as religious duty (al-'Azm 1969; Lewis 1988).
These quotes suggest a clear causal relationship between fear, obedience and silence on
the part of the masses and the perpetuation of autocracy in the Muslim world. This fear has had
its effect on the intellectuals as well: “From South Asia to North Africa, an entire generation of
Muslim intellectuals is at this moment under threat: Many have already been killed, silenced, or
forced into exile” (Ahmad and Rosen 2002).
I have not noted enough support for this sense of fear or obedience among the
interviewees. Quite the contrary; there was a mixture of rebellion and disillusion. Most
interviewed Muslims, men and women, young and old, have a clear sense of dissatisfaction with
their rulers but with no clear alternative plan. Dr. Hassan Hanafi of Cairo University refused
putting all Muslims in the basket of obedience and fear. He differentiates among four types of
rebellious responses that have existed in the Muslim history since the 8th century and still prevail
in Muslim societies. First, there is the militant opposition which is like the Kharijite/dissidents.
Second, there is the manifest opposition according to the famous Islamic principle of enjoining
the good and forbidding the evil that was institutionalized into the ancient institution of
hisba/observing moral codes in markets. Contemporary Muslims still enjoin the good and forbid
the evil through modern opposition parties and independent intellectualism. Third, there are
secret movements that wait for the opportunity to take over power such as the Shiite under the
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Sunni caliphate. Fourth, there are others who resort to patience and awaiting obedience such as
ancient schools of Sufism and mysticism. There is more support in the focus group discussion
for this 4-category classification than the over-generalizing argument that puts all Muslims in the
category of fear and obedience.
Out of all the 188 Muslims whom participated in focus groups, there was only one
person who advanced this duty of submission to the ruler as a religious duty. Thus, at least
within the pooled list of the participants, there was hardly any support among the educated
Muslims for obedience to their current rulers as a matter of Islamic commitment.
Second, some Muslims oppose incumbents and support democratically elected
politicians instead from an opportunistic view of democracy. In other words, some of the
participants did not deal with democracy as valuable in its own right but rather as a reflection of
the desire to replace incumbents with a specific alternate elite rather than an absolute
commitment to majority rule. This position reflects a short-run interest in alteration of power.
There is no systematic way of measuring this short-run advocacy of democracy, yet it is very
alarming because it means that democracy, to some at least, is judged by the government that
results from it. A Sudanese student studying at al-Azhar in Egypt stated that: “Democracy that
brings al-Mirghani [an opposition figure] into power will not be accepted by him or his tribe.” A
Tunisian professor interviewed in the US believes that democracy is equally as good as any
other means to get rid of the incumbent. There is enough support in the group discussions that
some Muslims are less committed to democratic principles than others. However, the survey
did not capture this difference.
Third, the overwhelming majority of the interviewed Muslims do not trust that the
incumbents will give up power voluntarily. “The rulers do not give up power unless forced”
according to an Algeria secondary school teacher. A Saudi computer engineer echoes the same
argument: “Swearing by Allah, [the rulers] consider themselves above questioning or
accountability…. The only way to reform the system is by threatening their thrones. Then they
will pay attention to the public’s demands.”
Take Saudi Arabia as a test case for this argument. In Saudi Arabia, the rebellion of
1979 in Mecca propelled the government to suggest establishing the powerless Shura council.
The unrest calmed down. Some commentators link the re-emergence of the Shura council 14
years later to the liberation of Kuwait and the crisis of legitimacy that swept over the whole
region. After the bombings in Riyadh (May 12th, 2003) , it is expected that more reforms will be
debated and possibly advanced (al-Khazen 2003).
A Shiite professor of journalism was interviewed in the US who was exiled in Germany
for 11 years. He blames the dearth of democracy on the autocratic rulers. “Within four months
after ousting Saddam Hussein, Iraqis issued 190 newspapers representing all possible Islamic
(Sunni and Shiite) Marxist, liberal, nationalist, pan-Arabist, anti-pan-Arabism, Kurdish and
independent trends and streams,” he argued. In other words, autocratic rulers are the ultimate
factor behind the dearth of freedoms in Muslim countries. A female poet and liberal intellectual
from Pakistan concurs that Muslim rulers are responsible for Muslims’ plights. “Arab and
Muslim rulers are fond of Napoleon, Bismarck and Machiavellian politics rather than being
students of Washington, Locke or Mill.”
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b. The West as a Credible Agent of Democratization?
For almost two years, the US has mounted strong rhetorical and diplomatic campaigns
toward democratization in Muslim countries in general and in the Middle East specifically. The
US assumes that a democratic Middle East will be safer and eventually less hostile toward the
West following the Kantian famous axiom of “democracies do not fight each others.” Two
problems here: first, is the West trusted by Muslims to act as a credible agent of
democratization? Second, is a more democratic Muslim world will be less hostile toward the
West?
The two questions were investigated at the survey, focus group discussions and the elite
interviews.
The respondents in the survey were asked to (strongly) agree or (strongly) disagree to
the following questions: “The West (USA and its allies such as Britain and others) does not want
Muslims to freely elect their rulers.” Let one introduce a note of caution. This survey was run
before the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the results may be dated but still convey some significant
indications of how Muslims perceive the West’s attempts to establish democratic constitutions
and parliaments in their countries following the shock and awe model of democratization: "After
defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and
parliaments” (Bush 2003).
At the descriptive level, the percentages of respondents’ confidence that the West is
really sincere in boosting pro-democratic changes in the Muslim world is very low throughout
the Muslim world and even in the US itself.
This distrust in the Western commitment to democracy reaches its minimum level in four
Arab countries. None of them seems to be a surprise: Syria, the Sudan, Libya and Yemen.
Between 72 and 73 percent of educated Muslims in these four countries (strongly) agree that
the West (the US and its allies) do not want Muslims to freely elect their rulers.
The same position continued after President Bush’s public and diplomatic campaigns to
democratize the Middle East and Muslim world.
For months, newspapers throughout the Arab world unleashed a barrage of
angry articles that denounced the Bush administration's stance on democracy,
calling into question its sincerity, and attacking it as a smoke screen designed to
distract attention from Bush's real agenda: to grab Iraq's oil and give Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians
(Ottaway 2003).
To take the average of all Muslims surveyed in this project, one finds that only 8 percent
of Muslims (strongly) trust that the US really supports free and fair elections in the Muslim world
including only 17 percent of American Muslims who trust the US interest in democratic Muslim
world.
This result confirms the findings of the Gallup survey of 2002:
The people of Islamic nations also believe that Western nations do not respect
Arab or Islamic values, do not support Arab causes, and do not exhibit fairness
towards Arabs, Muslims, or in particular, the situation in Palestine (Gallup
2002).
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An Emirati modernist Islamist videotaped the following statement by Sen. John McCain:
“Why does not the U.S. force Saudis do something revolutionary like allowing women to sit in
the driving seat of the car?” (McCain 2002). A group of Muslims in a casual meeting, though
critical of subordination of women in Muslim countries, highly begrudged the senator’s comment
since it reflects a great deal of disrespect for their traditions.
To examine the effect of Muslims’ trust in the West as an agent of democratization, the
SUR models as portrayed in Table 4.1 show that this five-point scale variable in itself does not
explain much. In other words, trusting or the lack of confidence that the US and its allies do not
want or hinder democratic elections in the Muslim world does not have an effect on the support
for democratic hardware or software except in the cases of Muslims of Albania and the US.
This result along with Table 4.1 tells us that since most Muslims, regardless of their democratic
preferences, distrust the West (distrusting the West is almost a constant) then there is no enough
variability to explain the variability in the attitudes of Muslims toward democracy.
Fearing that this result may be the artifact of this specific question, I used another 3point scale question that was meant to measure the relationship between the West (among other
factors) and autocracy in the Muslim world. The question reads: “Which one of the following
reasons can best explain why dictatorship prevails in the Muslim world? (Check all that apply.)”
One of the possible options is “The West (by supporting authoritarian rulers).” A three-point
scale was developed to quantify the respondents’ choice among: a very important reason, a
somewhat important reason and not a reason at all.
By using the 3-point scale instead of the 5-point scale in the regression models, three
differences occurred comparing to the original models. The Malaysian and Senegalese became
more supportive of democratic hardware, the more they blame the West for supporting
authoritarian rulers. The significant relationship between trusting the West and support for
democratic software among the Albanians disappeared in the models using the data of the 3point scale question.
However, the descriptive statistics of the 3-point scale question show a highly consistent
tendency among Muslims to blame the West for supporting Muslim authoritarian rulers.
How would Muslims defend their argument that the West is behind their political
plights? It is enough to sit down with a Muslim, no matter how simple-minded, to find them
mentioning the crusades, colonialism, detaching Muslim nations by imposing arbitrary political
borders, nurturing repressive rulers, and support for Israel among many other infractions by
Western countries. An Indonesian used the Western support for the independence of East
Timor and lack of support to the self-determination of Palestine and Chechnya.
Four broad lessons can be learned from Muslims’ open discussions of the role the West
plays in their political lives and West’s capacity to work as an agent of democratization.
First, Western support to Muslim rulers is not perceived positively by most Muslims
even if this support takes the form of economic and military aid. On several occasions, my
interlocutors talked about the West as the Muslim rulers’ real constituency. Judged by the focus
group discussions, most Muslims perceive the negative role of the West as the “in, out and on”
game: To keep the West in the Muslim world, it needs the anti-Western rulers out of power
and instead the West’s henchmen should stay on top of power. Thus, the West works very
hard to make sure that elections will never bring their enemies into power. With the exception of
UAE, there was a clear sense of resentment and lack of trust in the minds of most Muslim
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interviewees on the role the West plays in their countries. “Why would the West support both
Iran and Iraq fighting each other? Why would the West turn the cold shoulder to the army’s
intervention in Algeria? Why would the West support the Mujahideen and then destroy them?
Why would the West encourage Saddam to invade Kuwait and then push him out? They know
what they want. Tell them that we know what the want too,” Shaikh H. al-Hamid of Saudi
Arabia argued in an interview with him.
“The West has an agenda to be superior over the Muslim world. They will achieve it as
far these […] rulers work for them,” an Egyptian science teacher said. A Syrian male working in
the field of information systems in the US said: “They [i.e. the West] want their own tailored
version of democracy that serves their own interests.” In his mind, if the West encourages
democracy, it is this kind of democracy that will not lead them to deal with Arab nationalists or
Islamists.
Second, this lack of trust on the part of Muslims is highly related to a sense of
humiliation among most educated Muslims. They have a holy scripture that tells them that they
are the best nation to come to humanity because of their capacity to enjoin the good and forbid
the evil, while practically this is not the case. A group of Tunisian highly educated Muslims
complained that in their country they have to shave their beards and to avoid showing up for
many prayers at mosques fearing being suspect Islamists. Ben Ali eliminated all Islamist
opposition through police action, nationalized all the mosques, locked their doors except for
prayers and is strictly monitoring the sermons of its government-employed prayer leaders who
are often heard make supplication for the President as part of the prayer rituals. My Tunisian
interlocutors, who are by no means fanatics or extremists, attribute this perplexing situation to
the elites’ attempts to Westernize the country by force. This feeling that Muslims are just
following the Western model without having a real say in their affairs exacerbates the sense of
humiliation among Muslims. “Is it his father’s farm to run it as he pleases? Why does not he have
real elections and let everybody express his solution?”, one of the interviewees lamented
referring to the ruler of his country.
Instead of being one of the leaders of world civilization, Muslims found
themselves quickly and permanently reduced to a dependent bloc by the
European and later the American military, economic, political and cultural
dominance (Armstrong 2000).
This type of reasoning took the discussion into the thesis of clash of civilizations.
There is a general agreement among most of the interviewees that there is a clash of civilization
between the West and the Muslim world. However, for Muslims it is the West’s war on Islam
rather than the war of Islam on the West.
A Libyan professor of business administration who lived for eleven years in five
European and North American countries stated that: “Muslims have been the target of the West
since the 8th century. The West knows that there is a religion behind us that teaches us not to be
like them in their worship of the dollar.” He wanted to teach me the following lesson: “The West
is not Christian. It has no God. The only God they have is the dollar and franc. Their place of
worship is the stock market”.
The Libyan professor, among others, is very articulate in portraying the Arab and
Muslim leaders as the defenders of the Western interests in the Muslim world. Whether this is
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true or not is another question. But what really matters is that there is a widespread resentment
among the masses against the West.
It is not true that Muslims are anti-Western democratic political values. Most Muslims
may have clear reservations on other socio-economic values but not democracy. It is puzzling
that most Muslims who are in favor of Western democratic values and systems find the West
responsible for not helping Muslims assimilate these values and systems by supporting autocratic
regimes. It is a paradox that an Algerian taxis driver who lived in France for six years clarified
by saying: “Democracy is like a success-recipe. Whoever owns it has the key to success. The
West does not want us to have it and blame us on being unfit to have it. ”
Graham Fuller, former Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at CIA,
demonstrated the same puzzle: “Many Muslims are very angry since they prefer to adopt
Western values of democracy, human rights and pluralism but they cannot” (Fuller 2001).
Antagonism against the West is not limited to violent traditionalists. Yet violent
traditionalists put the West, rulers of Muslim countries and whoever is silent about their
wrongdoing in the same basket. A famous quote by al-Zawahri is highly striking:
“We have chosen to blow up the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan instead of the U.S. embassy due
to shortage in resources” (al-Zawahri 2001).
All the interviewed made it clear that killing Westerners is not their first choice unless
they are forced to do that. Yet they argue that if there is a clash of civilization then it is because
the West wants it.
For instance among three of the Saudi ulama/scholars who were absolutely opposed to
the US role in Desert Storm unequivocally renounced the violence of September the 11th
regardless of who committed it. As one of them put it: “ A crime is a crime. Islam does not
condone killing innocent people for any reason” (al-Rashid 2001).
Third, Muslims in general think of the West as conspirators against Islam and Muslims.
In other words, Muslims on average tend to think of the West as weaving a conspiracy against
the Muslim world. As two Iranian secular researchers, living in the US, put it: "To Muslim
minds, the West and its ways have become a powerful myth – evil, impenetrable, and
incomprehensible… But sadly, the great and brilliant works of the West's 'Orientalists' have
found no echo in a Muslim school of 'Occidentalism'" (Boroumand and Boroumand 2002: 1516).
This was true as well about the publics. When al-Qa’eda was blamed for the attacks of
September the 11th it was reported that:
Many people in Cairo reacted with anger and disbelief. “Every time it has to be
Muslims to blame, every time!” shouted Amaal abdel Rabboh, a housewife of
42, outside a mosque on Friday. “Our blood is cheap, eh? No, our blood is
precious and the American blood is water. Bin Laden is just an excuse to
occupy Afghanistan (Sachs 2001).
Many Muslims do not think that the description of the war against terrorism as a
crusade was not a slip of a tongue but it was an accurate depiction. “For a couple of thousands
of people dying in New York, tens of thousands of Muslims die in Afghanistan. What about
those who died in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, the Sudan and Kashmir?” Mustapha from Algeria
exclaimed.
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Muslims who believe in the Zionist-Western conspiracy against them usually starts by
thinking that whatever is wanted by the US and its allies will be in Israel’s interest thus it is
against Muslims’ benefit. A Jordanian housewife in UAE, used the example of the Jordanian
government’s campaign on birth control to show how the American government puts pressure
and provides medical aid to the Jordanian government to lower the number of citizens as a
service to the Zionist project in the region.
The conspiracy theory as employed by most Muslims has its objective grounds
according to Abdullah Al-Nefessi (Political Science professor, Kuwait) who referred to a fivestage Western plan to distort the evolution of the Muslim world and uprooting it from its origin:
The violence against Muslims during the military occupation; partitioning the Muslim world into
heterogeneous states and countries; solidifying this partitioning and division through creating
capitals, flags, diplomatic recognition and the linguistic westernization by making using the
Arabic language illegal; the economic dependency on the West and creating and supporting the
existence of Israel to save the gains of the last four tactics (Al-Nefessi 2002).
Fourth, there is a specific antagonism against the US. Most of the respondents equate
the West with its leader: the US. For instance, the Gallup survey found that the overall view was
not a positive one for the United States: 53 percent of the Muslims questioned had unfavorable
opinions of the United States, while 22 percent had favorable opinions in the survey that was
conducted before invading Afghanistan and Iraq (Gallup 2002).
A student of Assut University (in Upper Egypt) quoted the famous Egyptian play by the
name of “My Mother America” where the US is portrayed as the evil mother of the poor
Arabs. In the play the US sponsors a project for the rights of donkeys while clearly violating the
rights of the Arab human beings by stealing their wealth, supporting their enemies and
propagating their image as terrorists. The Islamic thinker Mohamed Omara of Egypt clearly
states that Muslims are not against the American science, values, technology or individuals. They
are against the US project to control and reshape Muslims’ minds. As a modernist Islamist
himself he thinks that his mission is to debunk this project by uncovering the elements of strength
in Islam and developing an Islamic authentic alternative.
However, the evidence from other sources suggests that this anti-Americanism is not
limited to Muslims. “Even in close allies like South Korea, there has long been a deep strain of
anger among ordinary people at supposed American arrogance, bullying and high-handedness”
(Kristof 2002b). However, the US ambassador to South Korea Thomas C. Hubbard argued
that: “When Koreans were able to express their anger in the late 1980's and early 1990's, they
let off steam and the frustration dissipated. In short, we may be best off if radical clerics in Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan remain free to denounce us” (Kristof 2002b).
Due to my ignorance of Korean culture, I cannot draw any lessons from the Korean
situation. However, I can safely state that America is largely seen throughout the Muslim world
as the rulers’ ally and the peoples’ enemy. Even if one focuses on the US record as an agent of
democratization and a harbinger of human rights in the region, the US has very little credibility
among Muslims.
If Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, offered Turkey to work as a
role model of democracy to the Muslim world (2002), an Egyptian writer, before Wolfowitz
made his suggestion, stated that: “The U.S. wants all Muslim countries to be like Turkey that
bombards its people with series of pornographic movies and episodes” (Mahmoud 2001).
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Another commentator argued that the American position toward democracy is purely
opportunistic. When the Emeriti Zayid Center for Research questioned US policies in the
Middle East and invited researchers who doubted the role of al-Qaeda in the attacks of
September the 11th, the US pressured on the Emeriti government to close down the Center.
The Emeriti government concurred. Meanwhile the US has pressured the Egyptian government
to set free the Egyptian-American sociologist Sa’ad el-Din Ibrahim whose policies are in
tandem with the US interests in the region (Howaidi 2003d).
One can never exaggerate the negative effect of US diplomatic, economic and military
support to Israel on its image among Muslims. Given this notorious reputation, can more
democratic Muslim world decrease the level of anti-Americanism? Theoretically, there are good
reasons to argue for yes and no. Anti-Americanism could increase with more anti-American
forces in power. However, it may decrease if the US is no longer perceived as the ally of the
autocratic governments. There is enough empirical evidence to support the first argument. The
second one is a mere speculation. A law professor from Bahrain asked if the US would support
democracy in oil-producing countries that might result in increased oil prices. In his mind, the
answer would be no.
c. Ulama as Agents of Democratization?
There is a debate among Islam researchers about the roles that mosques and
ulama/scholars, khateebs/preachers and (sheikhs) imams/leaders of prayers play in shaping the
Muslim mind24. Some accounts state that:
“Muslims are addicted to religion. Thus any attempt to reform Muslims’ affairs will fail unless it
starts from Islam” (Omara 2002b).
This kind of discourse is repeatedly instilled in the Muslim mind by all religious figures
(al-Buraiq 1994; al-Gazza'eri 1984; al-Qaradawi 1980). It is argued that mosques will always
be among the most important agents of moral and political socialization in the Muslim world
(Neusner 1996; Sharot 2001; Zaman 2002). The only exceptions to this rule are Tunisia (Ismail
2003; Tamimi 2001) and Turkey (White 2002).
“[The ulama] were the purveyors of Islam, the guardians of its tradition, the depository of
ancestral wisdom, and the moral tutors of the population” (Marsot 1972: 149).
Moreover, ulama/scholars and officially sanctioned preachers are finding it very hard to
monopolize the tools of literate culture. Mass education and mass media are eroding the
monopoly that ulama/scholars used to have over the Muslim mind for centuries (Eickelman
1999).
More specifically the political role of the ulama/scholars shifted dramatically after the
abolition of the institutions of waqf/endowments and their transition to salaried state technocrats
(Mohamed 1989; Nettler et al. 2000; No'man 2003). Traditionally they used to channel the
demands of the masses to the rulers and to advise the rulers to enjoin the good and forbid the
evil. Since most Muslim ulama/scholars have become salaried officials in mostly failed states
(secular or Islamist), most Muslims lost trust in their attempts to legitimize illegitimate rulers and
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These terms will be used interchangeably in this section.
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regimes. Islamists in opposition are now filling this vacuum of trust (Anderson 1997; Esposito
1992; Shariati and Rajaee 1986).
Is it true that ulama/scholars have lost their influence over Muslims’ schema of thought
or are they still credible source of socialization in the Muslim world? If they still have a role, how
does this role affect Muslims’ support for democratic hardware and software?
Two questions are used to gauge the influence of ulama/scholars, sheikhs and imams as
credible agents of socialization.
The first question intentionally avoids the issue of democracy. It reads: Regarding the
Arab/Israeli conflict, whose opinions do you trust most? The respondents were given four
options and the opportunity to write down “other.” The four options were the government,
official ulama/scholars, independent ulama/scholars and independent intellectuals. The distinction
between official ulama/al-Islam al-rasmi and independent ulama/al-Islam al-sha'bi is very critical
since the official ulama/scholars are limited to government-imposed agenda and positions. Table
4.2 summarizes the responses.
Judged by the issues of the conflict in Palestine, it is clear that Muslims in general trust
ulama/scholars more than other sources (government officials and independent intellectuals) in all
the cases except for Albania, Turkmenistan, India and Mali. However, and more interestingly,
Muslims trust independent ulama/scholars who represent al-Islam al-Sha’bi more than those
who represent the official Islam or al-Islam al-rasmi without any exception. This result might
have been expected in countries that have not adopted Islam as its official ideology. Yet it was
found in the cases of Iran and the Sudan that base their legitimacy on Islamic ideologies and
both have very rigid anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian stances.
Fearing that the question about the Arab-Israeli conflict may have its own biases,
another question (2.23) was developed to focus on the issue of democracy. The respondents
were asked to explain who may be responsible for the spread and continuation of dictatorships
in Muslim polities. Among the possible options available was the “[t]he SCHOLARS (sheikhs
who are opposed to democracy).” The respondents can choose between “a very important
reason,” “somewhat important reason,” or “not a reason at all.”
The responses to this question took a normal distribution in almost all cases with a clear
majority (between 57 percent in Turkey and 83 percent in India) choosing “somewhat important
reason.” A young Sheikh from Algeria, argues that this is a “fair answer… because the
ulama/scholars carry the amana/covenant of Allah to lead Muslims to His way and most of them
could not deliver.” He thinks that their failure of deliver attributes to their current limited role that
is why they are “somewhat responsible for all the difficulties not only the dictatorship issue.”
A Turkish imam of a fairly large mosque in Istanbul adds another dimension that the
mosque is the first place where young Muslims learn about “the Prophet and his companions
and most importantly where they get their moral frame of reference.”
The frame of reference is an absolutely important concept to understand the ulama/scholars’
influence. Muslim ulama/scholars discuss things and issues in terms of halal/acceptable and
haram/forbidden by Allah rather than in terms of legal and constitutional or illegal and
unconstitutional. The paradox stems from the fact that in modern Muslim societies, not
everything considered halal by the ulama is considered legal by the state.
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Table 4.2
Credible Sources of Political Socialization
GovernIndepend.
Country
ment
Intellectuals
Qatar
9
30
Senegal
19
18
Tajikistan
23
26
Iran
31
11
Saudi
17
16
UAE
31
18
Gambia
21
25
Nigeria
17
20
Banglad
11
34
Morocco
19
19
Albania
21
32
Turkmen
13
39
Malaysia
13
33
Tunisia
13
29
Jordan
11
26
Algeria
19
24
Pakistan
14
26
Kuwait
16
18
Egypt
13
22
Turkey
3
37
Mali
13
40
Libya
11
36
Yemen
18
27
Lebanon
19
25
Syria
20
22
Sudan
13
18
Indonesia
18
30
EU
1
42
US
0.42
47
India
4
53
Source: web and written survey 2002

Official
Ulama
30
26
24
24
24
23
23
22
21
21
20
19
19
19
19
18
18
18
17
17
16
15
14
14
13
12
11
8
4
2

Independ.
Ulama
31
37
27
34
43
28
31
41
34
41
27
29
35
39
44
39
42
48
48
43
31
38
41
42
45
57
41
49
49
41

Total
Ulama
61
63
51
58
67
51
54
63
55
62
47
48
54
58
63
57
60
66
65
60
47
53
55
56
58
69
52
57
53
43

For instance wearing hijab in government buildings is religiously fardh/obligation
according to the overwhelming majority of ulama/scholars yet in Tunisia and Turkey it is illegal.
Drinking alcoholic beverages, allowing interests on loans and bank deposits and showing
inappropriate movies and music on national TV are "politically" legal and "religiously" haram,
which is absolutely inimical to the traditional understanding of Islam as both religion and state.
Ulama/scholars have a word to describe all these discrepancies: secularism.
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Secular outlets and agents of socialization such as governmental schools, state
controlled TV stations and papers in most Muslim countries are highly condemned by
ulama/scholars as the source of all evils. Most Muslims get exposed to this anti-secular
discourse at very young ages which creates the first frame of reference that is absolutely antisecular since these secular intellectuals and politicians are enemies of authentic Islam.
Many Ulama/scholars clearly state that authentic Islam, not the one taught at
government schools and preached by official ulama/scholars, is incompatible with secularism
because in a secular state there is no place for divine laws (which are the core of Islam), and
secular laws are against Islam. Thanks to these ulama/scholars, democracy has been introduced
to the Muslim world as an alien Western secular panacea.
Mohsan Al-‘awaggi, an independent modernist scholar from Saudi Arabia, criticizes the
official ulama/scholars for being state-driven and not Allah-driven in their khotbas/sermons.
“They were very harsh in criticizing those who committed the September 11th without being as
frank in condemning what is happening in Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan or elsewhere because
the Saudi government prevents them from doing that.”
I met Sheikh K. of Tunisia in the US. He is an imam of a mosque and a hafez which
means that he memorized the entire Holy Qur'an. He is very critical of the Tunisian government
since it created a French education system in a Tunisia. According to him, “the government has
overhauled all education curricula from kindergarten to the universities to emphasize equality
among all religions; as if Islam is just one option available to Muslims.” To him and most
Muslims, Islam is the correct religion since it does not associate anybody or anything with Allah,
unlike all other religions.
K. resumes, “all the verses that emphasize chastity, women as mothers and housewives
and polygamy were expunged from all textbooks as if Bin Ali (the President) corrects Allah.”
When I asked him if he preaches these objections in his country, he said of course not.
He is trying to do his best as a good Muslim within the government-imposed boundaries.
The solution that most secular governments found is to nationalize Islamic outlets such as
mosques, Islamic houses of publications and the Islamic waqf/endowments. Muslim
governments managed to make the unofficial ulama/scholars run but could not silence them.
Their tapes and books are available and are widely and passionately heard and read by young
Muslims.
This duality in Islamic discourse is not new. It always existed in the history of Muslims.
Early ulama/scholars had to fight the rulers’ transgressions. Thorough the first 13 centuries of
Islam, the independent ulama/scholars counteracted the ambitions of the rulers, fend off the
hypocritical stances of the official ulama/scholars and support the grievances against the
injustices of the rulers.
Assuming that the ulama/scholars’ impact is still significant on most educated Muslims,
does this impact help or hinder the cause of democracy. Column 12 of Table 4.1 shows the
statistical significance of the effect of ulama/scholars on democratic software and hardware in
Muslim societies. To gauge the relevance of the ulama/scholars as credible agents of political
socialization, a dummy variable was generated where 1 indicates trust in ulama/scholars (official
independent) and 0 is for other.25
25

There was no enough variation on the variable about the responsibility of ulama/scholars for dictatorship
that is why it was not used.
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The more Muslims trust ulama/scholars as agents of socialization, the less they are
supportive of democratic hardware and/software in all the cases except Tajikistan, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan (where there is no statistically significant effect), the Gambia, Mali, Qatar
and Senegal (where the trust in ulama/scholars increases the support for democratic software
and/or hardware). All cases are formally secular states except for Qatar. However, the
relatively liberal environment in the small emirate gives the independent ulama/scholars the
freedom to express their views to the extent that it is almost impossible to differentiate between
the official and unofficial positions of the ulama/scholars.
The overall result in this study indicates that in most Muslim countries, the credibility of
ulama/scholars is associated with attitudes that are not conducive to democratic software and
hardware. This result needs explanation.
A physician from India residing in the US whose father is an imam of a mosque in
Ahmadabad, feels sympathetic with the ulama/scholars who excel at memorizing the Qur'an,
books of hadith/sayings of the Prophet and many ancient interpretations without learning enough
geography, sciences, philosophy and mathematics. With lack of preparation, they do not look at
the future. Democracy for these so-called ulama/scholars is “alien and improper.” The
ulama/scholars “longingly keep repeating the virtues of the thirty-year reign of the al-Khulafa alRashidoon / the rightly-guided caliphs since they were the golden era of Islam.”
This comment reflects a similar observation by Armstrong that Muslim societies are
“divided and split between an elite intelligentsia who have a Western education and understand
what's going on and the vast rank and file who are essentially left to rot in a pre-modern ethos”
(Armstrong 2002).
An engineer from Algeria who does not seem to be a Muslim any more, decided to give
up attending Friday khotbas/sermons. In his mind, the khateeb (one who gives sermons) is
shallow and does not address the serious challenges of Muslims. “Why do we still discuss the
issue of hijab, application of hodod/Islamic penal code or how to clean oneself for prayer while
[there are] no jobs, no money and no hope?” He thinks that attending such Khateebs/preachers
are not only irrelevant but harmful since they make people pre-occupied of the useless.
An American citizen of Libyan origin thinks that Islam has become the opium of
Muslims: “Khateebs/preachers preach to us to obey the ruler as far as they do not prevent us
from prayers. How come? They are corrupt, traitors, and ignorant. How can I listen to an
employee who teaches me nothing?”
An Iranian female liberal thinker agrees to the use of ulama/scholars by rulers as tools
legitimating their authority. Being Shiite, she explains how the ulama/scholars preach that the
infallible Twelfth Imam went on concealment. The Shiite have been suffering under the political
oppression of the unjust awaiting the return of this concealed Imam as savior. “This is stupidity,”
she said, “I questioned this belief and challenged a female scholar but she has no logic. She
believes blindly and does not allow for multiple interpretations.”
This comment on lack of plurality sounds familiar to people who have studied all
religions. Gilsenan reached a similar result:
The text is made esoteric and becomes the special preserve of scholars, who
are self-defined as the only ones who can really understand it. The text becomes
an instrument of authority and a way of excluding others or regulating their
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access to it. It can be used to show that others are wrong and we are right;
what is more, we have the right to be right and they do not! We know (Gilsenan
1982:31).
I asked some of the imams who were interviewed if it was possible for them to discuss
issues such as democracy, elections, political equality with non-Muslims in their
khotbas/sermons. The answer in almost all cases was no. A sheikh from Saudi Arabia said he
could not and no khateeb could do that since “this is the minbar/stand of the Prophet of Allah
and we cannot dare saying what he did not say.”
A sheikh of a well-know mosque in Cairo thought that he could not use the word
democracy in the sermon of Friday. He did give a sermon on shura/mutual consultation and how
it was practiced by the Prophet and his companions. He is convinced that democracy is not like
shura/mutual consultation. Democracy may lead Muslims astray but shura/mutual consultation is
only bounded by Allah’s imperatives.
In a clear example of the influence of this sheikh on his followers, my attempt to show
how democracy has positive sides that may be necessary for Muslims to consider failed. The
three attendees showed clear support for his argument and started quoting verses, mostly out of
their context to condemn the effect of the West on Westernized Muslims like myself.
This statement is reminiscent of a quote by Ahmad Nawafal, a member of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan, who said: “[i]f we have a choice between democracy and dictatorship,
we choose democracy. But if it’s between Islam and democracy, we choose Islam” (Pipes
1995).
Some of the interviewed Muslims tended to defend the role of ulama/scholars as
politically bounded by the autocratic rulers. Many of the interviewees quoted several names of
ulama and sheikhs who have been jailed due to criticizing the rulers or galvanizing the masses
around themselves. This persecution of ulama and sheikhs has hindered their roles as reformists
and increased their roles as conservatives. Thus, the depiction of ulama as responsible for the
continuation of autocracy, at least to some of the interviewees, is like blaming the victims that
they are not powerful enough to defend themselves.
Muslim ulama/scholars have been depicted as either catalysts for autocracy or its
victims. However, they can be part of the solution as well. Take Iran as a test case. Obedience
to unjust rulers and awaiting the concealed imam has been a tradition in the Shiite creed for over
12 centuries. However, this creed was turned upside down when imam Khomeini made
ijtihad/independent reasoning and coined the concept of vilayat-i faqih. This ijtihad it was spelled
out in full in Article Five:
During the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr [i.e., the Twelfth Imam] (may God
hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah devolve
upon the just ['adil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih, who is fully aware of the
circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of
administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office (The
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 5).
This effort on the part of the Iranian ulama/scholars showed that such well-entrenched
concepts and principles can be questioned and eventually altered. This pro-democratic role
played by clerics has been heard of in Catholic societies. The map of the world after WWII did
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not have any single democratic polity in societies with a Catholic majority. Yet by the 1960s,
“the attitudes of Catholic clergy and those victimized by oligarchies and tyrannies” (Karatnycky
2002:105) helped diminish their legitimacy.
One can argue that unless fighting dictatorship becomes prioritized in the public agenda
through the efforts of ulama/scholars and others, the future of democracy in the Muslim world
will be highly contingent on the free will of the ruler.
5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter aims at providing some focused analysis of why some Muslims in the same
society and across societies adopt different or even contradictory attitudes toward the two
dimensions of democracy: hardware and software. To give a general, and definitely less
accurate, description of how Muslims relate to democracy one can differentiate among three
types of variables:
First are variables that consistently furnish more support for democracy across and
within societies in general:
1- With the exception of Saudi Arabia and UAE, the more Muslims get educated, the
more they support democracy holding other variables constant.
2- Muslim Women are more supportive of democracy than men in all Muslim societies
holding other variables constant.
3- Muslims who resided in a democracy for a year or longer endorse democracy more
than Muslims who did not have this experience holding other variables constant.
4- Modernist and liberal Muslims who believe in the compatibility between shura and
democracy strongly furnish support to democracy than those who have doubts about
this compatibility holding other variables constant.
5- Muslims who are not satisfied with the incumbents tend to be more supportive of
democracy holding other variables constant.
6- In most cases, the more Muslims have an experience with political participation through
voting, the more they support democratic hardware and software holding other
variables constant.
Second variables that have contradictory effects across cases:
1- Increasing relative income has a generally positive effect on Muslims’ attitudes toward
democracy in the cases of Albania, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Morocco, , Turkey and the US. More income has the opposite effect on other cases
such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Relatively affluent Muslims of
Jordan are more tolerant but less supportive of democratic mechanisms and
procedures. Kuwaiti relatively affluent Muslims have the opposite trend: support
democratic hardware and less tolerant toward women and minorities.
2- Older people are found to be more supportive of democracy than younger people in the
cases of the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, , Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, and Tunisia, holding all other variables constant. However, older people are
found to be less supportive of democracy in the cases of Bahrain, Iran, Turkey and
USA. Older Muslims of Saudi Arabia and UAE are more tolerant but less supportive of
democratic mechanisms.
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3- More religious people are found to be more supportive of democracy in general than
non-religious people in the cases of Europe, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco,
Senegal, the Sudan, Mali, and Qatar. However, religious people in the cases of Algeria,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Europe, the Gambia, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. More religious Muslims in Oman, Indonesia, and
Europe are more supportive of democratic hardware and less supportive of democratic
software.
4- The trust in the ulama/scholars as credible agent of socialization is associated with
positive support for democracy on the part of Muslims in the Gambia, Mali, Morocco,
Qatar, Senegal and USA. However, this trust of ulama/scholars is associated with
negative support for democracy on the part of Muslims in Albania, Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Yemen. However, this trust in ulama/scholars
leads the Muslims of Europe and Indonesia to more support of democratic hardware
and less support for democratic software.
Third, there are two variables that did not have the expected explanatory power:
1- Blaming the West for the continuation and spread for dictatorships in the Muslims world
and thus refusing it as a credible agent of democratization is so common among proand anti-democracy Muslims alike that it ended up having no statistical effect on the
attitudes of Muslims toward democracy except in the cases of Muslims of the US and
Albania.
2- The attitudes toward political Islam measured by Muslims’ attitudes toward the concept
of Islam as a religion and state are found not to be as helpful in explaining the attitudes
of Muslims toward democratic hardware at all. Yet Islamists who believe in the
previous slogan were found to be less tolerant toward women and minorities in the
cases of Algeria, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan,
UAE and Yemen. Islamists of Turkey, Tunisia India and Egypt are found to be more
tolerant toward women and minorities than non-Islamists.
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VI. THE CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Although there are few points of consensus in modern social science, the incompatibility
of Islam and democracy is a candidate for one of them. Many students of Islam and the Middle
East operate from the implicit if not explicit assumption that Muslims have one creed (Islam),
and thereby one culture and collectively share a disdain for modernity and reject democracy as
a formula of governance.
A thorough reading of the scholarship on Islam and democracy in the West suggests
that most students of Islam and the Middle East resort to theological, juristic and philosophical
arguments to link Islam to autocracy. This scholarship relies mainly on secondary sources when
addressing this relationship and arguably assumes that Muslims are prisoners of an eternal and
uniform culture. In most cases, it is either implicitly or explicitly assumed that this culture hardly
changes or evolves since it is genuinely associated with Muslims' creed. This resistance to
change has been suggested to be the core of the affinity between Islam and autocracy.
This project has addressed a different, though related, empirical puzzle: do the attitudes
of ordinary educated Muslims stand as an obstacle toward the adoption of democracy?
This puzzle calls for empirical/behavioral methodological tools that bring into focus
contemporary Muslims' attitudes rather than ancient jurists' contributions. In other words, the
project tries to shift attention from ancient Islamic texts to contemporary Muslims' mindsets.
Unfortunately, the great majority of Muslim governments do not allow researchers to
conduct empirical research freely in their societies. Thus, the triangulation of different, and
possibly imperfect, methodological tools, such as text and speech analysis of intellectuals'
discourses, surveys of educated Muslims, focus-group discussions and interviews with
intellectual elites, is the most viable and scientifically defensible strategy to color a picture that
has been drawn mainly with a white-black (either/or) brush.
1. Summary of Findings
a. The project has served to debunk the cultural determinism of the typical neo-orientalist
position. Cultural determinism has two major problems: First, it ignores the other factors
that may affect Muslims' attitudes and behaviors, such as individual demographics and
political actors. "It is one thing to argue that culture matters. It is quite another to argue
that it is all that matters" (Sabra 2003). Second, it ignores the diversity inside culture.
Muslim intellectuals, let alone ordinary educated Muslims, are not identical in their
responses to the common concerns that face them, which in turn indicates that Muslims
are the makers of their culture as well. As a result, students of Islam should supplement
their discussion of Muslims' culture with Muslims' sub-cultures.
b. As a corollary, when one tries to respond to Senator McCain's question of “why
authoritarianism is the only game in Muslim towns,” (McCain 2002), one has to be
careful not to resort the easy answer, the purported uniformity and uniqueness of
Muslim culture, as the neo-orientalists would argue. This project has generated sufficient
empirical and systematic evidence to demonstrate that educated Muslims are
heterogeneous enough to defy any one-size-fits-all kind of cultural explanation.
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c. Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars have been found to be part of the problem of
democratization in most Muslim societies due to their uncompromising readings of Islam
and democracy. As Makiya 26 put it, “Instead of recognizing our own fallibility and
frailty, we Arab intellectuals-secular and non-secular alike-have, on the contrary, been
perfecting in the last quarter of a century a different kind of language, one that is
constantly preoccupied with blaming others for problems that are largely-although not
completely-of our own making” (Makiya 2002).
d. It is not true that “[R]eligious traditions are usually constant within societies, they are
variables only across societies” (Fish 2002). This project finds enough variation in
Muslims' attitudes both across societies and within societies to rebut this assertion. A
quick look at tables 3.7, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 clearly illustrates that inside each Muslim
society, no matter how democratic or undemocratic it seems to be, there are
representatives of each sub-culture: traditionalists, modernists, liberals and autocrats.
e. This project shows in a systematic way that not all secular Muslims are liberal, since
some are autocrats, and not all Islamists are anti-democratic traditionalists, since some
are modernists. Traditionalists search for an Islamic government that is not similar or
even close to any other un-Islamic government. This system of government is the
antithesis of what has been known as representative democracy. Modernists search for
a governmental system that is compatible with Islam rather than being idiosyncratically
Islamic. To them most aspects of democracy are compatible with their reading of Islam,
or at least Islamizable. Secularists do not pay heed to Islamic justifications of any sort of
government since Islam, like other religions, is subject to plural interpretations.
f. At the level of society, a Muslim society would score highest on the democratic
hardware and software scales and thus be potentially democratizable if:
g. The distribution of attitudes indicates that autocrats and traditionalists are in the minority
and modernist Islamists and liberal secularists are in the majority.
h. There is a majority of Muslims who are ideologically liberal in the sense that they accept
the existence of political parties even if they endorse opposing ideologies.
i. There is a majority of Muslims who have negative attitudes toward the undemocratically
elected incumbents.
j. There is a majority of Muslims who are ready to publicly demand and sacrifice for their
political rights.
k. There is a majority of Muslims who do not adopt utopian ideas about what government
can or should be and, thus, accept a democratic system of government.
l. The traditionalist narrative is but one narrative and is actually in the minority in most
Muslim societies. Saudi, Yemeni, Sudanese, Pakistani and Nigerian societies are the
most plagued with this inherently anti-democratic narrative. Thus, these societies'
political cultures are clear obstacles to democratization. While not all traditionalists are
ready to use violence against their societies or rulers, the danger of violent traditionalists
comes from the fact that they, no matter how few they are, can put the whole
democratic transition and demands for democracy on hold. In Muslim countries such as
26

Kanan Makiya is the Iraqi expatriate author of Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny and Uprising in the
Arab World (1993) and The Republic of Fear (1989) under the pseudonym Samir Al Khalil.
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Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and the Sudan, where the roots
of democratic praxis and norms are still nascent, violence gives the autocratic
governments of the region the pretext to tighten freedoms, impose martial law, violate
basic rights and claim the incompatibility between democracy and their societies. It is
noteworthy that the democratic transition can continue even if violence erupts. Actually,
it is argued that democratization can help lessening tension and violence. Spain pressed
on its democratization process despite all the violence committed by ETA (Linz and
Stepan 1996).
Some Muslim societies exhibit public claims for internalizing democracy in the Muslim
world. These societies have a majority of modernist Islamists and/or liberal secularists.
Turkey, USA, EU, Albania, India, Malaysia, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia, Iran, Egypt and
Morocco have enough pro-democratic Muslims. In these societies, it is difficult to argue
that culture stands as an obstacle toward democracy. If these societies are still under
autocratic governance, the evidence suggests that one should search for non-cultural
reasons for why they do not democratize.
Some Muslim societies, despite the existence of a relatively strong traditionalist
discourse, have had some liberal and modernist intellectual elites that inject democratic
norms in the Muslim mind. The evidence suggests that some societies are in a transition
stage to accept, but not yet to internalize, democratic norms such as Qatar, Bahrain,
Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, the Gambia, Lebanon, Turkmenistan, Kuwait,
Syria, Egypt and Bangladesh. However, others are still in the state of norm-emergence
such as the Sudan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Tajikistan.
The Islamist ideology is embraced by the absolute majority in all 32 societies with the
exception of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Mali, Tunisia, Albania and Turkey (Table 3.7).
This result indicates two important lessons: 1) At least in the short to medium run, no
democracy can emerge with the marginalization of Islam as a source of political ideology
or Islamists as political actors. 2) Free and fair elections in most of Muslim countries
would lead Islamists to power, holding other variables constant.
A notable observation should be made regarding the gigantic gap between Muslim
rulers and Muslim publics as showed in Table 3.11. This gap can be described as a
legitimacy crisis. In other words, if Muslims were given the opportunity to change their
rulers, they generally would do so. Other surveys confirm the same results. Though
some Muslim rulers are committed to the coexistence between Israeli and Palestinian
states, a Pew survey found that 90 percent, 85 percent, 85 percent, and 72 percent of
citizens of Morocco, Jordan, Palestinian, and Kuwait, respectively, disagree with their
governments' official positions (Borting 2003). Though the attitude toward Israel is not
the only reason for the crises of legitimacy, the previous statistics demonstrate the gaps
among the rulers and the masses.
Assuming that the only way for Muslims to achieve democracy is through mass-led
series of demonstrations, strikes and public demands following the East European paths
toward democracy, the prospects for democracy do not seem promising in Arab
countries in general comparing to Muslim non-Arab countries such as Iran, Turkey and
Mali, as demonstrated in Table 3.12. On average the elasticity of demand for
democracy among Arabs is much higher than among non-Arab Muslims.
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r. The individual-level analysis aims at explaining why Muslims, who live in the same
society, adopt different or even contradictory attitudes toward democracy. The
variables that shape Muslims' attitudes across societies can be divided into three types:
First, variables that consistently furnish more support for democracy across and
within societies in general:
a. With the exception of Saudi Arabia and UAE, the more Muslims get educated, the
more they support democracy, holding other variables constant.
b. Muslim women are more supportive of democracy than men in all Muslim societies,
holding other variables constant.
c. Muslims who resided in a democracy for a year or longer endorse democracy more
than Muslims who did not have this experience, holding other variables constant.
d. Modernist and liberal Muslims who believe in the compatibility between shura and
democracy strongly support democracy compared to those who have doubts about this
compatibility, holding other variables constant.
e. Muslims who are not satisfied with the incumbents tend to be more supportive of
democracy, holding other variables constant.
f. In most cases, the more Muslims have an experience with political participation through
voting, the more they support democratic hardware and software, holding other
variables constant.
Second, variables that have contradictory effects across cases:
a. Increasing relative income has a generally positive effect on Muslims’ attitudes toward
democracy in the cases of Albania, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Morocco, Turkey and the US. More income has the opposite effect on other cases
such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Relatively affluent Muslims of
Jordan are more tolerant but less supportive of democratic mechanisms and
procedures. Kuwaiti relatively affluent Muslims have the opposite trend: they support
democratic hardware but are less tolerant toward women and minorities.
b. Older people are found to be more supportive of democracy than younger people in the
cases of the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, and Tunisia, holding all other variables constant. However, older people are
found to be less supportive of democracy in the cases of Bahrain, Iran, Turkey and
USA. Older Muslims of Saudi Arabia and UAE are more tolerant but less supportive of
democratic mechanisms.
c. More religious people are found to be more supportive of democracy in general than
non-religious people in the cases of Europe, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco,
Senegal, the Sudan, Mali, and Qatar. However, religious people in the cases of Algeria,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Europe, the Gambia, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. More religious Muslims in Oman, Indonesia, and
Europe are more supportive of democratic hardware and less supportive of democratic
software.
d. The trust in the ulama/scholars as credible agents of socialization is associated with
positive support for democracy on the part of Muslims in the Gambia, Mali, Morocco,
Qatar, Senegal and USA. However, this trust of ulama/scholars is associated with
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negative support for democracy on the part of Muslims in Albania, Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Yemen. However, this trust in ulama/scholars
leads the Muslims of Europe and Indonesia to more support of democratic hardware
and less support for democratic software.
Third, there are two variables that did not have the expected explanatory power:
a. Blaming the West for the continuation and spread for dictatorships in the Muslims world
and thus refusing it as a credible agent of democratization is so common among proand anti-democratic Muslims alike that it ended up having no statistical effect on the
attitudes of Muslims toward democracy except in the cases of Muslims of the US and
Albania.
b. The attitudes toward political Islam measured by Muslims’ attitudes toward the concept
of Islam as a religion and state were not found to be helpful in explaining the attitudes of
Muslims toward democratic hardware at all. Yet Islamists who believe in Islam as a
religion and state were found to be less tolerant toward women and minorities in the
cases of Algeria, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan,
UAE and Yemen. Islamists of Turkey, Tunisia, India and Egypt are found to be more
tolerant toward women and minorities than non-Islamists.
2. Policy Recommendations
If one wants to summarize the whole cultural map of Muslim societies regarding the
issue of democracy and autocracy, it is safe to say that there are two broad types of subcultures in the Muslim world: the culture of "dictatorship, but…"27 and the culture of
"democracy-as-a-must." The former is the sub-culture of two groups of Muslims: 1)
Traditionalist Islamists who argue that a just autocratic ruler who abides by sharia/Islamic
legislation and defends its tenets is the most legitimate ruler of all. 2) Autocratic secularists who
argue in favor of a Hobbesian ruler who maintains the state's sovereignty and defends it against
its foreign and internal enemies. In both cases, Muslims behave as rational actors who find that
the advantages of having an autocratic ruler outweigh having a democratically elected one.
The "democracy-as-a-must" sub-culture is the one that is adopted by modernist
Islamists and liberal secularists. Modernist Islamists treat democracy, as far it does not
contradict the clear-cut taboos of Islam, as a vehicle to fight dictatorship and ensure pluralism in
society. Liberal secularists argue that democracy is the core component of modernity that
should be adopted on secular grounds.
Democracy has no future in Muslim societies unless the "democracy-as-a-must" subculture becomes the dominant culture. "Democracy must triumph in theory before it can be
realized in practice. Muslims must widely and unambiguously accept that Islam and democracy
are compatible and that meaningful faith requires freedom" (Khan 2003).
There are some practical lessons to be learned from this project to make "democracyas-a-must" sub-culture dominant:
27

"Dictatorship, but…" refers to the type of culture that permits benevolent dictatorship such as stating
that Nasser of Egypt was dictator but he was pan-Arabist and true socialist and so on.
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First, advocates of democracy in the Muslim world should make more efforts to Islamize
democracy rather than democratizing Islam. Islamizing democracy is a philosophical, theological
and juristic endeavor that aims at finding Islamic roots for democratic norms and praxis. Many
sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohamed can be endorsed as the Islamic roots of majority
rule, moral and political equality of women and non-Muslims, obligatory shura, and the
eradication of apathy and "dictatorship, but…" culture.
However,
many
secularists
adopted
a
self-defeating
strategy
by
democratizing/secularizing Islam through distorting Islamists' image, debunking ulamas' roles,
copying Western experiences, implanting secular solutions and heightening the intellectual civil
war. This process has been perceived by many Muslims as a Western attack on their legacy
and identity. Using Islamic teachings to reform Muslims' culture sounds like the most feasible
strategy in most of the societies studied in this project.
Rachid al-Ghannouchi (1996), the founder of the Tunisian Islamic movement, al-Nahda,
believes that:
Once the Islamists are given a chance to comprehend the values of Western
modernity, such as democracy and human rights, they will search within Islam
for a place for these values where they implant them, nurse them, and cherish
them just as the Westerners did before, when they implanted such values in a
much less fertile soil.
The process of Islamization of democracy is based on three assumptions:
First, democratic norms and praxis are not entirely Western. They are the mankind’s
shared efforts to fight despots and tyrants anywhere and anytime. Muslims have made their
contribution to this goal by emphasizing the values of unity, respect for order, equality, peaceful
coexistence and pluralism in addition to their effort to abolish slavery and emancipate humanity
throughout its history.
Second, “Wisdom is the goal of the believer, wherever he/she finds it, he/she should
learn it” as Prophet Mohamed said. Early Muslims did not find it anti-Islamic to learn systems of
administration from the Persians, irrigation from the Egyptians, and philosophy from the Greeks.
They can learn from others what they lack without necessarily finding it anti-Islamic.
Third, Muslims’ experience with governance was distorted due to the mis-governance
of corrupt rulers under the Ottoman Empire and European colonialism. Democratic impulses
began to escalate in Europe in the early 18th century onward, which was the period during
which most Muslim countries began to fall under the colonial control of the Europeans who
distorted the class structures and cultural priorities of Muslim societies. Thus, the best way to
correct for this historical lapse is to catch up and learn what Muslims should have authentically
invented or developed.
The second lesson pertains to the importance of the actors' behavior in creating the
"democracy-as-a-must-culture." Students of democracy have debated which variables have
supremacy in regard to explaining successful democratic transitions: crafting (actors’ behavior)
or prerequisites (contextual variables). The advocates of crafting school underscore the
importance of the political actors who have the commitment and skills to minimize their powers
and to maximize the powers of the electorate. The pre-requisites school emphasizes the
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importance of certain values that need to exist no matter how committed the elite are to values
of democracy. These values are mainly associated with a secular reading of religion and its role
in public life and the level of development of each society. It is said that “virtually all of the nonoil-producing high income or upper-middle-income counties, with the exception of Singapore,
are democratic” (Huntington 1996b). Almost all countries considerably influenced by the West,
with the exception of Cuba, Pakistan and Algeria, are democratic.
This study suggests that political actors and cultural entrepreneurs have specific tasks to
play in building the necessary blocks toward "democracy-as-a-must" culture.
a. Role of Ulama
There have always been lively debates within the Islamic tradition on who has the
historical right to interpret Islam and its teachings (Wright 1992). This historical, and possibly
eternal, debate is settled in the minds of most educated Muslims who trust independent over
official ulama/scholars and ulama/scholars in general over intellectuals in most Muslim societies.
This trust of ulama/scholars as agents of democratization has been particularity clear in the
significant effect of Muslims' perception of democracy as an extension of shura on their support
of democracy.
Esposito eloquently characterized the challenge ahead for Muslim ulama/scholars and
intellectuals:
“A major issue in democratization in Muslim societies is whether or not
scholars and leaders have successfully made the transition from listing
'democratic doctrines of Islam' to creating coherent theories and structures of
Islamic democracy that are not simply reformulations of Western perceptions in
some Muslim idioms" (Esposito 1996).
The effort of the 80-year-old sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi of Egypt is one of the most
successful attempts to Islamize democracy. His book on the Fiqh of Islamic State (2001a) is a
notable attempt to demonstrate the Islamic underpinnings of democracy in the Sunni Muslim
world. This book has been often quoted by other modernist ulama/scholars and intellectuals in
their books, booklets, and sermons. It has given informal permission to many other
ulama/scholars to use the originally alien word of "democracy" without necessarily referring to it
by its equivalent Islamic references such as (popular) shura/mutual consultation.
Al-Qaradawi's attempt, along with others, has made democracy acceptable by many
Muslims, but it is still not perceived as a must. In contrast, waging jihad against Israel or
American troops in Iraq or Afghanistan is a must according to all modernists.28 Thus, a Muslim
who dies while waging this type of jihad believes s/he will go to heaven. But there is no such
emphasis on jihad against dictatorships in their rhetoric (seeEl-Affendi 2001).
Take Syria as a case-study. In 2000, ninety-nine Syrian intellectuals published a
demand for greater democracy and freedom of expression in a rare, direct appeal for political
reform in Syria. The petition calls the Syrian government to join the world's "common language"
of democracy "by expanding civil liberties, liberalizing press freedoms and releasing political
28

Pacifist traditionalists and modernists would not use violence against their own rulers or societies but can
do so against colonial powers.
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prisoners" (Schneider 2000). One can argue, based on the findings of the current research, if
this petition for democracy is signed and aggressively endorsed by ulama/scholars, the popular
pressure over the Syrian government would have been substantially augmented. Without
aggressive support on the part of the ulama/scholars, these petitions for democracy will be
perceived by most Muslims as elitists' demands for their own narrow interests.
Out of 7829 audio-tapes available at islamway.com and islamweb.net, I found only 15
tapes that attack dictatorship in the Muslim world. One tape, by Yusuf al-Qaradawi with the
title of Democracy in Islam, explicitly defends democracy, universal suffrage, elections, voting
and representative government as a full package. Unfortunately, the attempts of ulama/scholars
to Islamize democracy are still few in number and shallow in effect. Another tape is by Sheikh
Sa’id Marrawi, most likely from Syria, who was critical of democracy. However, he referred to
one possible positive thing. It is better than dictatorship. “No Islam and no freedom is worse
than no Islam with freedom.”
The scarcity of audio-tapes that that seek to Islamize democracy may be partially
explained by the positions of autocratic governments. Such governments attack these attempts
as a part of the Islamists' propaganda to hijack the disposable democracy of one-man, onevote, one-time. However, optimistic researches perceive the attempts to Islamize democracy
as a gradual Aggiornamento (following the Vatican II) to reform Islamic discourses (Ansary
2003). It is gradual in the sense that a greater number of ulama/scholars and Islamic thinkers do
not try to discard traditional religious (wrong) doctrines but to re-interpret them under the lights
of modern needs.
b. The Role of the US
Especially after the events of September 11th, understanding Islam and Muslims has
become a matter of national security for the US. The war on terrorism, in return, has been seen
as an American crusade against Muslim countries. Several surveys have shown that the US is
seen as a real danger by Muslims and the US should be fought. For instance, more than 70
percent of Muslims in Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Palestine
are disappointed that the Iraqis did not fight the US invasion and support the military operations
against American troops in Iraq (Borting 2003).
This project shows that the US emphasis on democratization is perceived by most
Muslims as part of its crusade against Islam.
The distrust of the US surpasses all ideological,
demographic and societal differences in the Muslim world. It is the only variable that is so
invariant that it explains nothing in the variation in attitudes among Muslims toward democracy in
any Muslim society.
However, the war on terrorism has taught students of Islam and the Middle East some
lessons:
First, despite the difficulty of transplanting a Madisonian democracy into the desert of
the Muslim world without careful understanding of Muslim culture, the pressure for democracy
has increased Muslims' self-criticism. The campaign against the religion that systematically
produces terrorism according to Western media, the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
made the Arab and Muslims shudder. It certainly gave Muslim intellectuals and activists more
grounds for the criticizing the status quo and those responsible for it. Iraq in the mind of the
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region's intellectuals is not an outlier. All Muslim countries can be Iraq if they challenge US
interests (al-Khouri 2003).
One intellectual likened the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in
1798. The French invasion of Egypt awakened Egypt and the Middle East from the mentality of
the middle ages. Likewise, the US invasion of Iraq poses another challenge to the embalmed
totalitarian ideologies of the region, mainly pan-Arabism and Islamic fundamentalism (Saleh
2004).
Second, the US can prevent Muslims from doing certain things but cannot force them to
do others. In other words, the US has the capacity to usher the camel to the lake but cannot
force it to drink. For instance, the US exerted enough pressure on the Pakistani government to
stop the 20,000 self-funded Madrassas but it cannot force the Pakistani population to be
tolerant toward each other or to actively participate in free and fair elections which, in Pakistan,
they do not have to begin with.
The experience of the past two years indicates that the US cannot create real democrats
on the ground, but it can put the autocratic Muslim regimes on the defensive. It moved from the
cell of "do nothing" to correct for the misgovernance of "our" allies to the cell of "something
should be done." Yet tough choices should be made: "Between the realist's option of 'do
nothing' and the romantic's option of "elections now" lies a third path -- gradual yet persistent
liberalization" (Mustafa and Makovsky 2003).
The US can increase its demands for democracy in the Muslim world by getting
engaged in a dialogue with the liberal secularists and modernist Islamists who can themselves
pressure the rulers for democratization. Yet the US should make a clear commitment that its
invasion of Iraq is an exceptional decision that will not occur in any other cases. Muslims in
general would not accept democracy under the American flag.
c. The Role of Rulers
It was argued that the lack of democracy in Arab and Muslim societies cannot be
attributed only to non-democratic rulers but to the characteristics of the culture in general. Some
anecdotes have been used to support the cultural argument. For example, the Kuwaiti
parliament prevented women from voting and the anti-Semitic tone that prevails in the
uncensored programs of Al-Jazeera TV station (Zakaria 2001).
In a non-deterministic vision of the future of democracy in the Muslim world, Zakaria
(2001) proposes that democracy is possible in Arab/Muslim countries if an autonomous private
sector leads society toward modernism. As a result, he advises the U.S. to focus more on
private sector development in these countries. The assumption here is that capitalism somehow
will lead to or facilitate democracy.
Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the economic ramifications of political
misgovernment in Muslim countries. These ramifications had many catastrophic results on the
economic landscape in all Muslim societies, with the exception of Malaysia and UAE. This
study shows how Muslims themselves blame their rulers for their plight. Macro-economic
indicators as well support this argument. For instance, in the early 1970s, the GDP per capita in
the Arab Gulf states was less than $1,000 yet it jumped to $12,000 in late 1970s due to the
sharp increase in oil prices. Nowadays it is around $10,000 (yet the discrepancy increased
between $20,000 in UAE and less than $10,000 in Saudi Arabia). A quick comparison with
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South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore shows that their GDP per capita increased from $740,
$1,132 and $3,040 to $15,530, $20,500 and $22,300 respectively (World Bank 2001).
A Saudi political scientist argues that Muslim rulers in general set up their political
agenda on the assumption that the economic realm should be dependent upon their political
agenda which is in turn a function of their self-survival strategies (Al-Hamad 2003). In short, the
flourishing of private sector in the Muslims world will be faced with all the problems of
nepotism, corruption and lack of law that are mainly the wrongdoing of the autocratic
governments.
However, this analysis should not lead to the hasty conclusion that getting rid of the
autocratic rulers is always and instantly good. Although autocratic rulers in most Muslim
countries are illegitimate in the eyes of their own people, one should not assume that their
sudden and abrupt absence means transition toward democracy. This was the assumption of the
"shock and awe" strategy adopted in the Operation Iraqi Freedom. In other words, it was
assumed that Iraq was Iraq because of Saddam and Afghanistan was Afghanistan because of
the Taliban. Consequently, it was presumed that once Saddam and the Taliban were ousted,
Iraq and Afghanistan would become democracies. The experiences of the last three years in
Afghanistan and Iraq teach us that Saddam was Saddam because of Iraq and the Taliban were
the Taliban because of Afghanistan. In other words, for a ruler to hold a country such as Iraq or
Afghanistan together, he should be like Saddam or Taliban (and exclude the possibility of being
Madison).
The collapse of the state institutions in Afghanistan, Iraq and, for that matter, Somalia,
after ousting Taliban, Saddam and Barre is not a mere coincidence. There are structural and
cultural factors behind these three incidents. In most Muslim countries, the authority of individual
rulers, legitimacy of regimes and sovereignty/unity of states are inextricably interwoven.
Sudden and abrupt shifts in power in almost all countries of the region will not only
diminish the authority of the rulers but also threaten the legitimacy of the regimes (thus the
structure of power) and imperil the unity of the states themselves. This is exactly what happened
in Somalia immediately after the overthrow of President M. S. Barre in Jan. 1991, Taliban in
2001 and later in Iraq after ousting Saddam Hussein from office in 2003. The absence of
Saddam Hussein meant no Ba'thist regime and endangered the unity of Iraq as a state. If the
U.S. presses for similar abrupt shifts in power in Saudi Arabia for instance, this will likely affect
not only the persons who currently hold power but the whole legitimacy of the Saudi family and
the whole unity of the Saudi state with its current borders. Save for Egypt and Tunisia which
have very solid social fabrics, this analysis can be applied to almost all other Muslim countries.
Thus, though most incumbents are not legitimate and can be easily removed from
power, they are functional in holding the societies with overlapping cleavages together.
3. Limitations of the Project
The results of this project should be understood within the limitations of the sample. These
limitations can be characterized in two aspects.
1- One-snapshot Project
This data is at best a snapshot of the attitudes of educated Muslims between the age of
18 and 50 during the period from May 2002 and August 2002. In other words it is not a
longitudinal study that captures dynamics. Consequently, it does not speak for Muslims after five
164

years or so. Political cultures are social organisms that dynamically mutate and evolve in
response to socio-political events and challenges (Berger 1989; Catterberg 1991; Lasser
1996). Political culture is analogically like an old person who moves very slowly in response to
the events and incentives that occur around him/her. Many events in the Muslim world call for
further investigation of Muslims' political culture. Take Saudi Arabia as a case study. In postSeptember 11th Saudi Arabia, “the word Islah (reform) has become on all lips.” (al-Fassi
2003). Saudi officials declare specific steps toward initiating the public participation in the
Kingdom. Prince Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz (deputy prime minister of Saudi Arabia) promises real
political reforms. He states that he refuses the notorious 99 percent election results other Arab
countries. According to him, "manipulating elections is the easiest thing the kingdom can do."
His brother Crown Prince Abdullah promised expanding the role of the Shura Council
and raising the bar of accountability and transparency (al-Sharq al-Awssat, June 9, 2003). The
Saudi royal family promised the first local elections in the year 2004. A national dialogue under
the auspices of the Crown Prince has started in response to many written and oral petitions by
Saudi academicians, modernist Islamists, liberal ni tellectuals, business men and women, and
leaders of tribes. A famous petition signed by 100 Saudi public figures in January 2003
specifically asked for political, bureaucratic and economic reforms with a clear emphasis on
crafting a written constitution for the Kingdom instead of the claim that the Qura'an is the
constitution.
Another petition in April 2003 signed by 450 public figures including many Shiite
Muslims asks for equality between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in top executive and legislative
positions in addition to more freedoms for them to practice their religion.
The royal family established the Institution of King Abdul Aziz for National Dialogue to
institutionalize the demands for reform. Though practically speaking nothing happened on the
political landscape of the Kingdom, it is clear that the demands for reform have come on the
public agenda of the masses and elite as well (Abo Taleb 2004).
The Saudi royal family knows that the cost of oppression has become extremely high for
domestic and external reasons. The fact that fifteen out of the nineteen perpetrators of the
September 11th attack were Saudi citizens put the Saudi society and state on the defense. The
Saudi version of Islam, known in the West as Wahabism, has become under attack. Saudi
Arabia is changing. The famous claim that since Saudi Arabia was never colonialized it thus
possesses the pure and authentic reading (since it was never contaminated by the influence of
the west), is diminishing.
Domestic developments as well make many Saudis, actually many Muslims, see the
benefits and freedoms of globalization without benefiting them. The majority of Saudis are welleducated and have access to a substantial amount of available websites and satellite dishes.
"My mother didn't go to any school at all, because then there were no girls' schools at all," A
Saudi female physician said. "My older sister, who is 20 years older than me, she went up to the
sixth grade and then quit, because the feeling was that a girl only needs to learn to read and
write. Then I went to college and medical school on scholarship to the States. My daughter,
maybe she'll be president, or an astronaut" (Kristof 2002c).
The same can be said about so many other countries that have been facing changing
challenges. Turkey with an Islamist party in power is introducing a new model that deserves to

165

be studied. This model has been labeled: "religious or pious secularism" and is suggested to be
the exemplar for Iraq (Gawad 2003).
The unpopular decisions taken by the Assembly of Guardians in Iran is creating more
tension among young men and women who are not ready to sacrifice their freedoms due to
excessively conservative interpretations of some debatable and controversial verses,
hadiths/sayings or fatwas/religious verdicts of grand imams.
2- Big-Picture Project
This project is not about any specific country or society. It is about 32 Muslim societies
in comparison to each other. This broad sample of societies means that one has to sacrifice
complexity and nuance for the sake of comparability and generality. "An appreciation of
complexity sacrifices generality; an emphasis on generality encourages a neglect of complexity.
It is difficult to have both" (Ragin 1987:54).
That is why it is important for future research to take a smaller number of cases to strike
a different balance between generality and complexity. The existing survey, or at least something
similar, will allow researchers to compare and generalize. By using the same survey again, Islam
and Middle East researchers can obtain panel-data that would eventually help create an Islamic
barometer to gauge developments in Muslims' political culture.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
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1. Ahl al-hal wa al-‘aqd: the people who have the power of contract with the ruler. The vast
majority of Muslim jurists argued more pragmatically that ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd are those
who possess the necessary shawka (power or strength) to insure the obedience or, in the
alternative, the consent of the public.
2. Al-Muraja'at: is a sect of Islam that was known for postponing the final verdict of a sin
doer until the Day of Judgment. Traditionalists criticize modernists since a typical modernist
would not kill an apostate but just advise him/them to repent.
3. Al-salaf al-saleh: The pious predecessors. Al-salaf al-saleh is a concept used to refer to
the early companions of the prophet and traditionalists tend to extend it to all ancient
scholars who spent their lives studying and preaching Islam.
4. Al-Tawheed: monotheism
5. Al-wala' wa al-bara'a: alliance to Muslims and disloyalty to non-Muslims
6. 'Aqeeda: creed
7. Bay'a: (or Bay'ah) is an oath of allegiance to the ruler on the condition that he obeys
Allah’s sharia.
8. Bed'a: (or Bid'a) man made innovated practices introduced in the religion of Allah. The
Prophet stated that: “every Bid' a is a deviation from the true path and every deviation leads
to Hellfire.”
9. Caliph: (or Khalif) Successor. A title formerly given to a Muslim political leadership of the
umma.
10. Da'wa: (or Dawa) inviting Muslims and non-Muslims to a better understanding of Islam.
11. Fatwas: Religious verdicts A legal verdict given on a religious basis. the sources on which a
fatwa is based are the Holy Qur'an and hadiths/saying of the Prophet.
12. Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence or he science of ascertaining the precise terms of the
sharia/Islamic legislation.
13. Fitnah: internal divisions or civil strife
14. Hadith: (singular of ahadiths) which are the sayings of the prophet Mohamed. After his
death, the hadiths were tested for accuracy and collected into organized bodies of material.
Hadiths of the pophet are second in authority to the Qur'an.
15. Hodod: (or Hudud) The limits ordained by Allah and Islamic penal code.
16. Ijma': A consensus view among Muslims especially of Muslim ulama/scholars on any
Islamic principle.
17. Ijtihad: independent reasoning or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered
by the Qur'an or the hadiths.
18. Ikhtlaf: Differences and divisions of opinions on religious matters. Such diversity is
permissible as long as the basic principles of Islam are not affected. It is the opposite of
ijma'/consensus.
19. Imam: A person who leads the prayer, a Muslim Khalifa or a famous Muslim scholar in
fiqh.
20. Jahilliyya: (or Jahiliyyah and Jahiliyah) the state of ignorance such as the pre-Islamic era
that preceded the revelation of the Qur'an.
21. Kharijite: (or Kharijies) Used to refer to dissidents or outsiders. Its root goes to a group of
Muslims who turned against Ali (the fourth Caliph) and killed him while praying.
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22. Khateebs: (or Khatibs) preachers at mosques.
23. Khiraj: (or Kharaj) properties of the nations Muslims occupy or tax imposed on the
revenue from land taken from non-Muslims to ensure their equal rights under Islamic law.
24. Madhab: sub-tradition and school of fiqh/jurisprudence.
25. Mutazila: (or Mutzilah) the term applies to members of a theological school that flourished
in Basra and Baghdad in the 8th–10th century. The Mutazila were the first Muslims to use
the categories and methods of Hellenistic philosophy to derive their dogma. The tenets of
their faith included the oneness of God, free will and responsibility for one's actions, and the
justice of God and the consequent inevitability of reward in heaven or punishment in hell.
Their doctrine of a created (as opposed to eternal) Quran held sway (827–49), but was
ultimately abandoned. Mutazili beliefs were disavowed by Sunni Muslims but accepted by
Shiites
26. Qiyas: analogical reasoning and considered by most ulama/scholars as the fourth source of
fiqh/jurisprudence by Sunni scholars (after the Qur'an, hadiths and ijma’). Shiite scholars
accept the first three but instead of the Qiyas, they emply ‘aql or reason (i.e. cost benefit
analysis).
27. Sadd al-dhari‘ah: blocking the means to illegality. This principle means the lawmaker
and/or ulama could claim that behavior that is lawful ought to be considered unlawful
because it leads to the commission of illegal acts.
28. Sharia: (or Shariah) Islamic legislation. The revealed and the canonical laws of the religion
of Islam.
29. Sheikhs or imams: (or Shaikh) is a title or a nickname for an elderly person or a religious
leader in a community. This title is also given to a wise person. It is used here to refer to the
leaders of prayers
30. Shura: mutual consultation to Islamist modernists it is Islam’s equivalent to Western
democracy.
31. Taqlid: Imitating and emulating the salaf or the predecessors in their praxis and opinions.
32. Umma: (or ummah) the Islamic nation or community regardless of political borders,
languages or ethnicities.
33. Waqf: Endowment. A charitable trust in the Name of Allah, usually in perpetuity, and
usually for the purposes of establishing the Deen of Islam, teaching useful knowledge,
feeding the poor or treating the sick.
34. Zandaqqa: heresy can be traced back to the early Abbasid era to depict any deviation
from the authentic central understanding of Islam as understood during the prophet’s life and
the 40 years after his death. In the second century of Islam (8th century A.D.) many of the
Farsi (nominal) Muslims declared Islam while kept practicing their own traditional (unIslamic) rituals. All these practices were described as religious zandaqqa yet when these
same people rebelled against the central authority the word has gained political connotation.
It is important to keep in mind that since there is no religious structure in Islam analogous to
the Catholic Church, the allegations of zandaqqa remained very political, selective and
partial.
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The research question of this project focuses on the attitudes of ordinary Muslims. It
requires, consequently, obtaining first-hand data from Muslims. To do that, the researcher had
three possible choices. First, drop the idea of the survey and obtain secondary sources.
Second, drop all sensitive, and necessarily serious, questions. Third, target the individuals who
have enough education to respond to a written survey about such politically sensitive issues.
The third option was the most viable both for logistical and theoretical reasons.
Practically, convincing educated Muslims to participate in a survey about politics with serious
questions was doable comparing to do the same thing with illiterate Muslims. Second, the
educated Muslims are important because they are politically the most relevant and they harbor
most if not all demands for democratic reforms for the future. That is why any response or
discussion with non-educated Muslims, thought rare, were tossed away.
Another issue was related to how to approach the educated Muslims. Written and
telephone surveys are the most famous ways for surveying people in open societies. The issue of
the reliability of these two tools were raised given the sensitivity of the questions asked. After
consulting with a number of area experts, the face-to-face written surveys were preferred over
telephone surveys for two reasons: first there will be the possibility of explaining to the
respondents any questions. Second, there will be the possibility of having focus group
discussions with some of the respondents to add depth to the survey through discussing certain
questions and explore further attitudes that are not captured by the written survey.
However, many observers and participants in the pilot study commented that in some
countries, the respondents will still think that their responses will be monitored by government
agents and thus they will be reluctant to reflect their actual attitudes. Beside, restrict anonymity
and verbal assurances before handing in the surveys, two other solutions to this potential
problem are used. First, whenever and wherever possible the surveys were administered by
native academicians and research centers who are both perceived as trustworthy and not
known for working for governments’ agents.
Second, there should have been another systematic tool to check for the impact of the
suspicion of governmental surveillance. Another survey administered through the web by
emailing Muslims the URL of a website and asking them to respond to the same identical
questions of the written survey was developed to reflect. Technically, this kind of web-based
survey is drawn from a non-probabilistic controlled-quota sample in the sense that there is no
known probability for the possibility of including all Muslims who have access to the Internet
into the frame of respondents. However, some non-probabilistic can be more representative
than others if there are known possible sources of biases.
Obtaining survey responses from two different tools poses a methodological challenge
and provides a methodological opportunity to examine the efficiency of the two tools as well.
Theoretically, there can be one of two broad scenarios: 1) The two tools are in conflict mainly
due to the fact that Muslims who have access to the Internet are a homogenous group of
Muslims who think alike and thus are not representative of the broader population of educated
Muslims. 2) The two tools are complementary in gauging Muslims’ attitude since both pooled
samples are drawn from the same population.
It is found that there are no statistically significant differences between the attitudes of Muslims
who responded to the written and web-based surveys
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To test these two broad scenarios, a question about how many times a week the respondents to
the written survey have access to Internet was added. ANOVA has not reported significant
differences between the means of those who have daily access to the Internent and those who
do not have access to the Internet. To confirm the previous finding, ANOVA was used against
to compare the responses from the two samples regarding the questions relevant to the purpose
of this dissertation. Again, no statistical difference was found in all cases. As a third step to
confirm the complement of both tool, preliminary regression analysis was utilized to make sure
that the demographics do not have contradictory effects based on the tool used. Except for age,
there was no difference between the coefficients obtained from the web-based survey and the
written survey.
This lack of significant discrepancies can be explained by the fact that, the two tools (the web
and written surveys) targeted almost the same population of urban, educated and non-poor
Muslims. Yet ANOVA suggests that most respondents were less self-restraint in their criticism
of their governments and support for elected accountable governments in the web-based survey
comparing to the written one which may be explained by the freedom of expression they enjoy
in cyberspace comparing to written surveys.
This finding has been confirmed by the fact that with the exception of question number 2.24 that
reads: “Do you think that Muslim countries should have democratic rulers instead of the current
political rulers?” The respondents to the web-based survey were significantly more critical of
their rulers than the respondents to the written survey and the focus group discussions in Saudi
Arabia, the Sudan and Libya.
a. Web-administered Survey
Literature on web-administered surveys raises concerns regarding technical problems
and representation problems. The technical problems are centered on “the lack of
standardization among operating systems, servers, and browsers.” (Smith 2002) Smith noted in
her paper that “browser incompatibility problem” was among the most challenging problem in
using web-based survey. However, it seems that this problem has become less relevant in the
advancement of severs protocols and the standardization of HTML and JAVA programming
(Pitkow and Kehoe 1999).
With this kind of technological progress29, other measures are highly recommended.
Those measures include reliable server to save the data and well-organized plan of sending out
emails and putting the pop-up ads in a relatively long span of time to prevent web-conjuncture.
Pilot examination of the server and the mechanism of sending out emails (either through web cgi
script or Mailto Action) and pre-testing of their reliability is a highly recommended measure in
this regard (Kennedy, 2000) .
I followed those technical recommendations and depend upon the free survey suite of
University of Virginia that has been recommended to me by professor David Hartmann of
Sociology department and the director of Kercher Center for Social Research at WMU. He

29

The technological progress has gone into three directions: “the adoption engine, the user interface, and
the server interface” (Colleen and Pitkow. 1996).
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uses this service quite often and assures me that it is quite reliable. Besides, I have already pretested it and showed great convenience and reliability.
Some other problems may occur due to the attempts of some people of submitting their
responses more than once. The literature suggests tracking users through identifying their ISP’s
and limit the responses coming from one ISP to one respondent (Dillman 2000). This solution is
not practical for this project’s purposes due to the absolute anonymity promised to the
respondents and required by HSIRB-WMU. Besides there is always the possibility that more
than one person responds from the same computer. A case of a whole family responding from
the same ISP or people who use internet cafés are two expected cases in mind. I would opt for
another solution, which is to compare the responses to the open-ended questions. If there are
two or more identical responses in all questions, including the open-ended questions, they will
be tossed away. Microsoft Access is a database package that performed this task with great
efficiency.
The rather more challenging concern about using web-administered surveys is the
problem of representation that leads to sampling errors. According to Smith, “Perhaps the most
critical problem with Internet-based research is the practical impossibility of probability
sampling, that one can only tentatively generalize to a very specific population, if at all” (Smith
2002). After discussing different accounts of this problem she concludes that “we do this all the
time” whether we use web-based, telephone based or paper-based surveys. None of them is
completely random. The solution that Smith advances is to “learn more about [the respondents’]
demographics” which will enable “generalizability to well-studied segments of the overall
population.”
Two econometricians examined five decades of sampling mathematically and
theoretically and suggested that that the great majority of the sampling methods that social
scientists use do not actually produce random samples unless we ignore the impracticality of
most of the underlying assumptions (Ullah and Breunig 1998).
In other words, if the web-based is generally biased toward people who are above
average in education and experience with computers (Bowker and Dillman May 2000) and we
know the structure of this bias through asking explicit questions about the demographics of
respondents we can limit our generalizations to the specific category. This solution makes more
sense than to abandon using the revolutionary advantage of web-administered survey besides, it
is not recommended for researchers to throw away data.
The advantages of using web-based survey are numerous. “The advent of web
surveying means it is now possible to bring a survey instrument to hundreds of thousands of
people and process the results for a cost that would previously only have allowed a few
hundred responses to be tabulated” (Dillman and Bowker 2000).
In the Muslim context specifically, web-based survey has a very important advantage
which is it is the only possible data-gathering tool that does not require the approval and
necessitate the full supervision of non-democratic governments that usually have no experience,
let alone respect, for this type of research. Part of the way web-based survey can be defended
in the Muslim world context is that we cannot beat something with nothing. Another advantage
that web-based surveys have over paper-based surveys is related to the environment of
skepticism in authoritarian countries. Most of the written surveys done on non-democratic
countries have shown a very high degree of conservative and mild responses due to the fear of
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being questioned or detained in the future (Elder 1976; Verba 1971). However, in the webbased survey with absolute anonymity, most respondents are presumed to be less concerned
about being monitored by authorities (Solomon 2001).
The Sampling technique:
In the Web-based survey a quota controlled sample is convenience sampling, but with
the constraint that proportionality by strata be preserved.
Maximum variation sampling is the goal of controlled quota sampling, in which the
researcher purposively and non-randomly tries to select a set of cases, which exhibit maximal
differences on variables of interest. Further variations include extreme or deviant case sampling
or typical case sampling. That is why the 55,100 email addresses were obtained from 35
diverse web-sites, chatting groups and email-lists and in five different languages (English,
Arabic, Urdu, Farsi and French). Upon consulting Muslims from Arab, African and Asian
countries about the most-frequently visited websites and chatting rooms, the emails were
purposively and proportionally distributed among regions taking into consideration most and
least conservative websites.
According to the statistics gathered from the United Nations30 approximately 42% of
Muslims are under the age of 18. Besides, around 45% of Muslims who are above 18 are
illiterate. Calculated together, only 26% of Muslims above 18 can actually read and write. Thus
almost 74% of the 1.2 billion Muslims are out of the reach of all behavioral tools available to
examine their beliefs. That is to say, any generalization drawn from the web-based survey will
be at best limited to around 300 million Muslims who are literate and above the age of 18.
Appendix 2 lists the number and percentages of people who had access to the Internet
in January 2001 (9 months before the survey was run on the web). The last columns are the
most relevant for examining the percentages of Muslim individuals who have access to the
Internet in various countries of the world as percentage of the total population. The average is
around 10.8% of Muslims have access to the Internet. However, the variance is too high
(323.6) which indicates that there are number of outlier cases that drive the average into
exaggerated figure. After excluding ten countries which have very high Internet access and
meanwhile have small minorities of Muslims (as depicted in the last column), the average is now
2.9% and the variance is relatively reasonable (33.4). This information suggests that those who
had access to the Internet in Muslim countries in January 2001 are slightly more than 2.9% of
total Muslims, which are around 34.8 million individuals.
This figure represents the total number of individuals who actually had access to the
Internet in Muslim countries in the year 2000 (after excluding Muslim minorities in the highest ten
countries providing Internet to their residents). Since I am only interested in the adult Muslims, it
is reasonable to expect that these 34.8 million individuals who represent 12 percent of the 300
million individuals who represent the target population.
The researcher met the problem of the diversity of languages among Muslims who live in
more than 80 countries of the world. After exploring different attempts and consulting a wide
range of Muslims from different backgrounds and speak different languages, the most
reasonable choice is twofold: first to rely mainly on an English version of the survey with
30

http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2, the calculation of this percentage calculated through adding
the percentage of population at age 0-14 to the percentage of population 15-17 in almost all countries that
have notable (3% and above) percentages of Muslims.
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transliterating the most technical concepts and words into Arabic and Urdu; second to allow for
Arabic and French speakers the ability to respond to an Arabic and French versions of the
same survey. Pilot examination of the clarity of the language and reliability of the questions and
their words led to different iterations of the same survey. Based upon several tests of the survey
in different contexts by English, French, Arab and Urdu speakers in the U.S., Egypt, and Iran,
three versions of the survey were developed and used: English, French and Arabic.
b. Paper-Based Survey
The same questions of the web-based were used in a face-to-face written survey in
Egypt, UAE, Pakistan, Algeria, Libya, Malaysia, Iran and Turkey, as well as among Muslim
students who are doing their studies at three American universities (Western Michigan
University, Colorado University and University of Michigan). The attempt to administer a
written survey in Saudi Arabia failed.
As always, the target population (the population for which information is required) and
the survey population (the population actually covered) differ for practical reasons, even though
they should, in actuality, be the same. It has been extremely difficult to obtain a balanced sample
of all educated Muslims from all parts of each country. That is why, it has been necessary to
impose geographical and career limitations excluding certain parts of the target population
because they are inaccessible. Thus, the respondents to the written-survey have been college
students.
I made subjective judgments (which were cross-checked by regional specialists)
concerning the best estimate of which schools and colleges to be chosen to be representative of
each country.
Appendix 5 lists the number of respondents who responded to the written survey. One
question was added to the written survey which asked the respondents to indicate how frequent
they surf the Internet to help control for the effect of the Internet and to examine the
characteristics of the individuals who have access to the Internet. Three main characteristics of
the respondents to the internet is that male Muslims serf the net more than females. Relatively
affluent Muslims have access to the internet more than the relatively less advantages. Younger
Muslims (40 years and below) spend more time on-line than older Muslims.
Egypt and the US in particular are two pivotal countries for the diversity of non-native
Muslims who live in both of them.
The written surveys is used not only to check the consistency and reliability of the Webbased survey but as well to expand the generalizability of the results to people who do not
necessarily have access to the Internet.
Comparison between available data and other samples
Fortunately, the Gallup survey, Pew survey project and Zogby International have run
face-to-face surveys in different Muslim societies in the years 2002-2003 (Gallup 2002; Pew
2003a, 2003b; Zogby 2002). Comparing the demographics of the respondents to web-based
and written surveys of this project with the educated Muslim respondents to these other surveys
indicate clear oversampling of the relatively affluent over the relatively less advantaged and
individuals under 35 over older people. These surveys indicated that they over sampled men
and the urban literate.
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Since I make no attempt to establish proportions of all Muslims who support or oppose
democracy, it matters little whether the pooled data is a representative sample of all Muslims of
the world or not. It is enough that it is representative of the educated Muslims who potentially
pay enough head to political matters.
c. Intensive Interviews and Focus Group Discussions
An important part of this project is to randomly select a 3-11 respondents of the
respondents to the written-survey and conduct focus-group discussion with them. These
discussions took place among Muslim in eight societies (Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, UAE, Iran,
Turkey, Algeria and the US).
Subjects were selected randomly and I talked to each potential interviewee explaining
my purpose and followed this up with the possible benefits. I offered the respondents the
opportunity to chat with me for around 30 minutes in a friendly get-together with beverages
provided at my expense. The number of individuals invited for the focus group discussions was
over 600 but only 188 accepted to participate.
Three advantages have been gained from conducting intensive interviews and focus
group discussions.
1- This research method permitted respondents to reveal their convictions and
uncertainties, their reasoning processes and emotional reactions, their foci for passion and
indifference, their expertise and ignorance. From the interviews, I was able to evaluate the
content, complexity, and strength of individual beliefs about Islam and democracy which
definitely added depth to the survey analysis.
2- The survey explains findings through the correlation between certain characteristics
such as gender and support to democracy; I interpret the relationship and infers that the female
educated Muslims support democracy because democracy promote their socio-political
positions. Intensive interviews explain this finding by discussing with female respondents what
they expect and how they would feel about the effect of democracy on their lives. The
conclusions from both types of research may be equally valid, even identical, but they emerge
from different types of data, which are collected in different ways to yield different types of
explanations for the same phenomenon.
3- Surprisingly the intensive interviews and focus group discussions throw light on
certain aspects that are overlooked by quantitative tools that are “limited by either a failure of
imagination or the exigencies of statistical techniques” (Hochschild 1981: 25). For instance,
what if an educated Muslim woman makes a novel argument against democracy? Regression
analysis will definitely ignore her position if there is statistically enough evidence that most
educated women are pro-democracy. Intensive interviews and focus group discussions bring
these potential anomalies into the focus of the researcher’s attention.
The main disadvantage of the focus group discussion is that it is not as diverse and
representative as the survey. However, this disadvantage is of little value in this project. A
concern that a disproportionate number of the male (or female) respondents are more or less
educated, rich or poor, or whatever, would be misplaced. These demographic considerations
become important only in the pooled survey data since one seeks to infer from the sample how
many and what kinds of respondents seek more or less democratic changes.
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d. Elite Interviews
Five to nine elite interviews with ulama/scholars, activists and intellectuals were conducted
during visit to each of the previous eight countries in addition to Saudi Arabia. The interviewees
were selected based on two criteria: first to represent the diverse ideological positions toward
democracy; second to have been known for their roles as public opinion leaders in their
respective countries.
The interviewees were asked to comment and reflect upon the descriptive graphs of the webbased surveys. Some of them asked for the results to be sent to them before conducting the
interview and had extensive comments on them. Others interpreted the findings and used them in
later references to defend their political causes.
Selection of Countries:
Four main reasons determined the selection of the countries whence the written survey,
focus group discussions and elite interviews have been conducted:
1) They represent the geographical and religious diversity of the Middle East and
Muslim world.
2) These countries represent a wide array of experiences regarding how both Islam and
democracy are perceived from the masses’ and elites’ points of view.
3) I received a high number of responses in pilot tests of web-based survey from
citizens of those countries.
4) The selection of countries is influenced by the researcher’s capacity to secure reliable
connections in those countries. These connections are instrumental to assist in getting access to
the respondents who became potential focus group participants and respondents to the written
survey.
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APPENDIX 3
INTERNET USERS IN COUNTRIES WHERE MUSLIMS
HAVE NOTABLE PRESENCE
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Interent Users
Country

Last
Number of % of Populating with Excluding
Updated
Users
Internet Access
Outliers
Albania
Dec.2000
12,000
0.34
0.34
Algeria
March 2001
180,000
0.57
0.57
Bahrain
March 2001
105,000
10.07
10.07
Bangladesh Dec.1999
30,000
0.02
0.02
Egypt
March 2001
560,000
0.81
0.81
France
August 2001 11.7 million
19.65
Germany
August 2001 28.64 million
34.49
India
Dec. 2000
5 million
0.49
0.49
Indonesia
Jan. 2000
2 million
0.88
0.88
Iran
Dec. 2000
250,000
0.38
0.38
Iraq
Dec.2000
12,500
0.05
0.05
Jordan
March 2001
210,000
4.07
4.07
Kuwait
March 2001
165,000
8.08
8.08
Lebanon
Dec. 2000
300,000
8.38
8.38
Libya
March 2001
20000
0.24
0.24
Malaysia
Dec. 2000
3.7 million
16.98
16.98
Mali
Dec. 1999
10000
0.09
0.09
Morocco
March 2001
220000
0.72
0.72
Niger
Dec. 1999
3000
0.03
0.03
Nigeria
Dec.1999
100,000
0.08
0.08
Oman
Dec.2000
90,000
3.55
3.55
Pakistan
May 2000
1.2 million
0.85
0.85
Qatar
March 2001
75000
9.75
9.75
Saudi Arabia March 2001
570,000
2.5
2.5
Senegal
Dec. 2000
40,000
0.4
0.4
Sudan
March 2001
28,000
0.08
0.08
Syria
March 2001
32,000
0.19
0.19
Tunisia
March 2001
280,000
2.89
2.89
Turkey
May 2000
2 million
3.05
3.05
UAE
Dec. 2000
735,000
31.02
31.02
UK
June 2001
33 million
55.32
US
Aug 2001
166.14 m.
59.75
Yemen
March 2001
14,000
0.08
0.08
Average
10.8
2.9
Variance
323.6
33.4
Source: http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html, 2/12/2003 3:30 AM
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The process of writing the English version of the survey took 6 months. When
formulating the questions, I had to consult with subject-matter experts and members of the
target audience. Also, I examine questions from other surveys (used in Egypt, World Value
Survey and Pew Research) on the same or similar topics.
Dr. Kevin Corder and David Hartmann reviewed the variables to be measured, and
ultimately, the survey questions and response alternatives.
Dr. Jim Butterfield made certain that the questions are relevant to the survey objectives
and information requirements, ensured that there was an established rationale behind each
question and that the response categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and no doublebarreled questions or tendentious language is used.
However, it is crucial that I have confident that the results are not artifacts of the
particular survey tool used. To gain this confidence, I re-run the models twice using the data
obtained from the two techniques separately and report only the general patterns that are the
same whichever data I use.
Islam and Politics
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled Islam and Politics designed to
analyze the political attitudes of Muslims toward politics in general and more specifically toward
democracy as Muslims understand it. The researcher who is conducting this survey is Moataz
Abdel Fattah who is a faculty member at the School of Economics and Political Science, Cairo
University and is doing his PhD in political science at Western Michigan University. Data
obtained from this survey will be part of his dissertation project. Kindly note that you are only
allowed to respond to the questions of this survey if you are 18 years or older. This survey is
comprised of 48 questions and will take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. Your replies
will be completely anonymous; so do not put your name anywhere on the form. If you choose to
not participate in this survey, please do NOT click "submit" button at the end of the survey. If
you choose to not answer any question, simply leave it blank.
Returning the survey (by clicking “submit” button at the end of the survey) indicates your
consent for use of the answers you supply. Please ask your Muslim wives/husbands,
sons/daughters and/or friends (who are above 18 years old) to fill in this survey. I appreciate
your cooperation. The data obtained by this survey will be public for researchers, individuals
and institutes Muslim and non-Muslim in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. If you have any
questions, you may contact Moataz Abdelfattah at 202-363-7220 or at
moatazfattah@yahoo.com. On July 15th 2002, you may visit the following website to benefit
from the data and see some graphs and aggregate tables summarizing the responses.
www.mzpolitics.com/data
Contact Information
Name: Moataz Abdel Fattah
Address: Cairo University
Voice: 202-387-7906
Email: moatazfattah@yahoo.com
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Part One
In this section, you will be asked to give us some information about your age, education, nationality...etc.
1.1.

How did you learn about this survey?
[]

1.2.

What is your gender?
[ ] Female (girl/lady)
[ ] Male (boy/man)

1.3.

What is your age?
[ ] 18-24
[ ] 25-29
[ ] 30-34
[ ] 35-39
[ ] 40-50
[ ] Above 50

1.4.

How far did you go in school?
[ ] Less Than High School Diploma
[ ] High School Diploma
[ ] Some College
[ ] Received Undergrad Degree (e.g. Bachelor)
[ ] Received an Advanced Degree (e.g. Masters or PhD)
[ ] No Response

1.5.

What is your annual personal income level in your own currency (if you are still supported by
your parents, indicate their income)?
[ ] Under 999
[ ] 1,000 to 5,999
[ ] 4,000 to 6,999
[ ] 7,000 to 9,999
[ ] 10,000 to 15,999
[ ] 16,000 to 25,999
[ ] 26,000 to 35,999
[ ] 37,000 to 49,999
[ ] 50,000 to 80,000
[ ] More than 80,000
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]

1.6.

What currency did you have in mind while answering the previous question? (Select based on
country)
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1.7.

Do you think that the elections or referenda (parliamentary, presidential or syndicates) that occur
in your country, if any, are free and fair ?
[ ] Very fair and free
[ ] Somewhat fair and free
[ ] Not fair or free at all
[ ] My country does not have elections or referenda

1.8.

If you have the nationality (citizenship) of a Muslim country, select it from the following list. (If
you are not from a Muslim country, go to the next question. If you are from a Muslim country,
answer this question and skip the next one.) [ ]

1.9.

If you are a Muslim who has the citizenship of a non-Muslim country, what is it?
[]

1.10. What is your country of birth?
[]
1.11. What is your original/native language?
1.12. Which one of the following would best describe your status? (Check all that apply.)
[ ] I am an Arab Muslim
[ ] I am an African (non-American) Muslim
[ ] I am a white American Muslim
[ ] I am an African American Muslim
[ ] I am a Muslim of a European nationality
[ ] I am an Asian non-Arabic speaking Muslim
[ ] I am a Muslim who does not fit into the previous categories
[ ] I am not a Muslim
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]
1.13. Which one of the following best describes your status:
[ ] Sunni Muslim
[ ] Shiite Muslim
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]
1.14. Name three NON-Muslim countries in which you resided (stayed) for one year or more. If not,
leave it empty (blank): [ ]
1.15. How many times do you pray (make salat) daily?
[ ] I pray 5 times a day without delay.
[ ] I pray 5 times a day but not necessarily on time.
[ ] I pray from 2 to 4 times a day.
[ ] I pray once a day.
[ ] I rarely pray.
[ ] I do not pray at all.
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]
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1.16. Are you satisfied with the performance of the political parties (if any) and (elected)
representatives (if any) in your country of origin?
[ ] Very satisfied
[ ] Satisfied
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Unsatisfied
[ ] Very unsatisfied
How many times have you voted in public elections or referendums (parliamentary, presidential
1.17. or syndicates)?
[ ] My country has elections, but I never voted
[ ] Voted once
[ ] Twice or more
[ ] Never voted because my country does not have elections
1.18. How many times have you had any sort of alcoholic beverages or wine (khamr)?
[ ] Never in my lifetime
[ ] Only once in my lifetime
[ ] Twice in my lifetime
[ ] Sometimes
[ ] Once a week or more.
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]
Part Two
In this section, you will be asked to tell us how the best form of government looks like from your own
perspective. For questions 2.1 to 2.11, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the
statements in each question.
2.1.

Non-Muslims (ex. Christians, Jews or Hindus) should be allowed to build churches or temples to
practice their religion in Muslim countries.
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.2.

Islamic sharia gives non-Muslims (Christians, Jews or Hindus) the right to have their own houses
of worship in Muslim countries.
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.3.

Democracy is very close to shura (consultation) and can be adjusted to suit the Islamic sharia.
[ ] Strongly agree
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[]
[]
[]
[]

Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly disagree

2.4.

By allowing people to make their own laws, democracy replaces the will of Allah with the will of
the people; that is why it is some type of disbelief (kofr).
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.5.

Islamic movements should be allowed to form political parties (ahzab) and run for elections
(intikhabat).
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.6.

Political participation (for example voting in elections) is some type of enjoining the good and
forbidding the evil (amr bi-al ma’roof and nahii a’an al-monkar)
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.7.

If we let Muslims elect their rulers, these elections will lead to homosexuality (shozoz), drinking
wine (shorb al-khamr) and secularism (3almania).
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.8.

One popular saying is that “Islam is both religion and state” (deen wa dawla), Do you agree?
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
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2.9.

If Islamists reach government through elections in Muslim countries, they will stay in power
(government) in the future even if people do not want them in power.
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
[ ] Please comment if you wish:
[]

2.10. Political institutions and processes such as elections, parliament and political parties are against
Islamic sharia.
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
2.11. The West (USA and its allies such as Britain and others) does not want Muslims to freely elect
their rulers.
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
2.12. Which one of the following countries comes closest to your best (ideal/favorite) political system?
[]
2.13. Why have you chosen this country to be the closest to your best (ideal/favorite) political system?
2.14. To achieve their political rights (ex. freedom of expression and freedom of association), Muslims
should:
[ ] challenge their authoritarian rulers VIOLENTLY even if they may be killed or jailed.
[ ] challenge their authoritarian rulers PEACEFULLY even if they may be killed or jailed.
[ ] express their negative feeling towards their rulers but NOT publicly.
[ ] be patient and pray to Allah to grant them better rulers.
2.15. Regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict, whose opinions do you trust most?
[ ] Your Muslim government
[ ] Official religious scholars (Sheikhs appointed by the government)
[ ] Unofficial religious scholars (independent Sheikhs)
[ ] The Intellectuals (independent press)
[ ] None
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]
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2.16. Some Muslim countries have Christian (massehi) minorities that want to participate in the political
process as voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers. If you had the ultimate say in this
regard, what would you allow them to do?
[ ] They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
[ ] They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
[ ] Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
[ ] Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers
2.17. Some Muslim countries have Jewish minorities (yahood) that want to participate in the political
process as voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers? If you had the ultimate say in this
regard, what would you allow them to do?
[ ] They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
[ ] They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
[ ] Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
v Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers
2.18. Do you think that Muslim women should be allowed to participate in the political process as
voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers? If you had the ultimate say in this regard, what
would you allow them to do?
[ ] They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
[ ] They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
[ ] Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
[ ] Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers
2.19. On a scale of political freedom from 1 to 5, where 1 is a non-democracy/dictatorship (istibdad)
and 5 is a free political system, how free do you consider your country of origin?
[ ] 1 (full dictatorship)
[ ] 2 (partial dictatorship)
[ ] 3 (in between/in the middle)
[ ] 4 (partially free)
[ ] 5 (fully free)
2.20. There are individuals who are killed or sent to jail because they publicly ask for their political
rights. Do you agree or disagree with what they do?
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
2.21. Based on Islamic shari’a how would you put your country of origin on the following scale?
[ ] 1 Full non-Islamic government
[ ] 2 Partial (to some extent) non-Islamic government
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[ ] 3 In between
[ ] 4 Partial (to some extent) Islamic government
[ ] 5 Full Islamic government
2.22. If you were allowed to choose among three political rulers for your country of origin, which one
of the following would you prefer?
A religious Muslim ruler who establishes the hodood of Islam in which his citizens cannot
[]
disagree with him or question his actions.
A religious Muslim ruler who establishes the hodood of Islam in which his citizens may
[]
disagree with him and hold him accountable for his actions.
A good ruler who is not necessarily a good Muslim but willing to give up power if he loses
[]
public support
2.23. Which one of the following reasons can best explain why dictatorship prevails in the Muslim
world? (Check all that apply.)
Very
Somewhat
Not a
Do not
important
important
reason at all
know
reason
reason
a.

The WEST (by supporting
authoritarian rulers)

[]

[]

[]

[]

b.

The INDIVIDUALS (who are not
ready for democracy)

[]

[]

[]

[]

c.

The RULERS (who do not leave
their positions)

[]

[]

[]

[]

d.

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY
contradict each other

[]

[]

[]

[]

e.

The SCHOLARS (sheikhs who
are opposed to democracy)

[]

[]

[]

[]

2.24. Do you think that Muslim countries should have democratic rulers instead of the current political
rulers?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] I am not sure
2.25. Would you accept that your son/brother gets married to a woman from another religion
(Christian, Jewish, …etc.)
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] I am not sure
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]
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2.26. Would you allow Sunni and Shiite to get married to each other?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] I am not sure
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]
2.27. Muslims who adopt Western ideologies such as liberalism, socialism or communism should be
allowed to form political parties (ahzab) and run for elections (intikhabat).
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]

Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly disagree

2.28. In your opinion, what is democracy?
[]
2.29. In your opinion, what is Islam?
Some Muslim countries have Muslim minorities (ex. Shiite and Ahmadi) that want to participate
2.30. in the political process as voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers. If you had the
ultimate say in this regard, what would you allow them to do?
[ ] They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
[ ] They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
[ ] Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
[ ] Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers
2.31. Please feel free to add comments if you wish.
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List of Respondents to the Written Survey
Muslims Surveyed
in Egypt
Egypt
1617*
Nigeria
89
Mali
36
Gambia
49
UAE
75
Yemen
85
Sudan
145
Europe
87
Bangladesh
122
Kuwait
94
Bahrain
84
Indonesia
116
Malaysia
114
Tunisia
107
Morocco
102
Senegal
113
Pakistan
103
Libya
43
Iran
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Algeria
84
US
Total
3265

Muslims Surveyed
in their Countries

Muslims Surveyed
in the US
49

65*

45
83
23
31
74
19
18
38
79
12
23
74
135
8
23
64
182
26
223*
1229

279*

490*

634*
215*
319*
200*
88*
2290

* Indicates samples that were selected randomly.
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Total
1617
138
36
49
185
168
447
118
196
113
102
154
683
119
125
187
872
266
342
264
182
198
223
6784

Included/
excluded
Included
Included
Excluded
Excluded
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
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Abbrev.
AFG
ALB
ALG
ARA
AUS
AZE
BAH
BAN
BEL
BOS
BRU
CAN
CHI
EGY
FIJ
FRA
GAM
GER
GHA
IND
INS
IRE
IRN
IRQ
IVO
JOR
KEN
KUW
KYR
LEB
LIB
MAD
MAI
MAL
MAU
MOR
NET
NEW
NIG
OMA

List of Respondents to the Web-Based Survey
Country
Coded as:
Afghanistan
Other
Albania
Albania
Algeria
Algeria
Arab
Other
Australia
Other
Azerbaijan
Other
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bangladesh
BANGLADESH
Belgium
EU
Bosnia Herzegovina
Other
Brunei
Other
Canada
Other
China
Other
Egypt
EGYPT
Fiji
Other
France
EU
Gambia
Gambia
German
EU
Ghana
Other
India
INDIA
Indonesia
INDONESIA
Ireland
EU
Iran
IRAN
Iraq
Other
Ivory coast
Other
Jordan
JORDAN
Kenya
Other
Kuwait
KUWAIT
Kyrgyzstan
Other
Lebanon
LEBANON
Libya
LIBYA
Maldives
Other
Mali
Mali
Malaysia
MALAYSIA
Mauritius
Other
Morocco
MOROCCO
Netherlands
EU
New Zealand
EU
Nigeria
NIGERIA
Oman
Oman
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Freq.
138
500
570
5
37
12
530
935
86
53
28
276
9
1346
5
239
489
196
18
1497
1331
23
1138
91
28
687
36
533
10
534
597
15
521
1177
48
627
33
26
579
494

Appendix 6 – Continued
PAK
Pakistan
PAL
Palestine
QAT
Qatar
SAU
Saudi Arabia
SEN
Senegal
SIN
Singapore
SOM
Somalia
SOU
South Africa
SRI
Sri Lanka
SUD
Sudan
SUR
Suriname
SYR
Syria
TAJ
Tajikistan
TAN
Tanzania
TOG
Togo
TRI
Trinidad and Tobago
TRK
Turkmenistan
TUN
Tunisia
TUR
Turkey
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UGA
Uganda
UK
UK
USA
USA
YEM
Yemen
ZAI
Zaire

PAKISTAN
1685
Other
85
QATAR
568
SAUDI ARABIA
942
SENEGAL
569
Other
178
Other
18
Other
208
Other
55
SUDAN
583
Other
22
SYRIA
613
Tajikistan
497
Other
54
Other
24
Other
42
Turkmenistan
504
Tunisia
546
TURKEY
1058
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
595
Other
22
EU
171
USA
1083
YEMEN
488
Other
13
Wholesale total
26120
Total EU
774
Total Other =
1530
Total 31 cases>480
23816
Only countries with respondents 480 and above are recorded. Iraq, though has only 91
respondents, it was included for its policy implication relevance. Muslims from six European
countries are coded as EU. All other countries are recorded as "other." Total number of
respondents is 26,120. Yet only 23,816 come from the 32 countries that met the 480respondents, above 18 and below 50 Muslims criteria.
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Date: October 26, 2001
To:

James Butterfield, Principal Investigator
Moataz Abdelfattah, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair
Re:

HSIRB Project Number 01-10-07

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled “Islamic Norms and the
Democratic Alternative: Cross-Cultural Examination of Muslims’ Belief Systems” has been
approved under the full category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board.
The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan
University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You
must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek
reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there
are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of
this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB
for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: October 17, 2002
Note: The document is on file at The Graduate College.
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Principal Component Factor Analysis
Q#

Religiosity

Democratic Hardware

Democratic Software

(2 questions)

1.15
1.18

2.6
2.7
2.10
198

1. How many times do you
(3 questions)
pray (make salat) daily?
2. How many times have you
had any sort of alcoholic
beverages or wine (khamr)?
Alpha =.875
Alpha =.926
1. Voting is some type of enjoining the good and forbidding
the evil.
2. Public elections of rulers will lead to taboos?
3. Democratic institutions and procedures are against Sharia.

(4 questions)

Elasticity of Demands
for Political Rights
(2 questions)

Alpha =. 763
2.16
1. Attitude toward participation of Christian minorities in the political process.
2.17
2. Attitude toward participation of Jewish minorities in the political process.
2.18
3. Attitude toward participation of Muslim women in the political process.
2.30
4. Attitude toward participation of Muslim minorities in the political process.
2.14
1. The Risk Muslims take to express their demands for their political rights.
Alpha =.91
2.20
2. Appreciation for people killed or jailed because of their political rights
Note: Principal component factor analysis was used with varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization. The total model predicts 78.8% of
cumulative variance. The religiosity and support for democratic hardware scales were reversed so that a positive response expresses
more religiosity and greater support for democratic hardware.
Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal consistency is reported as Alpha.
Source: Islam and Politics Survey, (2002).
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Preparing Individual-level Data
Using the standard statistical procedures, I checked for missing data, outliers, perfect
coollinearity among variables, and non-normality of variables.31
Regarding the missing data, using the SAS 8.2 command of PROC MI shows that there are
certain variables that contain high percentages of missing responses. Besides, the missing
responses were clearly missed at random (MAR assumption). To handle this problem of
missing data, the researcher opted to the technique of multiple imputation that provides a
useful strategy for dealing with data sets with missing values. Instead of filling in a single value for
each missing value, Robin’s multiple imputation procedure replaces each missing value with a set
of plausible values that represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Rubin 1987).
These multiply imputed data sets are then analyzed by using standard procedures for complete
data and combining the results from this analysis. No matter which complete-data analysis is
used, the process of combining results from different imputed data sets is essentially the same.
This results in statistically valid inferences that properly reflect the uncertainty due to missing
values.
SAS 8.2 has the MI procedure that creates multiply imputed data sets for incomplete pdimensional multivariate data. It uses methods that incorporate appropriate variability across m
imputations. Once the m complete data sets are analyzed using standard SAS/STAT
procedures, PROC MIANALYZE can be used to generate valid statistical inferences about
these parameters by combining the results. By averaging parameters across data sets to get
single point estimates and calculating standard errors using variation within and between
datasets. For scalar point estimate, the following formula was used.

where q could be regression or logit coefficients, M is the number of datasets and qj is the
parameter estimate from the jth dataset.
For the scalar standard error estimate, the following formula was used:

where sej is the standard error estimate for the jth parameter; qj is the jth parameter estimate;
and M is the number of datasets.
M in this project = 5 and the MI was conducted for each country separately.
Since I use multiple indicators to gauge the same variables, the problem of collinearity was
noticeable. The factor analysis helped combing collinear indicators together. There was no real

31

I have to thank Dr. Susan Carlson of WMU Sociology Department for providing the technical expertise
regarding the multiple imputation techniques.

200

outlier or influential cases which is unlikely in a survey research. Upon running the primary
regressions, the problem of heteroskedasticity was amazingly prevalent.
Heteroskedasticity:
Almost all the models used in this project are plagued by heteroskedasticity (HSK), a violation
of the “equal variance of error term” assumption in OLS regressions. Since HSK does not lead
to biased coefficients, but tends to mess up standard errors, thus disordering t-values and
masking the potential relevance of a regressor. This is called “loss of efficiency” in
econometrics. To solve this problem, I used the White robust estimation of the standard errors
in both the SUR and multiple logistic regressions.
Seeming Unrelated Regression and Multiple Logistics:
Zellner’s idea of combining several equations into one model to improve estimation
efficiency ranks as one of the most successful and lasting innovations in the history of
econometrics (Greene 2000). Thus Zellnar’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) was used to
account for the contemporaneous correlation between error terms in the two equations of
democratic hardware and software for each society (Srivastava and Giles 1987).
To be more certain about the robustness of the SUR analysis, multiple logistic
regressions (MLR) were run as well. The logistic regressions serve to examine the robustness of
the SUR coefficients. That is why the stars reported in table 4.1 reflect the common results
between the two types of regressions (SUR and MLR). For instance, the logistic regression in
the cases of USA, Libya and Bahrain showed positive effect of Muslims who support political
Islam on democratic hardware. Since this result was not supported by the SUR system and
does not have theoretical significant explanation, Table 4.1 did not report the relationship.
Using the logistic regression as a check mechanism has the important advantage of
dropping some of the most controversial assumptions of OLS and SUR such as the linear
relationship between the dependent and independent variables, the multivariate normality and
that the residuals are homoskedastic for each level of the independent variables.
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Explanatory
A

Relative Income
Education
Age
Female

B

Voting
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Residence
C

Religiosity
Dem & Shura
Religion & State

D

Incumb-ents/Dem
West/Dem
Ulama/Dem
Constant

R2

Albania
Soft
.147*
(.085)
.331*
(.169)
.16
(.169)
.762**
(.322)
.399*
(.21)
1.166***
(.406)
-.096
(.129)
1.403*
(.737)
.026
(.183)
1.684***
(.253)
.217*
(.122)
-.053*
(.029)
-1.043***
(.343)
.165

Hard
.033
(.052)
.193**
(.098)
.147
(.102)
.53***
(.2)
.518***
(.132)
.569***
(.192)
-.025
(.067)
.16**
(.08)
.126
(.102)
.28*
(.169)
.129*
(.071)
-.025
(.067)
-.794***
(.144)

Algeria
Soft
.028
(.089)
1.277***
(.169)
.079
(.156)
.907***
(.308)
-.267
(.197)
1.88***
(.722)
.018
(.083)
.233*
(.123)
-.213*
(.127)
.051
(.25)
-.125
(.108)
-.231*
(.132)
-.601***
(.181)

Hard
.111
(.082)
.328**
(.158)
.078
(.107)
.337
(.23)
.032
(.158)
3.523***
(.899)
-.264***
(.064)
.191**
(.085)
-.101
(.119)
.118
(.179)
.122
(.081)
-.117
(.358)
-.5***
(.109)

.339

.337

.2

Bahrain
Soft
-.067
(.101)
.418***
(.126)
-.036
(.135)
1.018***
(.333)

1.163***
(.286)
.011
(.065)
.173**
(.085)
.073
(.127)
.269*
(.155)
.12
(.077)
-.114*
(.065)
-.659***
(.221)

Bangladesh
Soft
-.109
(.077)
.606***
(.112)
-.147
(.099)
1.12***
(.236)
.2*
(.114)
1.1414***
(.303)
-.369***
(.067)
.26***
(.1)
.086
(.15)
1.383***
(.197)
.108
(.092)
-.367***
(.067)
-1.827***
(.49)

Hard
-.119*
(.068)
.305***
(.083)
-.159*
(.089)
.376*
(.209)

Hard
-.001
(.046)
.324***
(.066)
-.065
(.062)
.587***
(.149)
.342***
(.124)
.904***
(.194)
.012
(.047)
.148**
(.063)
.167
(.161)
.538***
(.119)
.093
(.062)
-1.324***
(.439)
-1.968***
(.609)

3.284***
(.691)
-.368***
(.099)
.276**
(.133)
.269
(.188)
1.271***
(.223)
.094
(.112)
-.571*
(.293)
-.538***
(.142)
.213

.285

.228

.284

Explanatory
A

Relative Income
Education
Age
Female

B

Voting

204

Residence
C

Religiosity
Dem & Shura
Religion & State

D

Incumbents/Dem
West/Dem
Ulama/Dem
Constant

R2

Egypt
Soft
-.101
(.065)
.931***
(.084)
.095
(.102)
.603***
(.195)
.311*
(.165)
1.035***
(.236)
.272***
(.066)
.45***
(.095)
.736***
(.128)
1.038***
(.197)
.051
(.079)
-.138*
(.072)
-.225***
(.078)
.219

Hard
.038
(.04)
.266***
(.05)
-.095
(.058)
.263**
(.12)
-.023
(.096)
.86***
(.119)
-.022
(.037)
.254***
(.052)
.272
(.184)
.264**
(.134)
.164
(.105)
.104
(.095)
-.533***
(.18)
.314

SUR Results — Continued
Europe
Gambia
Soft
Hard
Soft
.16***
.069*
.182*
(.061)
(.035)
(.104)
.229**
.13**
-.108
(.117
(.066)
(.107)
-.055
-.111
.164
(.14)
(.084)
(.19)
.665***
.266*
.752**
(.225)
(.153)
(.323)
-.118
.651***
-.285
(.195)
(.107)
(.23)
1.168***
(.365)
-.186**
.155***
-.246*
(.073)
(.053)
(.143)
.555***
.623***
.383***
(.119)
(.065)
(.132)
.05
.184
-.275
(.113)
(.176)
(.424)
1.92***
.402***
1.664***
(.208)
(.13)
(.277)
.136
.109
.115
(.117)
(.104)
(.121)
-.584**
.172
.302**
(.236)
(.949)
(.14)
-.475*** -.468***
-.701***
(.175)
(.162)
(.113)
.272
.334
.196

Hard
.133*
(.069)
.148
(.094)
.205*
(.121)
.388*
(.229)
.161
(.162)
1.119***
(.237)
.058
(.094)
.316***
(.268)
-.133
(.206)
.159
(.206)
.061
(.092)
.622***
(.143)
-.205***
(.066)
.198

India
Soft
.074*
(.043)
.568***
(.077)
.37***
(.117)
1.001***
(.174)
.248**
(.119)

Hard
.084***
(.03)
.121***
(.047)
.341***
(.083)
.298**
(.126)
.233***
(.08)

-.447***
(.051)
.295***
(.072)
.241**
(.11)

.022
(.038)
.206***
(.056)
.206
(.185)

.14
(.865)
-.597***
(.227)
-.715***
(.249)
.286

.191
(.127)
-.24*
(.136)
-.813***
(.254)
.334

Explanatory
A
Relative Income
Education
Age
Female
B
Voting
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Residence
C
Religiosity
Dem & Shura
Religion & State
D
Incumbents/Dem
West/Dem
Ulama/Dem
Constant
R2

Indonesia
Soft
.113**
(.045)
.233***
(.084)
-.013
(.089)
1.861***
(.204)
-.218
(.293)
2.363***
(.368)
-.369***
(.053)
.091
(.074)
-.828***
(.081)
.314**
(.136)
.099
(.071)
-.204***
(.053)
-.821***
(.152)
.324

Hard
.039
(.031)
.183***
(.058)
.113*
(.06)
1.231***
(.144)
.04
(.23)
1.109***
(.285)
.202***
(.037)
.111**
(.054)
-.933
(.761
.07
(.105)
.009
(.051)
.202
(.371)
-.614
(.491)
.41

SUR Results — Continued
Iran
Jordan
Soft
Hard
Soft
-.07
.016
.176**
(.063)
(.047)
(.083)
.328***
.096*
.911***
(.078)
(.051)
(.107)
.09
-.138**
.047
(.089)
(.069)
(.117)
1.676***
.346***
1.437***
(.19)
(.129)
(.27)
.382**
.323***
-.305
(.184)
(.11)
(.191)
1.214***
.347**
2.261***
(.225)
(.139)
(.314)
.477***
-.021
-.538***
(.062)
(.035)
(.085)
.341***
.107*
.213*
(.087)
(.062)
(.125)
-.098
-.044
.06
(.119)
(.095)
(.194)
1.19***
.316***
.765***
(.171)
(.121)
(.213)
-.059
.034
-.183
(.08)
(.055)
(.116)
-.279*
-.593***
-.372***
(.155)
(.162)
(.141)
-.602***
-.545***
-.771***
(.118)
(.135)
(.278)
.315
.282
.342

Hard
-.153***
(.054)
.445***
(.067)
.036
(.08)
.427***
(.151)
-.135
(.115)
.754***
(.168)
.006
(.055)
.253***
(.082)
.014
(.094)
.268*
(.14)
.032
(.062)
-.594*
(.326)
-1.058***
(.37)
.448

Kuwait
Soft
-.189*
(.096)
.471***
(.123)
.6***
(.171)
1.774***
(.291)
.629**
(.261)
1.489***
(.352)
-.237***
(.083)
.36*
(.215)
.061
(.202)
.82**
(.403)
.18
(.119)
-.343**
(.162)
-1.488***
(.519)
.425

Hard
.12*
(.062)
.024
(.067)
.16**
(.073)
.004
(.164)
-.105
(.128)
.23
(.204)
-.038
(.044)
.421***
(.121)
-.019
(.112)
1.501***
(.281)
.056
(.067)
-.571***
(.213)
-.856***
(.325)
.56

Explanatory
A
Relative Income
Education
Age
Female
B
Voting

206

Residence
C
Religiosity
Dem & Shura
Religion & State
D
Incumbents/Dem
West/Dem
Ulama/Dem
Constant
R2

Lebanon
Soft
.058
(.069)
.204*
(.104)
.28**
(.137)
.657**
(.301)
-.097
(.222)
.255
(.382)
-.013
(.063)
.134
(.109)
-.806***
(.105)
.954***
(.272)
-.057
(.123)
-.379*
(.199)
-.587***
(.149)
.564

Hard
.07
(.06)
.122
(.086)
.117
(.11)
.693***
(.217)
.005
(.188)
1.319***
(.268)
.135**
(.06)
.323***
(.088)
.146
(.117)
.318*
(.165)
-.121
(.088)
-.353**
(.169)
-.453***
(.127)
.237

SUR Results — Continued
Libya
Malaysia
Soft
Hard
Soft
.123
.033
.06
(.083)
(.053)
(.039)
.422**
.199**
.15*
(.168)
(.095)
(.08)
-.013
.071
.064
(.166)
(.099)
(.093)
.687**
.553***
.664***
(.319)
(.2)
(.182)
.34**
(.151)
.791*
1.104***
1.166***
(.405)
(.191)
(.223)
-.11
-.011
-.091
(.131)
(.07)
(.075)
.144
.205**
.131*
(.134)
(.08)
(.074)
.091
.098
.099
(.186)
(.104)
(.107)
1.535***
.201
.072
(.254)
(.168)
(.137)
.027
-.001
.053
(.122)
(.071)
(.069)
-.195*
-.161*
-.158**
(.114)
(.09)
(.076)
-1.217*** -1.256***
-1.605***
(.437)
(.429)
(.478)
.146
.339
.298

Hard
.059**
(.026)
.078*
(.047)
.05
(.058)
.35***
(.123)
.002
(.1)
1.107***
(.132)
.307***
(.05)
.124**
(.05)
.212
(.173)
.186*
(.1)
.031
(.045)
-.099**
(.044)
-1.126***
(.251)
.481

Mali
Soft
.083
(.099)
.792***
(.154)
.203
(.189)
1.195***
(.296)
.144
(.219)
.761**
(.364)
.325**
(.126)
.33**
(.157)
-.534***
(.17)
1.695***
(.287)
.101
(.117)
.213*
(.124)
-.874***
(.277)
.282

Hard
-.044
(.066)
.368****
(.119)
.336***
(.113)
.77***
(.203)
.294*
(.156)
1.357***
(.207)
-.007
(.057)
.29**
(.125)
.18
(.144)
.397*
(.21)
-.04
(.091)
-.021
(.019)
-.318***
(.113)
.231

Explanatory
A
Relative Income
Education
Age
Female
B
Voting
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Residence
C
Religiosity
Dem & Shura
Religion & State
D
Incumbents/Dem
West/Dem
Ulama/Dem
Constant
R2

Morocco
Soft
-.01
(.091)
1.216***
(.261)
.305
(.188)
.851***
(.283)
.639**
(.295)
.113
(.336)
-.098
(.089)
.622***
(.144)
-.271
(.203)
1.083***
(.313)
.028
(.133)
-.282
(.514)
-.515***
(.078)
.208

Hard
.269***
(.058)
.526***
(.125)
.123
(.101)
.613***
(.191)
.421***
(.142)
.608**
(.276)
.098*
(.058)
.224***
(.086)
-.067
(.113)
.435**
(.176)
.108
(.074)
.26**
(.116)
-.742***
(.091)
.251

SUR Results — Continued
Nigeria
Oman
Soft
Hard
Soft
-.196**
-.011
.049
(.083)
(.07)
(.101)
.183
.678***
-.093
(.136)
(.109)
(.125)
-.005
.435***
.092
(.154)
(.108)
(.166)
2.922***
.226
.498
(.309)
(.213)
(.42)
.093
.262*
Dropped
(.198)
(.157)
1.832***
1.618***
1.068**
(.637)
(.517)
(.521)
-.313***
.057
-.561***
(.104)
(.066)
(.086)
.154
.331***
.515***
(.106)
(.083)
(.142)
-.506**
-.226
.197
(.234)
(.143)
(.195)
1.467***
.378**
1.531***
(.235)
(.163)
(.239)
.197
.135
.148
(.124)
(.083)
(.127)
-.483***
-.2**
-.094***
(.173)
(.09)
(.029)
-.388***
-.418***
-.041***
(.144)
(.126)
(.013)
.326
.286
.27

Hard
-.226***
(.079)
-.057
(.093)
-.023
(.122)
2.525***
(.277)
Dropped
2.423***
(.424)
.16**
(.069)
.536***
(.094)
-.046
(.15)
-.358**
(.168)
-.076
(.093)
.042
(.039)
-.285***
(.109)
.254

Pakistan
Soft
-.037
(.06)
.449***
(.088)
.24**
(.104)
.701***
(.203)
.208
(.133)
.858***
(.201)
-.413***
(.052)
.344***
(.073)
-.284**
(.118)
1.354***
(.136)
.034
(.021)
-.432***
(.145)
-1.276***
(.421)
.253

Hard
.029
(.042)
.3***
(.061)
.095
(.063)
.301**
(.122)
.096
(.083)
3.476***
(.346)
.05
(.036)
.149***
(.051)
.173
(.28)
.398***
(.095)
-.052
(.046)
-.496***
(.173)
-.937***
(.296)
.198

Explanatory
A
Relative Income
Education
Age
Female
B

1.075***
(.223)

SUR Results — Continued
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Soft
Hard
Soft
.036
-.209***
-.137
(.064)
(.045)
(.085)
-.378***
-.062
.634***
(.107)
(.077)
(.144)
.358***
-.126*
-.129
(.095)
(.07)
(.145)
.746*
1.617***
1.019***
(.418)
(.306)
(.311)
Dropped
Dropped
.849***
(.326)
.932
2.214***
1.988***
(1.129)
(.779)
(.36)

Hard
.063
(.052)
.64***
(.089)
.078
(.085)
.653***
(.189)
.186
(.187)
.951***
(.219)

Sudan
Soft
.09
(.09)
.612***
(.122)
-.022
(.162)
1.39***
(.344)
-.356
(.217)
1.676***
(.62)

.209***
(.061)
.218***
(.08)
.034
(.137)
.289*
.151
.038
(.075)
.19**
(.078)
-.567***
(.131)
.364

-1.338***
(.062)
.203**
(.079)
-.556***
(.15)
.151
(.14)
.014
(.081)
-.755***
(.193)
-1.34***
(.485)
.416

.099*
(.057)
.161**
(.076)
.081
(.131)
.328**
(.149)
-.076
(.07)
.725***
(.102)
-.641***
(.15)
.415

.142
(.113)
.322**
(.134)
-.621**
(.252)
.483*
(.264)
.143
(.116)
-.281**
(.141)
-1.454***
(.517)
.282

Qatar
Soft
-.032
(.095)
.333***
(.125)
.133
(.144)
1.76***
(.287)
Dropped

Hard
-.164***
(.06)
.213***
(.075)
.019
(.09)
.379**
(.182)
Dropped

1.024***
(.351)
.31***
(.094)
.316**
(.124)
.036
(.203)
1.23***
(.212)
.147
(.112)
.496***
(.147)
-.858***
(.321)
.243

Voting

208
Residence
C
Religiosity
Dem & Shura
Religion & State
D
Incumbents/Dem
West/Dem
Ulama/Dem
Constant
R2

-.422***
(.038)
.163**
(.063)
-.184
(.191)
-.093
(.101)
.054
(.065)
-.453***
(.163)
-1.56***
(.573)
.276

.017
(.097)
.457***
(.127)
.076
(.222)
.436*
(.249)
-.038
(.117)
.364***
(.075)
-.903***
(.304)
.252

Hard
.079
(.059)
.436***
(.093)
.068
(.118)
.21
(.262)
-.243
(.179)
4.562**
*
(.457)
.131*
(.077)
.262***
(.097)
.359
(.275)
.468**
(.204)
-.009
(.082)
.876
(.795)
-.859**
(.341)
.241

A

Explanatory
Relative
Income
Education
Age
Female

B
Voting
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Residence
C
Religiosity

D

Dem & Shura
Religion &
State
Incumbents/
Dem
West/Dem
Ulama/Dem
Constant

R2

Syria
Soft
-.101
(.083)
.89***
(.138)
-.055
(.114)
1.699***
(.339)
-.041
(.228)
2.464***
(.551)
-.059
(.097)
.328***
(.113)
-.217
(.215)
1.338***
(.225)
-.116
(.106)
-.259*
(.153)
-1.103***
(.329)
.272

Hard
.062
(.067)
.393***
(.121)
-.129
(.08)
.147
(.249)
.112
(.171)
3.198***
(.7)
-.083
(.054)
.321***
(.079)
.244
(.186)
.427**
(.199)
.115
(.085)
-.231
(.19)
-1.538***
(.423)
.151

SUR Results — Continued
Tajikistan
Tunisia
Soft
Hard
Soft
-.027
-.002
.076
(.115)
(.074)
(.048)
.037
.562***
1.457***
(.147)
(.094)
(.142)
.494***
.133
.35**
(.167)
(.105)
(.14)
1.319***
.594**
.565**
(.365)
(.241)
(.275)
.233
.004
.182
(.239)
(.164)
(.234)
1.044*
2.122***
1.67***
(.548)
(.295)
(.368)
.159
-.022
.073
(.135)
(.078)
(.089)
.21
.152*
.224*
(.138)
(.083)
(.115)
-.046
.167
.304***
(.182)
(.112)
(.115)
.174
.273**
.587**
(.253)
(.108)
(.249)
.096
-.031
.076
(.123)
(.083)
(.111)
.161
-.301
.279
(.145)
(.236)
(.182)
-.731***
-5.22***
1.282***
(.255)
(.176)
(.434)
.224
.32
.367

Hard
.024
(.052)
.504***
(.088)
.151*
(.078)
.475***
(.172)
.172
(.139)
.844***
(.211)
-.082
(.055)
.252***
(.068)
.267
(.172)
.266*
(.152)
.023
(.07)
.252
(.184)
-1.198***
(.416)
.405

Turkey
Soft
.087*
(.049)
.632***
(.097)
.097
(.097)
.63***
(.191)
.346***
(.132)
1.325***
(.203)
.054
(.056)
.246**
(.107)
.233***
(.087)
.41**
(.204)
.242
(.183)
.213
(.15)
-1.271***
(.478)
.412

Hard
.062*
(.035)
.251***
(.055)
-.235***
(.077)
.15
(.127)
.303***
(.088)
.371***
(.124)
.076***
(.029)
.149**
(.071)
.156
(.16)
.234*
(.12)
.226
(.157)
.237
(.188)
-1.916***
(.74)
.439
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SUR Results — Continued
Turkmenistan
UAE
USA
Yemen
Explanatory
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
A
-.006
.003
.036
-.109**
.038
.07**
.013
.041
Relative Income
(.099)
(.075)
(.064)
(.045)
(.044)
(.029)
(.105)
(.064)
.922***
.405***
-.378***
-.062
.403***
.16**
.271
.618***
Education
(.161)
(.117)
(.107)
(.077)
(.086)
(.064)
(.216)
(.119)
.026
-.234**
.358***
-.126*
-.171*
.073
.197
.126
Age
(.177)
(.117)
(.095)
(.07)
(.097)
(.067)
(.165)
(.12)
.78**
.325
.746*
1.617***
.477**
.41***
4.184***
.528
Female
(.324)
(.209)
(.418)
(.306)
(.198)
(.134)
(.603)
(.36)
B
-.181
.261*
.259**
.246***
-.074
.137
Voting
(.224)
(.142)
(.132)
(.094)
(.245)
(.174)
1.26***
.754***
.932
2.214***
2.488*
1.887**
Residence
(.366)
(.237)
(1.129)
(.779)
(1.341)
(.758)
C
-.172*
.037
-1.338***
-.082**
.01
.064
-.476***
-.375***
Religiosity
(.102)
(.072)
(.062)
(.038)
(.06)
(.04)
(.113)
(.065)
-.052
.215**
0.0
.163**
.188**
.138**
.122***
.203**
Dem & Shura
(.146)
(.091)
(.079)
(.063)
(.086)
(.054)
(.029)
(.087)
-.016
-.001
-.26*
-.114
.105
.084
-.572**
-.236
Religion & State
(.151)
(.096)
(.15)
(.091)
(.08)
(.057)
(.231)
(.156)
D
1.587***
.354**
.651***
-.193*
1.068***
.599***
.56**
.394**
Incumbents/Dem (.279)
(.179)
(.14)
(.101)
(.18)
(.105)
(.279)
(.174)
-.005
-.09
.115
.054
.184*
.21***
-.175
-.008
West/Dem
(.124)
(.076)
(.081)
(.065)
(.095)
(.058)
(.155)
(.097)
-.197
.725
-.755
-.323**
.351**
.553
-.552***
-.263**
Ulama/Dem
(.164)
(.711)
(.619)
(.163)
(.154)
(.439)
(.203)
(.105)
-.862***
-.546*** -1.34***
-1.12***
-1.238***
-1.514***
-.775***
-.678***
Constant
(.123)
(.078)
(.458)
(.273)
(.124)
(.395)
(.147)
(.22
2
R
.213
.234
.416
.276
.307
.345
.232
.234
* significant at the 0.1 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the .01 level. Standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for
heteroskedasticity. Given that I have no clear directional hypotheses for the effect of the variables, I use a two-tailed significance tests.

A= Demographics (relative income, level of education, age and gender).
B= Familiarity with Democracy through voting and residence in a democracy for a year or longer.
C= Islam’s affect through observing its rituals (religiosity), the compatibility of shura/mutual
consultation and democracy, and its ideological impact (Islam as religion and state).
D= Trust in Political Actors as Agents of Democratization (incumbents, the West, and
ulama/scholars).
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